The U.S. Treasury Department's March 14 ruling against a
Macau-based bank for its complicity in North Korea's illegal
activities could further the Six-Party Talks if Macau releases
Pyongyang's seized accounts. But Pyongyang's expectation that it
will overcome its isolation from international financial networks
is unrealistic and could lead it to delay compliance with the
preliminary agreement. Pyongyang's increasing demands and the
collapse of bilateral North Korean-Japanese talks portend difficult
follow-on negotiations and potential delays to negotiated
timelines. Nonetheless, the U.S. should continue its financial and
law enforcement efforts to combat North Korea's illicit
activities.
Targeting Illicit Activities
In 2003, the Bush Administration established the Illicit
Activities Initiative to target revenue from North Korea's illegal
trade in narcotics, counterfeiting, and money laundering.
Washington formally named North Korea in October 2005 court
documents as the source of counterfeit $100 "supernotes." The U.S.
also announced that it was seeking the extradition of a member of a
splinter Irish Republican Army group for conspiring with Pyongyang
to circulate millions in counterfeit dollars.
In September 2005, the U.S. Treasury designated Banco Delta Asia
(BDA), a Macau-based bank, as a "primary money laundering concern"
due to its assisting North Korean companies in laundering money
from counterfeiting and drug smuggling. Acting under Section 311 of
the Patriot Act, Washington banned all U.S. banks from dealing with
BDA.
Macau banking authorities froze 50 North Korean accounts worth
$24 million. Though this amount was small, the seizure had a
devastating impact on North Korea's ability to engage with the
international financial system. BDA was Pyongyang's principal
conduit to the international financial network for both legal and
illicit financial transactions. The U.S. action had a chilling
effect for foreign businesses and banks, which became unwilling to
engage with North Korea even on legal business ventures for fear of
being designated complicit in North Korea's illegal activities.
A Dual Message
The conclusion of Treasury's 18-month investigation on March 14
enables the Macau Monetary Authority to release frozen North Korean
bank accounts worth $8 million to $12 million--the money from
legitimate business activities. This would fulfill Washington's
promise to "resolve" the Banco Delta Asia issue within 30 days of
the February 13 Beijing Agreement. However, it may also be seen as
a signal of Washington's waning intention to confront North Korea
over its illicit activities and as a precursor to additional
sanctions relief.
North Korea's lead nuclear negotiator, Kim Gye-gwan, threatened
on March 9 that Pyongyang's agreement to halt operations at the
Yongbyon nuclear reactor, required under the Beijing Agreement, was
contingent on the U.S. lifting its economic restrictions. Kim
asserted that the U.S. had promised to scrap the sanctions on BDA
and that a failure to comply would force North Korea to take
"corresponding steps," such as only partially freezing operations
at Yongbyon if sanctions were only partially lifted.
But the stronger message is that Washington's suspicions about
North Korea's illicit activities were confirmed. The Treasury
Department ruled that U.S. financial institutions are prohibited
from "opening or maintaining correspondent accounts for or on
behalf of BDA [which] bars BDA from accessing the U.S. financial
system." The ruling cited the bank's willingness to engage in
deceptive financial practices that aided "North Korea's trade in
counterfeit U.S. currency, counterfeit cigarettes, and narcotics."
Washington estimated that the bank may have been responsible for
laundering hundreds of millions of dollars from North Korea's
illicit activities.
Unmet Expectations for North Korea
Treasury's ruling affirms global financial institutions'
assessments that conducting business with North Korean entities
presents an unacceptably high risk unless Pyongyang halts its
illicit activities. North Korea will also have to take a number of
steps before it can expect to be reintegrated into the global
financial system. There will be little significant foreign direct
investment or business activity until such concerns are
addressed.
As a result, the release of BDA accounts will not provide North
Korea the economic benefits that it was likely expecting and could
lead it to ratchet up its demands, delay fulfilling its Beijing
Agreement, or possibly return, over time, to escalatory
behavior.
Recommendations for the
Administration
- The U.S. should rebut North Korea's assertions that financial
sanctions have hindered nuclear negotiations. It is Pyongyang's
continued involvement in illegal activity, not U.S. enforcement of
protective measures, that has delayed resolution.
- Regulatory and law enforcement actions in response to illicit
activities are not negotiable. The U.S. should continue to
investigate and take action against any financial entities
suspected of complicity in illicit activities.
- The U.S. should insist that North Korea satisfactorily address
all concerns about its financial activities prior to being
readmitted to the international financial system.
- Washington should continue to target North Korea's illegal
activities using financial, intelligence, and law enforcement
methods.
Conclusion
North Korea's demand for removal of international sanctions,
along with its assertion that the U.S. promised to quickly remove
Pyongyang from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, may simply
represent characteristic "negotiating through headlines" tactics.
Alternatively, these moves may foreshadow increasing North Korean
conditionality for abandoning its nuclear weapons programs. It
remains critical for Washington to insist on detailed treaty text
to ensure that North Korea fully complies with denuclearization
without being deterred from combating Pyongyang's illegal
activities.
Bruce Klingner is Senior
Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at
The Heritage Foundation.