China's latest
United Nations veto threat should convince even the most generous
diplomat that Beijing is part of the problem in North Korea, not a
"partner" in a solution. If it ever hopes to get a solution,
Washington should now make Beijing's policy toward North Korea a
vital test of China's ability and desire to be a "responsible
stakeholder" in the international system. Specifically, the United
States should insist on the introduction of the Japanese draft
Chapter VII resolution proposing sanctions against North Korea for
noncompliance and allow China to use its veto, if it follows
through on its threat. Forcing a veto would clear the air and reset
the issue for policy-makers and diplomats. Though some would claim
a Chinese veto to be a "defeat" of U.S. policy, it would actually
be a sign of Chinese obstruction of an international consensus.
Regardless, it would end the charade that China has played a
"constructive role" in preserving the existing international
nonproliferation structure.
"Maintaining Peace
and Stability"?
North Korea
celebrated July 4th with the unannounced launches of seven short-,
medium-, and long-range ballistic missiles into the Sea of Japan.
These were just the latest example of Pyongyang's recklessness and
underscored the urgency of denuclearizing the regime.
Recognizing that
the only potentially successful diplomatic method of controlling
Pyongyang is through the united, multilateral approach, on July 6
President George W. Bush asked several world leaders, including
Chinese President Hu Jintao, for their help in fashioning a tough,
consistent international position committed to restraining North
Korea. Mr. Bush, apparently trying to cajole cooperation, told his
Chinese counterpart, "We appreciate all the efforts China has
exerted for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula."
In reply,
President Hu reportedly declared he would immediately send China's
top Asia specialist, vice foreign minister Wu Dawei, to Pyongyang
to accompany a Chinese delegation there to celebrate the 45th
anniversary of the China-North Korea military alliance. Observers
said China was obviously "irritated" with its North Korean allies.
The United States, in turn, sent its top North Korea negotiator,
Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill, to Beijing for
consultations with the Chinese foreign ministry.
But when the
Chinese delegation wrapped up its trip to Pyongyang, there was
little evidence of China's supposed irritation. Instead, the
Chinese delegation lauded North Korea's economic development,
promised closer ties, and praised North Korea's efforts to
"maintain peace and stability." The Chinese foreign ministry
asserted to foreign reporters that "China and North Korea are
friendly neighbors." Moreover, before he departed for North Korea,
Wu Dawei told a visiting Japanese politician that U.S. financial
sanctions on North Korea (put in place as punishment for
counterfeiting U.S currency), were the "major factor in the
decision to test-fire seven missiles."
In other words, it's America's fault.
Washington should
not have been surprised, then, when President Hu sent a telegram to
North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il reaffirming the Pyongyang
delegation's statements:
Over the last 45 years
both China and the DPRK have jointly accelerated the cause of
socialist construction and defended the peace and stability of
the region, respecting and supporting each other and closely
cooperating with each other on the principle and spirit of the
treaty.
(emphasis
added)
That message, and
the stark absence of any hint of disapproval in Beijing's tone much
less its actual rhetoric, was surely a slap in the face U.S.
policy.
Chinese Veto
Threat
And then the
Chinese slapped the U.S. a few more times. On Wednesday, July 12,
in Beijing, President Hu met with a North Korean counterpart to
celebrate the 45th Anniversary of the Chinese-North Korean
alliance. In careful language calibrated to be anodyne to North
Korea and give an impression of Chinese concern, President Hu
repeated, "We are against any actions that will aggravate the
situation. We hope that relevant parties will do more things
conducive to the peace and stability of the peninsula."
The same day,
China's United Nations ambassador, Wang Guangya, told reporters in
New York that if the Japanese draft resolution for tightly focused
sanctions were to be put to a
vote "without any modifications,
the instructions [for] me is to veto it."
In this, China objects more to the United
States and Japan's measured response to North Korea's provocative
behavior than it has to the behavior itself. Further, a veto threat
is strong stuff. In the 34 years that Beijing has occupied its
Security Council seat, it has vetoed Council resolutions only four
times.
