Whether or not the U.S. military is large
enough to perform its assigned missions is being debated once
again. Given that American soldiers will not be coming home from
Iraq on time, the answer seems to be an emphatic "no." However,
before the size of the force is decided, its missions must be
defined.
The
emerging capabilities gap exists because the force is being used
too extensively. With the war on terrorism, operations in
Afghanistan, fighting in Iraq, homeland security operations, and
peacekeeping in the Balkans all ongoing, some forces must be held
aside in case violence breaks out in some other part of the world,
such as the Taiwan Strait or North Korea. In the past year, the
United States was pressured to deploy peacekeepers to Liberia. This
was in addition to continuing U.S. peacetime responsibilities, such
as deterring large-scale aggression in vital regions of the world,
maintaining alliance commitments, and ensuring access to the high
seas.
Clearly, the U.S. military is either
under-resourced or incorrectly structured to handle the missions
that are being asked of it. Although the argument that combat land
forces have become increasingly irrelevant to modern warfare has
gained momentum in recent years, the war in Iraq has demonstrated
beyond doubt that such arguments are false. Indeed, it has become
increasingly clear that both the Army's and the Marines' ability to
take, hold, and control territory is as important as ever.
To
bridge the capabilities gap, the United States should focus its
military resources on missions that are vital to the nation.
Specifically, it must field a force capable of fighting the
immediate war on terrorism--which includes operations in
Iraq--fighting with little or no warning in unanticipated places,
maintaining adequate capability to deter aggression against
America's interests and allies, and contributing to homeland
defense.
Only
to the extent that America's capabilities exceed the demands of
these essential missions should the U.S. consider contributing
military resources to non-vital operations. Moreover, the long
delay in rotating troops out of Iraq demonstrates that the United
States does not have enough capabilities for even its primary
undertakings.
Adding Manpower Is Not Enough
Although U.S. forces are not adequate to
sustain the current rate of deployment, simply adding manpower is
not necessarily the answer. Clearly, the U.S. needs more
capabilities. However, while adding manpower may seem like the
quickest way to fill the capabilities gap, it is not the best way
to solve the problem. There are several reasons for this.
- People are
expensive. The most effective weapons in the U.S. armed
forces are soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines. They are also,
understandably, the most expensive. Only about one-third of the
defense budget is spent on developing and buying weapons. Most of
the rest goes to personnel and operational costs. Maintaining
personnel beyond the number needed to fulfill U.S. national
security requirements takes resources away from important efforts
such as modernization and transformation.
- The result can
be inappropriate deployments. A perceived excess of
manpower tempts political leaders to deploy forces on operations
that have little or nothing to do with U.S. national security.
After the Cold War, this perception arguably contributed to heavy
U.S. involvement in peacekeeping efforts in places like Haiti,
Somalia, and the Balkans.
- Manpower is not
the only measure of capability. Although manpower
end-strength is important, it does not by itself determine
capabilities. For example, a force trained and equipped for the
Cold War--regardless of size--would be inappropriate for the war on
terrorism. Similarly, a military unit using old technology may not
be as capable as a unit half its size using new technology.
Structuring the force to reflect modern national security
requirements accurately is more important than investing resources
in outdated and wasteful organizations.
Manpower Must Be Adequate for Service
Abroad and for Homeland Security
The
Secretary of Defense should ensure that the active armed forces
include additional combat and combat service support
elements--particularly in the Army--so that National Guard and
Reserve units can assume greater responsibility for homeland
security. Many combat support and service support units--for
example, in communications, logistical support, intelligence,
medical support, and food service--were moved into the National
Guard and Reserves in the late 1980s and throughout the 1990s to
reduce the size of the active armed forces.
Today, the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force
cannot go to war without activating large numbers of Reserve and
National Guard organizations. However, these same Reserve and Guard
components are the primary units to support homeland security
requirements. They should be freed from supporting the active
forces so that they can defend the homeland against terrorism.
Furthermore, combat support and combat service support personnel
that are put back into the active forces should be additions to the
total active force strength.
The Draft Is Not the Answer
Some
have begun arguing that the troop shortage should be filled by
reinstating the draft, either by itself or as part of a larger
compulsory national service program. The reality is that forcing
Americans to behave in ways that suit powerful Washington
bureaucrats rather than by freedom of choice would make the United
States neither militarily stronger nor more patriotic.
Heritage Foundation analyst James Carafano
recently argued strongly against the draft. He points out that the United States
has resisted a draft for most of its history because the draft is
not part of its tradition. Americans correctly view voluntary
military service as a hallmark of democracy.
All
of the men and women in today's military volunteered to serve. They
swore an oath to put aside their personal aspirations and
obligations to serve in behalf of all Americans. People do not
become soldiers because they cannot do anything else; nor do they
see themselves as hapless mercenaries, as some Members of Congress
seem to believe.
