The Department
of Homeland Security (DHS) released Tactical Interoperable
Communications Scorecards: Summary Report and Findings on
January 3, 2007. The report assesses 75 metropolitan areas'
progress in strengthening communications systems for dealing with
all types of emergencies, from terrorist incidents to natural
disasters.
Grades are
important-citizens have a right to know how well their communities
are doing-but for the Administration and Congress, the report holds
more important lessons for learning how best to help states and
local communities contribute to building a national disaster
preparedness and response system that will make all Americans
safer. The report found that federal programs that empower local
communities are more effective than programs that just throw
money and mandates at them.
Disaster to
Disaster
The efficacy of
emergency communications has been a long-standing issue of concern.
In reviewing the major lessons from the 2001 terrorist attacks on
the United States, the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States (the 9/11 Commission) concluded in its final
report:
The
inability to communicate was a critical element at the World Trade
Center, Pentagon, and Somerset County, Pennsylvania, crash sites,
where multiple agencies and multiple jurisdictions responded.
The occurrence of this problem at three very different sites is
strong evidence that compatible and adequate communications
among public safety organizations at the local, state, and
federal levels remains an important problem.[1]
The
well-publicized communications difficulties that first responders
encountered on September 11, 2001, only highlight systemic
shortfalls in emergency communications systems that affect law
enforcement, fire and rescue, medical workers, and other emergency
management personnel from multiple jurisdictions within a
common community.[2]
Despite the
robust national response to the 9/11 attacks, communications
interoperability problems have persisted. Much of the disarray seen
during the initial response to Hurricane Katrina in August 2005
resulted from the toppling of communication towers during the
storm, which disrupted cellular telephone lines and other
civilian communication infrastructure employed by many
emergency responders. This was exacerbated by inadequate local
plans for reconstituting communications, requesting state and
federal assistance, and sharing information.
Katrina served
as a reminder that lack of "hardware" was not the most
significant problem in establishing effective emergency management
communications. Equally if not more important was the paucity of
coordinated response, established procedures and protocols,
and preparatory contingency planning.[3]
WashingtonResponds
After 9/11,
America immediately began to address the limitations of the
responder community. The federal government accelerated its efforts
to strengthen communications interoperability among the hundreds of
federal, state, local, and private emergency agencies that would
respond to a major disaster. From the outset, the emphasis from
Washington, particularly from Congress, was on providing
responders with things rather than enhancing their capacity to
coordinate actions.
The 9/11
Commission recommended that Congress adopt legislation to
accelerate and increase the assignment of radio spectrum (portions
of the airwaves that are used to carry radio, television, and
digital communications) for public safety purposes.[4]
Congress subsequently enacted a law requiring television
broadcasters to make a portion of the radio spectrum available to
emergency response agencies and also established a new DHS office
to supervise the spectrum transfer.
Congress and the
Administration also provided substantial resources for other
communications initiatives. From 2003 to 2005, the DHS
distributed over $2 billion to state and local governments through
its Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program
(ICTAP).[5] Other federal initiatives have provided
almost $1 billion in additional funding to enable state and
local agencies to purchase equipment and pursue other projects to
improve communications interoperability.[6]
The federal
government's initial priority was to improve command, control, and
communications processes within 10 major high-threat urban areas
through the 2004 RapidCom Initiative. The DHS also took over
responsibility for managing the Wireless Public Safety
Interoperable Communications Program (SAFECOM) within its Office
for Interoperability and Compatibility, but this initiative
has suffered from its limited authority to oversee funding and
coordinate the myriad federal, state, and local programs creating
such networks.
More recent
programs have sought to extend incident communications
interoperability to wider regions surrounding urban centers.[7] For
example, the DHS Office of Grants and Training administers
ICTAP, which funds efforts to enhance interoperable communications
among federal, state, and local emergency responders and public
safety agencies.[8]
In December
2006, the DHS released the results of a National Interoperability
Baseline Survey of 22,400 emergency response agencies.[9] Of the
6,819 agencies that responded, approximately two-thirds had
developed some communications interoperability with other
emergency response agencies.[10] On the other hand, the DHS
acknowledged that only about 10 percent of the responding
communities could achieve interoperability consistently.[11]
Keeping Score
The January 2007
scorecards complement the survey, which relied on self-assessments,
by providing more objective grading. The 2007 survey judged
the communities' progress in achieving tactical communications
interoperability in three broad areas:
- Strategic planning to coordinate emergency services across
different political jurisdictions,
- Standard disaster response policies and procedures,
and
- Training exercises under simulated crisis conditions.
