Overview
Judicial candidates should be evaluated on
their legal merits, but diversity issues often arise in the
selection process. In the interest of fairness, more women and
minorities have been appointed to the bench in recent years than in
any previous time in American history. What effects have these
judges had on the administration of justice? Do they mete out
longer sentences overall? Do minority judges issue harsher
sentences to white offenders than their white counterparts? Are
they harder on minority offenders?
This
paper analyzes Pennsylvania sentencing data from 1998 to determine
the effects of the races and genders of offenders and judges on
judicial sentencing. It attempts to evaluate whether, or how, the
race or gender of judges makes a difference in severity of
sentencing. For example, do minority judges sentence minorities
differently than white judges sentence white offenders?
Using a Tobit regression model and
controlling for such factors as the sentence recommended by the
Pennsylvania sentencing guidelines showed that black judges handed
down longer incarceration sentences than white judges. Further,
although white judges did not tend to sentence black offenders any
more severely than they did white offenders, black judges did tend
to sentence black offenders to longer prison terms than white
judges gave to white offenders.
This
may stem from higher victimization rates in the black community.
Black judges simply may be more sensitive to the plight of the
victims. Nevertheless, generalizing these sentencing patterns to
judges in other states should be done only with caution, because
the Pennsylvania guidelines allow judges more discretion in
crafting sentences than is allowed by the guidelines in most other
states.
BACKGROUND
For
several decades, researchers have studied the determinants of
sentencing. In particular, sentencing outcomes in Pennsylvania, for
which the data are widely available, have been well studied. However, with the
exception of one other published study, most of this research has focused on
the effect that offender-related legal and extralegal factors may
have on sentencing outcomes. Departing from the majority of this
literature, this analysis introduces variables to control for the
characteristics of judges.
Given the importance of selecting judges,
what are the effects of adding more minority and women judges on
the administration of justice? While judicial candidates should be
evaluated on their legal merits, diversity issues often dominate
the political discourse of the judicial selection process. In
particular, this paper analyzes the effects of the races and
genders of offenders and judges on judicial sentencing. Does the
interaction of the races of the judges and offenders yield
different sentencing outcomes? For example, do minority judges
sentence minorities differently than white judges sentence white
offenders?
Some
have proposed that adding minorities to the bench will have
noticeable outcomes on criminal processing, especially to reduce
disparities in sentencing. Some have proposed that black judges,
because of their more liberal views, would be more sympathetic to
offenders than white judges. "If black judges are responsive to the
black community," says one study, "then, one would expect them to
be less likely to exhibit discrimination against defendants by
sentencing them as harshly."
Differences between the sentences by
female and male judges have been attributed to speculation that
women are more likely to have liberal political views; thus, women
judges will be more lenient in their sentencing decisions than male
judges. Several
studies have controlled for judges' characteristics to determine
whether judicial decisions are rendered differently by race,
ethnicity, gender, and other variables. Most notably, these studies have
generally found small differences related to the race of the judge
and sentencing outcomes.
Theories of Judicial Discretion
Sentencing decisions involving judges are
not isolated events. Judges interact with prosecutors and defense
counsels, and sentences are often a product of the plea-bargaining
process. Depending on court norms, judges may or may not play a
major role in the plea-bargaining process. Further, sentence
recommendations from prosecutors are often influential.
Research on sentencing emerged during the
1960s and initially used labeling and conflict theories to
interpret sentencing disparities. Alternative explanations did not
develop because researchers were interested only in uncovering
discrimination while neglecting the influence of such legal factors
as criminal history and the plea-bargaining process. Today, two
prominent theories of judicial discretion are the structural
organizational approach and "focal concerns" theory.
Structural
Organizational Approach. The structural organizational
approach recognizes the role of rational choice in decision making
and provides a useful model for understanding judicial
discretion. The
rational model assumes that a decision maker (1) accurately defines
the problem, (2) reviews all possible alternatives and accurately
identifies the outcomes associated with each alternative, and (3)
chooses the best alternative after weighing each one's benefits and
costs.
In
practice, the rational process of decision makers is not so
clear-cut. Rather than weighing all possible alternatives, time
constraints limit decision makers to considering only a few
alternatives. Further, the rational model is too demanding because
knowledge about potential outcomes is often fragmentary or even
unattainable. Applying the rational model to judicial discretion is
problematic because the judicial actors do not have a perfect
knowledge of an offender's future offenses.
While the rational model has drawbacks,
the study of administrative behavior provides an important
framework for understanding the decision-making processes used by
judicial actors.
The late Herbert A. Simon, 1978 Nobel Laureate in Economics,
acknowledged that "human behavior is intently rational, but only
boundedly so."
Thus, "In making administrative decisions, it is continually
necessary to choose factual premises whose truth or falsehood is
not definitely known and cannot be determined with certainty with
the information and time available for reaching the decision." Decision makers use
"simple rules of thumb that do not make impossible demands upon
their capacity for thought." In the end, they engage in "bounded
rationality," where the chosen alternative is satisfactory or "good
enough" given the circumstances.
Further, "in the situation of having
incomplete knowledge, the actor attempts to reduce uncertainty by
relying upon a rationality that is the product of habit and social
structure."
"[O]rganizational arrangements such as established operating
procedures, a division of labor, a hierarchy of authority, formal
channels of communication, professional training and, finally,
indoctrination" can compensate for the limits of rational decision
making. Decision
makers attempt to reach "a measure of rationality by developing
`patterned responses' that serve to avoid, or at least, reduce
uncertainty in obtaining a desired outcome." Decision making is then based on a
limited search of information that resembles "satisficing" rather
than searching for optimal solutions. In the context of sentencing, judges
consider both the offender's danger to society and the likelihood
that he or she will commit future offenses as inputs into
sentencing decisions.
