In the waning days of the 108th
Congress, the House and Senate were deadlocked over legislation
designed to reform the national intelligence community. In the
end, the intelligence reform bill passed without anti-terrorism
measures championed by House Judiciary Committee Chairman James
Sensenbrenner (R-WI) but with the promise that his
proposals would be considered early in the 109th
Congress.
The most significant of these proposals
involved enhanced identification security requirements for the
issuance of state identification cards or driver's licenses. By and
large, the proposals reflect a careful balance, enhancing security
without threatening civil liberty. Congress should move promptly to
act upon the Congressman's proposal.
The Identity Security
Imperative
The September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks offer many lessons. One of them is that to the terrorist,
an identity document is a weapon to gain access to sensitive
areas. A secure system of identification will have significant
effects on terrorist activities. It will make it more difficult for
a terrorist to obtain an identity document by fraud. Thus, a
terrorist will not be able to conceal his true identity to board
commercial aircraft, enter federal facilities, transfer funds to a
U.S. bank account, or engage in other activities that may require
identification. Instead, terrorists will be forced to use their
real identities. As a result, law enforcement and intelligence
officials are far more likely to be able to detect their activity
before an attack.
The focus of identity security efforts
must be on driver's licenses and identity cards. Most
Americans use their state-issued driver's license as their
primary form of identification. Other more secure forms of
identification, like passports, are used far less
frequently.
The 9/11 Commission's report urged the
federal government to set standards for the issuance of birth
certificates and other forms of identification, such as driver's
licenses. The commissioners had good reason to make this
recommendation. "All but one of the 9/11 hijackers," their
investigations determined, "acquired some form of U.S.
identification document."[1] They used those documents to
rent cars and apartments, buy airline tickets, pass through
security checkpoints, and board planes.
The findings and recommendations of the
9/11 Commission built on an earlier study by a Markle Foundation
task force that evaluated post-9/11 requirements for security and
the protection of civil liberties. "Minimum standards for federal
recognition of identification documents are by no means a
silver bullet," their report read, but "they are an important
aspect of a comprehensive security policy." [2] The task force
concluded that it was essential to have better identification
security, including minimum data requirements and standards to
ensure that a person who presents a form of identification is the
person identified on that document.
Moreover, the proposal is nothing new.
It is consistent with actions already taken by individual
states. In 2003, Nevada took the same action Congress is being
urged to take: Nevada does not accept licenses from 23 states and
the District of Columbia as primary proof of an individual's
identity because their license and issuance standards are less
stringent. Arizona took similar action, refusing to accept, as
primary proof of identity, a driver's license or identification
card issued by 19 states.[3]
The recently passed intelligence reform
bill[4]
did include provisions intended to strengthen identification
security, but the bill's provisions were flawed in two respects.
First, the law required that regulations relating to new identity
security requirements should be written through an elongated
procedure with "interested parties" at the table, a needless
exercise given existing comprehensive studies of the issue and
one likely to be frustrated by the forced inclusion of advocates
who oppose more stringent identity security despite its evident
necessity. Second, the act also included language that lets states
opt out of the new standards, creating a gaping
loophole.
New
Proposals
It is likely that new legislation will
be introduced in the House to establish a more secure
system for issuing driver's licenses and other forms of state
identification documents for use in connection with federal
benefits and activities. It is also likely that this legislation
will include the following provisions to determine whether a
state-issued driver's license may be used as a form of federal
identification:
-
State-issued driver's licenses or
identification cards would be required to display the full name,
date of birth, gender, license number, address, photograph, and
signature.
-
The identification card would also be
required to have a physical security feature to prevent tampering
or illegal duplication and a machine-readable component containing
the basic data about the individual to whom the card was
issued.
-
Before being issued an identification
card, the applicant would be obliged to present a picture identity
document, proof of date of birth and Social Security number, and
documentation showing the address of principal
residence.
-
The state would be required to verify
those documents' validity. That verification would include, for
example, assuring that the Social Security number presented was
valid and that an applicant seeking an identification card in a new
state of residence also relinquished his card for his former state
of residence.
-
Applicants would also be required to
prove U.S. citizenship or lawful presence within the United
States.
-
For those applicants temporarily within
the United States, the date of expiration of the identification
card would have to coincide with the date that lawful presence
within the United States ended and would have to be prominently
displayed on the face of the card.
-
The federal government, beginning three
years from the date of passage of the statute, would no longer
accept any non-compliant state identification card for purposes of
federal identification.
Why Not?