The SAFECOM
Interoperability Continuum and Interoperability Maturity Assessment
Model had identified these factors as the most important
criteria for measuring interoperability among emergency
response capabilities.
The survey
assessed interoperability in major cities and surrounding
communities because responders from neighboring areas would
typically provide assistance during a major crisis. In
addition, many emergency response agencies have regional
mutual aid agreements that provide for collective management of any
large-scale emergency. Several of the assessed areas include
responders from multiple states. For example, the National Capital
Region encompasses jurisdictions in the District of Columbia,
southern Maryland, and northern Virginia. The scorecards also
incorporated metrics relating to communications equipment
and technologies and how the responders planned and trained to use
them.
In the report,
the scores are displayed as Harvey Balls (pie charts with zero to
four quarters shaded). Because all of the metropolitan regions
receiving Tactical Interoperable Communications Plan (TICP) grants
had established some communications interoperability, each
metropolitan or urban area has at least one-quarter of the ball
shaded, representing "early implementation." Those areas
deemed to have achieved greater progress had two, three, or all
four quarters filled, representing "intermediate,"
"established," and "advanced" implementation,
respectively.
The reviewers
found that all 75 urban and metropolitan areas had met the
minimal requirement for DHS grants, meaning that they had developed
a TICP that could apply during the first hour of a crisis. The
scorecards also detected a strong and widespread commitment
among emergency responders to enhancing communications
interoperability across their specific disciplines and
jurisdictions. Nearly 70 percent of the areas surveyed effectively
established regional interoperability. Moreover, multiagency
communications occurs on a daily basis in 80 percent of the urban
and metropolitan areas. Recently, Atlanta demonstrated the TICP's
effectiveness by providing the Federal Bureau of
Investigation with radio support after its equipment
failed.
Nevertheless,
the survey concluded that strategic planning and other formal
governance processes, like allocating responsibility and oversight
of programs, remained inconsistent and underdeveloped. Beyond
TICP operational policies, few urban and metropolitan areas have
developed strategic plans for interoperable communications: 58
percent currently have no plans under development, 18
percent have plans in development but not adopted, and only 24
percent have fully implemented plans.
Some cities have
to address long-standing operational issues. The City of
Chicago and Cook County spent several decades developing
independent radio communications systems. While city and county
leaders agree on the necessity of an interoperable
communications system, procedural differences in developing
and adopting agreements between the county and the city have
stalled additional planning.
The assessments
also concluded that the areas of Columbus, Ohio; Laramie County,
Wyoming; Minneapolis-St. Paul, Minnesota; San Diego,
California; Sioux Falls, South Dakota; and the National Capital
Region around Washington, D.C., have developed the most resilient
emergency tactical communications systems. In contrast, the
DHS found that American Samoa; Baton Rouge, Louisiana; Chicago,
Illinois; Cleveland, Ohio; and Mandan, North Dakota, had achieved
the lowest level of emergency communications resiliency.
Lessons Learned
For Washington,
understanding how communities improved is more important than
assigning the individual grades. The federal government is
responsible for making all Americans safer and establishing a
national preparedness and disaster response system that will allow
the nation as a whole to respond to catastrophes that overwhelm
local and state governments. Thus, Washington needs to focus its
assistance on bolstering overall national capacity rather than
fretting over the needs of individual cities and states. In that
regard, the scorecards have a number of lessons to teach.
Lesson #1:
Federalism works.
Federalism holds
that the people closest to a problem will have the best solutions
to that problem and should have the preponderance of the authority
and responsibility for fixing it. Respecting this principle,
the DHS employed primarily a bottom-up approach toward building
communications interoperability. The report suggests that this is
the right approach: "Areas that were empowered to develop a TICP
based on a 'bottom-up' approach of a collaborative, regional nature
scored higher in Governance than those areas in which a 'top-down'
state-centric approach was used."[12] Clearly, the best answers
to addressing this issue are not always found in Washington or even
in state capitals.
