The National
People's Congress of the People's Republic of China (PRC) announced
on March 4, 2007, that it would increase the country's military
budget by 17.8 percent in 2007 to a total of $45 billion-by
far the largest acknowledged amount that China has ever spent on
its military.1 The Chinese government went out of its way to
reassure the world that this spending hike was normal and need not
worry anyone. "China is committed to taking a path of peaceful
development and it pursues a defensive military posture," a
spokesman said.2
As the Chinese
aphorism goes, "listen to what they say, but observe what they do,"
and what Beijing is saying is quite different from what it is
doing.
The resources
that Beijing devotes to its armed forces put China in the top
stratum of global military powers. With China's 2006 gross domestic
product (GDP) in excess of $2.5 trillion (about $10 trillion in
purchasing power parity terms) and its military spending estimated
by the Central Intelligence Agency at 4.3 percent of GDP,3 China's
military spending is more accurately pegged at about $430
billion than at $45 billion.
While China's
declared military budget primarily includes personnel costs (and a
17.8 percent military pay hike is reasonable), the declared budget
is only a small part of overall Chinese military spending. The
exact methodology that U.S. intelligence agencies use to estimate
the military's share of China's GDP is classified, but it
reportedly accounts foreign arms purchases, subsidies to
military industries, China's space program (which is under the
absolute command of the Central Military Commission), the
660,000-man People's Armed Police, provincial militias, and reserve
forces-all of which are excluded from official military budget
figures.4[1][2][3][4]
Defense spending
in some sectors that are not counted in the defense budget appears
to be increasing at a much faster rate than the official
military budget. For example, China's National Defense in
2006 (China's 2006 Defense White Paper) noted that:
In 2005, the
output value, added value and gross revenue of the entire spectrum
of defense-related science, technology and industry increased
by 24.3 percent, 20.7 percent and 21.6 percent, respectively, over
the previous year.[5]
The Chinese
military budget does not include the bulk of the defense-related
science, technology, and industry sectors or overseas military
procurement or provincial spending on militias and reserves.
Despite the
Chinese Communist Party leadership's espousal of China's
"peaceful rise," the facts tell a different story. The
unprecedented peacetime expansion of China's military capabilities
can no longer be viewed as though some benign force animates
it. China's military expansion is already sufficiently
transparent that one can discern Beijing's intention to challenge
the United States in the Western Pacific and establish itself
as the predominant military power in the region-in the name of
anti-hegemony and to promote a "multipolar international
system."
China's Rise as a
Military Power
Chinese leaders
are not seized by self-doubt about the direction of their regime.
The declared strategy of the Chinese leadership has been to turn
its economic growth into military power by means of the "four
modernizations" (agricultural, industrial, science and
technology, and military) and the "prosperous nation, strong
military" (fu guo, qiang bing) model.
Ironically, after
the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union-China's only existential
threat-China increased military spending, while the United
States and virtually all of its allies immediately set about
reaping a "peace dividend," with U.S. defense expenditures
dropping over 10 percent from $298 billion in fiscal year (FY) 1992
to $268 billion in FY 1997.[6] During the same period, Chinese defense
spending sustained annual double-digit increases. This pace of
Chinese military spending increases has continued to this day. The
Pentagon estimates total Chinese defense-related expenditures in
2005 at between $70 billion and $105 billion, which places China
third in nominal dollar defense spending after the United
States and Russia.[7]
American
intelligence analysts in both Republican and Democratic
Administrations have been surprised in recent years at the
breathtaking pace and scope of China's military development.[8] A 2006
Department of Defense report on China's military power notes that
the transformation of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has
included new doctrines, reform of military institutions and
systems, improved exercise and training standards, and the
acquisition of new foreign and domestic weapons systems. China's
military expansion has already altered regional military balances.
The long-term trends in China's military have the potential to pose
credible threats to modern militaries.[9]
Nuclear
Forces. The most ominous of China's military advances has been
in the PLA's strategic rocket forces, the 2nd Artillery, which
includes nuclear and conventional ballistic missile commands
and anti-satellite units. In the mid-1990s, the 2nd Artillery
embarked on a modernization program designed to improve the
reliability, survivability, response times, and accuracy of
its ballistic missiles to state-of-the-art standards. Since 1996,
it has more than doubled-and in some years has tripled-the
annual production of solid-fuel short-range ballistic missiles
(SRBMs).[10]
China has also
deployed at least 40 intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) targeted at the United States. The road-mobile DF-21
medium-range ballistic missile (MRBM) has been operational since
1996, and the 2nd Artillery is now introducing road-mobile
ICBMs, including the DF-31.[11] The DF-31A, which has a
range of 10,000 kilometers, is expected to become operational
by 2008. Given the known rapid growth in SRBM production,
production of MRBMs, intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs),
and ICBMs has likely increased at the same rate. Thus, by 2006,
DF-31 output could easily have reached 10-20 new missiles per
year.
China's current
Xia-class ballistic missile submarine is already loaded
with Julang-1 (JL-1) solid-fuel missiles, and a longer-range JL
variant submarine-launched ballistic missile with a range of
8,000 km will be deployed on China's new Jin-class
(Type-094) nuclear ballistic missile submarine in three years.[12]
In addition, the
PLA will have "several new conventional and nuclear variants
of MRBMs and IRBMs for regional contingencies and to augment its
long-range missile forces."[13]
Logically, the
strategic aim of this rapid expansion of China's nuclear
force, particularly the deployment of DF-31s and DF-31As and a
durable submarine-based nuclear capability, is to reduce China's
nuclear vulnerability substantially and develop a robust nuclear
deterrent focused on the United States.
