In the aftermath of the
widespread devastation wrought by Hurricane Katrina and the
unsteady response to conditions in New Orleans, some argued to give
the federal government a much more intrusive role in meeting future
catastrophic emergencies. [1] While improvements in
the federal response are necessary, turning responsibility for
everything over to Washington is a terrible idea.
Homeland security and
disaster management are national, not just federal, missions. The
right response to domestic emergencies requires effective action
from state and local governments, private-sector and voluntary
associations, and communities and individuals, as well as support
from federal officials. The best way to ensure cooperation and to
meet shared responsibilities is not to put big government in
charge.
Federalism has long been
the guiding principle for allocating responsibilities to meet the
needs of citizens after disasters. Remaining committed to a
federalist approach is not just being a slave to tradition. It
is a precedent based on practicality and experience. Both
scientific research on disaster response and an analysis of recent
emergencies argue that it is still the right approach. Many of the
best efforts to save lives and safeguard property highlight the
vital role that nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
private-sector initiatives, and individual civic deeds play
during extreme emergencies. In fact, they argue that rather than
being supplanted by federal oversight, grassroots responses
should be the cornerstone of the national effort.
The federal government can
best facilitate establishing an effective national response to
catastrophic disaster by meeting its own responsibilities, creating
a national response system that promotes collaborative effort,
and supporting "train the trainer" programs that help
communities to build strong grassroots response.
The
Constitution and Governance
Embodied in the U.S.
Constitution, the principles of limited government and
federalism give citizens and local communities the greatest
role in shaping their lives. The 10th Amendment states that "powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor
prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people." In matters relating to their
communities, local jurisdictions have the preponderance of
authority and autonomy. This just makes sense: The people closest
to the problem are the ones best equipped to find the best
solution.
America's system for
disaster response reflects these principles. The core assumption is
that incidents are typically managed best at the lowest
possible geographic, organizational, and jurisdictional
levels. Several reasons justify this approach.
-
Every community is
unique. Preparedness
planning must account for local conditions of culture, geography,
language, infrastructure, politics, and numerous other
factors.
-
Local communities have the
resources. Since local
communities are responsible for public safety, they already have
the preponderance of assets that are usually required to deal with
problems. Of the millions of emergency responders in the
United States-including fire, police, emergency services,
utility workers, medical personnel, and volunteer groups-the
vast majority work either for or with local
communities.
-
Time matters. In most disasters, the first few hours
are critical. Most life-threatening injuries require immediate
attention. Since local responders are already in the jurisdiction,
they are likely the only personnel that can reach the disaster
scene in time to make a difference.
-
Priorities matter.
Large-scale disasters will require
states and the federal government to prioritize the allocation of
additional resources to help affected communities throughout a
region. The more robust the local response, the more aid can be
focused on the areas most greatly affected by the
disaster.
-
It encourages
preparedness. If local
communities are not primarily responsible for disaster
response, they will be less likely to invest in the resources and
assets needed to safeguard their citizens.
A federalist approach to
disaster response for a nation like the United States, with its
vast population, wide geographical area, diverse regional
conditions, and traditions of strong state and local
governments and volunteerism, is the only practical
choice.
National planning
documents for homeland security adhere to the conviction that the
federal government should reinforce-not replace-state, local, and
nongovernmental efforts. Federal law, especially the Robert T.
Stafford Emergency and Disaster Assistance Act,[2] and
presidential directives embody this tiered approach in which state
and local authorities have the initial lead role in managing
emergencies within the United States.[3]
State and local
governments devise the emergency response and evacuation plans for
their jurisdictions and authorize their implementation. Each state
decides for itself the precise delineation of authorities and
responsibilities for emergency response between statewide and local
public bodies (e.g., municipalities and counties). The common
planning assumption is that communities need to manage a local
emergency largely by themselves for up to 72 hours until
substantial federal assistance can be mobilized and deployed on the
scene.
