Nothing
in this title shall be construed to authorize any Federal officer
or employee to exercise any supervision or control over the
practice of medicine or the manner in which medical services are
provided, or over the selection, tenure, or compensation of any
officer or employee of any institution, agency, or person providing
health services; or to exercise any supervision or control over the
administration or operation of any such institution, agency,
or person.
-Social
Security Act, Sec. 1801, Title XVIII[1]
There is
good news and bad news on Medicare reimbursement. The good news is
that Members of Congress are unhappy with the Medicare physician
payment program that they created. It is a complex system of
administered pricing and price controls, governed by elaborate
statutory formulas and characterized by mind-numbing
regulatory micromanagement. In sharp contrast to reimbursement
for professional services in other economic sectors, Medicare
providers are not paid according to their skill levels, their
innovative treatments, the quality of the care delivered to
individual Medicare patients, or the specific benefits provided to
patients. Moreover, under current government formulas, they can
look forward to future reductions in Medicare reimbursement
even though they are expected to treat a dramatically larger
Medicare population.
Needless
to say, most physicians are unhappy with Medicare's payment
system-a view increasingly shared by senior Members of Congress.
House Ways and Means Committee Chairman Bill Thomas (R-CA) and
Health Subcommittee Chairman Nancy Johnson (R-CT) have said, "It is
time to change this irrational system."[2]
The bad
news is that, instead of enacting real reform, Congress is
preparing not only to keep Medicare's rigid system of price
controls and central planning, but also to add another layer
of regulatory control over physician behavior. Senate Finance
Committee Chairman Charles Grassley (R-IA) and Ranking Member Max
Baucus (D-MT) are sponsoring the Medicare Value Purchasing Act of
2005 (S. 1356),[3] which would implement "pay for performance"
in the Medicare program by tying physician payment to compliance
with government-defined medical guidelines. Representative
Johnson has introduced a similar bill in the House. The approach is
well intentioned, but more central planning will only intensify the
Medicare reimbursement problem, not ameliorate it.
A
Misguided Approach
The
concept of "pay for performance" in Medicare is unquestionably
attractive to federal policymakers and suggests-correctly in
our view-that Medicare patients and the taxpayers are not
getting the best value for their money. Using the
rhetoric of "best practices" and "evidence-based medicine" to
describe this approach, proponents are creating the false
impression that new government guidelines would promote
market-like competition, control costs, and improve the
quality of health care delivered within Medicare. They believe that
adopting this approach would simultaneously control the growth
of Medicare costs in a more rational fashion and close the gap
"between the health care we now have and the health care we could
have."[4]
Before
succumbing to the latest health care policy fad, Members of
Congress should carefully consider two things: the likely
impact of government incentives designed to secure physician
adherence to centrally determined standards and whether or not
those standards can indeed provide higher quality to patients and
better value to taxpayers. Despite the rhetoric to the contrary,
this proposal is anything but a free-market approach to physician
payment. It is, in fact, a compliance-based system, inherently
burdened by serious limitations. For example, such a system
would:
-
Dump
patients into a system of top-down, "cookbook" medicine that is
incompatible with high professional standards of patient
care;
-
Spawn an
increasing number of Medicare rules, regulations, and guidelines,
further undercutting the physician's professional autonomy and
integrity, as well as patient choice and access to
care;
-
Undermine
the more desirable goal of high quality, which requires
personalized care;
-
Retard
medical innovation and introduce unproductive gaming by doctors to
secure higher Medicare reimbursement; and
-
Further
weaken the traditional doctor-patient relationship.
A Better
Policy
If
Members of Congress had seized the opportunity to replace the
current Medicare system with a premium support program similar to
the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program (FEHBP) during
consideration of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, they would
not now need to fix the Medicare physician payment system that they
created. The FEHBP is characterized by consumer choice, market
competition, and minimal bureaucracy and regulation. The
Office of Personnel Management, which administers the FEHBP,
does not prescribe detailed formulas for physician payment for
thousands of medical services, enforce price controls, or conduct
compliance audits or investigations into physician
payment.
However,
short of serious and comprehensive Medicare reform, Congress should
go back to the drawing board and design a new reimbursement system
for Medicare doctors, combined with reliable market-based
updates for physicians' services. Meanwhile, Congress
should:
-
Abolish
the current fee schedules and the update formulas;
-
Eliminate
Medicare restrictions on balance billing (effectively a price
control system) and allow doctors to charge either more or less
than the Medicare fixed price for medical services;
and
-
Require
physicians, as a condition of participating in Medicare, to
disclose the prices that they charge for Medicare
services.
As a
national market develops, private-sector organizations (e.g.,
consumer, professional, and seniors' groups) could generate
information on the quality of health care services, meeting the
market demand for quality information.
The Current Medicare Reimbursement System
Medicare's
current reimbursement policy is a complex, formula-driven system of
administrative pricing, central planning, and price controls.[5] It has
three main features: the fee schedule, updates and controls, and
balance billing restrictions.
The RBRVS
Fee Schedule.[6]Medicare
uses the resource-based relative value scale (RBRVS) to pay for
physician services. Under this formula, Medicare officials
compute the "objective value" of an estimated 7,000 procedures.[7] Each
component of a medical service is assigned a weighted value that is
calculated by using social science measurements of the time,
energy, and effort required to perform a given procedure,
including resource inputs such as medical equipment, malpractice
insurance, and administrative costs. These weighted "values"
are then converted into dollar amounts and used to determine
the fees that Medicare pays to physicians for those
services.[8] The diagnosis related group (DRG) system
reimburses hospitals using a similar strategy.[9]
Updates
and Controls. Attempting
to limit Medicare physician costs, Congress also created
volume controls, based on an official projection of the
"appropriate" growth rate of Medicare physician services.
Since 1997, these volume controls have been tied to the Sustainable
Growth Rate (SGR), the congressionally created formula for
determining annual updates in physician reimbursement rates under
the Medicare fee schedules. Under the SGR, the annual update in
reimbursement is linked to the aggregate level of Medicare spending
for physician services. If spending exceeds the government target,
which is based on growth in the national economy, a statutory
algorithm reduces the increases in the reimbursement
rate.
The SGR
system has been ineffective in controlling volume-the volume
of physician services per beneficiary rose by almost 22 percent
between 1999 and 2003[10]-while creating new problems for physician
reimbursement. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS)
recently reported that Medicare's sharp 15.2 percent increase in
spending for physician services in 2004 was due almost entirely to
volume growth. The result was a scheduled 4.3 percent cut in
physician reimbursement rates, beginning January 1, 2006.[11]
CMS actuaries are projecting similar negative payment updates
of 5 percent annually for the next seven years, which means that
physician payments would decrease by more than 31 percent from 2005
to 2012. During the same period, physician practice costs would go
up by 19 percent.[12]
As
doctors find it financially burdensome to treat Medicare patients,
they will stop accepting new ones. According to a recent American
Medical Association survey, 38 percent of physicians will reduce
the number of new Medicare patients that they see as a result of
the impending 2006 cuts.[13] More than one-fifth of Medicare enrollees
already have trouble finding a primary care physician, and 27
percent report delays in getting an appointment, according to a
recent Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC) study.[14]
There are
several reasons for the SGR's inability to control volume. For one,
the growth rate of the national economy (as measured by GDP) has
very little to do with the growth rate of services, making it a
poor benchmark for a spending target. For example, during a
recession, the spending target is pushed downward, punishing
physicians, even though practice costs and demand for services do
not drop proportionally. In fact, the growth in Medicare spending
is driven largely by new technology, patient needs, and public
policies related to the provision of services. These factors are
outside the direct control of physicians, making them useless
targets for volume control incentives.
Moreover,
even if physicians did exert a large degree of control over
Medicare spending, individual doctors cannot be expected to
respond to collective incentives. An aggregate spending target
and universally applied rate update will not decrease (and may even
increase) the short-run incentives for individual physicians to
increase volume, because they know that any personal effort to
reduce services would not result in a proportional increase in
payments.[15]
Balance-Billing
Restrictions. The third
feature of Medicare's current reimbursement policy is the
restriction on balance billing, the amount charged by a provider to
a patient above what Medicare is willing to reimburse. With
the enactment of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Congress
imposed new legal obstacles to private contracts for services
performed on Medicare recipients, cutting off an escape route
for doctors and patients who might want to enter into a private
payment system outside the Medicare program.[16] Meanwhile,
providers must incur losses because of inadequate reimbursement for
Medicare services,[17] and they do not have the flexibility to
adjust prices to attract new business or react to market challenges
and opportunities. By removing any remnant of a price mechanism,
balance-billing restrictions compound the inefficiencies of
the Medicare physician payment system and stifle improvements in
quality and value.
In
summary, Medicare pays doctors according to a resource-based
formula that embodies an "objective" theory of value that is
utterly inconsistent with modern economics, combined with
inefficient price regulation and an illogical reimbursement
update formula. The current Medicare fee schedule does not and
cannot account for differences in physicians' skills, quality of
service, and benefit to the patient any more than a physician can
account for the state of the national economy. While common sense
would dictate abolishing this outdated approach in favor of a
rational system of market pricing, Congress is instead
preparing to impose another layer of regulatory compliance on
physicians.