Judicial discretion is likely to be
influenced by uncertainty avoidance because judges have incomplete
knowledge about the likelihood of future offending by those who
appear before their courts. Uncertainty is related to offender
characteristics, the disposition process, and punishment.
Case
information is relevant to reducing uncertainty about recidivism. Judges process
information about offenders in order to determine the likelihood of
future offending. Thus, the severity of sentences for offenders
regarded as more likely to continue their criminal activity may be
greater than those imposed on offenders regarded as less likely to
recidivate. Detected disparities in sentencing based on extralegal
factors may be a product of bounded rationality, not racial
prejudice.
Focal Concerns
Theory. Focal concerns theory is very similar to bounded
rationality in that judges have limited information, so they use
substantively rational criteria in their decision process. These criteria are
(1) the blameworthiness of the offender, (2) community protection,
and (3) the practical consequences of judicial decisions for
organizations and individuals. These criteria potentially allow for
disparities in sentencing outcomes.
- Blameworthiness is established in the law
and associated with retribution. The offender's potential
punishment escalates according to culpability and the gravity of
the harm done.
- Concern for community protection causes
judicial actors to contemplate the necessity of incapacitation to
avoid future crimes, general deterrence, and the potential
rehabilitation of the offender. A prior criminal history can increase
the perceptions of blameworthiness and risk of recidivism.
- The practical consequences of judicial
decisions for organizations and individuals affect sentencing
outcomes. Organizational consequences include managing working
relationships among court actors, guaranteeing the uninterrupted
progression of cases, and being cognizant of correctional
resources. Practical consequences relating to the individual
offender that may sway judicial decisions include the potential
effects of the sentence on the offender and the offender's
family. In
addition, court actors may consider the likely impact of future
crimes by the offender on the public's assessment of the court and
their careers .
Focal concerns theory is similar to the
structural organizational approach in that judges "confront the
goal of protecting the public and preventing recidivism in the
context of high uncertainty about the offenders' future
behavior." Thus,
predictions about the dangerousness of the offender are influenced
by attributions predicted with respect to the nature of the crime,
case information, the offender's criminal history, and potentially
other background characteristics of the offender such as drug
abuse, education, employment, family circumstances, and community
ties. The interplay
of these concerns is used to reduce uncertainty about the
offender.
Previous Sentencing Research
Previous sentencing research has
consistently found that legal factors (e.g., offense type, offense
severity, and criminal history) are the principal determinants of
sentencing outcomes. However, the same set of literature
offers conflicting conclusions about the role of race, so the
impact of race on sentencing cannot be easily deciphered into neat
conclusions. While
the findings on the effect of an offender's race have been
inconsistent, the literature suggests that gender has a more
uniform effect on sentencing outcomes.
Women are less likely to be incarcerated
and more likely to receive shorter sentences. Some have proposed that the greater
leniency displayed toward women results from judicial
paternalism.
Conversely, others argue that the leniency displayed toward women
results from concern over the effect of incarcerating women with
dependent children
and that stereotyping results in women being perceived as less
threatening and less likely to recidivate.
For
brevity, the literature review will focus on the studies of
sentencing in Pennsylvania and studies that have controlled for the
characteristics of sentencing judges.
Pennsylvania Sentencing Studies
Throughout the Pennsylvania sentencing
research, criminal history and offense severity consistently have
positive relationships with the decision to incarcerate and with
sentence length.
However, one study of 1983 data found a negative association
between criminal history and incarceration sentence length. Of the studies that
controlled for the number of convictions, the studies found mostly
positive correlations or, in some cases, no effect on sentencing
outcomes.
The
extralegal factors, particularly race and gender, influenced
sentencing outcomes. The studies consistently found that being
female reduced one's incarceration chances and sentence length.
Nearly as consistent, the studies found
indications that black offenders were more likely to be
incarcerated and receive longer sentences than white offenders. However, the
differences were often small.
Nevertheless, there are two exceptions in
the literature.
Comparing sentencing in 1977, 1983, 1992, and 1993, one study found
interesting changes in the effect of race on sentence length. In
1977 and 1983, black offenders could expect to receive longer
sentence lengths, while by 1992 the differences between black and
white offenders were statistically insignificant. And in 1993,
black offenders received slightly shorter sentences compared to
white offenders. The study concluded that the changes in the
Pennsylvania guidelines have substantially reduced the impact of
race on incarceration length. While another study found that from
1991 to 1994, black offenders in four counties were more likely to
be incarcerated, their sentence length was almost one month shorter
than the incarceration lengths of white offenders.
Characteristics
of Judges and Sentencing. Sentencing research has
generally focused on the legal and extralegal factors associated
with offenders while omitting the extralegal characteristics of the
judges in the analyses. Given that they have differing backgrounds
and interpretations of the law, there is reason to believe that
judges may allocate sentences differently.
According to Jon'a Meyer, Assistant
Professor in the Department of Sociology at Rutgers University,
Camden, and Paul Jesilow, Associate Professor in the Department of
Criminology, Law, and Society at the University of California,
Irvine, "At a time when black justices were almost nonexistent,
researchers had assumed that disparities in sentences resulted from
racism by white judges against black defendants." The studies that have
examined the effect of the characteristics of judges have generally
found little differences in judicial decisions between black and
white judges. The
method used in this paper controls for differences in judges' race,
ethnicity, gender, and time served on the bench.