The National Response Plan
(NRP) provides the framework for delineating responsibilities
during a domestic emergency. The NRP designates which federal
agencies and programs are activated in various types of
incidents or threat conditions. In particular, it specifies 15
Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) and states which organizations
are primarily responsible for coordinating each ESF during an
emergency. The NRP also indicates how federal agencies interact
with state, local, and tribal governments and the private sector,
and it identifies when federal authorities assume control of
the national response.[4]
The Constitution, in such
clauses as "provide for the common defense,"[5]
recognizes the ultimate role of the federal government in
preventing and managing large-scale terrorist attacks and
other emergencies. When the scale of an incident exceeds the
capacity of state and local actors to respond, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and other U.S. government
agencies mobilize to provide assistance.[6] Such intervention
requires the President, following an appeal from a state
governor, to issue a disaster or emergency declaration that
authorizes supplemental federal assistance to the stricken
area.
However, even in this
case, state bodies retain much authority over the response-and that
is the way it should be. As long as state and local
governments remain viable and operate within federal law,
their sovereign authority to look after their citizens should not
be questioned.
National
Volunteer Network
Nongovernmental actors
such as private businesses and voluntary associations can also
make substantial independent contributions. Federal plans describe
how Washington interfaces with the private sector and NGOs in the
event of disaster. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5
states:
The Federal Government
recognizes the role that the private and nongovernmental sectors
play in preventing, preparing for, responding to, and recovering
from terrorist attacks, major disasters, and other emergencies. The
Secretary [of Homeland Security] will coordinate with the private
and non-governmental sectors to ensure adequate planning,
equipment, training, and exercise activities and to promote
partnerships to address incident management capabilities.[7]
The plans emphasize the
federal government's role in coordinating national activities, not
in directing how and what individual communities do in the event of
an emergency.
Although hundreds of national groups may
respond to a disaster, the National Response Plan names only two:
the American Red Cross and National Voluntary Organizations Active
in Disasters (NVOAD).
-
The plan assigns the Red Cross
responsibility for coordinating federal mass care assistance
(ESF-6) in support of state and local governments. This
includes sheltering, feeding, providing emergency first aid,
providing human services like counseling, processing benefits, and
maintaining the victims registry.
-
The NVOAD does not offer direct
support to victims. It is an umbrella organization: a
coalition of over 40 of the largest groups that provide a
range of emergency and support services. NVOAD primarily serves
before disasters as an information-sharing and planning network for
its member organizations. During disasters, it facilitates
coordinating their activities with one another.[8]
The role of these national
organizations, like the role of the federal government, is
supporting-not taking over-local communities.
Grassroots
Response
Washington's plans offer a
framework for providing national assistance to local
communities in times of need, both through state and local
governments and through national-level NGOs. They are
necessary but not sufficient. They are designed to supplement, not
supplant, grassroots responses- and with good reason. Current
research on disaster preparedness argues that community-centered
disaster preparations are far more effective than
Washington-centric planning.
More Effective
Planning. A study by the Center for
the Advancement of Collaborative Strategies in Health examined how
communities would react to two kinds of terrorist attacks: a
smallpox outbreak and a dirty bomb explosion. The study found that
most extant response plans will not work. Surveys suggested that
most individuals would not follow instructions such as reporting to
vaccination sites or sheltering-in-place when required.
The study found that most
people have common-sense reasons for noncompliance. People
have little faith in plans that affect their personal safety and
that were developed without their direct involvement. The public
has little confidence that the planning of professionals
necessarily offers the best course of action to protect themselves
and their families. This is especially true when plans ask them to
do things that are counterintuitive, such as not going to school to
pick up their children during an emergency. On the other hand, the
study found that disaster planning that included input from the
community resulted not only in higher quality plans, but also in
far higher levels of community approval and confidence in the
plans.[9]
More Meaningful
Response.Not only does
community-centered planning offer better prospects for
developing better plans and obtaining greater public support, but
grassroots efforts make for more resilient responses in the event
of disaster. Indeed, community-centered actions, in which
citizens take care of themselves and their neighbors, are more
effective and have therapeutic mental health effects. One disaster
research study found that when community ties "are strong,
supportive, and responsive to the individual's physical and
emotional needs, the capacity to withstand and overcome stress is
heightened."[10] Citizens feel more secure and
better cared for when they are looked after by members of their own
community.
