After a contentious campaign that seemed
to focus more on nationalist sentiments than on pressing domestic
and security issues, South Koreans elected a new president, Roh Moo
Hyun, on December 19. Since then, North Korea has garnered the
spotlight with the resumption of its nuclear weapons programs. As
the United States addresses these developments, it must recognize
that the anti-American sentiment in the Republic of Korea (ROK) and
the provocative actions of North Korea are related. The solution to
both these problems lies in a strong, proactive leadership on both
sides of the Pacific.
On
the U.S. side, the Bush Administration should assure South Koreans
that America fully shares their security interests and sincerely
desires reconciliation on the Korean peninsula. It must also work
to educate Koreans and the world community that North Korea, and
not the United States, is responsible for North Korean threats and
dangerous actions. Washington should continue to work with Seoul to
formulate realistic policies that address South Korean concerns
over the U.S. military presence without compromising its
operational interests. And the Administration should ensure that
its officials here and abroad appropriately address Korean concerns
and sensitivities.
On
the South Korean side, Seoul should better articulate the
seriousness of the North Korean threat to its people. To strengthen
the sense of partnership in the U.S.-ROK alliance, Seoul should
also publicize the enduring importance of the alliance to both
countries if peaceful reconciliation on the Korean peninsula is to
be achieved.
Much
of the current ire against the United States concerns an accident
last June, when a U.S. armored vehicle participating in military
exercises struck two 14-year-old Korean girls as they walked along
a narrow village road. A U.S. military court ruled that the deaths
were accidental and acquitted the two U.S. servicemen driving the
vehicle of homicide charges. This ruling prompted an eruption of
demonstrations in South Korea and a protest vigil outside the White
House in Washington. The protests have now expanded to include
calls for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from South Korea
altogether.
The
media in Korea and the United States regularly offer vivid images
of protestors and anti-American slogans, but it would be wrong to
conclude from these images that the U.S.-ROK alliance is in danger.
While the current protests are a signal that there are differences
of opinion in some sectors of South Korean society regarding the
U.S. troop presence and Washington's polices toward North Korea,
neither Washington nor Seoul should overreact in ways that would
damage the long-standing U.S.-ROK alliance.
Although there have been increasing
incidents of violence against Americans, few South Koreans--even
those participating in demonstrations at the U.S. Embassy compound
in Seoul--support movements that advocate harm to the United States
or its citizens. Rather, the major source of anti-American
sentiment is the growing chasm between U.S. and South Korean
perceptions of the threat posed by North Korea. While Americans'
concern over the dangers presented by the North Korean regime have
been heightened recently by Pyongyang's dangerous game of nuclear
brinkmanship, South Koreans seem to fear that U.S. firmness in
response to North Korea's policies increases the possibility of war
on the peninsula.
The
differing threat perceptions between South Koreans and Americans
paradoxically serve to further North Korean interests. If not
quickly addressed by leaders in Seoul and Washington, the situation
could jeopardize South Korea's security and America's interests in
promoting peace and stability in Northeast Asia.
BILATERAL DIFFERENCES
Recent headlines both in South Korea and
in the United States portray a rising tide of anti-Americanism that
has raised concerns in Seoul and Washington, but anti-American
protests in South Korea are not new. Indeed, during the
half-century of the formal relationship between the United States
and the ROK, anti-American sentiments have flared up often.
Today, the increase in criticism of, and
dissatisfaction with, U.S. policies is rooted in the growing
differences between Americans and South Koreans over their
perceptions of North Korea. South Koreans view the threat from
North Korea as immediate and local. The United States sees North
Korea as a regional and global threat that requires a concerted
effort to end the North's production and proliferation of ballistic
missiles and terminate its nuclear weapons program.
From
the U.S. perspective, the North Korean threat is based on (1)
Pyongyang's insistence on a "military first" policy, despite mass
starvation of its people; (2) its illicit pursuit of nuclear
weapons, including its flagrant violation of four international and
bilateral agreements; (3) its proliferation of arms and missiles;
(4) its record of state-sponsored terrorism, including the
kidnapping of Japanese and other foreign citizens; (5) its
continued hostile military stance toward the South; (6) its
continued brutality toward its own people through widespread
violation of human rights; (7) its involvement in the international
drug trade and counterfeiting; and (8) its provocation of South
Korea and Japan by spy boats and intelligence agents.
South Koreans today view North Korea
differently. Despite the North's clinging to communist tenets, most
South Koreans think the Cold War is over. No longer are South
Koreans faced with the invincible Kim Il Sung of the past, whose
threatening actions and rhetoric often resoundingly justified South
Korea's security-first mentality. South Koreans today see in Kim
Jong Il a leader who smiles, makes agreements and promises, and
seems to be pursuing reforms in North Korea.