The
Genesis of Pay-for-Performance Reimbursement
Health
policy experts who advocate pay for performance in provider
reimbursement invariably rely on the concept of evidence-based
medicine (EBM). Originally developed in the 1970s and 1980s by
clinical epidemiologists at McMaster University in Canada, EBM
is an attempt to apply epidemiological principles to clinical
care and promote reliance on research data, particularly
randomized controlled trials (RCTs), in the practice of
medicine.[18]
In a
performance-based reimbursement system, EBM is used to develop
"clinical practice guidelines" and compensate health care
providers according to their compliance with the "best
practices" dictated by a third party's interpretation of RCTs.
Health maintenance organizations (HMOs) seized upon this concept in
the 1990s, employing strict practice rules to override the clinical
judgment of the treating physician in order to control
utilization and limit costs. In practice, they used guidelines to
rule instead of to guide, stressing evidence-based guidelines
to the exclusion of clinical judgment.
Despite
provoking a backlash from physicians and patients during the mid to
late 1990s, practice guidelines continued to be developed for
physician practice at a rapid rate. According to one estimate, more
than 1,000 guidelines are being developed annually by
quality-of-care organizations, medical associations, and health
insurance plans.[19]
Those who
advocate tying clinical guidelines to financial compensation
through pay-for-performance reimbursement claim that it will
narrow the gap between "ideal," cost-effective care and actual care
observed in clinical settings. In their view, financial teeth are
needed to motivate physicians to standardize their treatment
decisions. They believe that this would reduce medical errors,
optimize quality of care, and control escalating health care costs
by controlling price and utilization more directly.[20]
Enter
Medicare. The
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services obtained the authority
to experiment with pay for performance in Medicare from the
Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 and the Medicare, Medicaid, and
SCHIP Benefits Improvement and Protection Act of 2000.[21]
The agency has established eight demonstration initiatives: Two
address the quality of clinical care in hospitals, three deal with
physician offices and integrated health systems, and three test
specific models of chronic care improvement and disease
management.
The
Premier Hospital Quality Incentive (PHQI) demonstration, the most
advanced initiative, is designed to track and reward performance in
treating five chronic health conditions at 270 hospitals
around the country.[22] Provider compliance with a uniform set of
34 quality indicators yields significant financial rewards for
participating providers, and failure to follow them adequately
leads to decreased compensation. While it will be several years
before conclusions can be drawn from even this first demonstration,
CMS did release a round of tentative first-year results in May,
showing an average increase in the composite quality score of
participating hospitals from 79 percent to 86 percent.[23]
While
seemingly impressive, however, these preliminary results do
not constitute evidence of improved quality, but rather of
increased compliance. The composite quality score is merely a
measure of the percentage of the time that hospitals followed
treatment instructions in pursuit of a financial bonus.
Tri
umph of
Process. Although
the score does contain two components, a process score and an
outcome score, it is heavily weighted toward recommended
processes, not outcomes. Of the 34 quality indicators in the
hospital demonstration, 27 measure compliance with dictated
processes, while only seven measure outcomes like mortality or
readmission rates.[24]
The
Physician Group Practice Demonstration, which began in April of
this year and is the first major Medicare pay-for-performance
initiative to concentrate on physicians, similarly focuses on
process over outcome. According to the demonstration design
report, "The major focus of the demonstration will be on
measuring process indicators of quality. They are the indicators
most easily measured."[25] They may be the most
easily measured, but are they the most indicative of quality
care?
Thus,
despite the relative lack of objectivity and flexibility,
Medicare's demonstrations rely primarily on process mandates rather
than outcome measures to implement pay for performance. David M.
Eddy, Senior Advisor for Health Policy and Management at Kaiser
Permanente, acknowledges that "a process measure, by its very
nature, micromanages. Instead of leaving plans free to set their
own priorities for improving health outcomes, a process measure
tells plans precisely what their priorities should be."[26]
Even if outcomes were used exclusively, the process of choosing
which outcomes to include and deciding the relative importance
of each outcome would necessitate deference to the values,
perspectives, and agenda of the policymaker.
Congressional
Action. Bipartisan
congressional efforts are now underway to move Medicare beyond
demonstrations into a full-scale pay-for-performance reimbursement
system. CMS Administrator Mark McClellan appears determined to
move ahead with a Medicare pay-for-performance expansion under the
regulatory prerogatives of his agency. He is making the effort one
of his top priorities and recently speculated that within the
next five to 10 years, performance-based compensation could
comprise up to 30 percent of the government's payments to
providers.[27]
Any
national Medicare pay-for-performance payment system will likely be
similar to the CMS demonstration initiatives, emphasizing
process over outcome and rewarding compliance with centrally
defined practice guidelines. Preliminary reports indicate
that the proposed legislation would pay for compliance-based
bonuses by withholding up to 2 percent of regular reimbursements
from all physicians.[28] In other words, most doctors would
receive less so some could receive more. This is not quality-based
compensation; it is redistribution of income toward those providers
who subordinate their judgment and creativity to the mandated
protocols most successfully.
Because
of Medicare's vast size, the change would reverberate throughout
the private payer system, compounding its effect. With almost 42
million enrollees and $290 billion in annual expenditures,
which will dramatically increase in 2006 when the Medicare Part D
drug entitlement takes effect, Medicare is the largest purchaser of
health services in the United States.[29] In an open letter
published in Health Affairs, Medicare
pay-for-performance advocates point out that "a major
initiative by Medicare to pay for performance can be expected
to stimulate similar efforts by private payers, just as
Medicare's adoption of prospective payment for hospitals did
two decades ago."[30]
Problems
of the Medicare Pay-for-Performance Project
Before
launching Medicare into a pay-for-performance program,
Congress should consider the problems that will necessarily arise
out of a Medicare payment system that requires adherence to
centrally defined protocols. Congress cannot safely ignore these
difficulties.
Problem
#1: Limitations of Evidence-Based Medicine
The gold
standard of evidence in evidence-based medicine is a combination of
double-blind, randomized, controlled trials and a systematic
review of medical studies called meta-analysis. Although it is
conceptually attractive because of its appeal to statistics, no
evidence supports overriding the treating physician's medical
decisions with RCT-based guidelines issued by a third party who has
never even seen the patient. In 2004, the Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality (AHRQ) in the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services reviewed the literature related to the efficacy of
EBM-based compensation, which it referred to as "quality-based
purchasing." The review found "only nine randomized controlled
trials" and concluded that "little unequivocal data" supported
this approach.[31]
The
premise of RCTs as objective verification of "best practice"
encounters several other serious conceptual problems. First, RCTs
can conflict with one another. In July 2002, scientists conducting
the Women's Health Initiative found that Preempro, a hormone
replacement therapy drug, had risks of heart attacks exceeding its
benefits. These results directly contradicted the results of
several other previous and ongoing RCTs, which showed a reduced
risk of heart disease associated with the drug.[32] According to Dr.
R. Brian Haynes, chief of the Health Information Research Unit at
McMaster University and one of the originators of EBM, "It is
difficult to be smug about the superiority of the research methods
advocated by EBM when the results of studies that are similar
methodologically not infrequently disagree with one another."[33]
EBM's
usefulness as the primary benchmark for treatment decisions is also
questionable because RCTs can address only limited medical issues.
Despite the massive amount of medical literature published every
year, legitimate RCTs cover only a small number of conditions and
procedures. Almost all are conducted over only a few months or
years, leaving the long-term consequences of a therapy
undetected.[34] According to Dr. Nuala Kenny, founder of
the Department of Bioethics at Dalhousie University in Canada,
"Scientific data cannot be expected to guide most medical
decisions directly. There are not enough randomized trials or
epidemiologic studies."[35] To develop guidelines, developers often
must depend upon some studies conducted on relatively small and
unrepresentative populations. As a result, explains Dr. Alan M.
Garber of Stanford University's School of Medicine, "Guideline
authors nearly always extrapolate to groups that were not
adequately represented in the trials."[36]
Interestingly,
early proponents of evidence-based medicine understood its
weaknesses and never meant for it to be more than one factor in a
"multi-faceted clinical decision-making decision process."[37]
According to Dr. Haynes:
[E]vidence
from research can be no more than one component of any clinical
decision. Other key components are the circumstances of the patient
(as assessed through the expertise of the clinician) and the
preferences of the patient. Just how research evidence, clinical
circumstances, and patients' wishes are to be combined to derive an
optimal decision has not been clearly stated, except that clinical
judgment and expertise are viewed as essential to success.[38]
Thus,
research evidence is just one of three decision points in the
treatment process. The other two, to which "applied research is a
complementary way of knowing," are clinical circumstances and
patient preferences.[39] By using financial incentives to drive
compliance with clinical algorithms, a Medicare pay-for-performance
scheme would devalue these two aspects of medical decisions in
favor of a prescribed list of procedures. In other words, it
would produce the very "cookbook medicine" that those who conceived
of EBM have denounced as a "misuse of evidence based
medicine."[40]
Problem
#2: Dangers of Replacing Patient Choice and Physician Autonomy with
Central Planning
As Dr.
David M. Eddy has observed, "It is not stretching things too far to
say that whoever controls practice policies controls
medicine."[41]
Since
clinical research produces conflicting, questionable, and limited
evidence, the decisions required to reconcile results, assign
relative importance, and sift out bad research cannot be made
without subjective human judgment. Ultimately, someone's values are
reflected in treatment decisions, whether those values are
those of the patient, the physician, or a third party. Bias is
inherent in such judgments.
Bias is
found in the production, interpretation, and application of
pay-for-performance quality indicators. Researchers exhibit bias
when deciding which areas of research to pursue, which previous
research to reference, and how to conduct their experiments.