While Beijing
purports to have a nuclear "no first use" (NFU) policy, some U.S.
experts believe that the Chinese leadership reserves the right to
use nuclear weapons in a first strike against Taiwan or Taiwan's
defenders. The unmistakable implication is that U.S. forces
defending Taiwan would be targets.[14] This position was
explicated on the record by a senior Chinese strategist in 2005.[15]
There are indications that the PLA is contemplating the use of a
high-altitude nuclear detonation to generate a powerful
electromagnetic pulse that would fry microcircuitry in U.S. weapons
systems during a conflict.[16] Rather than trying to reduce instability
in such a strategic environment, internal PLA military writings
treat NFU as a constraint on nuclear operations and reflect
considerable resistance to NFU in the PLA.[17]
Hence, China's
NFU declaration appears to be intended primarily for propaganda
advantage and possibly to encourage complaisance in American
decision-making. At least one study shows that Chinese nuclear
doctrine seems to make little distinction between conventional
ballistic missiles and nuclear-armed ballistic missiles with
respect to how they are deployed and used.[18]
Another serious
facet of China's nuclear doctrine is that the Central Military
Commission deploys nuclear and conventional warheads on the same
classes of ballistic missiles and co-locates them near each other
in 2nd Artillery units. This doctrine is apparently designed to
shorten the escalation fuse in an effort to further complicate U.S.
and Japanese responses during a crisis.[19]
Moreover, this
modernized and sophisticated nuclear force is clearly well in
excess of any mere Taiwan contingency. It involves new power
projection capabilities that give Beijing two advantages:
"area denial" strength, which is achieved by placing
forward-deployed U.S. forces in Japan, Korea, and Guam at risk, and
coercive diplomacy instruments to resolve other territorial
disputes, such as in the East China Sea with Japan and the South
China Sea with other Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)
countries. Indeed, China's new nuclear weapons systems present
grave implications for U.S. power projection in the Western
Pacific, the security of U.S. allies and friends in democratic
Asia, and regional military balances in general.
Nuclear
Proliferation. The United States also needs to pay far more
attention to China's tacit direct and indirect support for nuclear
weapons programs in Pakistan, Iran, and North Korea. Strategic
planners in Washington need to consider whether or not China
calculates that a nuclear strike launched by Iran on the United
States or by North Korea on the United States or Japan might
actually be in China's ultimate interests. The September 11, 2001,
attacks on the United States weakened the United States, distracted
U.S. policymakers from Asia, and diverted foreign investment flows
from the U.S. to China for several years thereafter. A
scenario in which Iran or North Korea inflicts major damage on
the United States or its allies with a nuclear device could be an
underlying motivation for China to give rogue states diplomatic
support against U.S. and European pressures to abandon their
nuclear programs.
As China refines
its missile guidance capabilities, forward-deployed U.S. forces in
the Western Pacific will become vulnerable to Chinese missiles. For
example, U.S. carrier battle groups could face theater
ballistic missiles with maneuverable reentry vehicles (MaRVs)
capable of hitting moving ships at sea.[20] The hyperspeeds of these
MaRVs make them virtually impossible to defeat with current missile
defense technology.
Chinese advances
in land attack cruise missiles and theater ballistic missiles will
also place U.S. forces in Japan, Korea, and Guam within their
range.[21]
Anti-Satellite
Weapons.Given the American military's highly advertised
reliance on space systems, an equally unsettling development
is the 2nd Artillery's experimentation with various
anti-satellite (ASAT) systems-capabilities that are targeted
exclusively at U.S. space assets. On January 12, 2007 (Beijing
time), a Chinese DF-21 missile lifted a kinetic kill vehicle (KKV)
into an intercept track for a Chinese weather satellite in polar
orbit.[22] The missile warhead then fired the KKV at
the satellite (perhaps guided by ground-based targeting laser) and
successfully destroyed it. U.S. space trackers have monitored but
did not publicize at least two previous ASAT tests in July 2005 and
February 2006. In the February test, the KKV was maneuvered
into close range of the target satellite but suddenly veered
away.[23]
Given the
grievous risks to low-orbit satellites presented by a debris cloud
from the January test, why the U.S. did not confront the Chinese
following the earlier tests is a mystery.[24] No doubt some
Administration officials did not want to antagonize China's space
efforts.
In April 2006,
shortly before Chinese President Hu Jintao's official visit to
Washington, China's Deputy Space Agency Administrator Luo Ge
evidently found a receptive audience in the White House for his
proposals for joint U.S.-China space cooperation. Mr. Luo
requested that the U.S. agree to Chinese participation in the
International Space Station (ISS), including making modifications
on the orbiting station that would allow Chinese spacecraft to
dock, and President Hu and President George W. Bush did discuss
Chinese participation in the ISS and cooperation on a future lunar
landing effort- an initiative that might explain some of the U.S.
hesitation.[25] Some observers speculate that U.S.