Race and Ethnicity. The
majority of studies that controlled for the race and ethnicity of
the judges examined differences between white and black judges, while a few analyzed
differences between Hispanic and white judges. One analysis of sentencing in four
Pennsylvania counties from 1991 to 1994 found that black judges
were more likely to incarcerate offenders than their white
counterparts.
However, the incarceration lengths of the sentences under black
judges did not differ statistically from the incarceration lengths
of sentences by white judges.
A
1978 study of city judges did find statistically significant
differences in sentencing decisions between black and white
judges. However,
the sizes of the differences were meager. Both black and white
judges imposed slightly harsher sentences on black offenders. Further, a different
study found that rulings by black and white federal district judges
appointed by President Jimmy Carter were not significantly
different in terms of being pro-defendant or pro-prosecution. Thus, the study's
authors concluded that black judges are not more sympathetic to
offenders than white judges. When the analysis was done by gender,
the same held true: Rulings by female judges did not differ
statistically from rulings by male judges.
A
1988 study found that in a Northeastern city its authors called
"Metro City," the fact that the judge was white or black did not by
itself make a statistical difference on the decision to
incarcerate. However, when the data were limited to white
offenders, black judges were more likely to incarcerate.
Conversely, when the authors limited the data to black offenders,
the judge's race did not affect incarceration decisions. In terms
of sentence length, black judges imposed shorter prison sentences
compared to their white counterparts. When the data were split by
the race of the offender, black judges did not sentence white
offenders to longer terms, while they were more lenient to black
offenders. Further, the same study found that black judges were
more likely than white judges to incarcerate white offenders. Black
judges were more likely to impose shorter sentence lengths on black
offenders, while white judges were not more lenient toward
white
offenders.
More
recently, two 1990 studies found a lack of substantial differences
in sentence outcomes between black and white judges in Detroit. In
the first study, conviction and incarceration decisions in sexual
assault cases of black and white offenders were similar, regardless
of whether the presiding judge was black or white. However, female
judges did impose longer incarceration sentences than male judges.
The difference between male and female judges is due to black
female judges imposing longer sentences when compared to black male
judges.
The
second study found that black judges were less likely to
incarcerate in violent felony cases, but the difference was small.
In terms of sentence length, expected minimum sentences by black
and white judges were not statistically different. However, both
black and white judges imposed harsher sentences on black offenders
than white offenders. The study concluded that the harsher
treatment of black offenders cannot be ascribed exclusively to
white judges.
In
contrast to studies that examine only sentencing differences
between white and black judges, a study of sentencing in El Paso
County, Texas, found that Hispanic judges sentenced white offenders
and Hispanic offenders more harshly than white judges sentenced
white offenders. Further, while white judges sentenced Hispanic
offenders more harshly than they sentenced whites, Hispanic judges
sentenced white offenders to more severe sentences. The study
concluded that Hispanic judges are not more empathetic toward
minority offenders, because white judges are more lenient than
Hispanic judges. However, these findings should be treated with
caution because the study's methodology could be misleading.
In a
study of judges from a metropolitan county in southern California,
the authors interviewed the judges in order to develop explanations
for sentencing decisions. The judges' stated goal of attempting to
"do justice" might suggest a manner in which bias sneaks into
judicial decision making. The extralegal factors that the judges
reported as influencing their decisions were defendant attitudes
and motivations for committing the crimes. No differences were
found between sentencing by white judges and sentencing by minority
judges.
A
study of sentencing in Dona Ana County, New Mexico, suggests that
Hispanic judges were less likely to incarcerate but were involved
in the application of longer incarceration sentences than white
judges. However, white judges were more likely than their Hispanic
counterparts to impose longer incarceration sentences on
Hispanic
offenders.
The
lack of substantial differences in sentencing between black and
white judges has led researchers to propose three possible
explanations:
- The judicial recruitment process screens
out nonconformist candidates, resulting in those minorities who are
selected for judgeships representing conventional legal norms.
- Socialization processes within the courts
force minority judges to accept the norms of the court community. The role of
precedents and the court community, in particular prosecutors and
defense attorneys, can constrain judges' discretion.
- Concern for crime victims may play a
greater role than concerns over minority sentencing disparities in
influencing sentencing decisions by minority judges. Some propose that the
disparity in the sentencing of black offenders by black judges may
be caused by concern for black victims. In addition, black judges
may perceive themselves as possible victims of black-on-black
crime. Given that
U.S. Department of Justice data indicate that crime is largely
intraracial, the
assumption that minority judges would be more inclined to show
leniency to minority offenders at the expense of minority victims
may be unfounded.
Gender. While one study
proposed that female judges would be more lenient than their male
counterparts, the authors found otherwise. Female judges were
slightly more likely to sentence offenders to prison, while the
difference in sentence length was insignificant. When the data were
separately analyzed according to the offender's gender, female
judges were more likely than male judges to sentence both female
and male offenders to prison, while the findings were statistically
insignificant for sentence length. The study concluded that male
judges have paternalistic attitudes toward female offenders.
In a
study of sexual assault cases, female judges were not more likely
to incarcerate, but they delivered longer incarceration sentences
than their male counterparts. However, a different study of
sentencing in misdemeanor courts found that male judges were 3.5
times more likely to incarcerate than their female counterparts.
