On November 19,
President George Bush and Russian President Vladimir Putin will
discuss dominant global security issues-the Middle East, including
Iran and Iraq, North Korea, and Georgia-at a summit in Hanoi,
Vietnam. Тhis meeting will take place alongside the meeting
of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Organization (APEC). Both
presidents, along with U.S. Trade Representative Susan Schwab and
the Russian Economics Minister German Gref, are also expected to
preside over the signing ceremony of a bilateral protocol on
Russia's accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO).
Despite a troubled
relationship between the U.S. and Russia in the last three years,
the U.S. has an interest in Russian membership in rules-based
organizations, such as the WTO. Furthermore, expansion of U.S. and
Western trade and investment ties with Russia integrates Russia
with the outside world and hopefully will prevent Russian
isolationism and aggression. If President Bush receives assurances
from Putin on two key issues-Iran and foreign access to Russian oil
and gas reserves-the U.S. should sign the bilateral protocol.
Iran:
The Key Issue
Russia has been
insufficiently cooperating with the U.S. on the key international
security issue-Iran-by stalling and backtracking on the earlier,
agreed-upon U.N. Security Council (UNSC) draft resolution sponsored
by Great Britain, France, and Germany. That document calls for
sanctions against Iran's nuclear, missile, and military
programs.
Moreover, Russian
Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov recently downplayed the
International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) discovery that Iran has
concealed highly enriched uranium and plutonium-even as President
Mahmud Ahmadinejad promised to make Iran a nuclear power by March
2007 and announced the launch of a 3,000-strong centrifuge cascade
capable of enriching weapons-grade fissile material. Ahmadinejad
also threatened to expand the cascade to 60,000 centrifuges, which
would eventually give Iran a powerful nuclear weapons-producing
capability.
Moscow is
concerned that support of tough UNSC sanctions may diminish its
leverage in Teheran and the Middle East as compared with Washington
and European capitals. The Kremlin may also be concerned that
sanctions could jeopardize its Bushehr nuclear reactor deal and the
sale of TOR M-1 mobile anti-aircraft system worth $700 million.
Proposed sanctions could affect many other transactions of weapons
and technology: For example, Russia supports technology transfer to
the Iranian space program, a precursor to the intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) production capacity. Earlier this week
U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. John Bolton rejected Russia's
alternative, and toothless, sanctions resolution draft.
Promises on
Trade
President Bush has
promised Putin repeatedly to abolish the Jackson-Vanick Amendment.
The amendment, passed in 1974, denied the USSR the Most Favored
Nation (MFN) status in trade. He also promised Putin to facilitate
the passage of Permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR) through
Congress. So far, neither has been accomplished, and the new
Democratic majority in Congress is likely to stall оn these
issues, citing concerns about trade, insufficient protection of
intellectual property rights, democracy shortcomings, and harsh
treatment of Russia's neighbors, such as Georgia.
The U.S. business
community supports liberalizing trade with Russia and has lobbied
for Russian accession to WTO. Boeing, Shell, Ford, Microsoft, and a
number of agribusinesses have market access issues to address and
businesses to expand in what is one of the most dynamic economies
on the planet. Russia has been growing at about 6.5 percent of GDP
a year since 2000.
The WTO agreement
does have clear achievements, such as Russia's recognition of 100
percent foreign owned banks, broker-dealers, and investment
companies. The agreement also provides for some liberalization of
the insurance sector.
Russia has also
softened its stance on major agricultural dispute resolution issues
regarding U.S. exports of meat and poultry. President Putin had to
override the intransigent and allegedly corrupt Russian
Agricultural Ministry and the meat-and-poultry lobby to do
this.
Energy Access
A major concern
remains unanswered: foreign company access to the Russian mineral
resources fields and deposits, including hydrocarbons, and private
ownership of oil and gas pipelines. Russia promised and then denied
Western companies partnership in development of the giant Shtokman
gas field in the Barents Sea. Russia is also facing difficulties in
the Sakhalin Island oil projects. Additionally, the Russian
pipeline monopoly Transneft is increasing tariffs for transit
through the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPS) pipeline from
Kazakhstan to the Black Sea. The tariff increase is a major
bottleneck in development of exportable Russian energy resources,
and the U.S. should achieve progress before granting Russia
PNTR.
Georgia
on Moscow's Mind
Russia rejects any
official mediation of the Georgian conflict, which it deems within
its "sphere of influence." Moscow is threatening to recognize
independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, both parts of Georgia,
following the model of Kosovo. The U.S. rejection of the South
Ossetia's November 12 independence referendum complicates the
issue. Moscow must conclude a bilateral WTO accession agreement
with Tbilisi, but this will not be easy, as Russia severed trade,
financial, and transportation ties with Georgia and banned the two
Georgian key exports to Russia: wine and mineral water.
Danger and
Opportunity
Moscow and
Washington are facing the lowest point in the bilateral relations
since the end of the Cold War, with Russia providing arms and
diplomatic cover to Iran, the main anti-status quo power in the
Middle East and the world. Moscow, at the same time, strives to
join the developed nations as a respected power and a key supplier
of energy, raw materials, and, increasingly, machine tools,
industrial goods, and services. It cannot achieve such status while
challenging the U.S. on vital security issues. Signing the WTO
protocol is a step away from confrontation and, hopefully, toward
cooperation on the two issues of great importance to the U.S.-Iran,
and access to oil and gas.
At the Hanoi
summit, President Bush should strive to receive guarantees from
President Putin that Russia will end its fence-sitting on the
Iranian nuclear program and will recognize the threat to world
peace, including the threat to itself, from a missile-wielding,
nuclear-armed Iran. Russia should support and be part of the
U.S.-European policy on bringing sanctions against Iran and not
ruling out the use of force if sanctions fail.
In exchange,
President Bush should recommit to passing PNTR for Russian and
abolishing the Jackson-Vanick Amendment in the lame duck session of
Congress. However, Russia must agree to allow Western companies
access to its natural resources and energy transportation
infrastructure. Russia also needs to demonstrate that it is serious
in protecting intellectual property rights.
Finally, the U.S.
may consider offering its services in resolving the Russia-Georgia
dispute, which should include lifting Russian economic and
transportation sanctions in exchange for lifting Georgia's
objections to Russia's WTO membership.
Conclusion
Presidents Bush
and Putin, like their countries, have experienced ups and downs-and
a lack of trust-in attempting, and often failing, to reconcile
conflicting national interests for the greater part of the decade.
Addressing U.S. concerns about Iran and energy and signing Russia's
WTO accession is a good place to start in turning a new page in
this complicated relationship.
Ariel Cohen,
Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow in
Russian and Eurasian Studies and International Energy Security in
the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy
Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis
Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.
Anna Bryndza, a Heritage Foundation intern, assisted in researching
this paper.