officials were holding out the prospect of space cooperation
to persuade China to accept space launch rules of the road. In
fact, China's People's Daily touted U.S. interest in manned
lunar mission cooperation with China, an obvious propaganda ploy,
but the PLA rejected Washington's rules-of-the-road initiatives.[26]
Some enthusiastic
support for U.S.-China space cooperation persisted in the White
House until August 2006, when the PLA attempted to blind (or
illuminate) a U.S. reconnaissance satellite, but that support was
resisted by the Pentagon and NASA and by Undersecretary of State
Robert Joseph.[27] By the end of September, NASA
Administrator Michael D. Griffin was expressing deep frustration
that the PLA had blocked any reciprocal access to Chinese space
launch facilities or engineering centers. Without transparency
in China's programs, especially given China's refusal to coordinate
launch information and space debris data, cooperation remained
impossible.[28] While senior U.S. military
commanders debated on China's ASAT intentions even into
October 2006, all but the most ardent apologists admitted that
China simply was not prepared for serious international cooperation
in space.[29]
The Propaganda
Department of the Chinese Communist Party approved a September 28,
2006, commentary in Beijing's Huanqiu Shibao that declared:
"The United States' exaggeration of China's counter-satellite
technology is only an attempt to seek an excuse to justify its
development of space weapons."[30] In retrospect, however,
whatever the United States was doing regarding China's
counter-satellite technology, it was not exaggerating it. The
January 12, 2007, ASAT test irrefutably confirmed that China was
interested solely in scoring propaganda points and not in
space cooperation, as China did not seem to feel any obligation to
give international notification that it intended to fill a
polar orbit 530 miles up with thousands of particles of space
debris, each with the potential to damage or destroy space craft
orbiting at or below that altitude.[31]
The following
week, the State Department filed a démarche with the Chinese
government protesting the ASAT test but received no response. A
week later, the Pentagon briefed journalists on the test. It was
the first time the Department of Defense had reported on China's
KKV-ASAT program, although the Defense Department had described
other Chinese ASAT efforts in its annual China military power
reports.[32] Subsequently, the Chinese foreign
ministry, while not publicly admitting that an ASAT weapon
test had taken place, dryly observed that Beijing has shown a
"responsible attitude" by offering "explanations" to the U.S.
and Japan and insisted that Beijing has all along "upheld the
peaceful use of outer space."[33] "China opposes the
weaponization of space and any arms race," the foreign
ministry added, pledging reassuringly that "The test is not
targeted at any country and will not threaten any country."[34]
Judging from the clueless reaction of China's foreign ministry to
the angry démarches and complaints from several nations with
space programs, few outside the PLA chain of command or the
Communist Party Politburo were informed of the tests ahead of time
or were briefed afterward.[35]
This does not
mean that Beijing's foreign ministry does not have a vital
role in China's ASAT program. Chinese diplomats have the
important mission of getting the United States to adhere to a
Chinese draft statement, "Preventing an Arms Race in Outer Space"
(PAROS), that Beijing has circulated in the United Nations.
Although U.S. negotiators have tried to engage Chinese counterparts
on Beijing's thoughts on verification of a PAROS regime, the
Chinese have uniformly insisted that they will consider
verification issues only after the U.S. has first signed a PAROS
agreement.[36] However, this point seems lost on
most of America's allies. China and Russia managed to isolate the
United States 160-1 on the PAROS statement in the last meeting of
the U.N. First Committee. Israel abstained, while Japan, Britain,
and Australia voted for it. The United States needs to be wary of
the disastrous potential for Beijing's public relations campaign on
the PAROS statement to drive a wedge between the U.S. and its
allies.[37]
In this, the
Chinese have learned much from Soviet arms control negotiators, who
realized by the 1980s that they did not have to rely on
verification when dealing with the United States. Once the U.S.
signed an arms control agreement, it was self-enforced by America's
democratic processes. Moreover, as evidenced by the Soviets'
construction of the Krasnoyarsk anti-ballistic missile (ABM)
battle-management radar in direct contravention of the ABM
Treaty, the Soviets could openly cheat, deny inspections, and
confound verification without fear that the U.S. would abrogate the
treaty. China appears similarly intent on violating any PAROS
agreement by forming covert ASAT units in the 2nd Artillery.[38]
Since the January
12 test, U.S. media reports from the Pentagon have reflected alarm
among U.S. space strategists over several other Chinese space
weapon initiatives including ground-based lasers and radio
frequency weapons.[39] They are particularly concerned
about the launching of small Chinese satellites into orbits
very close to key U.S. intelligence, reconnaissance, and
communications spacecraft. Such parasitic microsatellites are
presumed to be time bombs that could blind and cripple American
military operations and financial communications. "These things
aren't being sent up there to be space rocks," one military source
said.[40] All these programs bespeak an
anti-satellite development program that is very broad and
sophisticated.[41]
While official
U.S. government speculation that China's political leaders may not
have known of the ASAT tests[42] is not credible, it is
certainly PLA practice to withhold information from civilian
departments. The PLA's refusal to inform health authorities
about the 2003 SARS epidemic in military hospitals across China is
a clear example of this. It is possible that the PLA believed that
the January 12 ASAT test would go unnoticed, although for 18 months
before the test the Pentagon had extended a standing
invitation to China's 2nd Artillery commanders to visit U.S.
Strategic Command to discuss the dangers of space debris and how
the U.S. tracks it.[43] Few doubt that the PLA is fully aware of
U.S. Strategic Command's and Air Force Space Command's space
tracking capabilities and fully appreciates that the U.S. would
detect the debris cloud immediately after a successful ASAT test.
While low-level officials in China's foreign ministry have admitted
that they knew nothing of the ASAT tests, most observers agree that
the civilian party and government leaders, at least at the
Politburo level, are extensively briefed on important military
advances.[44]
Naval
Forces. China is now the world's largest commercial
shipbuilder, and its naval ship production has slipstreamed
behind the civilian sector.[45] President Hu's speech to
the PLA Navy on December 27, 2006, indicated clearly-if not
explicitly- that China is preparing to confront the United States
at sea and under the sea.[46] China's navy is also upgrading its naval
aviation and power projection capacities. China's naval
modernization, Hu reported, "has made great strides, comprehensive
combat capabilities have strengthened visibly, and we have achieved
new heights and made new contributions to the various missions
which the Party and the people have bestowed."
A few days later,
China's Defense White Paper declared: "The Navy aims at gradual
extension of the strategic depth for offshore defensive operations
and enhancing its capabilities in integrated maritime
operations and nuclear counterattacks."[47] China has already
assembled a modern submarine fleet of 29 advanced diesel-electric
submarines, including 12 super-quiet Russian-made Kilo-class
subs[48] and 14 Chinese-made Song-class and
Yuan-class boats. At least 10 more conventional and nuclear
submarines are under construction in Chinese shipyards, with
another five new nuclear ballistic missile and attack subs on
the drawing boards.