More Versatile
Response. Another reason why
grassroots responses are essential is that as the scale of the
disaster increases, so does the likelihood of confusion and
ambiguity. Under these conditions, improvisation and adaptation are
crucial to eliciting an effective response, particularly in
the first hours and days of a catastrophe before organized
responders can reach the scene. Research has found that the
communities themselves are the best source of innovation and
ingenuity, and the stronger the community, the more
resourceful and robust is the nature of its adaptive qualities.[11]
America
in Action
The efficacy of grassroots
response was demonstrated in the wake of Katrina.
National-level organizations-not just the federal government,
but nongovernmental agencies such as the Red Cross and the
Salvation Army-proved unable to mobilize an effective
response. They lacked adequate situational awareness of local
needs and the means to deploy the right resources to the right
place at the right time to do the right thing.
In contrast, local
communities in many cases provided the most effective response. One
district in Louisiana had 40 operating shelters in the
immediate aftermath of the storm, and less than 10 were Red
Cross shelters. Tens of thousands of people were sheltered and fed
by local efforts.
"The best job," argued
Representative Jim McCrery (R-LA), was done by "ordinary
people who came out of their homes and bought diapers and pillows
and blankets and food and stayed at the high school gymnasium or
wherever, the civic center in some small town and cooked for the
people who were there, who gave them rides to the Social Security
office to make sure they got their checks."[12]
Additionally, local faith-based organizations responded
quickly and effectively by providing facilities and resources and
by mobilizing volunteers. Louisiana residents affected by these two
storms generally rated the assistance provided by private sources
such as nonprofit, community, and faith-based organizations
substantially higher than assistance from federal, state, and
local governments and national organizations like the Red Cross.[13]
Such views are not
exceptional. Traditionally, local churches provide immediate
assistance to a stricken area, the American Red Cross takes the
lead in providing emergency relief a few days later, and other
charities (many from the affected community itself) then focus
on long-run recovery.
In the aftermath of
Katrina, the grassroots response proved especially important.
Overwhelmed American Red Cross personnel required an
exceptionally long time to service many of the smaller, often rural
Gulf Coast communities and declined to operate in some locations
when they feared for the safety of their volunteers and the
victims (e.g., because of fear of strong winds or
unsanitary conditions).[14] Government
agencies also found it difficult to provide timely assistance to
all residents of the many devastated areas. Private civic efforts
(often local churches) filled many of these gaps through countless,
if often unrecorded, acts of generosity. In cooperation with
neighbors, friends, and fellow sufferers, victims also organized to
help themselves-a step that mental health professionals
consider essential to overcoming feelings of powerlessness and
trauma.[15]
The
Not-So-Local Community
Since New Orleans has an
unusually large number of long-term residents, they perhaps
found it easier to form self-help networks than would
communities with more transient inhabitants. On the other
hand, local newspapers throughout the United States reported how
myriad groups organized to help to fill the gap by collecting
money, food, clothing, and other supplies; sending them to stricken
regions; and distributing them to Katrina victims, either in the
Gulf Coast states or wherever they had been evacuated. Although
they lacked the resources available to government agencies, their
smaller size and innovative approaches often allowed them to
respond more flexibly than their larger, more established
partners.[16]
As after the terrorist
attacks on September 11 and the tsunami in the Indian Ocean, large
corporations and small enterprises donated hundreds of
millions of dollars in cash, goods, and services after Katrina and
Rita. Umbrella associations such as the Business Roundtable played
an important role in connecting companies seeking to provide
assistance with points of contact in government and
nongovernmental sectors.[17] For example, Wal-Mart provided
2,500 trailers of emergency supplies within the first three weeks
of the disaster. In some cases, local Wal-Mart managers organized
their stores as caches of supplies for local responders and
disaster victims.[18]
Modern communications
technologies such as the Internet also facilitated the development
of virtual communities among concerned people. Many commercial
Web sites (including Amazon, Google, MSN, and Yahoo) offered
visitors the opportunity to donate cash to hurricane victims with
just a few clicks of a mouse.