In
addition, the American public should be wary of those who urge the
United States to scrap the all-volunteer military force that has
served this nation well for three decades. The all-volunteer
service is the most skilled, disciplined, and motivated force on
the planet. If there needs to be a larger force, it should be a
larger all-volunteer force.
Returning to the draft represents a
failure of democracy, not a means to ensure its future. Citizenship
carries both duties and privileges, but democracy thrives only when
citizens hold both to be equally precious. Therefore, compelling
Americans, by law, to engage in national service does nothing to
make American democracy stronger. Indeed, such policies would
significantly weaken it.
Misplaced Resources, Not Inadequate
Resources
A
temporary manpower increase may alleviate pressure in the near
term, but long-term success requires further restructuring. This
effort has already begun with the force restructuring in Europe and
the Pacific. Similarly, the Pentagon has begun to identify clerical
positions within the uniformed services that could be filled from
the private sector. Of these positions, some were already converted
to combat positions in 2003, and more will be converted this
year.
To
maximize the short-term impact of the additional troops without
jeopardizing future reforms, Congress and policymakers should
consider the following recommendations:
- Keep personnel
increases temporary until future needs are better
understood. America's armed forces have not been sized for
the many missions asked of them since the end of the Cold War.
Throughout the 1990s, the force was drastically cut while
simultaneously asked to take on many more missions. This mismatch
resulted in severe declines in readiness by the late 1990s. While
the gap had begun to close before September 11, the war on
terrorism--specifically, Operation Iraqi Freedom--has once again
exposed the disparities between America's military ends and means.
This problem is not so much a result of the war on terrorism as a
consequence of failing to reform the defense establishment
adequately. Simply adding troops would allow the Pentagon to
perpetuate its structural problems
- End deployments
in the Balkans. As of December 31, 2003, the United States
had over 3,000 troops on peacekeeping missions in the Balkans. This
translates into 9,000 persons dedicated to that mission: For every
soldier deployed, one is recovering from deployment and one is
preparing for deployment. Ending this unnecessary deployment would
significantly reduce the stress on the force by adding 9,000
soldiers to the rotation base--soldiers whose experience in the
Balkans would prove extremely valuable on the ground in Iraq and
Afghanistan. The Spanish troops recently withdrawn from Iraq could
easily take the place of American troops in the Balkans.
- Do not sacrifice
other priorities. Some Members of Congress have suggested
that more troops are needed and that money from other priorities
should fund them. Senator Carl Levin (D-MI), for example, has even
suggested taking these funds from missile defense. Doing so is
unnecessary and dangerous. First, Congress has already appropriated
the funding for operations in the $87 billion supplemental passed
in 2003: Additional manpower requirements could be met through the
current $25 billion supplemental request. Second, the threat from
long-range ballistic missiles has not receded. The United States is
finally close to ending its total vulnerability to ballistic
missiles and should continue that effort.
- Use any
permanent increases to reduce strain on the Reserve
component. Any permanent increase in the active force--to
the extent an increase is needed--should be restricted to those
areas of combat support and combat service support that are now
largely maintained by the Reserve component. The remaining
permanent increases should be in the Reserve component. The
resulting force size should be adequate to defend America if the
nation focuses on defending its vital interests. That said, the war
on terrorism is unpredictable, and future requirements may dictate
further increases in the force; but then again, they may not.
Outside Iraq, the war on terrorism is resource intensive, not
manpower intensive. Barring further invasions and occupations, the
United States needs no additional increase in manpower. However, by
keeping a large Reserve, the nation will be prepared if other
manpower-intensive missions become necessary.
- Encourage
Reservists and National Guardsmen to enter the active
force. Numerous members of the Reserves and National Guard
desire to enter the active force, but government regulation and
bureaucracy make it difficult to do so. Upon meeting medical and
physical standards, these individuals could be retrained with
critical skills that could alleviate some of the current pressure
on the active force. Both Congress and the Pentagon should not only
remove the bureaucratic obstacles to such transfers, but should
also create incentives to motivate such career paths.
- Strongly
encourage voluntary retention over recruitment. Permanent
increases take years to implement. The Army recently estimated that
increasing the active force by 30,000 troops could take up to four
years. Given that U.S. forces are stretched thin and that troop
requirements in Iraq should decline over the next four years, the
Army should seek to increase forces as soon as possible. It can
best achieve this by providing incentives to personnel to remain on
active duty and by encouraging National Guard and Reserve members
to transfer to active-duty forces. Retaining active-duty troops
would bring increased strength to bear much faster while
maintaining unit cohesion and avoiding training costs. Because
these personnel were already planning to retire, this will also
make downsizing easier as the demand for manpower in Iraq
decreases.
- Continue the
Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process on schedule.