[1] Edward Cody,
"China Boosts Military Spending: Senior U.S. Official Presses
Beijing to Clarify 'Plans and Intentions,'" The Washington
Post, March 5, 2007, p. A12, at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/04/
AR2007030400401.html (April 23, 2007). This was
certainly the biggest increase in yuan terms. China has announced
the following annual percentage increases: 1.5 percent in
1987; 2.6 percent in 1988; 12.6 percent in 1989; 15.4 percent in
1990; 12.0 percent in 1991; 12.0 percent in 1992; 12.5 percent in
1993; 20.3 percent in 1994 (the yuan was devalued from Y6.10 to the
dollar down to Y8.28 to the dollar); 14.6 percent in 1995; 11.3
percent in 1996; 12.7 percent in 1997; 12.8 percent in 1998; 12.7
percent in 1999; 12.7 percent in 2000; 18 percent in 2001;
17.7 percent in 2002; 9.6 percent in 2003; 11.6 percent in 2004;
12.6 in 2005; 14.7 percent in 2006; and 17.8 percent in 2007. China
also increased military spending by 20 percent in 1979 to pay for
its February incursion into Vietnam. Data compiled by June Teufel
Dreyer, Ph.D., University of Miami.
[3] Central
Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook 2007 (Washington,
D.C., 2007), s.v. "China," at www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ch.html (April
23, 2007). The latest World Bank figures for China's GDP indicate a
purchasing power parity (PPP) of $7.634 trillion in 2004, while
using a nominal exchange rate yields a GDP of $1.938 trillion,
producing a PPP ratio of 3.94. However, according to the Penn World
Table, China's PPP ratio was 2.14 in 2004. World Bank, World
Development Indicators (Washington, D.C.: International Bank
for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank, 2006), Table
1.1, at http://devdata.worldbank.org/wdi2006/contents/Table1_1.htm
(May 15, 2007), and University of Pennsylvania, Center
for International Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices,
Penn World Table, s.v. "China," at http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt62/pwt62_form.php
(May 15, 2007).
[4] Mark Magnier,
"China Announces Military Budget Hike," The Los Angeles
Times, March 5, 2007, p. A1, at www.latimes.com/news/printedition/asection/la-fg-china5mar05,1,5200670.story
(April 23, 2007). Other studies indicate that provincial reserves
and militias absorbed the bulk of the 200,000 troops, which the
2006 Defense White Paper says were demobilized between 2003 and
2005. In addition, the military seems to have generated large
amounts of income from land rentals and sales in major cities.
Dennis Blasko, "PLA Ground Force Modernization Underway in All
Military Regions, Preparing for a Variety of Missions," presented
at the 2006 PLA Conference at Carlisle Barracks, Pa., October 6-8,
2006, pp. 11-12.
[6] Office of
Management and Budget, Historical Tables, Budget of the
United States Government, Fiscal Year 2008 (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 2007), pp. 49-51, at www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2008/pdf/hist.pdf
(March 27, 2007). The U.S. State Department lists
China's annual military expenditures as second only to those of the
United States. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Verification and
Compliance, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers
1999-2000 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office,
2002), p. 38, at www.state.gov/t/vc/rls/rpt/wmeat/1999_2000
(April 23, 2007).
[8] Kurt Campbell,
former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, noted: "You look back
on those studies, and it's only been a decade, China has exceeded
in every area military modernization that even the far-off
estimates of the mid-1990s predicted." Mike Shuster, "Growing
Chinese Military Strength Stirs Debate," Morning Edition,
National Public Radio, October 17, 2005, at www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4961290
(April 23, 2007). Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Rodman
noted that "we are caught by surprise by the appearance of new
systems that suddenly appear fully developed." Peter Rodman, in
hearing, China's Military Modernization and U.S. Export
Controls, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission,
U.S. Congress, 109th Cong., 2nd Sess., March 16-17, 2006, p. 32, at
www.uscc.gov/hearings/2006hearings/transcripts/march16_1
7/March_16-17_FINAL.pdf (April 23, 2007).
[9] The Pentagon
already assesses that the "pace and scope of China's military
build-up already puts regional military balances at risk." U.S.
Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
Quadrennial Defense Review Report, February 6, 2006, p. 29,
at www.defenselink.mil/qdr/report/Report20060203.pdf
(April 23, 2007).
[10] SRBMs were
deployed against Taiwan at a pace of 50 per year between 1996 and
2002. Bill Gertz, "Missiles Bolstered Opposite Taiwan," The
Washington Times, April 29, 2002, p. A12. By the end of 2006,
new SRBM deployments had reached a rate of at least 100 per year.
The Pentagon estimates that deployments of M-9 and M-11 missiles
increased from 500 to 690 in the Taiwan Strait theater between 2003
and 2004. U.S. Department of Defense, "Military Power of the
People's Republic of China, 2006," p. 3.
[12] For a
comprehensive look at China's missile industry, see Evan S. Mede
iros, Roger Cliff, Keith Crane, and James C. Mulvenon, A New
Direction for China's Defense Industry, RAND Corporation, 2005,
pp. 51-108, at www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2005/RAND_MG334.pdf
(April 11, 2006).
[13] U.S.
Department of Defense, "Military Power of the People's Republic of
China, 2006,"p. 27.
[14] "The Chinese
delegate to the U.N. disarmament talks has asserted that since
Taiwan is Chinese territory the Chinese no-first-use pledge does
not apply." Michael Nacht and Tom Woodrow, "Nuclear Issues,"
Session 6, in Hans Binnendijk and Ronald N. Montaperto, eds.,
Strategic Trends in China (Washington, D.C., National
Defense University Press, 1998), at www.ndu.edu/inss/books/Books%20-%201998/
Strategic%20Trends%20in%20China%20-%20June%2098/
chinasess6.html (April 23, 2007).