Other Judge-Related
Factors. While the previous studies examined the
relationship between the characteristics of judges and sentencing
focused on race and ethnicity, a 1988 study analyzed the effect of
the judge's age, prior employment as a prosecutor, and religion on
sentencing. Older judges imposed harsher sentences than their
younger counterparts. Former prosecutors were more likely to
incarcerate, but the sentences they imposed did not differ in
length from those imposed by judges without prosecutorial
experience. Southern Baptist and fundamentalist judges were more
likely to incarcerate but imposed shorter sentences than judges of
other faiths.
However, the differences were small.
Although the study concluded that the
social background of judges had either no influence or only a
slight influence on sentencing, interacting the judge
characteristics with the offender characteristics produced
interesting findings. Southern Baptist and fundamentalist judges
were more likely to incarcerate black offenders but displayed
greater leniency in the length of prison sentences imposed on black
offenders. These same judges were also more likely to incarcerate
defendants who were older and convicted of robbery or burglary.
However, the length of prison sentences was generally unaffected by
the judge's religion, except for black, violent, and drug offenders
who received shorter prison sentences when the overseeing judge was
Southern Baptist or fundamentalist. Older judges administered more
lenient sentences for white offenders and those convicted of
burglary, while judges who were formerly prosecutors were more
likely to incarcerate violent offenders and female offenders.
Unique among the literature, one study
analyzing federal sentencing of draft resisters during the Vietnam
War controlled for a number of judge characteristics overlooked by
the other studies. The political party of the appointing President,
prior military service, prior judicial experience, veterans group
membership, and having draft-age sons had no statistically
significant correlation with sentencing outcomes. However, the age
of the judge had a statistically positive relationship with
sentencing outcomes, while tenure of the judge had a negative
relationship.
Similarly, a different study of federal sentencing in Florida found
that prior prosecutorial experience, age, and years served on the
bench had statistically insignificant relationships with decisions
to incarcerate.
The Data
The
data used in this analysis are based on criminal sentencing in
Pennsylvania in 1998 under the state's 1997 sentencing guidelines.
The sentencing data were obtained from the Pennsylvania Commission
on Sentencing (PCS) and include felony and misdemeanor sentences. The PCS does not
require judges to report life and death sentences, so these cases
are excluded from the analysis. Further, the PCS does not collect
data on sentences in juvenile court. In addition, the analysis was
limited to the offender's most serious conviction, which is
identified in the dataset.
In
order to analyze the relationship between sentencing and the
characteristics of judges, the race, ethnicity, gender, and time
served on the bench for 290 judges were added to the PCS data. The
descriptive statistics for these judges are presented in Table 1.
The majority of the judges are male and white. In 1998, the average
time served on the bench was just over 11 years. The collection of
the information on judges was made possible by the assistance of
the York Daily Record in York, Pennsylvania; however, the findings
and conclusions drawn in this report do not necessarily reflect the
views of the York Daily Record.

The
variables in the analysis are intended to measure the effect of
legal factors, extralegal factors, characteristics of the judges,
and jurisdiction characteristics on the length of incarceration
sentences. The descriptive statistics for the variables in the
analysis are presented in Table 2.

In
this analysis, three models are estimated. The first model analyzes
the effect of the legal and extra-legal factors that relate to the
offender. The second model controls for the same factors as the
first model, but includes the addition of the judge-related
variables. In the last model, the interactions of the gender and
race/ethnicity of the judges and offenders are substituted for the
offender and judge gender and race/ethnicity variables. These
interactions will help identify whether minority judges sentence
minority offenders differently than white judtges.
Dependent
Variable. The dependent variable is the minimum number of
months that the offender was sentenced to jail or prison for
felonies and misdemeanors. A non-incarceration sentence, such as
probation, was coded as a zero.
Legal
Factors . The legal factors included in the analysis
capture differences in criminal history, current offense severity,
disposition type, and number of convictions. The guidelines provide
a formal structure to guide courts in the administration of minimum
sentences but allow the courts to adjust sentences according to
aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The Pennsylvania
sentencing guidelines are unique in that they prescribe minimum
sentencing ranges, in contrast to the guidelines of other states
that provide instructions for minimum and maximum sentences. In
addition, the Pennsylvania guidelines offer judges more latitude in
crafting sentences on a case-by-case basis, so the data used in
this study are particularly useful to estimating judicial
discretion.
Modeling the effect of sentences
prescribed by guidelines needs to reflect the relationship between
offense severity, offender history, and sentencing outcomes. The presumptive
sentence is determined by the severity of the offense and the
offender's criminal record. The offender's offense is converted
into an offense gravity score (OGS), which ranges from 1 to 14. The
offender's criminal history is represented by the prior record
score (PRS), which ranges from 0 to 5. The OGS and PRS values plot
cells in the sentencing matrix that recommend minimum sentence
ranges.
Depending on the circumstances of the case
and the interaction between the offense gravity score and the prior
record score, the sentencing guidelines provide three ranges for
the recommended minimum sentence:
First, the standard minimum range is used
for normal circumstances.
Second, the aggravated minimum range is
used for when the court determines that there are aggravating
circumstances present that warrant a more severe sentence.
Third, the mitigated minimum range is
applied when the court establishes that there are mitigating
circumstances that necessitate a reduced sentence. The midpoint of
the standard minimum range is used to capture the effect of the
sentencing guidelines.
In
addition to the presumptive sentence, this analysis controls for
the offense type and the number of prior convictions per offender.
Offenses were classified as property crimes, violent crimes, drug
crimes, and miscellaneous crimes. The inclusion of the four broad
offense variables is an attempt to measure the qualitative
differences between offenses in the judges' minds. The dummy variables
for offense type are not factors in determining the presumptive
sentence under the guidelines. By including the four offense type
variables in the model, this analysis attempts to control for the
qualitative differences between these crimes. For example,
offenders convicted of violent offenses are expected to receive
longer minimum incarceration sentences.