The commonsense provisions of the
Sensenbrenner proposal seem so reasonable that it is hard to
understand why some oppose them with such vehemence. But they
do, and they offer a host of reasons-none of which withstand
sustained analysis.
Concerns About De
Facto
"National Identity Cards"
One argument against the identity
security proposals is that establishing national standards for
licenses will make the licenses a surrogate for a national identity
card. But minimum federal standards for documents used in federal
screening do not transform a driver's license into a national
ID card.
A national card might require a separate
federal agency, while the various congressional proposals would use
the existing state issuance infrastructure, laws, and
regulations. A national identity card would come into existence
only if it were the sole form of identification required for
certain essential purposes rather than a voluntary and optional
form of identification. Nations have recognized for centuries
that a secure passport is necessary for some very limited
purposes relating to international travel. But a single national
identity card is unnecessary for homeland security purposes
and should be opposed for a variety of reasons. Indeed, one
improvement to pending legislative proposals would be a provision
that forbids federal agencies from making any single form of
identification the only acceptable identifier.
More important, the concern expressed
mistakes a symptom for a cause. The problem is not with
requiring an enhanced, more reliable form of identification. The
problem, to the extent it exists, is that identification is being
increasingly called for when it is unnecessary. Every petty
bureaucrat should not require a picture ID merely for the privilege
of entering a building-but where the security concerns are
legitimate (as, for example, with entry into secure facilities or
boarding aircraft), the need for a reliable identification
form is paramount.
As a purely voluntary and optional form
of identification, state driver's licenses are the preferred
form of identification for most Americans, in part because most
Americans already carry them for ease of proving driving
eligibility. They already are a generally accepted identity card
and are used as an optional form of identity confirmation in
many federal laws such as the Help America Vote Act. The
pending proposals would simply add to their utility in fighting
terrorism, an even more significant objective. More important, by
continuing to use the distributed state-based network of
identity protection, we guard against encroachments on civil
liberties that arise from more centralized systems.
Thus, the identity security legislation
would not substantially change either the types of uses or the
frequency of use of driver's licenses as optional forms of
identification. The only significant change is that the legislation
would enhance the reliability of the form of identification most
Americans prefer. It simply is not sound public policy to prefer
unreliable and potentially forged documents over the same
documents that are more secure and reliable.
Federalism Not
Threatened
The point is also made that it is not
the state's job to issue identity cards to meet the needs of
federally supervised activities, such as boarding an airplane.
To be sure, this is true. The federal government issues
identity documents now that are more reliable substitutes and that
serve as "national identity cards." These include passports,
military identity cards, and identity cards for access to secure
federal facilities, which are issued by the federal government and
have strict controls on the methods for confirming the identity of
the holders. But they are unwieldy, and not everyone has them. For
example, although more than 40 million U.S. citizens possess
passports, they are not issued in a "wallet sized" format. So it is
generally inconvenient to carry a passport for
identification, although many people now do so for domestic
airline travel for the convenience of a quick identity
confirmation.
The essential point is that those people
who prefer to use a federal ID can do so, and no state is
required to change its licensing laws under the proposed
legislation. Yet states will know that this is the form of
identification most of their citizens desire. The federal
government would simply notify the states that if they wanted to
serve their citizens' interests to continue to use their
state-issued driver's license for certain federal purposes in the
future, they would have to make them more reliable. The respective
states could decline to follow the federal standards, but the
consequence would be that their citizens would have to use one of
the other forms of federal identification. That would narrow their
citizens' choices and might arguably enhance the role of the
national government, but a state's voluntary compliance with the
proposed law would hardly violate federalism principles.
Nor should the legislation prevent a
state from continuing to issue non-compliant driver's licenses
(perhaps in a parallel system) if it wishes. For example, a state
that wished to do so could have a secondary form of "state driving
permit" that it issued in a manner that does not meet federal
standards. If a state were to adopt such a parallel
system for its own convenience (perhaps because it values the
broader availability of driving permits even for those ineligible
for a federally compliant license), it should be free to issue such
permits, provided only that they are clearly distinct from its
federally compliant ID card.
In other words, the proposed legislation
should merely make clear the obvious-that driver's licenses used
for federal purposes are insecure, and they should not be. The
legislation should be agnostic on the unrelated state interest in
authorizing driving within its borders.
Unfunded Mandate
Argument Is Backwards
Another objection to the identity
security proposals is that they will constitute an unfunded
mandate obliging the states to expend funds for compliance. This
objection ignores history: Historically, federal regulation of
driver's licenses has been tied to transportation
funding.
The current proposals are more sensitive
to state interests. Rather than penalize for non-compliance, the
latest identity security proposals would use an incentive system,
fostering compliance through grants to assist those states that do
not already meet the standards over a three-year period.