[15] On July 14,
2005, at a briefing of foreign journalists, Major General Zhu
Chenghu, dean of foreign students at the PLA National Defense
University, said that "if the Americans are determined to interfere
[then] we will be determined to respond" and that "we Chinese will
prepare ourselves for the destruction of all of the cities east of
Xi'an. Of course the Americans will have to be prepared that
hundreds…of cities will be destroyed by the Chinese." Danny
Gittings, "General Zhu Goes Ballistic," The Wall Street
Journal, July 18, 2005, p. A13.
[16] See U.S.
Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense,
"Military Power of the People's Republic of China, 2005," July
2005, p. 40, at www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2005/d20050719china.pdf
(April 26, 2007). The PLA's eagerness to understand the
vulnerabilities of U.S. military radiation-hardened microcircuits
is evident from the case of a Chinese scholar who illegally shipped
a number of such microchips to a Chinese military research
institute in 2001. Spencer S. Hsu, "Scholar Says U.S. Unharmed: Gao
Defends Human Rights Efforts, Appeals for Sympathy," The
Washington Post, November 28, 2003, p. A6.
[17] For example,
see U.S. Department of Defense, "Military Power of the People's
Republic of China, 2006," p. 28. Larry Wortzel notes a significant
but subtle difference in terminology in the 2006 Defense White
Paper: "The 'White Paper' declares 'China remains firmly
committed to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons at
any time and under any circumstances.' However, the next
sentence of the 'White Paper' tells the reader 'it
unconditionally undertakes a pledge not to use or threaten
to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states or
nuclear-weapon-free zones.'" Dr. Wortzel notes that "a 'firm
commitment to policy' is not as strong a position as an
'unconditional' pledge." Larry M. Wortzel, China's
Nuclear Forces: Operations, Training, Doctrine, Command, Control,
and Campaign Planning (Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College,
Strategic Studies Institute, May 2007).
[18] Wortzel
describes a conventional missile target set that is identical to a
nuclear target set. Ibid.
[21] Ronald
O'Rourke, "China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy
Capabilities-Background and Issues for Congress,"
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, updated
February 7, 2007, pp. 5-6, at www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33153.pdf (April
26, 2007).
[22] Craig
Covault, "Chinese Test Anti-Satellite Weapon," Aviation Week
& Space Technology, January 22, 2007.
[23] Private
conversations with U.S. analysts.
[24] The New
York Times reports that the Bush Administration pondered how to
respond, but that the suggestion that Washington ask Beijing "to
forgo the test had been broached by some Pentagon officials" but
"was rejected for several reasons," including that "China was
unlikely to cancel the test and that there were few good options to
punish China if they ignored an American warning." Additionally,
"American intelligence agencies were loath to let the Chinese know
they were aware of the state of their preparations." Michael R.
Gordon and David S. Cloud, "U.S. Knew of China's Missile Test, But
Kept Silent," The New York Times, April 23, 2007, p. 1.
[26] These
conclusions are based on private correspondence with U.S. experts
on China's space programs. On May 1, 2006, the Chinese press
reported that "US space experts believe that China will launch
spacecraft to the Moon in 2017" and that "the United States will
send astronauts to the Moon in 2018" so "the two countries have a
'coincident' landing time." "China, US to Join Hands in Lunar
Probing?" People's Daily Online, May 1, 2006, at http://english.people.com.cn/200605/01/eng20060501_262542.html
(April 26, 2007). China wants the world to believe the next manned
lunar mission will be a joint China-U.S. program.
[27] Andy
Pasztor, "U.S. Asserts a Military Option Is Needed to Guard Space
Assets," The Wall Street Journal, December 14, 2006, p. A6,
at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116607013949049936.html
(April 26, 2007; subscription required), and Marc Kaufman, "Talk of
Satellite Defense Raises Fears of Space War; U.S. Says Attacks on
Crucial Systems Are Possible, Warns It Would Respond Forcefully,"
The Washington Post, December 17, 2006, p. A12, at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/
12/16/AR2006121600791.html (April 26, 2007).
[29] See Vago
Muradian, "China Tried to Blind U.S. Sats with Laser,"
DefenseNews, September 26, 2006, p. 1, at www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2125489Americas (April 27, 2007),
and Elaine M. Grossman, "Top Commander: Chinese Interference with
U.S. Satellites Uncertain," Inside the Pentagon, October 12,
2006, p. 1.
[31] William J.
Broad, "Orbiting Junk, Once a Nuisance, Is Now a Threat," The
New York Times, February 6, 2007, p. D1.
[32] For example,
see U.S. Department of Defense, "Military Power of the People's
Republic of China, 2006," p. 35.
[33] Whatever
"explanations" the Chinese may have given to American interlocutors
were apparently lost in translation. Marine General Peter Pace,
chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said that during his March
2007 visit to Beijing, he received no explanation: "I don't know
what their policy is…. So I am still, as are others,
confused about what their intent is." Peter Spiegel,"Review Ordered
into Vulnerability of U.S. Satellites," Los Angeles Times,
April 22, 2007, at www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/washingtondc/
la-na-satellite22apr22,1,3289845.story (May 7, 2007).
[37] Press
release, "Disarmament Committee Approves Text Reaffirming Urgency
of Preventing Outer Space Arms Race, Need for Reinforcing Existing
Legal Regime," GA/DIS/3334, U.N. General Assembly, October 25,
2006, at www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2006/gadis3334.doc.htm
(April 27, 2007).