Moreover, South Korean citizens seem to be
satisfied with Kim Jong Il's promises, even though he has
consistently either broken them or failed to fulfill them. South
Koreans now feel a connection to what they see as poor, starving,
and weak brethren in North Korea. They are eager to grasp this as
the new reality on the peninsula--an unforeseen legacy of the June
2000 summit in Pyongyang that was part of President Kim Dae Jung's
Sunshine Policy effort. But North Korea remains a local and
immediate threat to South Korea.
Some
South Koreans view the United States as an obstacle to
reconciliation and reunification. They blame President George W.
Bush's principled stance against the North for slow progress in
inter-Korean rapprochement and the break in dialogue with
Pyongyang. This perception was exacerbated when President Bush
named North Korea as part of "the axis of evil" in his State of the
Union address in January 2002.
It
is clear from North Korean actions since late 2000 that Pyongyang,
not Washington, is responsible for the break in dialogue with the
South. Nevertheless, some South Koreans and the international media
overlook such realities and instead blame Washington for the
breakdown in talks, which contributes to anti-American
sentiments.
Negative South Korean views of U.S.
policies were further strengthened by the U.S. response to the
North's disclosure of an illicit nuclear program. South Koreans
regard the decision by the Korean Energy Development Organization
(KEDO) to suspend fuel aid to the North in order to pressure it to
end its nuclear programs as part of an American scheme to keep the
peninsula tense and divided.
This
is an incorrect assessment of America's intentions and actions.
Since the recent tensions caused by the nuclear program, President
Bush has made clear that Washington wants to find a peaceful,
diplomatic, nonmilitary resolution. The United States is rightly
standing firm in its refusal to enter into negotiations with North
Korea until Pyongyang ceases its nuclear programs.
It
is more accurate to characterize the Administration's stance prior
to the North's nuclear revelation as cautious and skeptical but
open to engagement. The Administration's skepticism about South
Korea's Sunshine Policy is, in the end, not very different from the
South Korean public's own discontent over the shortcomings of this
policy.
SOURCES OF ANTI-AMERICAN SENTIMENT
Changes in South Korean perceptions of the
North Korean threat are due in part to the desire to reap a "peace
dividend" from the end of the Cold War. South Koreans also are
psychologically tired of considering their brethren an enemy, even
though North Korea maintains military forces along the border with
the South. It is even more problematic for South Koreans to accept
that a regime so desperate that it allowed millions of its own
citizens to starve to death is a meaningful and menacing threat to
a country that is at least 50 times stronger economically.
Over
the past two decades, South Korea has undergone profound political,
economic, and social transformation. Politically, it is now one of
the most vibrant and thriving democracies in East Asia.
Economically, it has become a regional if not global powerhouse.
Socially, it has embraced globalization, perhaps more thoroughly
than any other Asian society. Thus, South Korea is adjusting to the
immense challenges that accompany such changes, including how to
reconcile national pride and achievements with lingering feelings
of inadequacy and dependency stemming from a long and bitter
Japanese colonial legacy.
The
newfound freedom of South Koreans to express their opinions and
their ability to pursue activities beyond mere economic survival
also help to explain the recent growth of anti-American sentiments.
Even those who have weak political motivation can now participate
in the political process, particularly due to the wide availability
and popularity of the Internet. The ability of people to express
their opposition to U.S. policies widely and graphically over the
Internet has contributed to the perceived rise in anti-American
sentiment.
Other observers attribute the increase in
resentment against the U.S. military presence to the fading of
Korean War memories, given that over 60 percent of the Korean
population was born after the war. Yet this argument carries less
weight when one considers that it is this younger generation, born
in the post-war period, who also exhibit stronger anti-Japanese
sentiment than their elders even though they are even farther
removed from the Japanese colonial period.
Therefore, it is likely that the increase
in resentment toward the United States has more to do with the
South's greatly diminished perception of the threat emanating from
the North, increased national pride, and the end of the Cold War.
Whereas the older generations tend to view the U.S. Forces Korea
(USFK) as a necessary part of the national security landscape,
surveys show that these tendencies tend to subside among those aged
40 years and younger, as well as among intellectuals.
The
implications for U.S. policy are significant. If the United States
perceives that South Korea is increasingly anti-American and no
longer welcomes the U.S. military presence, then it may reconsider
its forward troop presence and perhaps even reassess the entire
alliance. This is even more likely if the American people and
Congress, who may fail to appreciate the nuances of South Korean
domestic politics, begin to share that perception.
THE ADMINISTRATION'S NEXT STEPS
Considering North Korean actions and South
Korean sentiments, the Bush Administration must take immediate and
direct action to shore up the crucial U.S.-ROK alliance. This means
making efforts to convey a sense of commitment and priority with
respect to issues of concern to the South Korean people.
Specifically, the Administration should
take immediate steps to:
1) Ensure that South Koreans understand the
security interests shared by Seoul and Washington, particularly the
nuclear threat posed by North Korea
While the Administration should not interfere in the
South's domestic political process, it should work to build support
across the political spectrum for continuing the U.S. military
presence in South Korea.
