[W]e as a Congress have an obligation to try
to fix [those entitlement programs] today so that they don't end up
bankrupting our children and our children's children
tomorrow.
-Senator Judd Gregg
(R-NH)[1]
There is no way we
are going to deliver all the Medicare promises that have been made.
No way.
-David M. Walker,
U.S. Comptroller General[2]
Since the
Administration's release of its latest 10-year cost estimates for
the Medicare drug bill, many Members of Congress say they are in a
state of sticker shock, and taxpayers are confused and suspicious.
More recent estimates of the bill's cost are far higher than the
2003 estimates on which Congress relied when voting on the
bill.
When Congress
enacted the Medicare Modernization Act (MMA) in November 2003,
it relied on cost estimates by the Congressional Budget Office
(CBO). The CBO estimated the 10-year cost of the drug
provisions at $394 billion for the period 2004 to
2013.
The Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), the agency that runs the
Medicare program, generated its own estimate in 2003 and has
continued to do so every year since the bill's enactment. Though
not made public until 2004, the CMS's 2003 estimate was $534
billion for the period 2004 to 2013. In CMS's February 2005
estimate, the 10-year price tag of the drug provision is $724
billion for the period 2006 to 2015.
Competing
Estimates
The difference
between the two CMS estimates is easily explained. Members of
Congress should not be surprised. White House press secretary Scott
McClellan correctly observes that comparing the two 10-year totals
is akin to "comparing apples to oranges."[3]
Specifically, the
previous estimates were for the time period 2004 to 2013. Since the
full-blown drug entitlement does not begin until 2006, the 2004 to
2013 estimate includes two years of the significantly less
expensive Medicare Drug Discount Card (MDDC), which offers
targeted, substantial help to needy seniors.[4] Only eight years
involve the new prescription drug program's higher costs. The newer
estimates, for the period 2006 to 2015, include 10 years of the new
entitlement-hence the major difference between the two
estimates.
New Taxpayer
Costs
The true
significance of the latest CMS estimate is that this number is the
taxpayers' first glimpse of the drug entitlement's enormous cost,
which will soon grow dramatically as the baby-boom generation
retires. These drug costs will aggravate the already enormous
unfunded liabilities of the entire Medicare program. For
example:
-
Taxpayers will face
an estimated $29.7 trillion in unfunded Medicare
liabilities. According to
the latest Medicare Trustees Report, the estimated total of
unfunded Medicare benefits increased by $2 trillion in just one
year.
-
Taxpayers will pay
trillions of dollars to cover the Medicare drug costs.
The latest
Medicare trustees' estimate of unfunded drug entitlement
liabilities alone is $8.7 trillion over a 75-year
period.
-
Taxpayers will pay
an increasing share of their income taxes just to keep Medicare
afloat. Under current law
and assumptions, Dr. Thomas Saving, a former Medicare public
trustee (his term expired after the 2005 Trustees Report was
issued), estimates that the program will consume 25 percent of
all federal income taxes by 2020 and 50 percent of all federal
income taxes by 2040.
Thus, the financial
burdens of the expanded Medicare entitlement pose a challenge for,
and impose an enormous burden on, both current and future
taxpayers. Even though the latest revelations of the Medicare drug
bill's 10-year cost should not surprise Members of Congress, their
anxiety is well founded. The most recent CMS estimates reflect a
reality that is very different from what many thought to be the
case in November 2003, as congressional leadership rushed the
Medicare bill through passage in both houses of Congress, based
solely on the CBO estimates.
A Responsible
Policy
Once an entitlement
is in place, it is nearly impossible to repeal or limit it.[5] The
most sensible option for Congress is to repeal the drug
entitlement provisions of Title 1 of the Medicare
Modernization Act of 2003 before they take effect. Meanwhile,
Congress could target direct and generous assistance to
seniors who are without drug coverage, particularly poor
seniors.