[39] For example,
see Reuters, "Satellite Surprise Highlights U.S.-China
Gap-Official," DefenseNews, February 1, 2007, at
www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2525587 (April 27, 2007),
and Bill Gertz, "Officials Fear War in Space by China," The
Washington Times, January 24, 2007, at http://washingtontimes.com/national/20070124-121536
-8225r_page2.htm (April 27, 2007). For descriptions
of Chinese ASAT programs, see U.S. Department of Defense, "Military
Power of the People's Republic of China, 2006," pp. 34-35.
[41] General
James E. Cartwright told a Senate panel on March 28, 2007, that
"they [the Chinese] have-they have undertaken a what we would call
a very disciplined and comprehensive continuum of capability
against space-our space capabilities, okay-all the way from
temporary and reversible effects that could be-examples would be
GPS jamming, things like that, COM jamming, all the way through
direct ascent ASAT. And eventually, they'll probably be looking at
co-orbital. And then, the one that you really worry about is
introducing weapons of mass destruction into space on a missile."
General James E. Cartwright, testimony before the Committee on
Armed Services, U.S. Senate, March 28, 2007.
[42] David E.
Sanger and Joseph Kahn, "U.S. Officials Try to Interpret China's
Silence over Satellite," The New York Times, January 22,
2007, p. A3.
[44] Mulvenon
speculates that the ASAT program was approved by the civilian
leadership, but "the civilians should be faulted for not
maintaining closer oversight of the program and not calculating the
possible negative international diplomatic repercussions of a
successful test." Mulvenon, "Rogue Warriors?" pp. 2-3.
[45] See "China
Tops Korea Again for New Ship Orders," Chosun Ilbo, March
20, 2007, at http://english.chosun.com/w21data/html/news/200703/20070
3200009.html (April 27, 2007). During the first two
months of 2007, Chinese shipyards accounted for almost half of the
total tonnage of all new ship orders worldwide, up 48 percent from
2006 levels and outpacing South Korea as the world's top
vendor.
[46] Cao Zhi and
Chen Wanjun, "Hu Jintao zai huijian Haijun di shice dangdaihui
daibiao shi qiangdiao; anzhao geminghua, xiandaihua, zhengguihua
xiangtongyide yuanze; duanzao shiying wojun lishi shi ming yaoqiude
qiangda renmin haijun; Guo Boxiong, Cao Gangchuan, Xu Caihou canjia
huijian" (Meeting Navy representatives at the 10th party congress,
Hu Jintao stresses that integrating principles of
revolutionization, modernization, and regularization to forge a
strong People's Navy fulfills the requirements of our historic
mission. Guo Boxiong, Cao Gangchuan and Xu Caihou present),
Renmin Ribao, December 28, 2006, p. 1, at http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2006-12/28/
content_12168965.htm (April 27, 2007).
[47] Chinese
State Council, China's National Defense in 2006,
chap. II.
[48] China seems
to have at least 10 Kilo-class submarines now: four
Kilo 877s, six Kilo 636s, and two additional
Kilo 636s that are no longer in Russian shipyards but are
not yet necessarily deployed by the PLAN.
[51] "Gencong
Xiaoying, Ding Yiping zuozhen zhihui; Haijun zhongda xingdong
zhihuiguan zhiyi 2003 nian yin qianting shigu bei jiangzhi; jinnian
8 yue beige jinsheng fusilingyuan; yuji sannian hou geng shang
cenglou" (Shadowing the Kitty Hawk, Ding Yiping in personal
command; one of commanders of the major naval operation was demoted
because of a 2003 submarine accident; promoted to deputy
commander of the navy this August; predicted for another step up
within three years), Shijie Ribao, November 16, 2006, p. A1
at www.worldjournal.com/wj-ch-news.php?nt_seq_id=1445428
(April 27, 2007).
[52] The article
describes the work of Dr. Jin Donghan, a Chinese naval propulsion
engineer, and his team at the 722 Institute in perfecting a new
marine engine and overcoming problems of "high pressure combustion"
in "small spaces," "gas recirculation," and other technical
challenges that sound suspiciously like an air independent
propulsion (AIP) system. The author goes out of his way to insist
that the technology is "entirely Chinese intellectual property" to
"overcome the blockade of foreign technology." Qi Yao, "Wei
Woguo Xinxing Jianchuan tigong Qiangjingde 'Zhongguo Xin'"
(Providing our country's new warships with a powerful 'Chinese
heart'), Keji Ribao (Science and Technology Daily), March
14, 2007, at www.stdaily.com/gb/stdaily/2007-03/14/content_643783.htm
(May 8, 2007).
[53] See Jonathon
Weng and Richard Scott, "China Develops Stirling AIP Technology for
Submarines," Jane's Navy International, April 1, 2007.
[54] "Waijiaobu:
Zhongguo Qianting we isui Mei 'Xiaoying' hao hangmu baodao bu shi"
(Foreign Ministry: Report of Chinese submarine tailing 'Kitty Hawk'
carrier not fact), Xinhua, November 16, 2006, at http://world.people.com.cn/GB/1029/5052209.html
(April 27, 2007).
[55] A Federation
of American Scientists blog says that the U.S. detected only two
PLAN submarine patrols in 2006 and none in 2005. Hans Kristensen,
"Chinese Submarine Fleet Continues Low Patrol Rate," Federation of
American Scientists Strategic Security Blog, February 6,
2007, at www.fas.org/blog/ssp/2007/02/post_2.php
(April 27, 2007).
[56] U.S.-China
Economic and Security Review Commission, 2006 Report to
Congress, November 2006, p. 135.
[57] O'Rourke,
"China Naval Modernization," pp. 7-11.