One Size Doesn't Fit
All
National standards for driver's
licenses, another objection holds, are too proscriptive, requiring
uniformity where it is not necessary. But that argument proves
too much-for it is an argument for never having federal standards
regarding any question. While one may debate the necessity of
federal intervention generally, there is little doubt that national
security interests are among the most vital federal
interests.
The specific requirements advanced are
all drawn directly from recommendations prepared by a task force of
state officials convened by the American Association of Motor
Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) immediately after 9/11 to study
security weaknesses and correct them. The AAMVA completed its
study, led by state officials from nearly all states, in February
2004, and its DL/ID Security Framework document set forth very
clear requirements for AAMVA member states. Some of the
recommendations mirror requirements dating to a 1982 federal
law, which have never been implemented by the states. The
Department of Transportation recommended similar security
improvements to Congress in July 2001.[5]
No Threat to
Privacy
Fears regarding an erosion of privacy
are legitimate, but they are overblown with regard to the
identity security legislation at issue. Long-standing standards for
the appropriate sharing of driver's license information are already
in place.[6] The federal government is not
demanding any new information. Additionally, national
standards provide new opportunities to put additional safeguards in
place, ensuring that information is properly used solely for
identify verification and not for any other purposes.
Not an Anti-Immigrant
Initiative
Provisions of the proposal would require
identity documents to expire at the same time as the
expiration of lawful entry status and would preclude
individuals who have illegally entered or are unlawfully present in
the United States from having identification documents.
Construing such measures as "anti-immigrant" is just wrong. The law
in no way would penalize individuals who are lawfully present in
the United States either as legitimate visitors or as persons
seeking to immigrate to the United States.
Still, critics of this provision of the
law have a more nuanced point that is worth considering. Some
states believe that the issuance of driver's licenses to illegal
immigrants advances legitimate state interests. Lawmakers in
California, for example, have promoted the effort to license
persons who are in the state unlawfully because doing so would
require testing those drivers and increasing the likelihood that
they would get insurance. This, they argue, would make roads safer,
which in turn would lower insurance rates.[7]
Substantively, this argument is
problematic. It rests on a conjecture that may or may not prove
valid, and it ignores the point that providing licenses to people
unlawfully present in the United States promotes living and working
here in violation of the law. While citizens may save a few
dollars on insurance claims, those savings are likely to pale
in comparison to the vast costs inherent in permitting an
underground economy-expenses that by some estimates already cost
California $10.5 billion a year.
Moreover, giving federally recognized
driver's licenses to people unlawfully residing in the United
States is not just an argument that makes bad economic sense; it
also makes for bad homeland security strategy. Any strategy
that hopes to stem the tide of illegal entry and unlawful
residence in the United States must make it more attractive
for people to enter and reside in the country under the rule of
law. National policies should focus on encouraging legal
behavior.
If regulating immigration and incentives
affecting illegal immigration is the real purpose of congressional
legislation, it ought to be addressed in separate legislation. It
is unclear whether the national government could or should simply
require states to deny various benefits or protections of state law
to illegal immigrants. The states might counter that the national
government has failed in its duty to control illegal immigration
and its citizens ought not to be subjected to uninsured and unsafe
illegal alien drivers. But that debate really is separate
from the national interest in more reliable and secure forms of
identification.
Moreover, the essential national
interest in more secure forms of identification for
transportation screening can be met without forbidding states
from issuing any driver's licenses to illegal immigrants. If that
is so, our constitutional federalism protects such state-based
actions where they do not trench upon federal interests, even when
they seem profoundly unwise to the citizens of most
states.
Thus, the federal government is wholly
within its power in insisting that licenses to be used for access
to federal programs and facilities must meet certain minimum
standards. It should, however, as already outlined, be permissible
for a state (at its own discretion) to adopt a parallel identity
card program (if it wishes to) that meets its own needs but does
not satisfy federal standards, so long as the two types of
cards are readily distinguishable.
In short, we think states ought not to
issue driver's licenses to illegal immigrants; but no matter
how wrongheaded we think that policy is, states ought to remain
free to issue such state driving permits as long as they are
clearly distinguishable from the driver's licenses that meet
national identification standards. In this way, a state would not
be pressured to abandon one policy that it believes to be in its
interest (requiring illegal immigrants to secure driver's
permits and insurance) in order to secure the utility of the
federal recognition for its lawful citizens. Perhaps a state
pursuing a dual licensing system would have to use a different
color for illegal immigrant driver's licenses and indicate across
the top that they do not meet the national identification
standards. That would satisfy the national interest without
unduly frustrating the state's purported interest.
