Data Protection Technologies
As
risk assessments become more popular and the volume of data
collected by such programs increases, individuals will attempt to
gain unauthorized access to the data and the systems on which they
reside. Attempts to penetrate protected systems usually involve
some combination of technology and social engineering. To counter
such tactics, the government and other organizations should
consider multiple safeguards to achieve information security. The
first is to use accepted industry standards to design a strong
information security plan. The second is to protect the data with
cryptography to the extent practicable. The third involves ensuring
that people authorized to access the data have permissions for
access only to data that they need.
Gaining Access to Protected Systems and
Data
Individuals seeking unauthorized entry
into a computer network will often engage in significant
reconnaissance before attempting entry. They may, for instance,
scan the target's Web sites and query online databases to find out
additional information about the organization or its employees. A
target's Web site can provide useful information such as contact
information, corporate culture and idioms, product names, business
partners, and any of the target's mergers or acquisitions. The
individual can also scan list servers for questions that give more
information about the network. For instance, the target's systems
administrator could post a question to a security-related listserv
that includes the types of hardware or software the target is
using. Google or other search engines may provide additional
information on the target or individual employees. "Whois" records
are another resource, listing the names and contact information of
employees responsible for network security and operations. Once the
individual has this background information, the hacker can then use
"social engineering" to fill in missing information like
passwords.
Social engineering usually involves the
hacker manipulating the human tendency to trust, with the goal of
accessing valuable systems and the information residing on them. There are a variety of
social engineering tricks for collecting passwords. These include
impersonating a new employee or an angry manager who needs a
password immediately; claiming to be an employee who needs to gain
access to the system remotely; or pretending to be the systems
administrator and requesting passwords from employees. Still others
may pose as legitimate customers of information providers and
secure confidential information through a simple ruse.
There are other techniques for acquiring
unauthorized access to networks. Some are as simple as visiting the
target's company parking lot and looking for vanity tags on cars.
Someone's password may be similar to the vanity tag. Other, more
technical, methods include war dialing, where the individual
systematically tests the target's phone numbers and extensions to
locate unprotected modems, and scanning the network for unprotected
ports. If not
properly secured, infrared and wireless networks may also be
vulnerabilities.
As
long as the government and private companies continue to collect
vast amounts of information about people, there will be individuals
attempting to access it. Entities that store valuable information
must be vigilant as hackers' tactics and methods will continue to
evolve and change.
Standards for Data Protection
To
protect its data and systems, every organization should have a
well-conceived and implemented security policy. Such a policy
allows for a systematic approach to security that minimizes the
chance of overlooked vulnerabilities. The optimal information
security policy should be based upon generally accepted public
standards used in combination to best meet each company's needs.
These public standards (some designed for specific industry
sectors) have been articulated in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
(GLBA), the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), and the International
Organization for Standardization's (ISO's) 17799. The GLBA standard,
which is intended to protect consumers' personal financial
information that is held by financial institutions, identifies 296
specific issues to be considered in 15 broad areas. HIPAA covers
consumers' private information in a health care context and
identifies 20 control areas with 329 discrete issues relating to
data/system security.
ISO
17799 is a non-industry specific, international code of practice.
The ISO describes the code's purpose as offering "guidelines and
voluntary directions for information security management. It is
meant to provide a high level, general description of the areas
currently considered important when initiating, implementing or
maintaining information security in an organization." It has two parts: ISO
17799, which is a code of practice, and BS7799-2, which contains
security management system specifications. This standard is
intended to serve as a single reference for determining the types
of controls needed for the majority of situations in which
information systems are used in industry and commerce. ISO 17799
identifies 10 control areas for implementation: (1) establishing
organizational security policy; (2) organizational security
infrastructure; (3) asset classification and control; (4) personnel
security; (5) physical and environmental security; (6)
communications and operations management; (7) access control; (8)
systems development and maintenance; (9) business continuity
management, and (10) compliance.
Organizations that collect and store data
must carefully choose the standards that best fit their individual
needs. An appropriate, reliable standard allows for a systematic
review of information security policies and systems to better
protect valuable systems and data.
Protecting Data with Cryptography
In
the United States, the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) establishes the standards for government agencies
wishing to encrypt their data. If properly implemented, cryptography
(the technology for keeping information secure) provides very
strong data protection. With cryptography, a person can know
everything about the cryptographic tool except the key and still be
unable to decipher the enciphered information. Cryptography is
therefore a powerful data protection tool because it allows an
organization to focus on protecting just the key instead of vast
amounts of information.
There are two types of algorithm keys:
symmetric and asymmetric. With symmetric algorithms the encryption
key and decryption key are identical. To use this type of
algorithm, the sender and receiver must decide in advance what the
key will be. If the key becomes known, then anyone with the key can
access the encrypted information. Symmetric ciphers are typically
used because information can be enciphered and deciphered
relatively easily and quickly.
Asymmetric or public key algorithms have
different encryption and decryption keys. In addition, the
decryption key cannot usually be determined from the encryption key
within a reasonable period of time. With this type of algorithm,
only the decryption key must remain secret. Security for such a
system is higher, but the ease of use is comparatively less.
