The United States is at a critical juncture in its history. Once
again the U.S. Congress appears to be on the verge of deciding
whether a war will be won or lost. While true in the long run that
the Iraq war could be won or lost in Iraq, it could also be lost on
the home front if Congress persists in passing resolutions
undercutting or limiting the President's ability to conduct the
war.
The U.S. has been here before. The outcome last time around is a
sobering history lesson all Members of Congress should consider as
they think about where they come down on the Iraq resolutions.
The year was 1974, and a Democratic Congress, upset with the
Ford White House for pardoning Richard Nixon, decided that it was
time to punish the new administration with all of the power that it
had accumulated during the Watergate scandal. Beginning with the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1974, after all U.S. troops had left
Vietnam, Congress cut off all U.S. funding to the South Vietnamese
government--cutting off its ability to buy the weapons it needed to
protect itself. It would eventually succumb to the North Vietnamese
Army in 1975, setting off a series of Communist victories around
the world, as well as the slaughter of millions in neighboring
Cambodia.
In retrospect, many historians acknowledge that none of this
needed to happen. In the years prior to 1975, the U.S. not only
succeeded in bringing the North Vietnamese to the negotiating table
to end the war, but South Vietnam remained a free, democratic
state, able to defend itself thanks to a steady supply of U.S.
foreign aid and the successful strategy of Vietnamization--not
unlike what the U.S. intends to foster in Iraq.
In other words, Vietnam was not solely a casualty of the North
Vietnamese, but rather also the victim of political expediency on
the part of antiwar Members of Congress. And the same kind of
political animosity and fear that seriously impaired the judgment
of Congress at the time of the Vietnam War is evident today in the
debate over the Iraq resolutions. While not yet at the point where
antiwar Members of Congress are cutting funding for the war effort
or the Iraq government, the U.S. may very well face that prospect
in the near future if the political discourse in this country does
not change. Unfortunately, it appears that some senators have yet
to learn this important lesson as they begin their journey down the
same slippery road that led to U.S. defeat more than 30 years
ago.
In the coming weeks, the Senate will consider new, consolidated
legislation that bridges resolutions offered by Senator Joe Biden
(D-DE), Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, and Senator
John Warner (R-VA), ranking member of the Armed Services Committee.
Though many in the media have already heralded this display of
bipartisanship, the Senator's cooperation will do nothing to make
this bill beneficial to our efforts in Iraq.
Although Congress has the power to pass a resolution that
undercuts the political, diplomatic, and military authority of
the President of the United States (though not his actual
constitutional authority to wage war or entreat with foreign
nations), the ability to do so does not, in and of itself, validate
the action. Whether the Senate passes or does not pass a resolution
on Iraq should not be decided based on constitutional
considerations, but rather on military and strategic arguments--in
other words, on whether it is good for the war effort in Iraq.
Reducing the Iraq war debate to parochial concerns about whether a
Senator has a right to do or not do something is completely beside
the point. Of course, the Senate has a right to take certain
actions (e.g., defund the war effort) that will inevitably
lead to the defeat of U.S. forces in the field and create a setback
for America's position in the world. But it should not hide behind
constitutional prerogatives as an excuse for doing so.
The government of South Vietnam did not have to fall. There was
nothing preordained in history that this had to happen. Rather, it
was in part the result of actions taken by the U.S. Congress, the
consequences of which could have been easily predicted. Are
Americans going to stand by and watch Congress make the same
mistake again--with the same predictable consequences in terms of
loss of human life and the enormous political damage done to U.S.
credibility and position in the world?
Once was enough. Congress should consider George Santayana's
warning that those who ignore the lessons of history are doomed to
repeat them. If there ever was a time when this warning should be
heeded, it is now.
Helle C. Dale is Director of
the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a
division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for
International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.