[58] Some
observers consider the Yuan-class submarines under
construction in Wuhan to be an improved version of the Song
class. See "Songji Gailiang Qianjian, Haijun Weilai Zhuli, Waigou
Eluosi K ji Qianjian, Tianbu Changgui Zhanli Kongxi, Bing Jiji
Yanshi Xinjian" (Improved Song-class submarine is main force
of future Chinese navy, with Russian Kilo-class, to buttress
conventional force posture in region, actively research and develop
new vessels), Shijie Ribao, June 1, 2005, p. A8.
[60] Bill Gertz,
"China Expands Sub Fleet," The Washington Times, March 2,
2007, p. A1, at www.washingtontimes.com/national/20070302-
012440-4462r.htm (April 27, 2007). Little is reported
about the Type-095 except that design work is apparently completed.
Some reports describe it as an improved attack submarine, while
others indicate that it will be a ballistic missile boat. See U.S.
Department of Defense, "Military Power of the People's Republic of
China, 2006," pp. 26 and 27. For a graphic of China's current
submarine fleet, see Vivek Raghuvanshi, "Leased Akulas Advance
India's Blue-Water Plans," DefenseNews, March 5, 2007, p.
12.
[61] Including at
least five Type-94 Jins, five Type-093 Shangs, five
Type-095s, one Yuan, 13 Songs, and 13 Kilo
877s and 636s. For the higher estimates, see hearing, China's
Military Power, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of
Representatives, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., July 27, 2005.
[62] The United
States will soon experience a depletion of its submarine fleet,
which will drop below 48 by 2020 (probably sooner, given the
heightened operational tempo) and below 40 by 2027, despite an
optimal fleet size of 68 and an absolute minimum of 58. The U.S.
Navy's submarine fleet can now fulfill only 62 percent of its
mission requests-a percentage that drops every year. See testimony
of Vice Admiral John J. Donnelly, Commander U.S. Submarine Forces,
et al., in hearing, Submarine Force Structure and
Acquisition Policy,Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary
Forces, Committee on Armed Services, U.S. House of Representatives,
110th Cong., 1st Sess., March 8, 2007.
[64] U.S.
Department of Defense, "Military Power of the People's Republic of
China, 2006," pp. 4, 5, 26, and 48.
[65] O'Rourke,
"China Naval Modernization," p. 12.
[66] "Junfang:
Yao fazhan hangmu jiandui, zhuan jian zaiji, fushu jianting kuai
wancheng, keneng xian zhuangbei Nanhai" (Military: China will
develop aircraft carrier group, sources say carrier-based planes
and escort ships almost complete, will probably first deploy in
South China Sea), Shijie Ribao, March 10, 2006, at www.worldjournal.com/wj-ch-news.php?nt_
seq_id=1323694 (April 27, 2007).
[67] "Zhongguo
Hangmu 2010 nian qian zhicheng; Renda Jiefangjun daibiaotuan
zhongjiang: Zhongguo you quanli, you shili, taguo wu quan guowen"
(China will complete construction of aircraft carrier by 2010;
lieutenant general in People's Congress PLA delegation: China
has the right, and the power, and other nations have no right to
question it), Shijie Ribao, March 7, 2007, p. A4, at www.worldjournal.com/wj-ch-news.php?nt_seq
_id=1497958 (April 27, 2007).
[68] John Ward
Anderson, "Turks Keep Ship Going Round in Circles; It's No Longer a
Carrier, Not Yet a Casino," The Washington Post, July 22,
2001, p. A18.
[69] Ruan Leyi,
"Wayagehao mujian hu yanmi" (Varyag carrier under heavy security),
Zhongguo Shibao, May 13, 2002, and Ruan Leyi, "Zhonggong
gouru wei wangong Ezhi hangmu rinei tongguo Taiwan dongbu"
(Unfinished Russian-built aircraft carrier purchased will
transit east of Taiwan in next few days), Zhongguo Shibao,
February 19, 2002.
[71] Ruan Leyi,
"Zhonggong yi neng dazao hangmu, xiang wei dingan poban" (PRC now
capable of building carrier; decision not final), Zhongguo
Shibao, January 10, 2007. For a comprehensive look at China's
aircraft carrier program as of 2002, see Richard D. Fisher,
Jr., "China's Carrier of Chance," Jamestown Foundation China
Brief, Vol. 2, Issue 6 (March 14, 2002), at www.jamestown.org/publications_details.php?volume
_id=18&issue_id=646&article_id=4621 (April
27, 2007).
[72] The official
media in China appear to be encouraging Chinese readers to believe
that China is, in fact, moving toward deployment of a carrier
fleet. For a series of images in a blog on a People's Daily
Web site, see "Haiwai kan Zhongguo: Zhongguo goumaide Su-33 ji
jiang zai hangmushang shifei" (How China is seen abroad-China buys
Russian Su-33 fighters for carrier test), Qiangguo Shequ
(powerful nation community), December 29, 2006, at www.military.people.com.cn/GB/42969/58519/5228125.html (April
27, 2007).
[73] Ruan Leyi,
"Yao bu yao hangmu, qu jueyu zhanlue xuyao" (An aircraft carrier or
not-depends on strategic demand), Zhongguo Shibao,
January 10, 2007.
[74] O'Rourke,
"China Naval Modernization," p. 15.
[76] Cao Zhi and
Chen Wanjun, "Hu Jintao zai huijian Haijun di shice dangdaihui
daibiao shi qiangdiao."
[77] Kevin
Lanzit, "PLAAF Transformation-a Midpoint Review," paper presented
at conference, "Exploring the 'Right Size' for China's Military:
PLA Missions, Functions, and Organizations," Carlisle Barracks,
Pa., October 6-8, 2006, p. 4.
