There is a danger in the European
constitutional process for transatlantic relations and American
interests because the fine print of European agreements often
determines outcomes of which few of its participants are aware. The
process, scheduled for approval by the various European governments
at the Brussels summit on December 13, 2003, was originally
de-signed to make the European Union (EU) political system more
transparent and understandable to the average European citizen.
Whatever the outcome of the process, however, it is already
apparent that this goal has not been met.
Consisting of over 440 articles and
written in an incomprehensible style, the constitution will surely
not further endear the EU to its citizens. At the same time,
though, the importance of the constitutional process cannot be
denied. For instance, the constitutional settlement on defense will
directly affect the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO),
defense issues among European member states, and thus all major
transatlantic foreign and defense policy decisions. Therefore, the
Bush Administration must inject clarity into the debate on issues
of primary concern for U.S.-EU relations, particularly in the area
of security policy, which is covered by the European Security and
Defense Policy (ESDP).
The
U.S. should make it clear to the EU that it will support the ESDP
only if NATO remains the primary transatlantic security
organization. NATO must continue to have first right of refusal for
any proposed military mission before the ESDP is activated, leading
to European military action. Further, the ESDP must not lead to
either duplication of NATO assets or competition with the alliance
for strategic primacy. By laying down markers and making its own
policy goals crystal clear, the United States can ensure that areas
of potential disagreement lurking in the EU constitution do not
poison the already endangered transatlantic alliance.
Common Foreign Policy Simply Not in the
Cards
The
EU constitutional process has only now begun to outline the future
of a Common European Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It is
highly unlikely that the constitutional process will result in an
integrated European foreign policy--a reality that ought to be
welcomed by Washington as it allows the U.S. to work with a greater
number of committed European partners.
Specifically, there is no evidence that
individual European states are willing to abandon their national
interests and sign on to a European process that would lead to
majority voting on matters of high politics regarding foreign
policy. (This would mean that EU member states would be willing to
give up their veto in Brussels on foreign policy issues.) The
national interests of the individual member states remain the basis
for their respective foreign policies and are likely to do so into
the indefinite future.
Things become far murkier, however, on the
defense side of the equation. The result may well be to paralyze
defense policymaking in Europe, making the EU a dragging anchor on
U.S. security policy.
The Vague Question of a Common Defense
Policy
Like
a vampire, European federalist efforts to establish a European
defense identity that is separate from and in competition with NATO
continue to rise from the dead. Berlin-Plus, the March 17,
2003, agreement between the U.S. and the EU member states, was
designed to resolve definitively the questions of compatibility
between the ESDP and NATO.
Berlin-Plus sought to avoid the
unnecessary duplication of transatlantic resources and had four
elements: It assured EU access to NATO operational planning; it
made NATO capabilities and assets available to the EU; it made the
Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (always a European) also
commander of any EU-led operations; and it adapted the NATO defense
planning system to allow for EU-run operations. This commonsense
agreement has now been called into question by Franco-German
efforts to set up a wholly separate EU headquarters and planning
structure.
Berlin-Plus allowed for greater alliance
flexibility and was successfully put to the test in the EU-led
mission to Macedonia. While the U.S. should not be forced to
participate militarily in every transatlantic mission, America
should allow the European allies to act alone using NATO assets if
Washington does not object.
As
the case of Macedonia amply illustrates, that should have been
that. During the height of European opposition to the U.S. stance
on Iraq, however, France, Germany, Belgium, and Luxembourg reopened
the question, in effect calling Berlin-Plus into doubt. They
advocated the establishment of an independent EU military
headquarters in Tervuren, Belgium, with an independent planning
capacity.
Beyond the obvious operational drawback of
such an institutional arrangement, which would lead to unnecessary
duplication with NATO, the political ramifications of such an
outcome are clear: It is the institutional expression of French
political desires to lessen the American role in Europe. Ambassador
Nicholas Burns, U.S. representative to NATO, rightly sounded the
alarm, calling such an outcome "the greatest threat to the future
of the alliance."
It
is this threat that the European constitutional process has been
designed to resolve. While the EU constitution does not formally
address establishment of an independent EU military headquarters,
the two issues emerged simultaneously and have since effectively
merged. Thanks to the tireless efforts of British Prime Minister
Tony Blair, another plan has been put forward to heal the rift
threatening the NATO alliance. Under its terms, the EU will
establish its own military planning cell, located within NATO
headquarters in Brussels.
Accordingly, the French Gaullist
initiative has been significantly watered down. Instead of working
through the planning cell as a separate entity, EU officers will
work from NATO's existing headquarters. Belgium, France, Germany,
and Luxembourg had pressed for a full-blown EU military
headquarters that would function independently of existing
structures.