In addition to the
corporate response, Korean, Hispanic, Vietnamese, and
African-American media and local activist groups around the country
were especially active in mobilizing support for fellow ethnic
people affected by the disaster. Fearful of dealing with the
federal government, illegal immigrants came to depend heavily on
such private assistance.
Indeed, in 21st century
America, the "local" community is defined by more than just
geographic proximity. As one research study found, in modern
urban societies, "people's personal communities often
transcend time and space and the traditional categories of
[geographic and demographic] groups."[19] These
extended communities, whether based on corporate responsibility,
social action, or individual initiative, are also an important
part of the grassroots response.
Learning
from Katrina
The worst reaction to the
aftermath of Katrina would be to adopt a more heavy-handed
federalized approach, which would undercut the very kinds of
responses that proved the most effective. This is not to say that
Washington's response does not need to be improved significantly.
The federal government has a unique and important role to play.
Only the federal government can build a national response system of
the kind needed in a catastrophic disaster (like Katrina) to
mobilize the resources of the nation in the face of a disaster that
immediately overwhelms local leaders and puts tens of thousands of
lives at risk.[20]
The federal government is
also responsible for building the "plugs" that allow state and
local government to "plug" into the system. This includes
training, education, planning, interoperable communications,
and effective information sharing.[21] Beyond that,
the federal government should focus federal dollars on building up
the federal assets needed to respond to catastrophic
disasters.
As part of the federal
effort, more can be done to improve Washington's support for
building grassroots responses.[22] The Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) should:
-
Create regional outreach
offices. The country
needs a national homeland security system that mobilizes public
safety officials and state and local governments as effective
partners in emergency response. For more effective
coordination among these different levels of government and
the private sector, the DHS should create regional field offices as
required by the Homeland Security Act of 2002. Among their
primary duties, the regional offices should work with state
and local officials to encourage strong community-based efforts.[23]
-
Deemphasize national
preparedness pro-grams. Initiatives like Ready.gov and National
Preparedness Month are redundant to pro-grams run by the American
Red Cross and will never be as effective as programs run by
communities with the participation and leadership of local
citizens.
-
Train the trainers.
The DHS can help state and local
communities develop a culture of pre-paredness by helping them to
establish training programs for state and local leaders, who in
turn can work to help develop strong community-centered
programs.
For its part, Congress
should:
-
Reform the grant
formulas. Washington's
approach to funding state and local security has been flawed from
the start. The Patriot Act requires a significant portion of
homeland security grants to be divided among the states without
regard to need or risk. As a result, 40 percent of the state grants
are simply entitlements. As the 9/11 Commission's report
accurately stated, the current system is in danger of turning
homeland security grants into "pork barrel funding."[24] Grants should be based on
risk, vulnerability, and national priorities, not on past funding
or state population. Congress should repeal or substantially reduce
the congressionally mandated state minimums. This would allow
available funds to be used to build a national response system that
supports state and local efforts and encourages communities to look
after their own needs rather than wait on Washington.
-
Require the DHS and the
Department of Health and Human Services to establish joint working
groups. These groups
should (1) promote the development of community-centric
planning; (2) help state and local officials provide the
necessary means and infrastructure for the American public to
volunteer to assume a direct and influential role in
community-based disaster preparedness, response, recovery, and
mitigation planning efforts; and (3) develop standards to measure
the success of community disaster planning efforts.
Conclusion
Preparedness and response
programs run by Washington bureaucrats that diminish the role and
responsibilities of state and local governments will not make
Americans safer. Instead, they will waste tax dollars and divert
the DHS from tasks that would make a difference.