However, if states attempt to meet their
interests by issuing licenses that cannot be used for federal
identity purposes, they open themselves to a plethora of unintended
consequences, including the prospects of creating a ready means for
racial or ethnic profiling. Tennessee, for example, has tried
issuing licenses labeled "FOR DRIVING PURPOSES ONLY, NOT VALID
FOR IDENTIFICATION." They are not to be used for boarding
airplanes or for purchasing guns or alcohol. Recognizing that
the document could subject cardholders to a degree of scrutiny
beyond a regular license, the League of United Latin American
Citizens filed a federal lawsuit charging that the
Tennessee law discriminates against Hispanic residents. Still,
that is a choice that a state may choose to make.
Conclusion
The proposal to establish federal
standards for state-issued identity cards is a reasonable
requirement. Most security systems in the United States rely
on establishing legitimate identities. While not a panacea that can
solve all the problems of homeland security, guaranteeing the
surety of identity documents is essential. Indeed, reliable
identity documents are essential both for protecting liberties and
for promoting security. They not only help law enforcement in their
efforts to protect us, but also can be tools to ensure that lawful
citizens are not inconvenienced as they conduct routine and
personal affairs. Valid secure documents can also help to
protect individual privacy by limiting the requirement for
individuals to share personal information.
Federal standards for identity documents
can be established in way that promotes security, protects
individual liberties, and preserves the principles of federalism.
Congress should not hesitate to establish laws that achieve
these ends.
Paul Rosenzweig is Senior
Legal Research Fellow in the Center for Legal and Judicial Studies
at The Heritage Foundation and Adjunct Professor of Law at George
Mason University. James Jay Carafano,
Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow for National Security and
Homeland Security in the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute
for International Studies at The Heritage
Foundation.
[1]National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Final Report of the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2004), p.
390.
[2]Markle Foundation Task
Force, Creating a Trusted Information Network for Homeland
Security, App. A (2003), at www.
markle.org/downloadable_assets/nstf_report2_full_report.pdf
(Oct. 19, 2004). One of the authors of this paper served on the
Markle task force.
[3]See Nev. Rev. Stat.
§§ 483.083, -.290 (2003) (requiring proof of identity and
lawful presence); Az. Rev. Stat. § 28-3158 (requiring proof of
identity, lawful presence, and verification of valid social
security number).
[4]Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (S. 2845) § 7212 (Jan. 28,
2005), at http://frwebgate.
access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_cong_bills&docid=f:s2845enr.txt.pdf.
[5]Evaluation of Driver
Licensing Information Programs and Assessment of
Technologies, July 2001, report to
Congress by the U.S. Department of Transportation, National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration, in conjunction with the Federal
Motor Carrier Safety Administration and American Association of
Motor Vehicle Administrators.
[6]Those with privacy
concerns often ignore the long-standing use of the National Driver
Register (NDR), created in 1960 by Public Law 86. The NDR is a
national database of driver's license information containing a
central file of state reports on individuals whose licenses to
operate a motor vehicle have been suspended, revoked, canceled, or
denied, for cause, or who have been convicted of the following
serious traffic-related offenses: operating a motor vehicle while
under the influence of, or impaired by, alcohol or a
controlled substance; a traffic violation arising in connection
with a fatal traffic crash, reckless driving, or racing on the
highways; failing to give aid or provide identification when
involved in a crash resulting in death or personal injury; and
perjury or knowingly making a false affidavit or statement to
officials about activities governed by a law or regulation on
the operation of a motor vehicle. The NDR's primary purpose is to
enable state motor vehicle agencies to share driver record
information with each other so that they can make informed
decisions about issuing driver's licenses to individuals,
particularly those who move into their states from other
jurisdictions. Other groups with access to the NDR include
employers and potential employers of motor vehicle and locomotive
operators; air carriers regarding pilot applicants; federal
agencies such as the Federal Aviation Administration, Federal
Railroad Administration, and the Coast Guard for transportation
safety purposes; the National Transportation Safety Board and the
Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration for crash investigation
purposes; federal departments or agencies that issue licenses to
individuals; and individuals who request information
pertaining to themselves. Without a program such as the NDR, an
inquiring agency would have to query each of the 50 states
individually in order to ascertain whether a driver's license
applicant's license or privilege has been withdrawn or denied in
another state.
[7]Nathan Root, "To License
or Not to License, Part II," Inside ID, July 26, 2004, at
www.insideid.com/credentialing/article.php/
3385831.