Critically, the Blair government steered
the compromise so that the ESDP will work on projects only when
NATO decides not to intervene in a crisis, and NATO retains the
first right of refusal in a crisis situation. As with the
Berlin-Plus agreement, the EU will continue to be allowed to draw
on NATO assets--but only if the alliance as a whole approves,
giving the U.S. a de facto veto over the process. What is most
important for the United States is that, while there is an EU
planning unit, the EU will not possess a separate headquarters for
the ESDP process.
The Last, Best Chance for Transatlantic
Diplomatic Peace
To
safeguard American interests, the Bush Administration should:
1. Make it clear that
the U.S. views the EU constitutional process as more than merely a
tidying-up exercise for existing European agreements, particularly
regarding defense issues.
The President should make it clear not only
that the outcome of the convention is entirely up to the EU member
states, but also that it will change political relationships, both
within the EU and between the EU and the U.S. For example, the
United States would view any attempt to make the ESDP a rival to
NATO or to do away with the veto of individual states on foreign
policy issues as highly detrimental to the transatlantic
relationship.
2. Accept the
NATO-ESDP compromise worked out during the EU constitutional
process, but only if it articulates clear operational lines of
control.
As it retains the key elements of Berlin-Plus,
the new European agreement crafted by Prime Minister Blair can be
accepted by the United States on three conditions.
First, in the words of Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld, "I am confident that things will sort through in a
way that we can have an arrangement that isn't duplicative or
competitive of NATO." As NATO Secretary General
Lord George Robertson has pointed out, "One thousand operational
planners are already available in [Supreme Headquarters Allied
Powers Europe] headquarters." What is needed are not
further architectural changes in the transatlantic military
alliance, but greater capability on the part of the European allies
in terms of a greater emphasis on computerized weapons,
communications, lift, logistics, and intelligence.
From NATO's 19 member states, excluding the
United States, only 55,000 troops are deployed abroad out of a
staggering 1.4 million people in uniform. As a senior European
defense official recently said, "there are far too many European
colonels who have never commanded anyone running Brussels, and far
too few deployable troops. Everyone knows this." The duplication of precious
resources does nothing to rectify this fundamental problem.
Second, after the failure of Berlin-Plus, the
United States must undertake to receive concrete assurances from
the European allies that NATO remains the preeminent transatlantic
security institution. The operational expression of this political
point is that the U.S. should condition its support for the new
compromise on NATO's retaining the first right of refusal to act in
any European crisis.
Third, the U.S. must clearly express its
continued strenuous opposition to the formation of a separate EU
headquarters, which would exist only to compete with NATO. As
Secretary Rumsfeld stated, "Our policy is very clear: that we
strongly support NATO as the primary forum for transatlantic
defense. We support ESDP that is NATO friendly." This clear strategic view
must guide the overall American reaction to any EU constitutional
defense initiative.
3. Make it clear
that, with the U.S. acceptance of the ESDP plan as formulated
around the EU constitutional settlement, the U.S. regards the issue
as closed.
The Bush Administration must be careful not to
fall into a pattern of continuing to make concessions on ESDP, only
to have subsequent "agreements" nullified by the European partners,
who will then ask for further concessions. The United States cannot
sit idly by while creeping Gaullist attempts undermine NATO in
order to build up the ESDP as a rival to the alliance.
The United States must clearly articulate that
other approaches would be highly destructive to the NATO alliance.
By laying down such a marker, the Bush Administration can measure
subsequent European diplomatic initiatives in a clear and effective
manner.
Conclusion
The
European experiment has always been driven by the process of
functionalism, of obscuring policy goals and not making clear the
genuine direction of the EU in order to foster internal political
consensus. While such an approach succeeded brilliantly on economic
issues, it is impossible to use the same modus operandi when
dealing with foreign and security policy. These issues require a
degree of clarity that leads to definite policy positions (i.e.,
one chooses to intervene in a country or not) in a manner entirely
different from that applied to economic issues.
The
United States must therefore make its position clear on European
constitutional foreign and defense policy initiatives; otherwise,
the constitution's fine print on foreign and security affairs could
weaken NATO, which remains a primary American interest.
While European states have the right to
work out whatever internal political relationship they prefer, the
U.S. must emphasize that actions have consequences and that a more
federal, centralized European defense could lead to a diminution of
NATO. This, in turn, would tragically affect the transatlantic
relationship.
John C. Hulsman,
Ph.D., is Research Fellow in European Affairs in the
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies
at The Heritage Foundation.