Federal, state, and local
governments need to work together to encourage, not supplant,
community-centered programs. As with many other homeland
security missions, applying-rather than trying to circumvent-the
principles of federalism usually produces the best
results.
James Jay Carafano,
Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow for National
Security and Homeland Security in the Douglas and Sarah Allison
Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn
and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The
Heritage Foundation. Richard Weitz, Ph.D., is Senior Fellow and
Associate Director of the Center for Future Security Strategies at
the Hudson Institute.
[2]42
U.S. Code 5121 et seq.
[3]"The
Federal Government recognizes the roles and responsibilities of
State and local authorities in domestic incident management.
Initial responsibility for managing domestic incidents generally
falls on State and local authorities." George W. Bush, "Management
of Domestic Incidents," Homeland Security Presidential Directive
HSPD-5, Section 6, at
(January 30, 2006).
[4]U.S.
Department of Homeland Security, National Response Plan,
December 2004, at
(January 30, 2006).
[5]U.S.
Constitution, Article I, Section 8.
[7]Bush,
"Management of Domestic Incidents," Section 7.
[8]U.S.
General Accounting Office, September 11: More Effective
Collaboration Could Enhance Charitable Organizations'
Contributions to Disasters, GAO-03-259, December 19, 2002,
at (January 30,
2006).
[9]Roz
D. Lasker, "Redefining Readiness: Terrorism Planning Through the
Eyes of the Public," New York Academy of Medicine, September 14,
2004, at
(January 30, 2006).
[10]Charles
E. Fritz, "Disasters and Mental Health: Therapeutic Principles
Drawn from Disaster Studies," University of Delaware, Disaster
Research Center, 1996, p. 78.
[11]Gary
R. Webb, Michael Beverly, Megan McMichael, James Noon, and Tabitha
Patterson, "Role Improvising Under Conditions of Uncertainty:
A Classification of Types," University of Delaware, Disaster
Research Center Preliminary Paper No. 289, 1999, at
(January 30, 2006).
[13]Audrey
Hudson, "Storm Victims Praise Churches," The Washington
Times, December 2, 2005, at
(March 15, 2006).
[14]Stephanie
Strom and Campbell Robertson, "As Its Coffers Swell, Red Cross Is
Criticized on Gulf Coast Response," The New York Times,
September 20, 2005, p. A24.
[15]See
Marianne Szegedy-Maszak, "Shattered Lives," U.S. News &
World Report, October 3, 2005, pp. 50-54, and Cynthia
Fagnoni, testimony before the Subcommittee on Oversight,
Committee on Ways and Means, U.S. House of Representatives,
December 13, 2005.
[16]Many
of their contributions are recounted in William Schambra, "Katrina
and the American Idea of Community," Philanthropy,
forthcoming.
[18]Jason
Jackson, testimony before the Committee on Homeland Security and
Government Affairs, U.S. Senate, November 16, 2005.
[19]Charles
E. Fritz, "Disasters and Mental Health: Therapeutic Principles
Drawn from Disaster Studies," University of Delaware, Disaster
Research Center Historical and Comparative Disaster Series
No. 10, 1996, p. 78, at
http://www.udel.edu/DRC/preliminary/handc10.pdf
(February 21, 2006).
[20]For
recommendations on improving the federal response to catastrophic
disasters, see James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., "Improving the
National Response to Catastrophic Disaster," testimony before the
Committee on Government Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives,
September 15, 2005, at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/tst091505a.cfm.
[21]Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 8 describes the kind of national
effort that is required. Under its auspices, the DHS is
establishing national performance standards, developing the means
to measure readiness and allocating funds based on national
priorities. See James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., "Homeland Security
Dollars and Sense #4: An End to Pork Barrel Security Grants?"
Heritage Foundation WebMemo No. 962, January 23, 2006, at
http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/wm962.cfm.
[24]Chairman
Thomas H. Kean and Vice Chairman Lee H. Hamilton, remarks on Final
Report of the 9/11 Public Discourse Project, December 5, 2005, p.
2, at
(March 16, 2006).