Journal publishers exhibit bias when deciding which research to
publish. Published research is then subject to interpretation by
guideline creators, who exhibit bias when choosing which
research to incorporate in their guidelines, resolving conflicting
results, assessing research flaws, and transforming findings into
rules that weight competing priorities.
According
to a 2004 Institute of Medicine report, "There are gaps and
inconsistencies in the medical literature supporting one practice
versus another, as well as biases based on the perspective of the
authors, who may be specialists, general practitioners,
payers, marketers, or public health officials."[42] Unable to avoid
bias, pay for performance cannot live up to the standards of
objectivity claimed by those who support imposing their version of
"doing the right thing" on the medical community.[43]
Members
of Congress need to ask themselves this crucial question: Whose
judgment and values do we want to control important decisions about
our medical care? Pay for performance would give control to
third-party insurance or government managers, who have no
information about the unique conditions, health history,
preferences, and personal values of the individual patient being
treated by the individual doctor. The protocols of the distant
government agency would in practice overrule the doctor's
medical judgment and the patient's choices.
The
impact of this control shift would be government
micromanagement of medical care and a corresponding reduction
in physician autonomy and patient choice.[44] Physicians would be
compelled either to follow government treatment guidelines or to
suffer financial consequences, regardless of whether a particular
guideline is in the best interests of a particular
patient.
Twila
Brase, president of the Citizens Council on Health Care, warns that
adopting a pay-for-performance program "will lead to a limited
list of approved health care services-'best practices' as
determined by the agendas and values of a small cadre of
politically motivated, personally-biased individuals sitting around
a table somewhere making treatment decisions far from the
patient's bedside."[45] These "elite" decision makers would not
even know the name of the patient, much less the patient's unique
circumstances and values.
When made
from a distance by budget-focused technocrats, treatment decisions
are apt to focus as much on rationing as they do on quality
improvement. Keith Syrett, professor of law at the
University of Bristol, observes that "decision making by
guideline offer[s] a means of scientifically depoliticizing
the rationing debate."[46] Payers are able to create the impression
that there is scientific legitimacy behind cost-based
decisions to restrict patient access to medically necessary
treatments.
The
American Medical Association expressed concern over such potential
EBM-based rationing at its national meeting in June 2005. "There is
a potential concern when there is another intent behind pay for
performance," said AMA Trustee John Armstrong, M.D. "Some so-called
pay-for-performance programs are a lose/lose proposition for
patients and their physicians, with the only benefit accruing to
health insurers."[47] As with any health care system that
employs top-down planning to ration health care, the ultimate
effect will be to limit access to appropriate health care services
according to priorities imposed by a centralized
bureaucracy.
This
should be considered in the context of medical malpractice. It
is bad policy to empower a centralized bureaucracy to
construct and determine which clinical algorithms are to be used
and which practices are "best" while also excusing it from any
"responsibility for the clinical consequences."[48] In reality, the
ultimate responsibility remains with the treating physician, whose
best medical judgment may dictate proceeding in one direction while
the third-party algorithm forces the physician to go in another.
This could produce adverse results for the patient, and it would
further complicate the medical malpractice crisis that is
deepening in many states of the union.
Problem
#3: Undermining of Personalized Care by Population-Based
Medicine
Health
care providers treat individual patients, not statistically
significant groups. What may be the best treatment for the group on
average might not necessarily be the appropriate treatment for an
individual patient. Enforcing uniform clinical guidelines on
patients whose conditions and values are anything but uniform is
like trying to dress everyone in average-sized clothes regardless
of their particular sizes and preferences.
Medical
treatment decisions depend on a combination of factors-such as
age, ethnicity, genetic background, severity of disease,
comorbitidies,[49] and patient values-which physicians must
incorporate into their evaluation of a patient's treatment options.
The Medicare population is especially heterogeneous because of the
prevalence of multiple illnesses in the elderly. Twenty percent of
Medicare beneficiaries have five or more chronic conditions, and 50
percent are receiving five or more medications.[50]
Accordingly,
Congress should question the appropriateness of using
financial incentives to impose population-based clinical results on
individual patient care. One study of 1,755 Type 2 diabetics found
a 24 percent rate of noncompliance with clinical guidelines by
internists. Far from finding a deficiency in quality, the
researchers found instead "a deficiency in the definition of what
constitutes best practices."[51] Among the clinical
guidelines were periodic retinal eye exams and urine protein
screens for microalbuminuria. Many physicians questioned the
usefulness of the urine screen for patients already receiving ACE
inhibitors, the indicated therapy for microalbuminuria. In another
example of "noncompliance," some patients did not receive eye
exams because they were blind. The authors concluded: "Our data
suggest that failure to follow guidelines is not necessarily
explained by 'bad doctors' or forgetfulness; rather,
noncompliance may reflect valid questions about the usefulness and
applicability of a best practice to an individual patient."[52]
In
addition to limiting a doctor's ability to act in the best medical
interest of an individual patient, one-size-fits-all clinical
guidelines ignore the role of patient preferences and values in
health care decisions. This is especially relevant to the
Medicare population. Evidence shows that elderly patients with
multiple conditions vary widely in their preferences regarding
longer survival, disease prevention, quality of mental and physical
functioning, level of inconvenience and pain, and risk of
complication.[53]
A system
of standardized treatment decisions is simply incompatible with the
variability found in medicine. Even if it were possible to create
evidence-based rules for every possible variation of patient
characteristics and conditions, the sheer number of guidelines
would be overwhelming and impossible to implement. Medical studies
provide useful information about treatment options that may or may
not work in a given situation, depending on the unique
combination of circumstances involving the individual patient.
However, the very nature of the statistical process, which
minimizes bias and seeks mean tendencies, makes it
insufficient to make the final decision for every patient.
Mathematical models or algorithms cannot capture that precise
moment of human choice that is the essence of medical
judgment.
Physicians
must be free to use their best medical judgment to make clinical
decisions that incorporate all relevant factors and available
evidence. Appropriate medical decisions cannot be made using an
assembly-line mentality that treats every patient like a generic
commodity traveling down a conveyer belt.
As
expressed by Dan Mendelson, president of the Health Strategies
Consultancy in Washington, D.C., "Patients expect their doctor to
tailor care to their individual condition, incorporating their
medical history and preferences, the doctor's experience with
similar patients, the most current research, and alternative
therapies."[54] To do otherwise not only does a
disservice to the patient, but also can ultimately increase
morbidity and mortality, which in turn can increase the cost
of Medicare.
Problem
#4: Deterioration of Clinical Judgment and Medical
Innovation
The
fourth problem with a pay-for-compliance health care system is the
deterioration of creativity, innovative ability, and medical
judgment that will occur in an environment that devalues such
qualities. With compensation hinging on adherence to
guidelines, providers will become highly skilled at adhering to
guidelines. In anticipation of a Medicare pay-for-performance
shift, the growing "Medicare industrial complex" of lobbyists,
lawyers, consultants, and professional "experts" who make a living
deciphering and explaining the Medicare bureaucratese have already
swung into action. Companies are already advertising
"Pay-for-Performance Prep Guides," containing 400 pages of
strategies to "ensure [that] your practice/organization
succeeds with P4P [pay for performance]."[55]
As
doctors treat the practice of medicine as if it were an SAT exam,
with right and wrong answers and grades handed out by the
government, their ability to be flexible, innovative, and
discerning in patient care will suffer. Focused on the specific
tasks that are linked to financial rewards, automatic practitioners
of government-prescribed behaviors will replace doctors who are
skilled in combining multiple sources of knowledge with their best
medical judgment in providing patient care.
Medical
students, interns, and residents will become trained in applying
the third-party rules that govern their clinical decisions instead
of developing keen clinical judgment and learning to
constantly seek better ways to treat patients.[56]
Proponents claim that this will "structure the environment in
which care is delivered so that 'doing the right thing' becomes
automatic."[57]
However,
the "right thing" can differ from patient to patient and often
changes over time. A 2001 study published in the Journal of the
American Medical Association found that of 17 clinical
practice guidelines published by the Agency for Healthcare
Research and Quality and still in circulation at the time,
seven were in need of a major update, six required a minor update,
and only three were determined to be valid. No conclusion was
reached for the remaining guideline. Using survival analysis, the
researchers found that about half of the guidelines were outdated
in 5.8 years.[58] A health care system that ties
reimbursement to sometimes outdated or low-quality guidelines
would, at least occasionally, force providers to choose between
financial compensation and their ethical duty to provide
high-quality care. Even worse, it could produce physicians who do
not know the difference.
Doctors
reimbursed according to compliance will also lose the incentive and
ability to innovate that has produced so many important medical
advances. In the late 1960s and 1970s, Dr. Charles Kelman, an
innovative ophthalmologist, challenged the entrenched "best
practices" of his day and pioneered groundbreaking new methods of
cataract surgery despite severe derision from colleagues. Dr.
Kelman's innovative techniques revolutionized the field of cataract
removal and ultimately became the standard by which all cataract
surgeries are performed today. In fact, many consider him to
be one of the greatest medical innovators because of the
miracle that he wrought with cataract surgery and the
millions of patients who have benefited from it.[59]
If
government-instituted compliance mechanisms had been in place in
the 1960s and 1970s, however, Dr. Kelman would have dared such
innovation only at his own financial peril, because any deviation
from the guidelines would have lowered his pay-for-performance
scores. Unless we believe that today's medical practice has reached
a state of perfection and is unlikely to be improved, it seems
shortsighted to discourage similar advances in the
future.
