On
February 19, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice will meet with their Japanese counterparts
in the first "two plus two" meeting since December 2002. The need
for such a meeting has never been more urgent. For the United
States, changes in the global security environment mean that a
strict regional definition of security threats is outdated. In
response, the Pentagon has begun to redefine its global defense
posture by bringing home some 70,000 troops from Europe and Asia
within a decade. Washington is turning increasingly to its allies
to assume greater roles in promoting regional peace and
stability.
Accordingly, the U.S. should encourage
Japan to continue strengthening the operational capabilities of the
Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF), initiate a formal bilateral
process with Japan to realign U.S. forces in the region and address
basing issues, and encourage Members of Congress to engage their
Japanese Diet counterparts to pursue increased dialogue and
exchanges.
Japan's New
Guidelines. Japan, for its part, has conducted a dramatic
review of its own military posture and appears willing to accept a
larger international security role. This is largely a function of
an increased sense of urgency about the country's ability to defend
itself in the face of a rapidly changing security environment in
Northeast Asia. In addition to terrorism and North Korea's nuclear
weapons programs and ballistic missile capabilities, there are
growing concerns about China and its rapidly growing political,
economic, and military power. China's naval expansion and regional
ambitions were shockingly evident when a Chinese nuclear submarine
intruded into the waters around Japan's southernmost islands last
November.
Thus, in December, the Japanese cabinet
adopted a new set of defense policy guidelines that establish
Japan's defense policies for the next 10 years. The guidelines,
revised to account for changes in the security environment, also
reflect Japan's determination to further strengthen its alliance
with the United States, although they also mention for the first
time the need to reduce the burden on Japanese citizens of hosting
U.S. forces while maintaining the U.S. deterrence. Also for the
first time, the guidelines specifically cite China and North Korea
as concerns and introduce major policy shifts, such as calling for
a more active role for the SDF in international peacekeeping
activities. They also relax Japan's arms export ban to enable the
sale of missile defense components to the United States.
U.S.-Japan
Alliance. Other recent changes in Japanese law promote a
more conducive environment for interoperability with U.S. defense
capabilities, including a missile defense system. For example, on
February 16, the Japanese cabinet approved a revision in the
current SDF Law that enables the Japanese Defense Agency Director
General to order missile interception with the consent of the prime
minister while dispensing with the sanction of the cabinet and
Japan's Security Council. The bill also seeks to reorganize the SDF
under a unified command by setting up a Joint Staff to oversee all
three branches of the SDF.
While such changes reflect much-needed
examination and articulation of Japan's defense and security
strategy, more work is required to transform Japan's military into
one with greater response capabilities that can benefit both
alliance partners. The existing U.S.-Japan mutual defense treaty,
enacted in 1947, is a solid agreement that provides a reasonable
degree of flexibility, but a more formal approach to defining
common goals and strategies is warranted if new and emerging
security concerns are to be addressed. The two-plus-two talks are
the ideal forum to develop concrete plans to strengthen the
alliance proactively.
What the United
States Should Do. During the two-plus-two talks,
Secretaries Rumsfeld and Rice should:
- Encourage Japan
to continue strengthening the operational capabilities of the
SDF --including missile defense and power projection
systems--and make greater contributions to international
security.
- Initiate a
formal bilateral process with Japan --in the form of
bilateral subcommittees--to conduct an ongoing dialogue to realign
U.S. forces in Japan and address basing issues. The process should
be institutionalized along the lines of the Security Policy
Initiative (SPI), which replaced the Future of the Alliance with
South Korea. The SPI serves as the mechanism both for finalizing
the restructuring and relocation of troops and for the enhancement
of and joint studies on combined force capabilities. The most
imminent basing issues with Japan include: (1) proposed joint
civilian-military use of the U.S. Air Force's Yokota Air Base in
western Tokyo; (2) reducing the burden of the U.S. military
presence in Okinawa by 2,600 Marines, including transferring
artillery and infantry units to mainland Japan sometime after 2008;
(3) possible transfer of the U.S. Army I Corps headquarters,
currently based in Fort Lewis, Washington, to Camp Zama in Kanagawa
Prefecture; and (4) integrating the bulk of 5th Air Force
headquarters at the Yokota base with the 13th Air Force
headquarters in Guam.
- Begin a serious
dialogue with Japan about whether U.S. force realignment
in the region (including the possible transfer of the U.S. Army I
Corps to Japan) would require Japan to expand its role beyond the
scope of the bilateral security treaty.
- Develop
strategies with Japan about how to address China's
military and economic rise, including stability in the Taiwan
Strait and China's new defense posture, and its implications for
the alliance.
- Encourage
Members of Congress to engage their counterparts in the
Japanese Diet to pursue increased dialogue and exchanges.
Conclusion. Emerging security concerns
in the Asia-Pacific region and beyond pose new challenges to the
U.S.-Japan alliance. Both countries must begin work now to forge a
new security relationship built on a stronger alliance
partnership.
Balbina Y. Hwang is Policy Analyst for
Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at The Heritage
Foundation.