Osama bin Laden's
latest
audiotape message, broadcast by Al Jazeera on January 19, is
ostensibly aimed at the American people but also addresses
important audiences in the Muslim world. Bin Laden's message is
multifaceted: He is still alive and still in charge of al-Qaeda
despite his long absence from public sight; he is a rational leader
who claims to speak for all Muslims; and he is willing and capable
of delivering a truce, if Americans will only stop their
"aggression."
Bin Laden's
message continued some of the themes of his October 29, 2004,
videotape message, which broached the possibility of a truce,
sought to undercut support for the policies of the Bush
Administration, and threatened to inflict future terrorist
catastrophes. Once again, bin Laden has sought to strike a
statesmanlike pose, offering a nebulous "long term truce with you
on the basis of fair conditions that we respect." Bin Laden also
offered a truce to European countries shortly after the Madrid
bombings in an April 15, 2004, audiotape message. That offer was
spurned by the Europeans, just as the Bush Administration has
rejected his latest offer, with Vice President Richard Cheney
saying flatly, "We don't negotiate with terrorists."
But bin Laden
addresses his boastful propaganda not to the U.S. government, but
to the American people. As part of his continuing psychological
war, he again is attempting to drive a wedge between Americans and
their government. He took note of public opinion polls that show a
growing number of Americans favor a withdrawal from Iraq and sought
to undermine President Bush's often-stated rationale that it is
better to fight terrorists in Iraq and Afghanistan than at
home.
Bin Laden crowed
that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are going "in our favor," and
that "our conditions are always improving, becoming better, while
yours are the opposite." This is a vain effort to make the offer of
a truce, after the murder of thousands of Americans, sound like a
magnanimous gesture. He cited the bombings in the capitals of the
"most important European countries of this aggressive coalition"
(London and Madrid) and warned that his terrorists would soon
attack inside the United States again: "Operations are in
preparation and you will see them on your own ground…"
Bin Laden's more
important audiences are his own followers and the broader Muslim
world, which he sought to assure that he is still alive, still
relevant, and still a leader of an organization capable of killing
Americans on their own soil. Bin Laden had not been heard from for
thirteen months, the longest gap between messages since the 9/11
attacks, fueling rumors that he was dead. He has had to distance
himself from many of his followers for security reasons and
undoubtedly sought to reassure them that he is still in the fight
and that they should fight on also despite recent losses, such as
the January 13th airstrike in Pakistan that reportedly killed four
or five of al-Qaeda's operational leaders.
Bin Laden's last
message had come in an audiotape released on December 27, 2004, in
which he had named Abu Musab Zarqawi as his deputy in charge of
al-Qaeda operations in Iraq. Zarqawi, a Jordanian of Palestinian
descent, met bin Laden during the war against the Soviets in
Afghanistan, but had retained his independence, in part because he
believed bin Laden was too soft. Although they shared the same
long-term goal of building a global Muslim state under a new
caliphate, Zarqawi held a fierce hostility to Shiite Muslims, whom
he regarded as heretics who should be converted or slaughtered,
while bin Laden was willing to paper over sectarian differences
until the "far enemy," the United States, was defeated.
As a former prison
enforcer, Zarqawi also displayed a ruthless streak that shocked
even some of bin Laden's supporters. He deployed truck bombs
against Shiite mosques and religious ceremonies in Iraq in an
attempt to provoke a civil war that would make Iraq ungovernable.
Zarqawi also made extensive use of videotaped beheadings of
hostages in Iraq, which became a kind of popular jihadist
pornography on extremist Islamic websites. As Zarqawi became
increasingly visible due to his highly publicized atrocities, while
al-Qaeda's leaders hunkered down in the
Pakistan/Afghanistan/Kashmir region, there was a real danger that
al-Qaeda would be eclipsed by Zarqawi's Tawhid (Monotheism) group.