In the
long run, automatic adherence to protocols is
counterproductive. Physicians need to respond effectively to a
changing medical world and unique patient challenges, but
compliance-based payment systems would deprive them of the very
ability to judge appropriate care and adapt with innovative methods
of treating illness. Ultimately, the political negotiations of
bureaucrats and statisticians would replace the medical judgment of
individual doctors and remove their incentive to do anything more
than what is expressly required to earn their reward.
Problem
#5: Poor Quality Because of Unproductive Gaming Behavior
In a
letter published in the New England Journal of Medicine, Roy
B. Verdery, Ph.D., M.D., claimed:
Economic
incentives are always subject to "gaming," inappropriate
manipulation of data, and "cherry-picking" of patients.…
Most physicians (and other professionals) work for rewards that are
more important than money, including the respect of their patients
and peers and the personal satisfaction of a job well done.[60]
By
diverting the focus of doctors and other medical professionals
from appropriate patient-centered medical care to superficial
financial rewards, pay for performance will likely create
incentives to game the system in several detrimental ways that may
cause real quality to decline even while measured indicators
are improving.
First,
basing financial compensation on specific indicators leads to
adverse selection. In other words, providers will tend to select
relatively healthier patients who have a higher probability of
complying with physician orders, achieving better outcomes, and
thus improving the provider's bottom line.
Two
recent studies on cardiologist report cards in New York illustrate
this concern.[61] The first study looked at more than
80,000 patients from New York and Michigan and found that doctors
in Michigan, which does not issue report cards, were more
likely to perform angioplasties on very sick patients. The second,
published in Archives of Internal Medicine, found that
approximately 80 percent of New York cardiologists said that the
system made them less likely to treat severely ill patients.[62] If
selection is such a significant concern when information about
physician performance is merely reported, one can imagine the
impact when it is directly tied to compensation.
Compliance-based
compensation could also encourage providers to falsify records to
circumvent the system and provide needed care. One study found
that 39 percent of physicians already falsify insurance records to
secure needed services for patients.[63] Government-endorsed,
standardized medicine would magnify this problem.
Finally,
if Congress ties money to specific medical interventions,
doctors and other medical professionals will be pressured to
focus on those interventions to the detriment of other important
areas of medicine. Pay for performance's very premise is that
financial incentives alter behavior. While very few doctors will
allow them to completely consume their behavior, the nature of
financial incentives will push them in certain directions. As
a result, some conditions and some procedures will receive less
than adequate attention.
"Inevitably…the
dimensions of care that will receive the most attention will be
those that are most easily measured and not necessarily those that
are most valued," according to a recent study in Health
Affairs on provider incentives.[64] Mitigating this problem
would require increasing the number of required measurements, which
would soon become overwhelming and counterproductive, even if there
existed the possibility of doing so adequately. Thus, while
adherence to measured indicators might show improvement, overall
quality might become worse.
Instead
of adjusting their behavior to a set of standard rules and
guidelines, health care providers should be encouraged to meet
their patients' needs and preferences in a comprehensive way. This
cannot be accomplished in an arbitrary system of compliance-based
incentives that encourages providers to manipulate the "game" to
their financial advantage.
Problem
#6: Further Weakening of the Doctor-Patient Relationship
"One
major barrier to the adoption of EBM," according to analysts
writing in Health Affairs, "is the overwhelming support for
preserving the physician-patient relationship."[65] A
Medicare pay-for-performance system would lead to a decline in this
relationship. When patients understand that their physicians are
being pressured to meet standardized treatment directives
rather than to provide them with customized care based on their
unique conditions and preferences, trust in their physicians
will be compromised-and for good reason.
A 2003
study published in the Journal of Ambulatory Care
Management showed that physicians operating under imposed
financial incentives are much less likely to feel strongly that
they can make clinical decisions in their patients' best interests
without adverse financial consequences. Because of misaligned
incentives, these physicians also feel less able to obtain
medically necessary services for their patients.[66] Various studies
have shown that such patients understood and internalized the
consequences of alternate payment methods and that this
affects their level of trust in their health care providers.[67]
From the
physician's perspective, the doctor- patient relationship changes
dramatically when the patient's actions determine the physician's
compensation. If the patient does not follow the physician's
treatment plan, does not take medication as prescribed, or
continues to engage in risky behavior, adverse results can occur.
These will be reflected in the physician's rating and thus in the
physician's pay-for-performance compensation. As physicians
struggle with the demotivating reality of being held accountable
for another person's behavior, which they do not control, their
frustration levels will increase substantially, and they will come
to see their patients as obstacles to overcome rather than as
fellow human beings in need of care.
The
doctor-patient relationship is crucial to patient care because
high-quality health care hinges on personal trust. Medical
decisions are complex, and patients do not have the level of
expertise necessary to navigate them alone, so they must be
able to trust their doctors with the most intimate information
about their health condition. They trust their doctors to advise
them on their most important decisions, matters of life and
death, sickness and health. Combining full information and patient
trust, physicians can provide the information and guidance
needed to make good decisions.
However,
trust requires that patients believe that their provider is acting
in their best interests. Once patients realize that their
physicians are trying to serve two masters-the patient and the
third-party payer-they will be unable to maintain the same level of
trust in their providers. They are not likely to replace that trust
with trust in the government agency creating federal treatment
guidelines.
What
Congress Should Do
Congress
should revisit Medicare reimbursement in the context of
enacting real Medicare reform, transforming Medicare into a system
of "premium support" that resembles the Federal Employees Health
Benefits Program, as originally recommended in 1999 by the majority
of the National Bipartisan Commission on the Future of Medicare.
With such a comprehensive reform, the current irrational national
system of administrative pricing, price controls, perverse
incentives, and regulatory overkill would simply
disappear.
Short of
comprehensive Medicare reform, Congress should fix what is
broken, not make it worse. Instead of responding to the
inefficiencies of central planning by instituting even more
intrusive forms of central planning, Congress should move
Medicare reimbursement in the opposite direction by removing
barriers to a freely functioning, consumer-driven health care
market. The key driver of value in a free market is competition to
meet consumer demand. Consumers must have access to full
information about services and must be free to choose those
services from doctors of their choice. Doctors must be free to
adjust the prices of the services that they offer.
To create
a market that improves quality and value within the Medicare
system, Congress should take the following actions:
In
addition, as Representative Nancy Johnson has proposed, the SGR
payment update formula should be scrapped in favor of an
annual update. This update could be based on the Consumer Price
Index or the Medicare Economic Index, which tracks changes in
the costs of medical care. Either index would be a much more
rational benchmark for physician reimbursement and would
prevent the absurd predicaments of the past several years in
which Congress has intervened at the last minute to save physicians
from payment rate decreases. To correct for imbalances among
specialties that may occur under an annual update, Congress
could commission MedPAC to recommend adjustments on the basis
of market surveys in order to reflect real changes in supply
and demand in the medical market.
-
Remove
Medicare restrictions on balance billing and private
contracting. Prices
for health care services delivered to Medicare recipients are
currently fixed by balance-billing restrictions. Beyond these
conventional Medicare billing limitations, even if a Medicare
enrollee wanted to pay out of pocket to receive more of a given
service than Medicare allows (e.g., a greater number of
physician visits to a nursing home), he or she could not do so
without encountering other legal restrictions.[69] The most
important is a legal obstacle to private contracts in Medicare,
coincidentally the feature of Canada's single-payer
system that was recently declared unconstitutional by the
Canadian Supreme Court because it can result in increased patient
suffering.[70]
Medicare's
restrictions on private contracts should be lifted, subject to a
means test to protect the vulnerable, and provider prices
should be allowed to fluctuate with positive or negative balance
billings, even if the government's share is fixed through
prospective payment. The Medicare Beneficiary Freedom to Contract
Act (H.R. 709), introduced by Representative Sam Johnson (R-TX),
would remove all restrictions on private contracts between Medicare
beneficiaries and health care practitioners.
-
Require
price transparency of Medicare-reimbursed services.
Price is
the mechanism by which buyers and sellers communicate in the
marketplace. Vigorous competition to provide the best quality at
the best price drives superior performance. Despite the importance
of price, health care consumers currently find it very
difficult to acquire pricing information from providers,
even when they make a concerted effort to do so. A recent survey by
Towers Perrin of 1,400 employees in various health plans found that
85 percent felt that they needed more information to make good
health care decisions, specifically information about price
and quality.[71] Physicians and other health care
providers in Medicare should be obligated to publish prices and
make them available, when possible, to patients before procedures
are performed.
-
Encourage
private-sector development of quality information. The
universal disclosure of prices will generate patient demand for
better information about quality of care. If consumers, with the
help of health care professionals, decide which criteria they value
and which sources of information they wish to rely upon in making
their decisions, the private sector will respond with
patient-empowering tools that increase the capacity to make
personal medical decisions. Combined with knowledge about price,
these tools will enable Medicare beneficiaries to make choices that
drive providers to compete for patients by using all available
components of appropriate medical care, thus pushing health care to
higher levels of quality and value.
Conclusion
The
current effort to change the payment system is well intentioned.
Moreover, the rhetoric of "quality-based purchasing"
advocates, including a reliance on evidence-based medicine,
best practices, and pay for performance as methods to improve
health care quality, is appealing. In reality, however, they would
further bureaucratize health care.