Additional near-term troop levels will require supporting
infrastructure. However, the addition does not justify slowing the
BRAC process. The process should continue on schedule. For it to be
successful, the Pentagon and the BRAC commission should consider
the future requirements of the force--including a possible
permanent increase in force structure--and present any conclusions
in their recommendations.
- Continue to
invest in high-demand assets and develop high-demand
capabilities. The U.S. military should continue to invest
in many of the capabilities that have been in the highest demand in
recent years. These include special operations units,
reconnaissance assets, military police, units that specialize in
chemical and biological agents, Patriot anti-missile batteries,
electronic warfare assets, and in-flight refueling aircraft. The
United States also needs more sea-lift and airlift capability--as
is painfully clear each time the United States moves high volumes
of assets. Balancing the supply and demand of these critical assets
would improve both the efficiency and the capability of the
military.
Ensuring Long-Term Force Structure
Health
Near-term manpower problems, however,
should not be addressed in a vacuum. As the Pentagon and Congress
engage these issues, they should also consider long-term
requirements. Unless they make sound manpower and force structure
decisions that take future ramifications into account, today's
problems will only continue to worsen. To ensure the force's future
health--as well as giving the current force what it needs to
succeed--Congress and the Pentagon should:
- Maintain robust
defense spending.With President George W. Bush's $401.7
billion defense budget under consideration, some Members of
Congress have recently entertained the idea of either cutting
defense--at least modestly--to help rein in ballooning federal
spending or taking money from some important programs to fund other
programs that they like better. However, cutting defense spending
now is both unnecessary and dangerous. According to estimates by
the individual services, even with recent defense budget increases,
the Pentagon has $12.2 billion in unfunded priorities. Instead,
Congress should fund the President's request, and the Pentagon
should identify savings to help close the $12.2 billion gap.
Maintaining an active, qualified force is
expensive, but it is also a sound and affordable investment. The
United States can afford to defend itself. The defense
budget--which is currently 3.5 percent of gross domestic product
(GDP)--is well within historic norms as a percentage of GDP. In
every year from 1941 to 1994 (except 1948), the United States spent
over 4 percent of GDP on national security.
The
U.S. military is heavily committed. Unless Congress wants to
sacrifice either the war on terrorism, U.S. commitments to allies,
near-term readiness, or the ability to prepare for the future, it
should fund the President's budget. The harsh reality is that the
Pentagon is simultaneously fighting a global war, maintaining
commitments that predate September 11, upholding peacekeeping
commitments, transforming into a 21st-century fighting force, and
recovering from a decade of underfunding and overuse. These efforts
cost money.
-
Establish
priorities for America's armed forces and develop plans around
those priorities.There is an emerging gap between
capabilities and strategy caused by the ongoing war against
terrorism and the increasing necessity of presenting credible
fighting forces for the Middle East and Korea. Therefore, the
nation's national security concerns should be prioritized. This
means that America's armed forces should--at a minimum--be prepared
for four missions: fighting the immediate war on terrorism; being
prepared to fight with little or no warning in unanticipated
places; maintaining adequate capability to deter aggression against
America's allies; and contributing to homeland defense.
-
Adopt a
principled approach to defense modernization and
transformation. The U.S. should
make significant investments both in modernizing existing weapons
platforms (to hedge against today's threats) and in research,
development, and acquisition programs (to prepare for tomorrow's
wars). Because the United States has limited wealth with which to
fulfill all current and future requirements, the Administration
must establish clear principles for modernizing the U.S. military
so that the world's best fighting force remains prepared for the
uncertain challenges of tomorrow.
-
Focus available
resources on combat capabilities. The armed forces could
increase near-term combat capability by minimizing non-combat
activities and shifting those resources to more urgent
requirements. This can be achieved by reducing commitments in the
Balkans, transferring personnel from infrastructure support to
combat-related missions, shifting investment to high-demand
capabilities, and accelerating base closures.
-
Increase land,
air, and sea capabilities. Ultimately, decisions about
weapon systems must be made. The immediate focus of modernization
efforts should be on acquiring new technology that allows weapons
to operate with less support. The development of hybrid engines and
fuel cells, for example, would mean that fewer fuel vehicles would
be needed to support field operations. Additionally, sensors and
networked information systems are allowing fewer people to cover
larger swaths of territory. Affordability should be judged by the
efficiency with which a system can be fielded over its
lifetime.
Conclusion
Ultimately, the United States may simply
need more uniformed personnel to meet all of its defense
needs--especially to decrease dependence on the Reserves. Yet those
already in uniform should first be used more efficiently. By making
smart investments and freeing wasted resources, the U.S. armed
forces can increase their capability in the near term and be better
prepared to fight and win America's wars.
Jack
Spencer is Senior Policy Analyst for Defense and National
Security in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for
International Studies at The Heritage Foundation.