Bin Laden essentially decided to anoint Zarqawi as his deputy in
Iraq, despite their ideological differences, in order to extend the
al-Qaeda "brand" to the Iraqi front, which had become an
increasingly important theater in the global terrorist war.
Although absorbing
Zarqawi's predominantly Jordanian, Palestinian, and Syrian
supporters gave al-Qaeda a stronger presence in Iraq and in Europe,
where Zarqawi had developed an independent network, it led to
ideological tensions within al-Qaeda. In July 2005, bin Laden's
chief lieutenant, Ayman al-Zawahiri sent a letter to Zarqawi,
subsequently intercepted, that urged Zarqawi to avoid making the
same mistake that the Taliban had in Afghanistan-ignoring the
importance of popular support.
But Zarqawi
apparently has spurned this advice and continued to massacre Iraqi
civilians indiscriminately, which has led to a backlash by Sunni
Arabs who form the backbone of the Iraqi insurgency. Zarqawi's
al-Qaeda has clashed violently with other insurgent groups who
believe his nihilistic terrorism is undermining the insurgency. On
November 9, 2005, Zarqawi's group launched suicide bombings at
three hotels in Amman, Jordan, slaughtering scores of Jordanian and
Palestinian civilians, including some attending a wedding party.
The subsequent backlash against al-Qaeda in Jordan has been
accompanied by criticism of al-Qaeda's tactics by many Muslims,
even some radical Islamists who share its long-term goals.
Bin Laden's latest
message also was aimed at reasserting his leadership and placating
some of these critics by presenting a more reasonable, politically
sensitive approach to the long-term goal of Islamic revolution. He
seeks to distract Muslims from al-Qaeda's slaughter of Muslims in
Iraq, Jordan, Afghanistan, and elsewhere by refocusing them on war
against the United States, in which he poses as their champion.
The truce offer is
not only meant to drive a wedge between Americans and their
government, but also to shore up al-Qaeda's crumbling support among
Iraqis. By offering a truce to "build Iraq and Afghanistan" rather
than continue Zarqawi's counterproductive approach, he puts the
onus on the United States for continuing the war.
The truce offer
also reinforces bin Laden's longtime contention that he is fighting
a defensive jihad against an implacable enemy. In such
circumstances, he has argued in the past, he is justified in taking
the most extreme measures to defend the Muslim community. By
offering a truce that he knew would be rejected, he strengthens his
case for another horrific attack on American territory.
Unfortunately, one
element of truth in his audiotape is that al-Qaeda is making
preparations for the next mega-terrorist attack. Bin Laden
undoubtedly could have launched car bomb or suicide bomb attacks
inside the United States before now. But such attacks would have
been a sign of growing weakness after 9/11. Bin Laden seeks to
launch a follow-on attack that would have as large a psychological,
economic, and propaganda impact as the 9/11 attacks, perhaps at
some of the same targets. A repeated theme in bin Laden's past
messages has been the need to attack economic targets, particularly
oil facilities. Bin Laden also has made references to Hiroshima,
which could foreshadow an attack involving a radiological "dirty
bomb" or some kind of a nuclear device. Despite improvements in
U.S. homeland security, al-Qaeda is a patient, resourceful, and
relentless foe that is sure to strike again.
The Bush
Administration correctly has rejected bin Laden's bogus "truce
offer." It also should take a page out of bin Laden's playbook and
offer a truce to some of bin Laden's wavering allies, such as some
of the more pragmatic Taliban leaders who were ousted from power in
Afghanistan and forced into exile in Pakistan. If they are willing
to provide useful intelligence against al-Qaeda and pledge loyalty
to Afghanistan's democratic government, they should be allowed to
return to Afghanistan but not engage in politics. After four years
of living as fugitives in exile, some former Taliban figures may be
tempted to return home and willing to trade valuable information to
do so.
James
Phillips is Research Fellow in Middle Eastern Studies in the
Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a
division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for
International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.