Members
of Congress need to ask themselves whether they want the government
to interfere with the practice of medicine-an intervention that
they statutorily prohibited when they enacted Medicare in 1965.
They also need to determine whether more central planning is real
reform, or whether such an approach will only further distort an
already dysfunctional system, resulting in even greater
difficulties for American seniors.
The
negative impact of a payment system that demands compliance with
standardized processes is predictable and significant. Americans
not only would find themselves in the type of government-controlled
health care system that they have perpetually rejected, but
also would see population-based study results applied to their
individual situations despite their unique health conditions,
their personal values, and their doctors' experience. They would
find themselves under the care of physicians restricted in
their ability to exercise their best medical judgment to tailor
care to their patients' specific situations and preferences. These
physicians would have more incentive to check the boxes on the
automatic protocol lists that generate compensation than they would
to act in the best interests of their patients. This would
undoubtedly decrease the level of medical innovation and weaken the
doctor-patient relationship.
A new
Medicare payment system should differentially reward providers
who do a better job of satisfying the needs, preferences, and
values of patients. However, if it rewards providers for
submitting to directive protocols that reflect the
financial and political incentives of third-party bureaucrats,
it is merely paying for compliance. The result will be greater
distortions and inefficiencies in Medicare, further
compromising quality, cost savings, and seniors' access to
care.
Rather
than follow this course of top-down micromanagement and artificial
competition, Congress should base Medicare reimbursement
reform on the free-market principles of price transparency, private
contracting, and consumer choice, thus removing barriers to real
competition and promoting high-quality and high-value
patient-centered health care.
Richard
Dolinar, M.D., is a Senior Fellow in Health Care Policy at the
Heartland Institute, and S. Luke Leininger is a former Health
Policy Fellow in the Center for Health Policy Studies at The
Heritage Foundation.
[2]Commonwealth Fund, "Reps. Thomas,
Johnson Ask for CMS Help in Changing Medicare's 'Irrational'
Payment System," Washington Health Policy Week in
Review, June 27, 2005,
at www.cmwf.org/healthpolicyweek/healthpolicyweek_show.htm?doc_
id=282389� (August 29, 2005).
[3]Senator Chuck Grassley, statement upon
introduction of the Medicare Value Purchasing Act of 2005,
Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, June 30, 2005, at
www.himss.org/Content/files/Medicare6-30-05_floor_statement.pdf
(August 29, 2005).
[4]Institute of Medicine, Crossing the
Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
(Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2001).
[5]Since the early 1980s, Congress has
tried repeatedly to solve the growing problem of rapidly rising
Medicare expenditures by imposing complicated and progressively
tighter systems of administrative pricing for hospital and
physician services. In 1983, with the support of the Reagan
Administration, Congress adopted a prospective payment system (PPS)
for Medicare payment to hospitals, fixing the prices of hospital
services according to the average cost of treating specified
diagnoses. In 1989, Congress created the RBRVS system for physician
reimbursement. In 1997, Congress expanded the PPS system for a
variety of non-physician Medicare providers.
[6]Altogether, Medicare uses 11 different
fee schedules and PPS arrangements to establish the prices paid to
over 1 million providers for treating Medicare patients. Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services, letter from CMS Administrator
Mark McClellan to House Ways and Means Committee Chairman William
Thomas, June 24, 2005.
[7]For more information about the RBRVS,
see Kevin Hayes, "Medicare's Payments for Physician Services,"
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, February 14, 2003, at
www.medpac.gov/publications/congressional_reports/Physicians_KH.pdf
(August 29, 2005). For a critical
evaluation of the RBRVS, see Robert E. Moffit, "Back to the Future:
Medicare's Resurrection of the Labor Theory of Value,"
Regulation, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Fall 1992), pp. 54-63, at
www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/reg15n4f.html (August 29,
2005). See also H. E. Frech III, ed., Regulating Doctors' Fees:
Competition, Benefits and Controls Under Medicare (Washington
D.C.: AEI Press, 1991).
[8]Robert E. Moffit, Ph.D., "Why Doctors
Are Abandoning Medicare and What Should Be Done About It," Heritage
Foundation Backgrounder No. 1539, April 22, 2002, p. 4, at
www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/BG1539.cfm (August 29,
2005).
[9]For more information about the DRG
hospital payment system, see Medicare Payment Advisory Commission,
Report to the Congress: Medicare Payment Policy, March 2005, pp. 43-44, at
www.medpac.gov/publications/congressional_reports/
Mar05_EntireReport.pdf (August 29, 2005).
[11]Medicare Payment Advisory Commission,
Issues in a Modernized Medicare Program, June 2005, p. 198, at
www.medpac.gov/
publications/congressional_reports/June05_Entire_report.pdf
(August 29, 2005).
[12]William Thomas, Chairman, Committee on
Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, and Nancy L.
Johnson, Chairman, Subcommittee on Health, letter to CMS
Administrator Mark McClellan, July 12, 2005.
[13]American Medical Association, "AMA
Member Connect Survey: Medicare Payment Cuts Will Hurt Access to
Care," April 5, 2005, at
www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/14925.html (August 29, 2005).
[14]American Medical Association, "Physician
Payment: The Facts," June 2005, at
www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/399/
nac_ppfacts.pdf (August
29, 2005).
[15]Moffit, "Why Doctors Are Abandoning
Medicare," pp. 5-6.
[16]Under the terms of
Section 4507 of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, any doctor who
enters into a private contract with a Medicare enrollee to provide
services outside of the Medicare system is prohibited from billing
Medicare for two years for any patients. Since 1997, the terms and
conditions of these relationships have been further codified
through regulation and litigation. For an excellent overview of
this issue, see John S. Hoff, Medicare Private Contracting:
Paternalism or Autonomy (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press,
1998).
[17]David Glendinning, "AMA to Write
Balance-Billing Legislation," American Medical Association
News, July 11, 2005, at
www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2005/07/11/gvsa0711.htm (August
29, 2005; subscription required).
[18]R. Brian Haynes, "What Kind of Evidence
Is It That Evidence-Based Medicine Advocates Want Health Care
Providers and Consumers to Pay Attention to?" BMC Health
Services Research, Vol. 2, No. 3 (March 6, 2002), at
www.biomedcentral.com/ content/pdf/1472-6963-2-3.pdf (August
29, 2005).
[19]Stefan Timmermans and Aaron Mauck, "The
Promises and Pitfalls of Evidence-Based Medicine," Health
Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 1
(January/February 2005), p. 19.
[20]Institute of Medicine, Crossing the
Quality Chasm, and
National Committee for Quality Assurance, "The State of Health Care
Quality: 2004," at
www.ncqa.org/communications/SOMC/SOHC2004.pdf (August 29,
2005).
[21]Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, "Medicare 'Pay for Performance (P4P)' Initiatives," fact
sheet, January 31, 2005, at
www.cms.hhs.gov/media/press/release.asp?Counter=1343
(August 29, 2005).
[22]Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, "Medicare Pay-for-Performance Demonstration Shows
Significant Quality of Care Improvement at Participating
Hospitals," press release, May 3, 2005, at
www.cms.hhs.gov/media/press/ release.asp?Counter=1441
(August 29, 2005).
[23]Ibid. This is the average of reported
composite score improvements for each of the five chronic
conditions.
[24]Outcome measures
represent only 50 percent of the hip and knee replacement score,
37.5 percent of the coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) score, 11
percent of the acute myocardial infarction (AMI) score, and zero
percent of the pneumonia and heart failure scores. Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services, "CMS HQI Demonstration Project:
Composite Quality Score Methodology Overview," March 26, 2004, at
www.cms.hhs.gov/quality/hospital/CompositeQualityScoreMethodology
Overview.pdf (August 29,
2005).
[25]Gregory C. Pope,
Michael Trisolini, John Kautter, and Walter Adamache, "Physician
Group Practice (PGP) Demonstration Design Report," Health Economics
Research, Inc., for Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services,
October 2, 2002, p. 105, at
www.cms.hhs.gov/healthplans/research/PGPDemoRpt.pdf (August
30, 2005).
[26]David M. Eddy,
"Performance Measurement: Problems and Solutions," Health
Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 4 (July-August 1998), p. 18.
[27]California
Healthcare Foundation, "Pay-For-Performance Programs Draw Mixed
Reviews," iHealthBeat, September 17, 2004, at
www.ihealthbeat.org/index.cfm?Action=dspItem&itemID=105722
(August 30, 2005).
[28]Renal Physicians Association, "RPA
Reviews Senate Finance Proposal for Pay-for-Performance in
Medicare," RPA Member Email, July 2005, at
www.renalmd.org/blastemail/july05.html (August 30,
2005).
[29]Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation,
"Medicare at a Glance," fact sheet, April 2005, at
www.kff.org/medicare/upload/
Medicare-at-a-Glance-Fact-Sheet-UPDATE.pdf(August 30, 2005).
[30]Open Letter, "Paying for Performance:
Medicare Should Lead," Health Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 6 (November-December
2003), p. 10.
[31]U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality, "Strategies to Support
Quality-Based Purchasing: A Review of the Evidence," 04-PO24, July
2004, at www.ahrq.gov/clinic/ epcsums/qpurchsum.pdf (August
30, 2005).
[32]Gina Kolata, "Hormone Studies: What Went
Wrong?" The New York Times, April 22, 2003.
