Senate
appropriators are rightly concerned with attempts by certain
members of Congress to curtail critical nuclear national security
programs by amending pending "energy development" appropriations
legislation.
The House already
only partially fulfilled the Administration's funding request for
research toward understanding the role of nuclear weapons in
today's changing world.
Decreasing these
funds even further would seriously inhibit America's ability to
transform its Cold War nuclear arsenal into one more appropriate
for the 21st century.
A Nuclear Force for
the 21st Century
The United States
must develop a nuclear arsenal that adequately reflects the modern
world. The U.S. maintains a Cold War nuclear arsenal, despite the
following developments over the past 12 years:
- The Cold War has
ended,
- Russia has taken
control of the Soviet nuclear arsenal and agreed to drastic
reductions in strategic arms,
- China has begun
a nuclear modernization program,
- India and
Pakistan have tested nuclear weapons, and
- Nations like
Iran and North Korea have edged closer to becoming nuclear
states.
All this in
addition to Al-Qaeda's demonstration that America's adversaries are
willing and capable of inflicting mass casualties on U.S. soil.
It is time to
reevaluate the role of nuclear weapons in national security policy,
especially the utility of low-yield tactical nuclear weapons.
Traditionally, these weapons have been necessary to counter an
adversary with very large land forces that could overrun America's
more expeditionary forces. While this requirement endures, tactical
nuclear weapons may also be the best way to address the new set of
threats.
New Battlefield Conditions
A tactical nuclear
force, for example, would counter any battlefield advantage an
adversary may gain from striking U.S. and allied forces with
weapons of mass destruction and thus deter an adversary from using
such weapons. An enemy leader may not fear America's
conventional response to the use of such weapons, believing that
his forces could withstand or defeat the United States. Indeed, his
use of chemical or biological weapons may be central to his
strategy.
The United States
finds itself in a unique historical position where it actually
cares more about the local populations of adversarial states then
its own leaders do. The result is that any threat to
retaliate with a strategic nuclear weapons loses credibility
because the an enemy leader may calculate that the United States
would not kill millions of innocent civilians do to his
actions.
The flexibility
that would result from introducing smaller nuclear weapons into the
strategic equation will increase deterrence by giving added
credibility to America's arsenal. Arguably, this is precisely
what happened in the first Gulf War. During that conflict,
the Bush Administration purposefully gave the impression that any
use of chemical or biological weapons by Saddam Hussein may result
in a tactical nuclear response.
Low-Yield Tactical
Options
There are emerging
battlefield requirements that may require a tactical nuclear
response. For example, America's application of information
technology has given it unprecedented advantages on the
battlefield. With precision-guided munitions, the U.S. armed forces
are able to target almost anything, anywhere, at any time.
America's enemies will adapt to this advantage by placing their
troops, weapons, command and control, and other combat elements
underground. Until adequate conventional weapons and/or forces can
be developed to destroy these underground targets, the United
States must explore a low-yield tactical nuclear option.
Then there is the
problem of proliferating biological facilities.
Research may demonstrate that low-yield nuclear weapons are the
best way to target large, underground biological-weapons production
facilities. Unlike a conventional bomb, which may destroy the
facility but could spread the biological agent, a nuclear device
would incinerate the agent as well. Although the possibility
of spreading radioactive material and long-term contamination are
legitimate concerns, it would be irresponsible for the Pentagon to
identify these emerging targets without conducting a comprehensive
investigation into how to address them.
Critics have
argued that a nuclear device would simply replace the chemical or
biological agent with radiation. This is not necessarily true.
First, a two-kiloton weapon engineered to minimize fallout used in
an unpopulated region would clearly have far less secondary impact
on surrounding populations then a 350-kiloton weapon. To
further reduce the negative secondary effects of a nuclear
explosion, the weapons could perhaps be engineered to burrow into
the ground before detonation, thereby containing the radiation
below ground.
Finally, the
explosion itself can be engineered to reduce the harmful radiation
that is normally associated with a nuclear explosion. Research,
however, is required to establish whether any of this is viable as
well as identifying how long there would -- if at all -- be
ground contamination. Even if the Pentagon would conclude that a
new family of nuclear weapons were appropriate for this emerging
target set, it would likely be necessary to conduct nuclear and
non-nuclear testing to assure that these weapons are safe,
reliable, and effective before any such weapon were fielded.
Funding the Research
While nuclear
capabilities will continue to serve as a deterrent in a world where
biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons are proliferating at a
dangerous pace, the United States must pursue advanced concepts
research to ensure that the weapons complex can provide credible
nuclear deterrence options in the post Cold War era.
The Bush
Administration has requested essential levels of funding for
feasibility studies that would begin to define the role that
nuclear weapons should play in the 21st century. Congress should
meet, or exceed, those funding requests.