Cryptography can provide authentication,
integrity, nonrepudiation, and confidentiality. In this context,
authentication means that it is impossible for someone to
impersonate someone else. Integrity involves being able to verify
that the data have not been modified, and nonrepudiation prevents a
person from denying having sent or accessed the information.
Encryption can also enhance confidentiality for stored data. The
greatest problem for cryptography, however, is lost keys, and the
concomitant necessity for ways to recover the key--for data without
a key are utterly lost. If data are being transmitted, losing the
key or data is less of a concern because either can be resent. In
order to counter the possibility of lost keys, there must be
systematic key management and a backup system for keys and data.
Yet this backup system for recovery is often the loophole and
source of greatest insecurity in the system.
While cryptography can protect data, its
more valuable role is in authenticating data and messages and
demonstrating their integrity. For instance, cryptographic keys can
be used to prevent intentional alteration or forgery. Many
cryptographic tools now automatically integrate encryption,
authentication, and integrity functions, since many individuals
have difficulty doing this properly on their own.
Legal and Policy Implications
Technology is both a problem and a
solution for the issues posed by enhanced information collection
systems. It can facilitate access to and the accumulation of large
amounts of data; however, if that access is not properly managed,
the information can be misused. When designed with proper
procedures and protections and combined with oversight, technology
can provide a reasonable balance between security and privacy.
Technology can assist in ensuring both
data security and data privacy. Software can allow for different
levels of information access between the data owner and the data
requester. This means that access is no longer a binary issue ("Can
I have access to all of your data, yes or no?"). In addition, the
variable access levels help to guarantee as much as possible the
privacy of the third party whose data are being examined. If a data
owner has a database of suspected terrorists, the owner can giver
data requesters different permissions for data access. The data
owner could, for example, give the State Department permission to
retrieve the names of the top 10 individuals whose information
matches at least 80 percent of the search request. The data owner
might give a private entity, like an airline, less access. The
search results might provide an identification number for
individuals who have at least a 90 percent match to the database
query. If the private entity (e.g., the airline) wanted more
information, it would have to return to the data owner and request
the information associated with the specific ID numbers. A third
permissioning option would allow or require the data holder to send
alerts to governmental entities, like intelligence agencies, when
the database retrieves certain search results.
A Way to Think about Data Protection
Technologies
There are gradations between the poles of
complete anonymity and full identity. Many government transactions
can now occur with the disclosure of a minimal amount of personal
information. Just as there is a growing understanding of the
concept of graduated identification, data protection technologies
can provide a spectrum of access solutions for the government.
Information databases can be designed to give data requesters the
type and amount of information they need, and no more.
Conceptions of liberty are not based on
the expectation of absolute privacy, but rather on the assumption
that the government will not intrude without good cause. When a
criminal or terror investigation is underway, Americans must be
able to expect that scrutiny will not be focused on them without a
good reason. Most interactions with the government require more
than absolute anonymity, but rarely reach detailed investigation.
There must be a continued expectation that the government will
ensure that infringements on liberty are commensurate with
necessity. Properly implemented data protection technologies allow
for authentication, verification, and graduated access. They can
help prevent expectations of privacy from eroding by allowing the
government to avoid treating full-scale disclosure as the default
for all individual interactions.
The
mere implementation of new laws and systems to combat terrorism
does not automatically diminish privacy. Rather such laws and
practices frequently involve substituting one type or level of
privacy intrusion for another. Some Americans might prefer a
shortened wait in airports if airlines can check their personal
information against suspected terrorist watch list databases
through limited permission rather than have to endure a longer wait
and investigative screening onsite. Not all data protection
technologies will work for every situation--nor should they. The
greatest policy challenge is finding the most effective uses of the
specific data protection technology--both for liberty and
security--not in labeling the collection of information as
evil.
Data
protection technologies can improve the safety of data and prevent
abuse. As with all technology, the implementation should be thought
out well in advance and designed with the appropriate protocols to
ensure privacy. Protocols can be both part of the hardware and the
operational guidelines and oversight mechanisms.
Conclusion
In
properly determining how best to enhance both liberty and security,
it is useful to have some basic principles for assessing data
protection technologies. Such a list might include the
following:
- The data protection technology should
allow for clear audit tracks to prevent data alteration or identify
when data have been changed.
- The technology should have a means to
provide graduated levels of access to the data.
- The technology should have protocols for
enforcing the confidentiality and security of the data.
There are multiple approaches to securing
data. One means is following one of the many published information
security standards; another is to protect the most sensitive data
through encryption. Controlling access to data and making sure that
entities only have the appropriate level of access is critical if
privacy interests are to be protected in the large data collections
within the U.S. government's control. It is possible to balance
security and privacy when it comes to data protection, but all of
the policies and plans need to be thought out first before any of
the data are collected.
Paul Rosenzweig is Senior Legal Research
Fellow in the Center for Legal and Judicial Studies at The Heritage
Foundation and Adjunct Professor of Law at George Mason University.
Alane Kochems is a Research Assistant in the Kathryn and Shelby
Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies at The Heritage
Foundation. This paper is based in part on a roundtable discussion
held June 22, 2004, at the Heritage Foundation and co-sponsored by
the Center for Democracy and Technology and The Heritage
Foundation.