[33]Haynes, "What Kind of Evidence?" p.
5.
[34]Mary E. Tinnetti, Sidney T. Bogardus,
and Joseph V. Agostini, "Potential Pitfalls of Disease-Specific
Guidelines for Patients with Multiple Conditions," New England
Journal of Medicine,
Vol. 350, No. 27 (December 30, 2004), pp. 2870-2874.
[35]Nuala P. Kenny, "Does Good Science Make
Good Medicine?" Journal of the Canadian Medical
Association, Vol. 157,
No. 1 (July 1, 1997), p. 34.
[36]Alan M. Garber, "Evidence-Based
Guidelines as a Foundation for Performance Incentives," Health
Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 1
(January/February 2005), p. 176.
[37]Aaron Michael Cohen, P. Zoe Stavri, and
William R. Hersh, "A Categorization and Analysis of the Criticisms
of Evidence-Based Medicine," International Journal of Medical
Informatics, Vol. 73,
Issue 1 (February 2004), pp. 35-43.
[38]Haynes, "What Kind of Evidence?" p.
4.
[40]David L. Sackett, William M. C.
Rosenberg, J. A. Muir Gray, R. Brian Haynes, and W. Scott
Richardson, "Evidence Based Medicine: What It Is and What It
Isn't," British Medical Journal, Vol. 312, Issue 7023 (January 13,
1996), p. 71.
[41]David M. Eddy, "Clinical Decision
Making: From Theory to Practice, Practice Policies-What Are They?"
Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 263, No.
6, (February 9, 2000), pp. 877-878.
[42]Philip Aspden, Janet M. Corrigan, Julie
Wolcott, and Shari M. Erickson, eds., Patient Safety: Achieving
a New Standard for Care (Washington, D.C.: National Academies
Press, 2003), p. 158.
[43]The third of five system strategies
listed on CMS's Quality Improvement Roadmap, published in July
2005, explains the agency's intention to "Pay in a way that
expresses our commitment to supporting providers and practitioners
for doing the right thing." Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, Quality Improvement Roadmap, July 2005, pp. 1-2, at www.cms.
hhs.gov/quality/quality%20roadmap.pdf (August 30,
2005).
[44]Americans overwhelmingly prefer control
of medical care to lie with themselves and their physicians. This
was demonstrated in the fight over President Clinton's Health
Security Act in 1993, which included, among other things, required
clinical guidelines to manage utilization.
[45]Twila Brase, "How Technocrats Are Taking
Over the Practice of Medicine: A Wake-Up Call to the American
People," Citizens' Council on Health Care Policy
Report, January 2005,
p. 18, at www.cchconline.org/pdfreport (August 30,
2005).
[46]Keith Syrett, "A Technocratic Fix to the
'Legitimacy Problem'? The Blair Government and Health Care
Rationing in the United Kingdom," Journal of Health Politics,
Policy and Law, Vol.
28, No. 4 (August 2003), p. 728.
[47]Mark Moran, "Pay for Performance Must Be
Quality Issue, AMA Says," Psychiatric News, Vol. 40, No. 14 (July 15, 2005), p. 9,
at pn.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/content/full/40/14/9-b
(August 30, 2005).
[48]Brase, "How Technocrats Are Taking Over
the Practice of Medicine," p. 2.
[49]Comorbidities are defined as concurrent
but unrelated medical conditions.
[50]Tinnetti et al., "Potential Pitfalls of
Disease-Specific Guidelines," p. 2870.
[51]National Center for Policy Analysis,
"Are 'Best Practices' Always Best?" Health Issues Daily Policy
Digest, December 6,
2001, at www.ncpa.org/iss/hea/pd120601c.html (August 30,
2005).
[52]Christel
Mottur-Pilson, Vincenza Snow, and Kyle Bartlett, "Physician
Explanations for Failing to Comply with 'Best Practices,'"
Effective Clinical Practice, Vol. 4 (September-October
2001), p. 212, at
www.acponline.org/journals/ecp/sepoct01/pilson.pdf (August
30, 2005). For another illustration of the incompatibility of
population-based guidelines with high-quality individualized
health care involving an example of colorectal cancer screening
within the Veterans Administration, see Louise C. Walter, Natalie
P. Davidowitz, Paul A. Heineken, and Kenneth E. Covinsky, "Pitfalls
of Converting Practice Guidelines into Quality Measures,"
Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 291, No.
20 (May 26, 2004), p. 2466.
[53]Tinnetti et al., "Potential Pitfalls of
Disease-Specific Guidelines," p. 2871. One study of 414
hospitalized patients 80 years old or older at four academic
medical centers specifically measured health values of the elderly
with respect to quantity vs. quality of life and other factors. The
authors found that "Preferences varied greatly" and recommended:
"Because proxies and multivariable analyses cannot gauge health
values of elderly hospitalized patients accurately, health values
of the very old should be elicited directly from the patient." Joel
Tsevat, Neal V. Dawson, Albert W. Wu, Joanne Lynn, Jane Soukup,
Francis E. Cook, Humberto Vidaillet, and Russell S. Phillips,
"Health Values of Hospitalized Patients 80 Years or Older,"
Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 279, No. 5
(February 4, 1998), p. 371.
[54]Dan Mendelson and Tanisha V. Carino,
"Evidence-Based Medicine in the United States-De Rigueur or Dream
Deferred?" Health Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 1 (January/February
2005), p. 134.
[55]Part B News and DecisionHealth,
"Pay-for-Performance Prep Guide," on-line advertisement, at
www.partbnews.com/tools/ p4p (August 30, 2005).
[56]Alan Muney, Oxford Health Plans,
explains: "The purpose…[of evidence-based education] is to
drive lifelong adherence to clinical practice guidelines resulting
in improvement in the value of healthcare expenditures." Brase,
"How Technocrats Are Taking Over the Practice of Medicine," p.
3.
[57]Kim A. Eagle, Arthur J. Garson Jr.,
George A. Belfer, and Cary Sennett, "Closing the Gap Between
Science and Practice: The Need for Professional Leadership,"
Health Affairs, Vol.
22, No. 2 (March-April 2003), p. 199.
From the
physician's perspective, the doctor- patient relationship changes
dramatically when the patient's actions determine the physician's
compensation. If the patient does not follow the physician's
treatment plan, does not take medication as prescribed, or
continues to engage in risky behavior, adverse results can occur.
These will be reflected in the physician's rating and thus in the
physician's pay-for-performance compensation. As physicians
struggle with the demotivating reality of being held accountable
for another person's behavior, which they do not control, their
frustration levels will increase substantially, and they will come
to see their patients as obstacles to overcome rather than as
fellow human beings in need of care.
The
doctor-patient relationship is crucial to patient care because
high-quality health care hinges on personal trust. Medical
decisions are complex, and patients do not have the level of
expertise necessary to navigate them alone, so they must be
able to trust their doctors with the most intimate information
about their health condition. They trust their doctors to advise
them on their most important decisions, matters of life and
death, sickness and health. Combining full information and patient
trust, physicians can provide the information and guidance
needed to make good decisions.
However,
trust requires that patients believe that their provider is acting
in their best interests. Once patients realize that their
physicians are trying to serve two masters-the patient and the
third-party payer-they will be unable to maintain the same level of
trust in their providers. They are not likely to replace that trust
with trust in the government agency creating federal treatment
guidelines.
What
Congress Should Do
Congress
should revisit Medicare reimbursement in the context of
enacting real Medicare reform, transforming Medicare into a system
of "premium support" that resembles the Federal Employees Health
Benefits Program, as originally recommended in 1999 by the majority
of the National Bipartisan Commission on the Future of Medicare.
With such a comprehensive reform, the current irrational national
system of administrative pricing, price controls, perverse
incentives, and regulatory overkill would simply
disappear.
Short of
comprehensive Medicare reform, Congress should fix what is
broken, not make it worse. Instead of responding to the
inefficiencies of central planning by instituting even more
intrusive forms of central planning, Congress should move
Medicare reimbursement in the opposite direction by removing
barriers to a freely functioning, consumer-driven health care
market. The key driver of value in a free market is competition to
meet consumer demand. Consumers must have access to full
information about services and must be free to choose those
services from doctors of their choice. Doctors must be free to
adjust the prices of the services that they offer.
To create
a market that improves quality and value within the Medicare
system, Congress should take the following actions:
In
addition, as Representative Nancy Johnson has proposed, the SGR
payment update formula should be scrapped in favor of an
annual update. This update could be based on the Consumer Price
Index or the Medicare Economic Index, which tracks changes in
the costs of medical care. Either index would be a much more
rational benchmark for physician reimbursement and would
prevent the absurd predicaments of the past several years in
which Congress has intervened at the last minute to save physicians
from payment rate decreases. To correct for imbalances among
specialties that may occur under an annual update, Congress
could commission MedPAC to recommend adjustments on the basis
of market surveys in order to reflect real changes in supply
and demand in the medical market.
