Establishing personal retirement accounts
within Social Security does not require any changes in Social
Security's Disability Insurance program. Even though both that
program and Social Security's retirement program use the same
benefit formula, it would be relatively simple to create a separate
formula for each program.
Similarly, it is a mistake to assume that
current law would allow the disability program to continue to pay
all of the promised benefits indefinitely. Just like Social
Security's retirement program, the disability program is financed
by a trust fund that will eventually run out of money. At that
point, existing law requires it to reduce disability payments to
the amount that can be financed by the taxes that it receives.
Current law does not allow for automatic tax increases or any other
way to pay full benefits.
The Troubled
Disability Insurance Program
The Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program
paid about $71.4 billion in benefits to about 5.3 million disabled
workers and 1.6 million spouses and dependent children in calendar
year 2002. Like the Social Security retirement program, SSDI is
funded by an explicit payroll tax. The first 0.85 percent of the
7.65 percent Social Security tax collected from the employer and a
matching amount from the employee (1.70 percent total) goes into
SSDI's trust fund and is kept separate from funds used to pay
retirement and survivors insurance benefits.
SSDI, however, faces serious fiscal
problems and operational challenges. The Social Security Trustees
have reported that the Disability Insurance trust fund will be
exhausted in 2028. Current law allows the fund to borrow money from
the retirement and survivors insurance trust fund, which could
extend its life until about 2041, but the retirement and survivors
program also faces chronic funding problems. In 2001, the U.S.
General Accounting Office (GAO) estimated that keeping the program
operating through 2073 would require a 50 percent increase in the
SSDI tax rate.
Changing the
Retirement Program Could Affect SSDI
Monthly SSDI benefits are determined using the same formula that
Social Security uses to calculate retirement benefits. Thus,
changing the formula to strengthen the retirement program would
also affect disability payments. Similarly, changing the annual
cost-of-living-adjustment (COLA) formula or speeding up the already
mandated change in the full retirement age to 67 would also reduce
disability payments unless Congress explicitly exempts SSDI from
those changes. Moreover, because disabled adult children of
retirees receive benefits through the retirement program, not SSDI,
any changes in government-paid retirement benefits would affect
them. To avoid affecting their benefits, this group of individuals
could be moved into SSDI.
GAO's Misleading
Report
In a January 2001 analysis, Social Security Reform:
Potential Effects on SSA's Disability Programs and Beneficiaries,
the GAO asserted that several Social Security reform plans that
include personal retirement accounts could inadvertently reduce
disability benefits. But this conclusion is misleading. A closer
reading of the report shows that the reform plans would actually
offer higher benefits to the disabled than they could receive under
the current program because, under current law, Social Security
will cease to pay full benefits around 2041 when the trust funds
become insolvent. However, the reform plans would provide funding
to ensure that those benefits continue.
Among the reform proposals examined by the
GAO were bills introduced during the 106th Congress, including a
bipartisan Senate bill (S. 1383), the bipartisan Kolbe-Stenholm
plan (H.R. 1793), and several non-legislative plans including one
suggested by Representative Clay Shaw (R-FL) and another proposed
by former President Bill Clinton. The GAO report suggests that
certain of these reform plans would reduce lifetime disability
benefits by 4.2 percent to 17.7 percent. However, the GAO compared
these reform plans to a nonexistent option that assumed that
payroll taxes would automatically increase when SSDI needs more
money. Eventually, those taxes would climb by 50 percent. In
reality, current law prohibits increasing taxes, meaning that SSDI
could not pay full benefits after about 2041.
Instead of reducing lifetime disability
benefits as the GAO estimates, the reform plans would increase
lifetime benefits over those provided by current law by as much as
25 percent to 45 percent. Once SSDI's trust fund runs out, current
law requires the program to reduce benefits automatically to a
level that can be financed from SSDI taxes. Even though the GAO
appears to say that the reform plans would hurt SSDI recipients,
doing nothing would result in even greater SSDI benefit
reductions.
The
GAO correctly points out that changing government-paid retirement
benefit formulas without retaining the existing formula for SSDI
benefits would reduce disability payments. It also correctly states
that a legislated change in annual COLAs would have the long-term
effect of reducing disability benefits. However, the existing
formula could easily be retained--a remedy that avoids the
unintended consequences of reform noted by the GAO. Reformers
therefore should:
- Avoid confusing
the programs when discussing reforms. The measures needed
to reform the Social Security retirement program are very different
from those needed to preserve SSDI. Legislation dealing with one
should leave the other untouched.
- Exempt SSDI from
benefit changes. Retirement reform bills should explicitly
exempt SSDI from any changes in benefit formulas. This is best
accomplished by setting up a separate benefit formula for each
program. SSDI would continue to use the current benefit formula,
while the retirement program would use a new one.
- Avoid unintended
consequences. Speeding up the increase in the full
retirement age to 67 or legislatively reducing COLAs would both
affect SSDI benefits. If reformers insist on including such
features in their plans, SSDI recipients should be exempted from
the changes.
Conclusion
Creating a Social Security retirement reform bill without
touching SSDI would be fairly simple. Although the fiscal problems
of the disability program also require attention, this effort
should be kept separate from legislation reforming Social
Security's retirement programs. The GAO's misleading 2001 report
that certain reforms could affect SSDI merely proves that the
program has serious fiscal problems. The report should serve to
caution reformers on avoiding unintended consequences.
David C. John is Research Fellow in
Social Security and Financial Institutions in the Thomas A. Roe
Institute for Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage
Foundation.