The
analysis also controls for each offender's disposition type using a
set of dummy variables for bench trials, negotiated guilty pleas,
non-negotiated guilty pleas, nolo contendere, and other disposition
types, with jury trials as the default.
Extralegal Factors. Some
studies of sentencing have found that extralegal factors, such as
the offender's race and ethnicity, influence sentencing outcomes.
The analysis controls for the effect of the offender's gender
through the use of a variable that identifies when the offender is
female with male offenders as the comparison. A set of dummy
variables identifies whether the offender is black, Hispanic,
Asian, American Indian, or some other race or ethnicity, with white
offenders as the default. The age of the offender at the time of
sentencing and the age at sentencing squared are included as
control variables. Including the age of the offender and its square
captures the curvilinear effect of age on sentencing.
Judge
Characteristics. This analysis controls for impact of the
judge's gender, race, and ethnicity, the number of years served on
the bench, and the number of years served on the bench squared. As
with the offender race and gender variables, the defaults for the
race and gender of the judges are white judges and male judges,
respectively. The inclusion of the variables reflecting the amount
of time spent on the bench captures the curvilinear relationship
with sentencing. The number of convictions per sentencing judge
during 1998 under the 1997 sentencing guidelines is used as a proxy
for the judges' caseloads. The use of the judge variables marks an
important contribution to the literature on sentencing determinants
in Pennsylvania.
Judge and
Offender Interactions. In Model 3, the interactions of the
gender and race/ethnicity of the judges and offenders are
substituted for the variables that identify the gender, race, and
ethnicity of the judges. The interactions were done to determine
whether sentence length differed when the gender and race/ethnicity
of the judges and offenders were different. For the these
interactions, the defaults are male offenders sentenced by male
judges and white offenders sentenced by white judges.
Jurisdiction
Characteristics . To control for differences in sentencing
practices among Pennsylvania courts, county-level fixed-effects are
used in each model. These county fixed-effects can control for
unobserved factors in the courts, such as prosecutorial tendencies
and differences between small and large courts, that may influence
sentencing outcomes. For example, courts in some counties may favor
harsher or more lenient sentences than courts in other counties.
The use of fixed-effects allows for this study to control for these
unobserved differences. A series of dummy variables for 66 of the
67 counties were entered into each of the models.
Pennsylvania Sentencing Guidelines
To
control for the degree of judicial discretion, the approach used
needs to model the sentencing guidelines properly. According to the
Pennsylvania Commission on Sentencing, "[t]he guidelines are
designed to structure the discretion of the sentencing court
without denying the court the power to craft sentences to the
particular needs of the defendant and the interests of justice."
The sentencing guidelines recommend minimum sentences based on the
severity of the current offense and the criminal history.
While the guidelines provide a framework
for the sentencing court, judges do have the discretion to deliver
sentences that are outside the recommended minimum range. If the
sentencing court determines that the guideline recommendations are
inappropriate based on the details of a particular case, the court
may give a longer sentence (departure above) or a shorter sentence
(departure below) as long as the court supplies a rationale for
such a sentence and reports that rationale to the PCS. If a judge
deviates too far from the guidelines, the prosecution and the
defendant have the legal right to appeal the sentence.
If
the effects of the sentencing guidelines are not properly
specified, the estimated relationship may be biased, and erroneous
conclusions may be reached. As previously mentioned, this analysis
uses the midpoint of the recommended minimum sentence range to
control for the effect of the interaction between criminal history
and offense severity on prescribed sentences. While most studies of
Pennsylvania sentences have used the offense gravity and prior
record scores as control variables, the sentencing guidelines' recommended
minimum sentence--as represented by the midpoint between the bottom
and top standard sentence--is used in this analysis.
According to Rodney L. Engen, Associate
Professor of Sociology at North Carolina State University, and
Randy R. Gainey, Associate Professor of Sociology and Criminal
Justice at Old Dominion University, controlling for current offense
severity and criminal history incorrectly assumes that a linear
relationship exists between these variables and sentence length.
Instead, controlling for the recommended sentence allows for the
model to reflect the non-linear increases in the severity of
recommended sentences as the offense gravity and prior record
scores increase.
The
impact of controlling for the presumptive sentence instead of
offense severity and criminal history is noticeable in an analysis
of Washington State sentencing data. When Professors Engen and
Gainey included offense severity and criminal history, males
received sentences that were 4.3 months longer than females, while
blacks and Hispanics received sentences that were, respectively,
1.9 months and 3.8 months longer than whites. However, when the
presumptive sentence replaced offense severity and criminal
history, sentences for males were only 1.2 months longer than
sentences for women, sentences for blacks were no longer
statistically different from sentences for whites, and the
disparity for Hispanics was reduced to 1.3 additional months.
Professors Engen and Gainey conclude that using offense severity
and criminal history, instead of the presumptive sentence,
overestimates the effect of gender, race, and ethnicity on sentence
length.
Jeffery T. Ulmer, Associate Professor of
Sociology and Crime, Law, and Justice at Penn State University,
urges caution in using the presumptive sentence approach. Professor
Ulmer's analysis of sentencing in Pennsylvania using a model with
presumptive sentences had a slightly lower overall explanatory
power than his model that used offense severity and criminal
history. Instead of making a linear assumption about the effect of
offense severity and criminal history on sentencing outcomes, he
recommends a quadratic model where offense severity and criminal
history are included along with their squared values. While this
quadratic approach had a higher overall explanatory power, however,
it is potentially plagued by multicollinearity.