Short of repeal, the
next best option is delay. Delaying the starting date from January
1, 2006, to January 1, 2007, would save nearly $40 billion in 2006
alone.[6] Accordingly, Representative Jeff Flake
(R-AZ) has introduced the Prescription Drug COST (Control
Overspending to Save Taxpayers) Containment Act of 2005 (H.R. 1382)
to delay the start of the drug entitlement while extending the life
of the Medicare drug discount cards, which are intended for seniors
who actually need help with the cost of their prescription
drugs.
Moreover, some of
the nearly $40 billion in savings from the proposed one-year
delay could be rolled over into the MDDC program, thereby expanding
the subsidy to low-income seniors and allowing more seniors to
qualify for that subsidy. This would increase aid to seniors who
are in actual need while temporarily relieving taxpayers of much of
the new entitlement's crushing cost.
Behind the Different
Medicare Estimates
As noted, Congress
voted for the MMA based on the CBO cost estimate, the only estimate
available to Members at the time. The CBO priced Title I (the
prescription drug benefit) at $409.8 billion over 10 years. After
savings in other areas, the estimated total cost of the law was
$394 billion.[7] In March 2004, Congress and the public
learned that the CMS had done its own cost projections on the MMA
and had estimated the 10-year price tag at $534 billion.[8] The
CMS and the CBO used different assumptions as to which and how
many seniors would sign up for the program. These account for most
of the difference,[9] but the real story goes deeper.
Whether made by the
CBO, the CMS, the Office of Management and Budget, or independent
health policy analysts, health care program cost projections
are a profoundly difficult exercise. Slight changes in assumptions
can dramatically affect these estimates, just as unforeseen
external factors can cause actual costs to vary greatly.
Tables 1, 2, and 3
compare the three sets of projections for the prescription
drug benefit's first eight years. (The CBO estimate includes 2004
and 2005, two years prior to the drug entitlement's 2006 start, but
the CMS estimate does not. Similarly, the CMS estimates include
2014 and 2015, but the CBO's does not. Therefore, these 10-year
estimates provide only eight years' overlap for
comparison.)



In summary, the
original CMS estimate for the period 2006 to 2013 is 23.7 percent
higher than the CBO estimate for the same period. The more recent
CMS numbers are even higher: 26.3 percent higher than the CBO
estimate.
Recalling Medicare
Catastrophic. Congressional
experience with the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988
directly relates to the current Medicare debate. That bill passed
by huge majorities in the House and Senate, and enjoyed the Reagan
Administration's support. It also included a prescription drug
benefit.
However, there is a
major ironic difference between that Medicare drug benefit and
today's drug entitlement, which was cobbled together by a
Republican congressional majority. The 1988 bill was
self-financing; those who would receive the drug benefits would pay
for them. The 2003 bill is not self-financing; it is an
open-ended entitlement, largely financed by the taxpayers out of
general revenues.
Although the 1988
Medicare drug provision was designed to be self-financing, its
costs ballooned out of control, and the Medicare Catastrophic
Coverage Act of 1988 was repealed after a little over a year.
Contributing factors included growing senior opposition
and exploding cost estimates, but the exploding cost estimates are
positively minuscule compared to the enormous obligations that
the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 imposes. As Robert E.
Moffit, Director of the Center for Health Policy Studies at The
Heritage Foundation and a Reagan appointee at the Department of
Health and Human Services in 1988, recalls:
The Congressional
Budget Office's (CBO) estimate of the annual cost of the 1988 drug
benefit jumped from $5.7 billion when the bill was passed to $11.8
billion just twelve months later. The CBO raised the cost of a new
skilled nursing benefit from $2.1 billion to $13.5 billion, or by
642 percent, in just 14 months.[10]
While the recent CMS
increase in the estimated cost of the MMA is striking across
the board, the most disturbing numbers are for the first years.
Estimates are more likely to be accurate in the early years than in
later years. For example, in its 2003 estimates for 2006, the first
year of the entitlement, the CMS exceeded CBO estimates by 36.2
percent, or $9.3 billion. For 2007, the second year of the
entitlement, CMS estimates are 30.8 percent, or $12 billion,
higher. (See Table 4.)