What is it that Mr. Wang's government finds so
objectionable? The Japanese draft "condemns" North Korea's missile
tests and places a binding international ban on supplying
North Korea with any material or technology relevant to its
ballistic missile or nuclear weapons programs. Besides China, the
measure has broad support. U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations
John R. Bolton declared, "We are very pleased with this draft," and
it is also supported by European members of the Security
Council.
China's Draft
But Ambassador Wang promises that China will
veto the resolution without major "modifications." First, the
Chinese draft would urge "all relevant parties" immediately to
return to the Six-Party talks, despite that the talks are about
North Korea's nuclear weapons, not its conventional missiles.
The Chinese draft would "regret" (yihan, but emphatically
not qianze, "deplore") North Korea's missile tests, implying
China's "regret" that North Korea was forced into this
unhappy situation by overwhelming circumstances. It further urges
"all sides" to employ restraint and self-control and avoid anything
that might further exacerbate the situation. Contrary to some press
reports, the public Chinese draft contains no provision that
suggests Pyongyang must reaffirm its 1999 moratorium on ballistic
missile tests.
Second, China demands that the resolution
cannot be under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, which mandates
"action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the
peace, and acts of aggression." At most, China might permit a vote
on a Chapter VI resolution (that demands "the pacific settlement of
disputes"), which would treat the missile firings as if they were
strictly a problem between the U.S., its ally Japan, and North
Korea. And if successful in getting a Chapter VI resolution, China
would still, at most, abstain.
What China appears to really want is a
non-binding "press release" from the Security Council president
that would be as vague as possible about apportioning blame for
North Korea's behavior. Ideally, this press release would allude to
North Korea's "reasonable concerns" for its security in the face of
a threat from America. As precedent, Wang referred to an obscure UN
action in 1999 in which a press release was issued but not made
part of the official UN record.
A separate Chinese-Russian counter-draft
circulated on July 13 reportedly "deplores" (better than "regrets")
North Korea's July 4 missile tests but, in the main, merely
suggests that Pyongyang not shoot off long-range missiles again. It
also suggests that UN member states might "exercise vigilance" in
the choice of goods, technology and materials they export to North
Korea's missile program.
China, for
its part, seems intent on exercising little vigilance. Reportedly,
ten Iranian missile engineers transited Beijing last month en
route to Pyongyang, where they intended to check the quality of
certain Chinese-made components in the North Korean missiles Iran
plans to purchase. If China is abetting the sale of North Korean
missile components to Iran, then it has no plans to exercise much
"vigilance" at all.
Obviously, China doesn't want to pressure
North Korea. Indeed, one leading Chinese scholar, Chu Shulong of
Tsinghua University, admitted, "China can do a lot to North Korea,
but China does not have a strong interest to do so." He continued
"It's a problem between North Korea and the U.S., and China's role
can only be limited."
Beijing clearly acts as if nuclear weapons and long range ballistic
missiles controlled by the world's most ruthless is not China's
problem but only America's.
Force a Chinese Veto
The history of UN action on North Korea is a
history of Chinese obfuscation, obstruction, and opposition. When
it comes to North Korea, there is no "lowest common denominator"
that can serve as a basis for disarming its nuclear and missile
ambitions. So long China is unwilling to be part of the solution,
there will be no solution.
There should be no further compromise on North
Korea's recklessness or China's immovable toleration of it. The
United States, Japan, and Europe should insist on the introduction
of the Japanese draft Chapter VII resolution proposing
sanctions against North Korea. If China
decides to use its veto, so be it. Once China proves itself
to be part of the problem rather than part of the solution,
American diplomacy can focus on China, and not just North Korea. A
public diplomacy campaign that paints China as the problem would
make it easier for the United States to use its full economic,
political, diplomatic leverage on China in Congress, in the media,
and with the American public. Simply put, China must be made to
choose whether it wants to continue as the enabler of the world's
rogue states or to become a "responsible stakeholder" in a stable
international system.
Michael
A. Needham is Director, and John J.
Tkacik, Jr. is Senior Research Fellow in China Policy, of
the Asian Study Center at The Heritage Foundation.