In addition,
according to the scorecards, effective interoperable communications
capabilities extending across geographic communities within
states remain rare. Furthermore, although more than 60 percent of
the local responders surveyed achieved considerable ability to
communicate with each other during a crisis, only 21 percent
demonstrated the capacity to converse with state and federal
officials during an emergency.
The current
system lacks capabilities for interstate planning and
coordination to better facilitate development of integrated TICP
efforts. The federal government could provide leadership in
this effort by:
- Emphasizing coordinated planning between
the TICP and the Integrated Wireless
Network (IWN). The IWN is a joint program of the Departments
of Justice, Homeland Security, and Treasury to provide a nationwide
system of voice and data communications for law enforcement,
homeland security, national emergencies, and other operational
missions.[13]
Lesson #2: Practice
makes perfect.
The DHS required
the 75 metropolitan areas to conduct large-scale exercises between
May and September 2006 to validate their TICPs, and the exercises
exposed numerous problems in local response systems and procedures.
Experience with real-world challenges also appears to strengthen
performance.
After emergency
crisis managers in the San Diego region encountered serious
communication problems while responding to devastating
wildfires in 2003, the region's authorities undertook a sustained
effort to bolster their capabilities. As a result, they achieved
some of the highest scores in the January 2007 evaluation.[14] To
encourage others to achieve similar results, the DHS should:
- Employ a national training and exercise
program that tests emergency communication
systems. This must be a central part of the long-term
solution to improving readiness.
Lesson #3: Win the
"battle of the badges."
In areas where
progress has not been made, one of the major reasons is a failure
in leadership.Local disagreements continue to impede tactical
communications interoperability among some responder
communities. Police officers, firefighters, and medical
personnel have developed unique long-standing communication
procedures (e.g., shorthand codes) that they remain reluctant to
abandon. Moreover, emergency response communities continue to
argue over which department's communication protocols should
apply under various circumstances.
In many cases,
the communities that made the most progress adopted recently
established DHS guidelines for national standards and then
practiced them through a disciplined program of tests and
exercises.[15] However, adequate backup capabilities for
wide-scale disasters are still lacking. To address this problem,
the DHS should:
- Continue to emphasize national standards. Standards are
vital for providing a framework for critical common operational
practices, including communications protocols.
Lesson #4: Fix a
flawed legacy.
On-hand
communications equipment, which can have a technical lifecycle of
10-20 years, is a significant barrier to communications
interoperability. For example, the "very extensive and
expensive legacy radio communications systems" developed
independently by the City of Chicago and Cook County have
complicated efforts to establish an interoperable communications
system in the Chicago urban area.[16]
For decades,
public safety agencies have deployed a plethora of technologies,
much of them outdated compared to what is commercially
available. Local officials with limited budgets find it
difficult to abandon existing communications systems, which
may function adequately under normal conditions, until new
alternate technologies with enhanced capabilities have proven both
affordable and reliable. Besides the costs involved in rapidly
making the transition to a new communications network, scrapping
existing technologies before a replacement system is in place would
create major vulnerabilities.
The most
cost-effective approach is to allow emergency responder communities
to retain existing communications technologies while
progressively incorporating new ones. Communities have already
demonstrated that this strategy works. According to the DHS
scorecard, the Twin Cities of St. Paul and Minneapolis have made
"commendable" progress in incorporating their legacy
communications procedures into their current system. The
report concluded that the way they did it "should be considered a
best practice."[17]
The best way for
Washington to speed this process is by encouraging the
adoption of more affordable and more capable commercial
off-the-shelf technologies. Specifically, Congress should:
- Open emergency management spectrum
to dual use for the public and
emergency responders. Simply providing more spectrum as
advocated by the 9/11 Commission is not the answer. Emergency
management agencies do not use the available spectrum efficiently;
nor do they have capability to do so, at least compared to the
commercial sector. Making the spectrum dual-use while ensuring that
responders have priority and secure communications will encourage
private-sector investment and give responders access to greater
capabilities at lower cost through adoption of commercial
off-the-shelf technology.[18]
Lesson #5: Make
federal dollars matter.