First-Year Drug
Costs. Now that the CMS has
released new cost estimates, the discrepancy relative to the
2003 CBO estimate is even greater. For just 2006, the program is
estimated to cost $37.4 billion-$11.7 billion more than the
CBO estimate that Members of Congress had available when they
voted for the MMA. (See Table 4.)
The CMS has
increased its own estimates for the first year of the drug
entitlement. Originally, the CMS put the price tag for 2006 at
$35 billion; now it puts it at $37.4 billion. This is a 6.9 percent
increase for the same time period, from the same agency, for the
same program, in 14 months.
The Price Taxpayers
Will Pay for Congressional Inaction
Just as the cost of
the prescription drug entitlement (Part D) will continue to
grow, so will the cost of the rest of Medicare, including both Part
A (hospital insurance) and Part B (supplemental medical
insurance). This will only increase Medicare's massive unfunded
liability.[11] The 2004 annual report of the Social
Security and Medicare trustees estimated the unfunded
liability for Medicare over the next 75 years to be $27.7 trillion,
$8.1 trillion of which is directly attributable to the prescription
drug entitlement.[12] The passage of the MMA in 2003 is
therefore responsible for nearly 30 percent of Medicare's
overall unfunded liability.
Bigger
Liabilities. The 2005 Trustees
Report has increased that number to $29.7 trillion, with $8.7
trillion directly attributed to drug entitlement.[13]
This is an increase of $2 trillion in just one year, including an
additional $600 billion, or 7.5 percent, for the drug entitlement
alone (Part D).


For perspective,
according to Forbes, the combined wealth of the 400
richest Americans reached $1 trillion for the first time in 2004.[14]
The further one pushes the 75-year window into the future, the
larger grows the burden of unfunded Medicare liabilities on
future generations of taxpayers.
Medicare's
Increasing Share of Federal Income Taxes. As the cost of
Medicare Parts A, B, and D continues to increase over the next 75
years, the share of federal income tax revenues required to pay
bills not funded by the traditional sources of Medicare funding
(premiums, payroll taxes, etc.) will grow exponentially. Dr. Thomas
R. Saving, one of the program's two public trustees, estimates
that Medicare will consume 25 percent of all federal income taxes
by 2020 if nothing is done to reform it.[15] By 2040, fully 50 percent
of every dollar collected through the federal income tax system
will have to be spent on Medicare just to pay the bills in excess
of funds received from traditional sources. (See Chart
3.)

The trade-offs are
painful. Assuming no change, either America's taxpayers face
massive tax increases, or seniors would face giant premium hikes or
benefit cuts, or Congress must enact major cuts in non-Medicare
government spending. However, the better course of action
would be to reform the Medicare system as soon as possible by
changing the structure of the program and repealing or delaying the
universal drug entitlement before it goes into effect on January 1,
2006.
Conclusion
The Administration's
latest $724 billion 10-year Medicare drug cost estimate should not
surprise Members of Congress. It is a cost projection for a
massively expensive, open-ended entitlement, the costs of which
will grow every year. In a sense, it almost does not matter whether
one uses CBO or CMS numbers: Either way, costs will soar; only the
rates differ. In fact, historically, every proposed Medicare drug
benefit has included a larger price tag than the one preceding
it.[16]
The real
significance of Medicare sticker shock is that it marks America's
first glimpse into the soaring future costs of the drug
entitlement. Congress can act now to revisit the Medicare law by
targeting drug subsidies to low-income seniors who are without
coverage and therefore lessening the deepening fiscal crisis
in Medicare. This can be done this year, either by postponing the
drug entitlement before it goes into effect on January 1, 2006, or
by repealing it.