The Administration, the U.S. Ambassador to
Seoul, and key leaders of the U.S. military forces in the South
must take measured and coordinated steps to continually market the
rationale behind the U.S. presence. They should endeavor to do this
alongside their South Korean partners. Successful U.S. policies
require the endorsement of the majority of South Koreans as well as
of the government. Leaders of the country's major political parties
should be encouraged to refrain from making the U.S.-ROK alliance a
political issue.
2) Continue to work with Seoul to
formulate realistic and prudent policies that address Korean
concerns regarding the U.S. military presence
In the long term, for example, the Administration should
continue to reduce the American footprint on the peninsula while
improving military training opportunities and combat power. These
can be modeled after the highly successful Land-Partnership Program
achieved in 2002.
In the short term, the Pentagon should consider
the implementation of policies that would immediately reduce the
chances of future training accidents. The U.S. armed forces, for
example, should refrain wherever possible from conducting exercises
in training areas that are located within populated civilian areas.
When military personnel must be mobilized and moved through these
areas, this should be done under escort, perhaps by South Korean
police, in a non-tactical manner or by administrative convoys. The
U.S. military should provide and ensure escorts for the convoys and
ensure that South Korean and U.S. military police monitor all roads
and other travel routes to protect the civilian population.
3) Launch an
aggressive media and public relations campaign to educate both
South Koreans and Americans on the facts of the SOFA (Status of
Forces Agreement) and other specific aspects of the U.S.-ROK
bilateral treaty
Both South Koreans and Americans suffer from a lack of
knowledge about the contributions by both sides to the alliance and
the U.S. force presence. Incorrect or false information contributes
to the negative emotions on both sides and feeds a mutual sense of
lack of appreciation.
For example, many Americans assume that the
United States government pays for the full cost of stationing and
maintaining 37,000 U.S. troops in Korea. In reality, the ROK
government contributes almost 50 percent of non-personnel
stationing costs for U.S. forces in South Korea.
On the South Korean side, the military accident
in June precipitated calls for a revision of the SOFA. These calls
are grounded in a mistaken belief that the agreement's allegedly
unfair terms allowed the U.S. military to avert all responsibility.
In reality, the terms of the bilaterally negotiated SOFA benefit
both sides by respecting the legal systems of both countries.
For example, most South Koreans believe that
the U.S. Forces Korea has jurisdiction over every SOFA-status
person who commits a crime in South Korea. This is untrue. In 2001,
82 percent of all crimes committed by USFK personnel in South Korea
were subject to South Korean jurisdiction. This high percentage
confirms U.S. respect for South Korean sovereignty and judicial
processes.
Many South Koreans also believe that the
supposedly unfair terms of the SOFA arrangement allowed the USFK
exclusive jurisdiction over the investigation and trial of U.S.
military personnel involved in the accident in June. In reality,
however, even South Korean soldiers are never tried by civilian
courts. Thus, for example, if the driver or track commander of the
June incident had been a South Korean soldier, he would have been
tried by the Korean military court-martial, not the civilian
criminal courts. The fact is that in ROK government agreements with
other countries where a South Korean military force may be present,
the ROK military maintains exclusive jurisdiction over its
personnel. This is an advantage that the U.S. does not even enjoy
in its SOFA with South Korea.
4) Encourage U.S.
officials be more sensitive to the emotionalism and volatility of
public sentiments in Korea
The United States should avoid making seemingly minor but
in reality costly errors, such as delaying its sincere and public
expression of regret over tragedies like the schoolgirl deaths in
June.
CONCLUSION
The
politicization of anti-American sentiments in South Korea has
caused undue distraction from the close cooperation and
coordination that is required to address the North Korean threat.
Neither the United States nor South Korea should overreact to the
emotionalism that is overshadowing other pressing non-security
issues, including the downturn in the global economy and a possible
consumer credit bubble in South Korea's economy.
Although the intensity of the
anti-American protests may be disconcerting, they should not be
seen as a signal that the alliance should be terminated. South
Koreans are expressing their frustration over specific events and
what they perceive to be divergent U.S. and South Korean national
interests.
Conflicts will inevitably arise as the
U.S.-ROK relationship adjusts to the domestic and international
political realities in the post-September 11 security environment.
If the mutually beneficial alliance relationship is to be
sustained, both sides must improve their understanding of the
security threats and the origins of anti-American sentiments in
South Korea. And they must take steps to address those sentiments
in the near term in order to ensure the future vitality of the
alliance.
This
year marks the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Mutual
Security Treaty. Both countries should use this important milestone
both to honor their relationship as one of the most successful
bilateral alliances in their respective histories and to ensure
that their citizens understand its importance and the need for it
to continue.
Balbina
Y. Hwang is Policy Analyst for Northeast Asia in the Asian
Studies Center at The Heritage Foundation.