Many state and
local leaders argue that they need more federal funding to enhance
emergency management communications.[19] Indeed, in some cases, an
infusion of federal funds clearly made a difference.
For example, one
reason that Boston and its surrounding communities scored so
highly was that the region received considerable federal funds and
equipment to improve emergency communications for the 2004
Democratic National Convention.[20] In contrast, Baton Rouge
was rated in the bottom 10 on the scorecards and was among the
bottom 10 cities in receiving homeland security grants. On the
other hand, the Chicago area ranks among the cities receiving the
most homeland security grants but ranked in the bottom 10 on the
scorecards. Sioux Falls was rated in the top 10 in achieving high
interoperability scores but was not among the cities receiving the
most federal grants.
While homeland
security grants help, they clearly are not the only factor
determining how successfully communities improve their
communications programs. In many cases, strong local
leadership and establishing effective governance programs or
emergency communications initiatives appear to be just as
important, if not more important, in achieving success. The
majority of federal funding from the State Homeland Security Grant
Program and Urban Area Security Initiative (the two major grant
programs administered by the DHS) are already spent or
allocated to interoperable communications projects.[21]
These funds are in addition to the $1 billion Interoperability
Grants Program, which is administered by the DHS and the Department
of Commerce.
The uneven
results from these federal programs argue that simply throwing more
money at the problem is not the answer. How the federal
government spends its grant dollars is more important than how
much it spends in achieving effective, high-quality, and
sustainable local initiatives. The current effort can be improved
by:
- Consolidating existing programs,
not authorizing new grant programs, to focus resources on
the state and local initiatives that show the most promise in
implementing best practices, cooperative regional solutions, and
national guidelines and standards.
In the first
months of the 110th Congress, the Senate and House passed bills
purporting to implement recommendations of the 9/11
Commission. Both bills emphasized emergency responder
communications. Regrettably, they do not reflect the lessons
learned from the urban scorecards. Both bills call for a grant
category to assist states and communities in building interoperable
communications systems.
Although
improving emergency communications is a laudable objective and
consistent with the 9/11 Commission's recommendations, the
commission also warned that homeland security grants are in danger
of becoming vehicles of pork-barrel legislation, viewed by
states as a means to supplant their own obligations to provide
emergency services or to purchase capabilities that are not
essential for safety and security. Indeed, significant amounts of
past homeland security grants have arguably been used
ineffectively.
While federal
assistance for emergency management communications initiatives
is reasonable, they can and should be funded out of existing
homeland security grant programs for states, displacing
wasteful and inefficient efforts that have done little to meet
national priorities.
Speaking with One
Voice
Congress can
help to build a robust and sustainable national emergency
management communications capacity that will serve Americans
well during disasters and national catastrophes, but to build this
capability efficiently and effectively, Members need to resist the
temptation merely to throw more resources and requirements at the
problem.
What is needed
most are federal initiatives that empower local leadership, nurture
good governance, and encourage regional cooperation. These
goals can be achieved far more effectively by:
- Insisting on a well-coordinated national exercise
program that serves the needs of states and local communities;
- Promoting the adoption of national standards;
- Coordinating federal efforts, such as the IWN, with
state and local initiatives;
- Providing incentives for private-sector investment
by establishing dual-use spectrum; and
- Consolidating homeland security grant programs into
a single, disciplined, focused program that puts national
needs first.
James Jay Carafano,
Ph.D., is Assistant Director of the Kathryn and Shelby
Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies and Senior
Research Fellow for National Security and Homeland Security in the
Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at
The Heritage Foundation. Richard Weitz, Ph.D., is Senior
Fellow and Director of Project Management at the Hudson
Institute.
[1] National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report:
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks
Upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2004),
p. 397, at (January
30, 2007). See also James Kendra and Tricia Wachtendorf, "Elements
of Resilience in the World Trade Center Attack," University of
Delaware, Disaster Research Center Preliminary Paper No.
