In a direct
parallel to legislative mistakes that helped to create the savings
and loan crisis of the 1980s, the recent Senate bipartisan
agreement on H.R. 3108, the Pension Fund Equity Act, places
corporate interests above those of the taxpayer. The agreement
between Sens. Chuck Grassley (R-IA), Max Baucus (D-MT), Judd Gregg
(R-NH), and Edward Kennedy (D-MA) would make it much more likely
that billions of dollars of taxpayer money will end up bailing out
underfunded corporate pension plans.
Uncontroversial House language
As passed by the
House last year, H.R. 3108 was limited to a minor, but important,
change in the way that a pension plan's ability to pay future
benefits are calculated. A provision that expired at the end of
2003 had required that the plans use up to 120 percent of the
weighted average of the thirty-year treasury bond yield to
determine if the plan was properly funded. However, the Treasury
Department stopped issuing thirty-year bonds several years ago, and
the House legislation replaced that index with another keyed to the
yield on corporate bonds for a two-year period. During those two
years, Congress is supposed to decide if the new measure should be
made permanent or replaced by another.
The House language
has been endorsed by the Administration as a first step towards
their long term proposal of last year. This proposal is by far the
most comprehensive approach to the problem of properly valuing
defined benefit pension plans.
The Senate special
interest agreement
The House
provision is relatively uncontroversial, and the Senate should drop
its agreement and just approve the House-passed language instead.
Unfortunately, the Senate agreement adds special interest
provisions that allow certain underfunded pension plans to avoid
making additional payments in order to fully pay for their pension
promises. Instead, they would only have to make 20 percent of the
needed additional contribution in 2004, and 40 percent in 2005.
Airline and steel
pension plans would automatically qualify for this relief, as would
plans run by a railway workers union and some smaller businesses.
Companies in other industries could apply to the Secretary of the
Treasury for equal relief, and only the worst funded would fail to
qualify. Finally, in a spectacular example of Congress picking
winners and losers, the Senate agreement rewards Greyhound Lines,
Inc., a bus company, for its lobbying skill by declaring that its
pension plan is better funded than it actually is. If it is allowed
to remain in the bill, this extremely dangerous exception to the
rules is likely to be only the first example of Congress fiddling
with pension accounting rules for political reasons.
Setting the stage for a taxpayer
bailout of PBGC
The taxpayer is
likely to pick up the cost for these special interest provisions.
Already, the agency that insures this type of pension plan, the
Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation (PBGC), is seriously
underfunded. According to numbers released earlier this month, the
agency is running a record $11.2 billion deficit. That number could
climb to $85.5 billion if all of the pension plans that could
"reasonably" be expected to fail did so.
By allowing
companies to avoid funding their pension plans' deficits, the
Senate agreement makes it likely that taxpayers will have to pick
up that liability. The sad fact is that many companies that qualify
for the funding holiday will be in just as poor shape in 2006. The
delay is likely to end with their plans running even higher funding
deficits. And once they turn their even more underfunded plans over
to PBGC, that agency will be further down the road to an inevitable
taxpayer-funded multi-billion dollar bailout.
PBGC insures the
pensions of about 44 million Americans. As its deficits mount,
Congress will be faced with the choice to either allow retired
workers to lose pensions they have earned or to pump billions of
dollars of taxpayer money into PBGC to make up the difference. No
one seriously believes that Congress will renege on PBGC's
guarantees, and the Senate pension agreement will do nothing more
than to increase the amount that taxpayers will have to
provide.
To make matters
worse, individual workers could also suffer from a PBGC bailout.
Already, workers' pensions tend to be reduced when the plan is
turned over to PBGC. As part of a congressional bailout, these
benefits are likely to be reduced even further.
Repeating mistakes
that caused the S&L bailout
Twenty years ago,
Congress faced a funding crisis in the savings and loan industry by
allowing S&Ls to declare that they had more assets than they
actually did. Congress also passed provisions that gave even more
undeserved benefits to specific companies that had the lobbying
muscle to get that language hidden in bills. Those S&L bills
used the same oblique ways of identifying the lucky recipient as
the Senate pension agreement.
Even after
receiving special treatment, the savings and loan industry began to
run massive deficits that resulted in a bailout that cost ordinary
taxpayers hundreds of billions of dollars. While a less "generous"
Congress would have seen companies fail earlier, the cost to the
taxpayer would have been much less.
As the American
philosopher George Santayana noted, "Those who cannot remember the
past are doomed to repeat it." The Senate pension agreement repeats
the mistakes that caused the savings and loan bailout. If Congress
approves the Senate pension agreement and President Bush signs it
into law, the stage will be set for a massive taxpayer-funded
bailout of PBGC that could have cost much less.
David C. John
is Research Fellow in Social Security and Financial Institutions in
the Thomas A. Roe Institute for Economic Policy Studies at The
Heritage Foundation.