-
Remove
Medicare restrictions on balance billing and private
contracting. Prices
for health care services delivered to Medicare recipients are
currently fixed by balance-billing restrictions. Beyond these
conventional Medicare billing limitations, even if a Medicare
enrollee wanted to pay out of pocket to receive more of a given
service than Medicare allows (e.g., a greater number of
physician visits to a nursing home), he or she could not do so
without encountering other legal restrictions.[69] The most
important is a legal obstacle to private contracts in Medicare,
coincidentally the feature of Canada's single-payer
system that was recently declared unconstitutional by the
Canadian Supreme Court because it can result in increased patient
suffering.[70]
Medicare's
restrictions on private contracts should be lifted, subject to a
means test to protect the vulnerable, and provider prices
should be allowed to fluctuate with positive or negative balance
billings, even if the government's share is fixed through
prospective payment. The Medicare Beneficiary Freedom to Contract
Act (H.R. 709), introduced by Representative Sam Johnson (R-TX),
would remove all restrictions on private contracts between Medicare
beneficiaries and health care practitioners.
-
Require
price transparency of Medicare-reimbursed services.
Price is
the mechanism by which buyers and sellers communicate in the
marketplace. Vigorous competition to provide the best quality at
the best price drives superior performance. Despite the importance
of price, health care consumers currently find it very
difficult to acquire pricing information from providers,
even when they make a concerted effort to do so. A recent survey by
Towers Perrin of 1,400 employees in various health plans found that
85 percent felt that they needed more information to make good
health care decisions, specifically information about price
and quality.[71] Physicians and other health care
providers in Medicare should be obligated to publish prices and
make them available, when possible, to patients before procedures
are performed.
-
Encourage
private-sector development of quality information. The
universal disclosure of prices will generate patient demand for
better information about quality of care. If consumers, with the
help of health care professionals, decide which criteria they value
and which sources of information they wish to rely upon in making
their decisions, the private sector will respond with
patient-empowering tools that increase the capacity to make
personal medical decisions. Combined with knowledge about price,
these tools will enable Medicare beneficiaries to make choices that
drive providers to compete for patients by using all available
components of appropriate medical care, thus pushing health care to
higher levels of quality and value.
Conclusion
The
current effort to change the payment system is well intentioned.
Moreover, the rhetoric of "quality-based purchasing"
advocates, including a reliance on evidence-based medicine,
best practices, and pay for performance as methods to improve
health care quality, is appealing. In reality, however, they would
further bureaucratize health care.
Members
of Congress need to ask themselves whether they want the government
to interfere with the practice of medicine-an intervention that
they statutorily prohibited when they enacted Medicare in 1965.
They also need to determine whether more central planning is real
reform, or whether such an approach will only further distort an
already dysfunctional system, resulting in even greater
difficulties for American seniors.
The
negative impact of a payment system that demands compliance with
standardized processes is predictable and significant. Americans
not only would find themselves in the type of government-controlled
health care system that they have perpetually rejected, but
also would see population-based study results applied to their
individual situations despite their unique health conditions,
their personal values, and their doctors' experience. They would
find themselves under the care of physicians restricted in
their ability to exercise their best medical judgment to tailor
care to their patients' specific situations and preferences. These
physicians would have more incentive to check the boxes on the
automatic protocol lists that generate compensation than they would
to act in the best interests of their patients. This would
undoubtedly decrease the level of medical innovation and weaken the
doctor-patient relationship.
A new
Medicare payment system should differentially reward providers
who do a better job of satisfying the needs, preferences, and
values of patients. However, if it rewards providers for
submitting to directive protocols that reflect the
financial and political incentives of third-party bureaucrats,
it is merely paying for compliance. The result will be greater
distortions and inefficiencies in Medicare, further
compromising quality, cost savings, and seniors' access to
care.
Rather
than follow this course of top-down micromanagement and artificial
competition, Congress should base Medicare reimbursement
reform on the free-market principles of price transparency, private
contracting, and consumer choice, thus removing barriers to real
competition and promoting high-quality and high-value
patient-centered health care.
Richard
Dolinar, M.D., is a Senior Fellow in Health Care Policy at the
Heartland Institute, and S. Luke Leininger is a former Health
Policy Fellow in the Center for Health Policy Studies at The
Heritage Foundation.
[2]Commonwealth Fund, "Reps. Thomas,
Johnson Ask for CMS Help in Changing Medicare's 'Irrational'
Payment System," Washington Health Policy Week in
Review, June 27, 2005,
at www.cmwf.org/healthpolicyweek/healthpolicyweek_show.htm?doc_
id=282389� (August 29, 2005).
[3]Senator Chuck Grassley, statement upon
introduction of the Medicare Value Purchasing Act of 2005,
Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, June 30, 2005, at
www.himss.org/Content/files/Medicare6-30-05_floor_statement.pdf
(August 29, 2005).
[4]Institute of Medicine, Crossing the
Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century
(Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2001).
[5]Since the early 1980s, Congress has
tried repeatedly to solve the growing problem of rapidly rising
Medicare expenditures by imposing complicated and progressively
tighter systems of administrative pricing for hospital and
physician services. In 1983, with the support of the Reagan
Administration, Congress adopted a prospective payment system (PPS)
for Medicare payment to hospitals, fixing the prices of hospital
services according to the average cost of treating specified
diagnoses. In 1989, Congress created the RBRVS system for physician
reimbursement. In 1997, Congress expanded the PPS system for a
variety of non-physician Medicare providers.
[6]Altogether, Medicare uses 11 different
fee schedules and PPS arrangements to establish the prices paid to
over 1 million providers for treating Medicare patients. Centers
for Medicare and Medicaid Services, letter from CMS Administrator
Mark McClellan to House Ways and Means Committee Chairman William
Thomas, June 24, 2005.
[7]For more information about the RBRVS,
see Kevin Hayes, "Medicare's Payments for Physician Services,"
Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, February 14, 2003, at
www.medpac.gov/publications/congressional_reports/Physicians_KH.pdf
(August 29, 2005). For a critical
evaluation of the RBRVS, see Robert E. Moffit, "Back to the Future:
Medicare's Resurrection of the Labor Theory of Value,"
Regulation, Vol. 15, No. 4 (Fall 1992), pp. 54-63, at
www.cato.org/pubs/regulation/reg15n4f.html (August 29,
2005). See also H. E. Frech III, ed., Regulating Doctors' Fees:
Competition, Benefits and Controls Under Medicare (Washington
D.C.: AEI Press, 1991).
[8]Robert E. Moffit, Ph.D., "Why Doctors
Are Abandoning Medicare and What Should Be Done About It," Heritage
Foundation Backgrounder No. 1539, April 22, 2002, p. 4, at
www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/BG1539.cfm (August 29,
2005).
[9]For more information about the DRG
hospital payment system, see Medicare Payment Advisory Commission,
Report to the Congress: Medicare Payment Policy, March 2005, pp. 43-44, at
www.medpac.gov/publications/congressional_reports/
Mar05_EntireReport.pdf (August 29, 2005).
[11]Medicare Payment Advisory Commission,
Issues in a Modernized Medicare Program, June 2005, p. 198, at
www.medpac.gov/
publications/congressional_reports/June05_Entire_report.pdf
(August 29, 2005).
[12]William Thomas, Chairman, Committee on
Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, and Nancy L.
Johnson, Chairman, Subcommittee on Health, letter to CMS
Administrator Mark McClellan, July 12, 2005.
[13]American Medical Association, "AMA
Member Connect Survey: Medicare Payment Cuts Will Hurt Access to
Care," April 5, 2005, at
www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/category/14925.html (August 29, 2005).
[14]American Medical Association, "Physician
Payment: The Facts," June 2005, at
www.ama-assn.org/ama1/pub/upload/mm/399/
nac_ppfacts.pdf (August
29, 2005).
[15]Moffit, "Why Doctors Are Abandoning
Medicare," pp. 5-6.
[16]Under the terms of
Section 4507 of the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, any doctor who
enters into a private contract with a Medicare enrollee to provide
services outside of the Medicare system is prohibited from billing
Medicare for two years for any patients. Since 1997, the terms and
conditions of these relationships have been further codified
through regulation and litigation. For an excellent overview of
this issue, see John S. Hoff, Medicare Private Contracting:
Paternalism or Autonomy (Washington, D.C.: AEI Press,
1998).
[17]David Glendinning, "AMA to Write
Balance-Billing Legislation," American Medical Association
News, July 11, 2005, at
www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2005/07/11/gvsa0711.htm (August
29, 2005; subscription required).
[18]R. Brian Haynes, "What Kind of Evidence
Is It That Evidence-Based Medicine Advocates Want Health Care
Providers and Consumers to Pay Attention to?" BMC Health
Services Research, Vol. 2, No. 3 (March 6, 2002), at
www.biomedcentral.com/ content/pdf/1472-6963-2-3.pdf (August
29, 2005).
[19]Stefan Timmermans and Aaron Mauck, "The
Promises and Pitfalls of Evidence-Based Medicine," Health
Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 1
(January/February 2005), p. 19.
[20]Institute of Medicine, Crossing the
Quality Chasm, and
National Committee for Quality Assurance, "The State of Health Care
Quality: 2004," at
www.ncqa.org/communications/SOMC/SOHC2004.pdf (August 29,
2005).
[21]Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, "Medicare 'Pay for Performance (P4P)' Initiatives," fact
sheet, January 31, 2005, at
www.cms.hhs.gov/media/press/release.asp?Counter=1343
(August 29, 2005).
[22]Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, "Medicare Pay-for-Performance Demonstration Shows
Significant Quality of Care Improvement at Participating
Hospitals," press release, May 3, 2005, at
www.cms.hhs.gov/media/press/ release.asp?Counter=1441
(August 29, 2005).
[23]Ibid. This is the average of reported
composite score improvements for each of the five chronic
conditions.