318, 2001, pp. 6-9, at
(March 23, 2007). Significant controversy remains over the
cause of the communications breakdown during rescue efforts in the
north tower of the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001.
As a result of interrupted signals, some emergency workers were not
evacuated before the building collapsed. Some blame failure of the
repeater installed in the building-a device specifically designed
to boost the radio transmissions of first responders inside the
building. Others claim that human error may account for
communication breakdowns. See McKinsey and Company, Increasing
the Fire Department of New York's Preparedness, 2002, p. 7, at
(March 23, 2007), and Jim Dwyer and Kevin Flynn, "9/11 Tape Raises
Added Questions on Radio Failures," The New York Times,
November 9, 2002, p. A1.
[2] National Research Council,
Committee on Army Science and Technology for Homeland Defense,
Army Science and Technology for Homeland Security: Report
2-C4ISR (Washington, D.C.: National Academies Press, 2004), pp.
42-64, at (March 23,
2007).
[3] Nancy J. Victory, "The FCC's
Independent Panel on Katrina's Impact on Communications: The Chair
Reports," The Metropolitan Corporate Counsel, Vol. 14, No. 7
(July 2006), at
(March 23, 2007).
[4] National Commission on Terrorist
Attacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission
Report.
[5] U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, Preparedness Directorate, Office of Grants and Training,
State Interoperable Communications, DHS Funded Activities,
Fiscal Years 2003-2005, May 2006, p. 9, at (March
23, 2007).
[6] U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
Tactical Interoperable Communications Scorecards: Summary Report
and Findings, January 2007, p. 4, at (March 23,
2007).
[7] For a description of RapidCom, see
U.S. Department of Defense, "Fact Sheet: RapidCom 9/30 and
Interoperability Progress," July 30, 2004, at
(March 23, 2007).
[8] U.S. Department of Homeland
Security, Preparedness Directorate, Office of Grants and Training,
"Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program
(ICTAP)," updatedDecember 5, 2006,at
(March 15, 2007).
[9] SAFECOM defines communications
interoperability as "the ability of emergency response agencies to
talk across disciplines and jurisdictions via radio communications
systems, exchanging voice and/or data with one another on demand,
in real time, when needed, and as authorized." U.S. Department of
Homeland Security, "Frequently Asked Questions," at
(March 15, 2007).
[10] SAFECOM, "2006 National
Interoperability Baseline Survey," December 2006, p. ES-1, at (March 23, 2007).
[11] Associated Press, "Report: Only
6 U.S. Cities Excel in Crisis Communications," January 2, 2007, at
(unavailable March 23, 2007).
[12] U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
Tactical Interoperable Communications Scorecards, p.
8.
[13] Vance E. Hitch, Chief Information
Officer, U.S. Department of Justice, testimony before the
Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet, Committee on
Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, September 29,
2005, at
(March 15, 2007).
[15] The evaluators of the National
Capital Region were so impressed by the region's progress in
resolving these issues that they recommended that its
intergovernmental committees assist the governments of Maryland and
Virginia to achieve greater communications interoperability
throughout their states. U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
Tactical Interoperable Communications Scorecards, p.
A56.
[18] James Jay Carafano, Ph.D., "Talking
Through Disasters: The Federal Role in Emergency Communications,"
Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1951, July 17, 2006, at
www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/bg1951.cfm
, and James L. Gattuso, "Cyren Call and Siren Calls: Spectrum
Allocation for Emergency Communications," Heritage Foundation
WebMemo No. 1346, February 6, 2007, at www.heritage.org/static/reportimages/A4D101F48566C45127551E7EA454797E.pdf.
[19] In a U.S. Conference of Mayors survey
of 183 local governments on homeland security and emergency
preparedness, 80 percent of respondents said that they had not yet
received sufficient federal resources to achieve full
communications interoperability. U.S. Conference of Mayors,
Homeland Security Monitoring Center, Five Years Post 9/11, One
Year Post Katrina: The State of America's Readiness, July 26,
2006, p. 1, at (March 15,
2007).
[21] U.S. Department of Homeland Security,
State Interoperable Communications.