After testing Professor Ulmer's quadratic
equation against the Pennsylvania sentencing guideline matrix,
Professors Engen and Gainey conclude that the approach does not
adequately control for the formally recommended sentences in the
guidelines. They
argue that the most direct way to control for the formal structure
of sentencing guidelines is to control for the presumptive
sentence. They
further add that analyses that control for the presumptive sentence
are "statistically sound, conceptually clean, and are more
consistent with current theorizing about the process under
guidelines." While
the debate over appropriately modeling for guidelines will surely
continue, this analysis uses the presumptive sentence to control
for the effect of the guidelines.
Modeling Judicial Discretion
Based on the expectation that Pennsylvania
judicial actors representing the state, especially judges, are
expected to follow the guidelines, the decision process is assumed
to occur in one stage. Thus, the Tobit model is used to estimate
judicial discretion. Using the Tobit model avoids selection bias
issues inherent in analyzing incarceration lengths. Some have proposed
that sentencing occurs in two stages. In the first stage, often referred to
as the "in/out" decision, the judge decides whether or not to
sentence the individual to incarceration. The second stage is the
decision on the length of incarceration.
In
Pennsylvania, the presence of sentencing guidelines suggests that
the decision process occurs in one stage rather than two stages.
Based on similar sentencing guideline circumstances, Shawn D.
Bushway, Assistant Professor at the University of Maryland, and
Anne Morrison Piehl, Associate Professor at Harvard University,
assumed a one-stage decision process for modeling judicial
discretion in Maryland.
The
structure of the Pennsylvania sentencing matrix itself supports the
assumption that the decision is made in one stage, not two. Most of
the matrix cells, which provide judges with the recommended minimum
sentencing range, recommend incarceration sentences only. Technically,
Pennsylvania judges can impose non-incarceration sentences when the
guidelines clearly recommend otherwise, but the legal right to
appeal sentences that deviate too far from the presumptive sentence
provides an important check on judicial discretion. Thus, the
sentencing process is considered to occur in a single stage.
However, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has set a high standard for
overturning sentencing decisions.
The
severity of incarceration sentences can be analyzed by viewing
non-incarceration sentences as unobserved, censored outcomes. While
modeling sentencing decisions as a one-stage process, the analysis
should still account for the censored outcomes (non-incarceration
sentences). Due to
the presence of left-censored data, the Tobit model was chosen over
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression for the purpose of
producing unbiased and efficient estimates. In the Tobit regression, censoring
occurs when the values of the dependent variable are not observed
because the values are either above or below a certain threshold.
In the case of this analysis, all of the offenders sentenced to a
punishment of less than incarceration in jail or prison are
left-censored at a cutoff value of zero.
The
structure of the Tobit model in this analysis is expressed as:

where åi ~ N (0, ó2), x has observed values for all
cases, and y* is a latent variable that is observed for values
greater than 0 and is censored for values less than or equal to 0.
In other words, there is a latent variable y* that is observed only
when its value is greater than a certain threshold. In this
analysis, the variable can be formally expressed as:

Basically, Equation 3 is the product of one probit
regression and one linear regression.
Findings
The
multivariate analyses that follow examine the effects of legal and
extralegal factors on sentencing outcomes. Three multivariate
models are presented. The first model contains the variables
commonly used to specify the relationship between legal and
extralegal factors relating to the offender. The second model adds
the judge characteristics to the analysis. This addition yields
important information about the influence of judge characteristics
in judicial decision making. The third model interacts the
race/ethnicity and gender variables for offenders and judges. The
interactions assist in determining the degree to which sentencing
outcomes vary by the relationship between offenders and judges.
For
all of the models, robust standard errors are used to test for
statistical significance. While the presumptive sentence and
offense type were used to control for the severity of the offenses,
the findings in all the models are affected by the fact that the
crimes for which minority offenders were convicted were more
serious than those for which white offenders were convicted.
Further, minority judges, on average, presided over convictions
that were more serious, as measured by the presumptive sentence,
than convictions overseen by white judges.
Model 1: Legal and Extralegal Factors
Table 3 presents the findings for the
first two models. The findings for the legal factors in Model 1 are
presented first. The presumptive sentence, as measured by the
midpoint, does have an impact on sentence length. The coefficient
for the midpoint for the presumptive sentence is statistically
significant and estimated at 0.93 months, which means that for each
additional month recommended by the guidelines, offenders sentenced
to jail or prison received an additional 0.93 months of
incarceration for their minimum sentence. This finding suggests that
Pennsylvania court actors are using a slightly more lenient
interpretation of the guidelines, ceteris paribus, when the
presumptive sentence is measured as the midpoint of the minimum
recommended range.

For
the number of convictions, the coefficient is 0.17 months and
statistically significant. For each additional conviction,
offenders can expect to receive about 0.17 additional months of
incarceration sentence. With miscellaneous offenses as the
reference, the coefficients for the offense dummy variables were
all statistically significant. Those convicted of property offenses
could expect to receive 2.41 less months of incarceration, while
those convicted of violent offenses received an additional 1.57
months. Offenders convicted of drug crimes received a sentence
reduction of almost 2.48 months.
In
addition to the legal factors, the extralegal factors influenced
sentencing outcomes. Compared to jury trials, offenders who had
bench trials received 1.37 additional months of incarceration.