[24]Outcome measures
represent only 50 percent of the hip and knee replacement score,
37.5 percent of the coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) score, 11
percent of the acute myocardial infarction (AMI) score, and zero
percent of the pneumonia and heart failure scores. Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services, "CMS HQI Demonstration Project:
Composite Quality Score Methodology Overview," March 26, 2004, at
www.cms.hhs.gov/quality/hospital/CompositeQualityScoreMethodology
Overview.pdf (August 29,
2005).
[25]Gregory C. Pope,
Michael Trisolini, John Kautter, and Walter Adamache, "Physician
Group Practice (PGP) Demonstration Design Report," Health Economics
Research, Inc., for Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services,
October 2, 2002, p. 105, at
www.cms.hhs.gov/healthplans/research/PGPDemoRpt.pdf (August
30, 2005).
[26]David M. Eddy,
"Performance Measurement: Problems and Solutions," Health
Affairs, Vol. 17, No. 4 (July-August 1998), p. 18.
[27]California
Healthcare Foundation, "Pay-For-Performance Programs Draw Mixed
Reviews," iHealthBeat, September 17, 2004, at
www.ihealthbeat.org/index.cfm?Action=dspItem&itemID=105722
(August 30, 2005).
[28]Renal Physicians Association, "RPA
Reviews Senate Finance Proposal for Pay-for-Performance in
Medicare," RPA Member Email, July 2005, at
www.renalmd.org/blastemail/july05.html (August 30,
2005).
[29]Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation,
"Medicare at a Glance," fact sheet, April 2005, at
www.kff.org/medicare/upload/
Medicare-at-a-Glance-Fact-Sheet-UPDATE.pdf(August 30, 2005).
[30]Open Letter, "Paying for Performance:
Medicare Should Lead," Health Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 6 (November-December
2003), p. 10.
[31]U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services, Public Health Service, Agency for
Healthcare Research and Quality, "Strategies to Support
Quality-Based Purchasing: A Review of the Evidence," 04-PO24, July
2004, at www.ahrq.gov/clinic/ epcsums/qpurchsum.pdf (August
30, 2005).
[32]Gina Kolata, "Hormone Studies: What Went
Wrong?" The New York Times, April 22, 2003.
[33]Haynes, "What Kind of Evidence?" p.
5.
[34]Mary E. Tinnetti, Sidney T. Bogardus,
and Joseph V. Agostini, "Potential Pitfalls of Disease-Specific
Guidelines for Patients with Multiple Conditions," New England
Journal of Medicine,
Vol. 350, No. 27 (December 30, 2004), pp. 2870-2874.
[35]Nuala P. Kenny, "Does Good Science Make
Good Medicine?" Journal of the Canadian Medical
Association, Vol. 157,
No. 1 (July 1, 1997), p. 34.
[36]Alan M. Garber, "Evidence-Based
Guidelines as a Foundation for Performance Incentives," Health
Affairs, Vol. 24, No. 1
(January/February 2005), p. 176.
[37]Aaron Michael Cohen, P. Zoe Stavri, and
William R. Hersh, "A Categorization and Analysis of the Criticisms
of Evidence-Based Medicine," International Journal of Medical
Informatics, Vol. 73,
Issue 1 (February 2004), pp. 35-43.
[38]Haynes, "What Kind of Evidence?" p.
4.
[40]David L. Sackett, William M. C.
Rosenberg, J. A. Muir Gray, R. Brian Haynes, and W. Scott
Richardson, "Evidence Based Medicine: What It Is and What It
Isn't," British Medical Journal, Vol. 312, Issue 7023 (January 13,
1996), p. 71.
[41]David M. Eddy, "Clinical Decision
Making: From Theory to Practice, Practice Policies-What Are They?"
Journal of the American Medical Association, Vol. 263, No.
6, (February 9, 2000), pp. 877-878.
[42]Philip Aspden, Janet M. Corrigan, Julie
Wolcott, and Shari M. Erickson, eds., Patient Safety: Achieving
a New Standard for Care (Washington, D.C.: National Academies
Press, 2003), p. 158.
[43]The third of five system strategies
listed on CMS's Quality Improvement Roadmap, published in July
2005, explains the agency's intention to "Pay in a way that
expresses our commitment to supporting providers and practitioners
for doing the right thing." Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services, Quality Improvement Roadmap, July 2005, pp. 1-2, at www.cms.
hhs.gov/quality/quality%20roadmap.pdf (August 30,
2005).
[44]Americans overwhelmingly prefer control
of medical care to lie with themselves and their physicians. This
was demonstrated in the fight over President Clinton's Health
Security Act in 1993, which included, among other things, required
clinical guidelines to manage utilization.
[45]Twila Brase, "How Technocrats Are Taking
Over the Practice of Medicine: A Wake-Up Call to the American
People," Citizens' Council on Health Care Policy
Report, January 2005,
p. 18, at www.cchconline.org/pdfreport (August 30,
2005).
[46]Keith Syrett, "A Technocratic Fix to the
'Legitimacy Problem'? The Blair Government and Health Care
Rationing in the United Kingdom," Journal of Health Politics,
Policy and Law, Vol.
28, No. 4 (August 2003), p. 728.
[47]Mark Moran, "Pay for Performance Must Be
Quality Issue, AMA Says," Psychiatric News, Vol. 40, No. 14 (July 15, 2005), p. 9,
at pn.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/content/full/40/14/9-b
(August 30, 2005).
[48]Brase, "How Technocrats Are Taking Over
the Practice of Medicine," p. 2.
[49]Comorbidities are defined as concurrent
but unrelated medical conditions.
[50]Tinnetti et al., "Potential Pitfalls of
Disease-Specific Guidelines," p. 2870.
[51]National Center for Policy Analysis,
"Are 'Best Practices' Always Best?" Health Issues Daily Policy
Digest, December 6,
2001, at www.ncpa.org/iss/hea/pd120601c.html (August 30,
2005).
[58]Paul G. Shekelle, Eduardo Ortiz, Shannon
Rhodes, Sally C. Moron, Martin P. Eccles, Jeremy M. Grimshaw, and
Steven H. Woolf, "Validity of the Agency for Healthcare Research
and Quality Clinical Practice Guidelines: How Quickly Do
Guidelines Become Outdated?" Journal of the American
Medical Association,
Vol. 286, No. 12 (September 26, 2001), p. 1461.
[59]Robert P. Gervais, "Cataract Surgery: A
Lesson on 'Best Practices,'" AZMed, Vol. 15, No. 5 (September/October
2004), pp. 21 and 25, at
www.azmedassn.org.xohost.com/publications/2004_09-10.pdf
(August 30, 2005).
[60]Roy B. Verdery, "Paying Physicians for
High-Quality Care," letter, The New England Journal of
Medicine, Vol. 350, No.
18 (April 29, 2004), pp. 1910-1911.
[61]Daniel Costello, "Rating Doctors: Who
Benefits?" Los Angeles Times, June 13, 2005, p. F1.
[62]Craig R. Narins,
Ann M. Dozier, Frederick S. Ling, and Wojciech Zareba, "The
Influence of Public Reporting of Outcome Data on Medical Decision
Making by Physicians," Archives of Internal Medicine, Vol.
165, No. 1 (January 10, 2005), pp. 83-87.
[63]Aspden et al., Patient Safety, p.
267.
[64]Meredith B. Rosenthal, Rushika
Fernandopulle, HyunSook Ryu Song, and Bruce Landon, "Paying for
Quality: Providers' Incentives for Quality Improvement," Health
Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 2
(March-April 2004), p. 139.
[65]Mendelson and Carino, "Evidence-Based
Medicine in the United States," p. 134.
[66]Jeffrey J. Stoddard, Marie Reed, and
Jack Hadley, "Financial Incentives and Physicians' Perceptions of
Conflict of Interest and Ability to Arrange Medically Necessary
Services," Journal of Ambulatory Care Management, Vol. 26, No. 1 (January- March 2003),
p. 45, Table 3.
[67]Audiey C. Kao, Diane C. Green, Alan M.
Zaslavsky, Jeffrey P. Koplan, and Paul D. Cleary, "The Relationship
Between Method of Physician Payment and Patient Trust," Journal
of the American Medical Association, Vol. 280, No. 19 (November 18, 1998),
pp. 1708-1713, and Anne G. Pereira and Steven D. Pearson, "Patient
Attitudes Toward Physician Financial Incentives," Archives of
Internal Medicine, Vol. 161, No. 10 (May 28, 2001), pp.
1313-1317.
[68]For additional details on the conceptual
flaws of the current Medicare fee schedule, see Robert E. Moffit,
Ph.D., "Comparable Worth for Doctors: A Severe Case of
Government Malpractice," Heritage Foundation
Backgrounder No.
855, September 23, 1991, at
www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/BG855.cfm, and H. E.
Frech III, "Overview of Policy Issues," in Frech, ed.,
Regulating Doctors' Fees.
[69]As cited earlier, under Medicare law,
with certain regulatory exceptions, any physician who establishes a
private contract to treat a Medicare patient is prohibited from
billing Medicare for any patients for two years.
[70]Jacques Chaoulli, "A Victory for
Freedom: The Canadian Supreme Court's Ruling on Private Health
Care," Heritage Foundation Lecture No. 892, July 22, 2005, at
www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/hl892.cfm.
[71]Vanessa Fuhrmans, "Patients Give New
Insurance Mixed Reviews," The Wall Street
Journal, June 14, 2005,
p. D1.