Representative
Flake's proposed Prescription Drug COST Containment Act of 2005
would simply push back the entitlement's starting date by one
year and extend the life of the Medicare Drug Discount Card to
cover that year. This would be a good start, saving taxpayers
nearly $40 billion in 2006 alone and ensuring that seniors in need
would continue to have help with the cost of prescription
drugs.
In any case, Members
of Congress cannot now pretend they do not know the true
dimensions of the nation's looming financial problems-even if
they insist that they did not know of them in November 2003,
when they enacted the largest entitlement expansion since Lyndon
Johnson's Great Society.
Derek Hunter is a
Research Assistant in the Center for Health Policy Studies at The
Heritage Foundation.
[1]Bill Swindell,
"Senate Committee Members Say It's Time to Control Medicare's
Surging Costs," CQ Today, February 8, 2005.
[3]Robert Pear,
"Estimate Revives Fight on Medicare Costs," The New York
Times, February 10, 2005, p. A20.
[4]For more
information on the Medicare Drug Discount Card, see Derek Hunter,
"The Truth About the Medicare Drug Discount Card," Heritage
Foundation Backgrounder No. 1766, May 28, 2004, at
www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/ bg1766.cfm, and Derek
Hunter, "The Medicare Drug Discount Cards: One Month In," Heritage
Foundation WebMemo No. 538, July 15, 2004, at
www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/wm538.cfm.
[5]The one major
exception is the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of
1988.
[6]Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services, "Comparison of CMS's Original Title
I MMA Cost Estimates to Those Underlying the President's FY
2006 Budget," attached to unpublished e-mail from Julie Goon,
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, February 9,
2005.
[7]Douglas
Holtz-Eakin, Director, Congressional Budget Office, letter and
attached chart to Representative Bill Thomas (R-CA), Chairman,
Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives,
November 20, 2003, at www.cbo.gov/showdoc.
cfm?index=4808&sequence=0 (April 21, 2005).
[8]Amy Goldstein,
"Official Says He Was Told to Withhold Medicare Data," The
Washington Post, March 13, 2004, p. A1.
[9]See Derek Hunter,
"How the Drug Entitlement Drives Different Medicare Cost
Estimates," Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 464, April 1,
2004, at
www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/wm464.cfm#_ftn6.
[10]Robert E. Moffit,
"The Last Time Congress Reformed Health Care: A Lawmaker's Guide to
the Medicare Catastrophic Debacle," Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder No. 996, August 4, 1994, at
www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/bg996.cfm.
[11]The unfunded
liability is the amount that the program will cost over and above
what current revenues will provide to the program.
[12]Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2004 Annual Report of the Board
of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance and Federal
Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Funds, March 23, 2004,
pp. 60, 99, and 108, Table II.B11, Table II.C16, and Table II.C22,
at www.cms.hhs.gov/publications/trusteesreport/tr2004.pdf
(April 21, 2005).
[13]Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2005 Annual Report of the Board
of Trustees of the Federal Hospital Insurance and Federal
Supplementary Medical Insurance Trust Funds, March 23, 2005,
pp. 92, 101, and 112, Table III.C10, Table III.C15, and Table
III.C21, at
www.cms.hhs.gov/publications/trusteesreport/tr2005.pdf
(April 21, 2005).
[14]David Armstrong
and Peter Newcomb, eds., "The Forbes 400," Forbes, October
11, 2004, at www.forbes.com/free_forbes/
2004/1011/103.html&r104 (April 21, 2005).
[15]Thomas R. Saving,
"Perspectives on the 2005 Social Security and Medicare Trustees
Reports," slides for presentation at congressional briefing,
"Analyzing the 2005 Social Security and Medicare Trustees Report,"
National Center for Policy Analysis, Washington, D.C., March 23,
2005, at www.ncpa.org/evn/washington/2005-perspectives.pdf
(April 21, 2005).
[16]See Derek Hunter,
"The Sky's the Limit: Medicare's Upwardly Mobile Drug Cost
Projections," Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 326, August
12, 2003, at
www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/wm326.cfm.