Offenders who entered into negotiated guilty pleas received
sentence reductions of 1.41 months, while non-negotiated guilty
pleas appear to have no effect. Offenders who entered nolo
contendere pleas saw their sentences reduced by 2.70 months, while
those that entered into other plea arrangements experienced a
sentence increase of 8.20 months of incarceration.
Statistically significant differences in
sentence lengths were present for the demographic characteristics
of the offenders. Female offenders received a reduction of 3.01
months compared to their male counterparts. This may reflect, as
some have proposed, a paternalistic attitude toward women
by judicial actors. Except for offenders of Asian, American Indian,
and Pacific Islander descendants, disparities in sentencing were
found for minorities. Compared to white offenders, black offenders
received a slight increase in incarceration sentences. Blacks could
expect to receive an increase in their incarceration sentence of
0.29 months, while Hispanics received an additional 1.71
months.
The
age of the offender and its square also had statistically
significant effects on incarceration sentences. For each additional
year, the offender's age had a curvilinear effect on incarceration
length. An 18-year-old offender could expect to receive almost 1.99
additional months of incarceration. The effect of age increased in
incremental steps up to age 38, at 2.76 additional months, and then
decreased thereafter until reaching approximately zero at age
76.
Model 2: The Inclusion of Judge
Characteristics
Overall, the addition of the judge
characteristic variables into the analysis did not substantially
change the findings of the coefficients in the previous model. All
of the previous variables remain statistically significant at the
same levels as in Model 1. Although there were slight changes in
the coefficients, the legal factors remained essentially the
same.
The
effect of the presumptive sentence and number of convictions
remained relatively the same. The coefficient for the presumptive
sentence was 0.93, and the coefficient for number of convictions
was 0.17 months. However, the coefficients for the offense dummy
variables changed slightly. The estimated reduction in length of
incarceration for property offenders was 2.38 months. For violent
offenses, the coefficient was 1.55 months. In terms of months, the
differences in the coefficients from Models 1 and 2 are
inconsequential.
In
addition to the legal factors, the extralegal factors remained
influential. Compared to jury trials, offenders whose cases were
handled through bench trials received an additional 1.36 months of
incarceration. Offenders who entered into negotiated guilty and
nolo contendere pleas still received shorter incarceration
sentences than those whose cases went to trial. The coefficient for
non-negotiated guilty pleas remained statistically insignificant.
Those who resolved their cases through other means could still
expect to be incarcerated almost 8.0 additional months.
While the magnitude and direction of the
coefficients for the extralegal factors did not substantially
change, the offender's race and ethnicity coefficients were
slightly affected. Female offenders received a reduction of 3.01
months compared to their male counterparts. Blacks could expect to
receive an increase in their incarceration sentence of 0.26 months,
while Hispanics received an additional 1.70 months. However, the
magnitude of the change in these coefficients from the coefficients
in Model 1 is meager.
As
for age and its squared term, the curvilinear results from Model 2
are approximately the same as in Model 1. The gender and race
characteristics of the judges presiding over the convictions
influenced sentences. All of these coefficients were statistically
significant. Offenders sentenced under female judges received 0.70
months less incarceration than offenders sentenced under male
judges. Sentences involving black judges were 1.10 months longer
than sentences involving white judges. Sentences imposed by
Hispanic judges were 1.43 months shorter than sentences imposed by
white judges; however, this finding should be interpreted with
caution due to the very small number of Hispanic judges in the
data.
The
coefficient for the number of convictions involving the sentencing
judge during the year was not statistically different from zero.
The coefficients for the number of years that the presiding judge
had been on the bench and its square were also statistically
insignificant. While the inclusion of the judge variables did
change the sizes of the coefficients for the other variables, the
actual changes in terms of months were very small.
Model 3: Interacting Judge and Offender
Characteristics
To
further test the influence of judge characteristics on sentencing,
Model 3 includes interactions between the judge's characteristics
and offender's characteristics. The addition of the judge-offender
characteristic variables into the analysis did not substantially
change the findings for the legal factors. Table 4 presents the
Tobit regression findings for the third model. The coefficient for
the presumptive sentence remained constant at 0.93 months per month
recommended. The coefficients for number of convictions, offense
types, and disposition types remained largely unchanged.

For
the judge-offender interactions for gender, the default variable
indicates sentences of male offenders by male judges. For the race
interactions, the default variable identifies sentences by white
judges of white offenders.
While the magnitude and direction of the
coefficients for the case disposition type and the offender age
variables did not substantially change, analysis of the
judge-offender interactions yielded interesting results on sentence
length. Sentences involving male judges and female offenders were
3.0 months shorter than sentences where both the judge and offender
were male. Male offenders whose cases were overseen by female
judges could expect to receive a sentence reduction of 0.72 months,
while female offenders could expect a reduction of 3.74 months.
Compared to sentences involving white
judges and white offenders, black offenders were not sentenced
differently by white judges. Hispanic offenders received an
additional 1.59 months when white judges presided over their cases.
Sentences involving white judges and offenders of other races or
ethnicities were not statistically different from sentences
involving both white judges and white offenders.
A
different sentencing pattern emerged for black judges. The
incarceration sentences of white offenders when the judge was black
were not statistically different from zero. However, minority
offenders did receive different sentences when black judges oversaw
their cases. Black and Hispanic offenders incarcerated under black
judges could expect 1.70 and 3.35 additional months, respectively.
An even larger disparity of 10.25 additional months was found for
offenders of other races and ethnicities sentenced under black
judges. However, the findings for sentences of Hispanic and other
offenders by black judges should be interpreted with circumspection
due to the small number of these cases in the data.
White offenders sentenced by Hispanic
judges could expect a reduction of 2.14 months, while black
offenders experienced a reduction of 1.29 months. Sentences of
Hispanic offenders involving Hispanic judges were 3.09 months
longer. However, the coefficient for Hispanic judge and other
offender interaction was statistically insignificant. As with the
Hispanic judge findings from Model 2, caution is urged in
interpreting these findings because of the small number of Hispanic
judges in the dataset.
As
for the number of convictions involving the judges and their time
served on the bench and its square, the coefficients were
statistically
insignificant.
Discussion
Dissimilarities based on extralegal
factors were found for incarceration length. As all of the model
specifications imply, female offenders received shorter sentences
than male offenders. This result may reflect the interaction of
judicial paternalism, an unwillingness to incarcerate women
with dependent children, and the perception that women are
less of a threat to the community.
The
gender of the judge influenced sentencing outcomes. Decisions in
cases overseen by female judges resulted in shorter incarceration
terms. When a female judge oversaw the case, the incarceration
sentence was shorter than if a male judge attended to the case.
When judge-offender interactions were introduced into the model,
patterns in sentencing disparities were more easily distinguished.
Regardless of whether the judge was male or female, female
offenders were the recipients of shorter sentences than males. The
most lenient sentences involved female judges presiding over the
cases of female offenders.
The
findings for the race and ethnicity of the offenders were less
clear. Black offenders incurred slightly longer sentences compared
to their white counterparts. However, the disparity for Hispanic
offenders was much more noticeable, while the finding for offenders
of other races or ethnicities was statistically insignificant. If
black offenders were stereotyped as being more dangerous to the
community, one would have expected to find the coefficient for
black offenders to be much larger. While this analysis found that
black offenders received slightly longer sentences, a similar study
of Pennsylvania judges did not find that black offenders received
longer sentences.
The
findings of the race and ethnicity interactions shed light on
sentencing patterns by the race of the judge. Compared to the
sentences of white offenders, white judges were not involved in the
differing allocation of incarceration sentences for black
offenders. However, Hispanic offenders could expect to receive
longer sentences than their white counterparts, while no difference
was found for offenders of other races and ethnicities.
Increasing minority judgeships has been
viewed as a way to reduce disparities in the sentencing of minority
offenders.
However, black judges in this study were involved in cases where
the incarceration lengths were harsher than sentences administered
by white judges. Some have offered surprise that black judges and
white judges would treat offenders differently, because the
socialization process of judges is anticipated to produce
conformity.
Concern over the higher crime rates of black communities possibly
explains the harsher sentences under black judges. When county
crime data for 1998 were analyzed by the race of the judge, black
judges presided over counties where the mean uniform crime reports
(UCR) Part 1 crime rate was twice as high as the mean for counties
overseen by white judges. Working in communities with higher
crime rates may influence black judges to administer sentences that
are harsher than sentences imposed by judges that work in
communities with lower crime rates.
Although the sentences of white offenders
involving black judges were not statistically different from zero,
black offenders could expect to receive longer sentences when black
judges presided over their cases. If disparities in sentencing were
driven by discrimination against minorities by white judicial
actors, one would expect black judges to balance sentences by
decreasing incarceration sentences for black offenders. The harsher
sentencing by black judges may be explained by survey data from the
National Crime Victimization Survey, which indicate that blacks
generally experience higher victimization rates than others. Black judges may be
more concerned for the plight of minority victims than for the
rights of minority criminals.
While the findings from this study do not
necessarily imply that racial discrimination is behind disparities
in sentencing outcomes, omitted variables may explain the
differences. Professors John H. Kramer and Darrell Steffensmeier at
Pennsylvania State University propose that confounding factors that
are not quantified in the analyses of sentencing in Pennsylvania
may explain the disparities. These confounding factors include
qualitative circumstances of the offenses (e.g., prior conviction
occurred several years ago); features of the offender's criminal
history not measured by prior criminal record scores (e.g., use of
a weapon in commission of the offense not included in the official
charge); history of unemployment; perceived rehabilitation
potential; different plea-bargaining tactics; and disinclination to
send white offenders to correctional institutions
disproportionately populated by blacks. Further, the omission of the type of
legal representation obtained by the offenders, the offenders'
culpability and attitude before the court, and their motivation for
committing their crimes in the dataset may bias the findings.
Future studies of sentencing in
Pennsylvania should include information related to prosecutors and
defense counsels. Modeling the effect of the interaction between
prosecutors, judges, defense counsels, and offenders on sentencing
outcomes may provide researchers with important insight on how
sentencing disparities emerge.
Conclusion
While the previous literature on
sentencing in Pennsylvania has generally focused on the legal and
extralegal factors relating to offenders, this study's inclusion of
information pertaining to judges adds to existing knowledge about
the determinants of sentencing. Using a Tobit model and controlling
for such factors as the presumptive sentence showed that black
judges were involved in the application of longer incarceration
sentences of offenders than white judges.
Further, the judge-offender race
interactions found different sentencing patterns. While disparities
in sentencing of black offenders sentenced by white judges were not
found, the sentences of black offenders by black judges were longer
than the sentences of white offenders by white judges.
The
harsher sentencing by black judges may be a consequence of the
higher victimization rates in the black community. Black judges may
simply be more sensitive to the plight of the victims.
Nevertheless, generalizing these sentencing patterns to judges in
other states should be done with caution because the Pennsylvania
guidelines allow judges more discretion in crafting sentences than
is allowed by the guidelines in most other states.
David B.
Muhlhausen is a Senior Policy Analyst in the Center for
Data Analysis at The Heritage Foundation.
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