[78] See Phillip
C. Saunders and Erik Quam, "Future Force Structure of the Chinese
Air Force," paper presented at conference, "Exploring the 'Right
Size' for China's Military," p. 8. Some estimates of the production
run are as high as 300. Taiwan's defense ministry apparently
believes it will be capped at 120. Agence France-Presse, "China
Looks to New Fighters, Sparking Regional Arms Race: Report,"
DefenseNews, January 31, 2007, at www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2521412
(April 27, 2007); Rich Chang, "China Deploys Advanced
Fighters," Taipei Times, January 22, 2007, p. 1, at www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2007/01/22/2003345791
(April 27, 2007); and Chua Chin Hon, "China Unveils New Fighter Jet
Amid Fanfare," Straits Times, January 5, 2007, at www.taiwansecurity.org/ST/2007/ST-050107.htm
(April 27, 2007).
[80] "Kongzhong
jiayou, Jiefangjun zuodao; yanchang zhandouji daikong shijian;
zengqiang yuancheng gongji nengli" (PLA achieves midair fueling,
prolongs fighter loiter time, strengthens long-distance attack
capabilities), Shijie Ribao, April 24, 2005.
[81] "Junyan
jieshu, jungou kaishi, Zhonggong xiading, caigou yunshuji jiayouji"
(After China-Russia military exercise, arms buys begin, PRC
contracts purchase of cargo and refueling aircraft), Zhongguo
Shibao, August 29, 2005.
[82] Chinese
journals refer to the Su-27 and Jian-10 as "third generation"
fighters.
[83] U.S.
Department of Defense, "Military Power of the People's Republic of
China, 2006," p. 4.
[84]Private
conversation with U.S. official. A Taiwan request for over 400 new
AIM-120 air-to-air missiles and Maverick air-to-ground missiles was
approved by the Pentagon on March 1, 2007. News release, "Taipei
Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United
States-AMRAAM and Maverick Missiles," Defense Security Cooperation
Agency, February 28, 2007, at www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2007/Taiwan_07-10.pdf
(April 27, 2007).
[85] For a
depiction of the "notional coverage provided by China's SA-10,
SA-20 SAM systems, as well as the soon-to-be acquired S-300PMU2,"
see U.S. Department of Defense, "Military Power of the People's
Republic of China, 2005," p. 32, Figure 8.
[86] See Chinese
State Council, China's National Defense in 2006,
chap. IV.
[87] The 2006
Defense White Paper says that the PLA numbers 2.3 million, but this
apparently includes the 660,000 in the People's Armed Police
(wuzhuang jingcha). U.S.-China Economic and Security Review
Commission, 2006 Report to Congress, November 2006, p. 134,
at www.uscc.gov/annual_report/2006/annual_report_full_06.pdf
(April 29, 2007).
[88] Blasko, "PLA
Ground Force Modernization Underway."
[89] See Chinese
State Council, China's National Defense in 2006,
chap. IV.
[90] The Type-98
is protected by reactive armor and armed with a fully stabilized
125-mm 50-calibre smoothbore gun with autoloader and is
controlled by a laser rangefinder, wind sensor, ballistic computer,
and thermal barrel sleeve. Dual-axis stabilization ensures
precise targeting and firing on the move. The Type 98's 125-mm
cannon can fire a Russian A-11 laser-guided anti-tank missile
(ATGM). Both the commander and gunner have roof-mounted stabilized
sights with daylight and infrared channels. The gun system
reportedly outclasses the Abrams. See Jane's Armour and
Artillery Yearbook.
[91] See Fisher,
"China's New Large Amphibious Assault Ship." Blasko suggests that
only 400 have been deployed. Blasko, "PLA Ground Force
Modernization Underway."
[92] Fisher,
"China's New Large Amphibious Assault Ship."
[93]Zhou Ye,
"Jiefangjun Zixunhua budui jinnian chengjun" (PLA cyberwarfare
units deployed this year), Zhongguo Shibao, March 15,
2003.
[95] See Dow
Jones Newswires, "Taiwan Military-China Cyber War More Likely Than
Invasion," December 14, 2004; "Chinese Hacker May Be PLA,"
Chosun Ilbo, July 15, 2004; "NK Hands Suspected in
Cyberattacks," Korea Times, July 15, 2004; and CNET
News.com, "Flaw in Microsoft Word Used in Computer Attack," The
New York Times, May 20, 2006, at www.nytimes.com/2006/05/20/technology/20zero.html
(April 29, 2007).
[96] Nathan
Thornburgh, "Inside the Chinese Hack Attack; How a Ring of Hackers,
Codenamed Titan Rain by Investigators, Probed U.S. Government
Computers," Time, August 25, 2005, at www.time.com/time/nation/printout/0,8816,1098371,00.html
(April 29, 2007).
[97] Allan
Paller, Director, SANS Institute Research, quoted in Bill Brenner,
"Titan Rain Shows Need for Better Training,"
SearchSecurity.com, December 13, 2005, at http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/originalContent/
0,289142,sid14_gci1151715,00.html (April 29, 2007).
See also Bradley Graham, "Hackers Attack Via Chinese Web Sites;
U.S. Agencies' Networks Are Among Targets," The Washington
Post, August 25, 2005, p. A1, at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article
/2005/08/24/AR2005082402318.html (April 29, 2007).
[98] Peter
Warren, "Smash and Grab, the Hi-Tech Way," The
Guardian, January 19, 2006, at http://technology.guardian.co.uk/weekly/story/0,
,1689093,00.html (April 29, 2007).
[101] CNET
News.com, "Flaw in Microsoft Word Used in Computer Attack."
[102] Lian
Junwei, "Weiruan chengnuo yu Zhonggong xiang yuanshima" (Microsoft
commits to giving source codes to PRC), Gongshang Shibao,
July 18, 2002.
[103] Warren,
"Smash and Grab, the Hi-Tech Way."
[104] Dawn S.
Onley and Patience Wait, "Red Storm Rising; DOD's Efforts to Stave
Off Nation-State Cyberattacks Begin with China," Government
Computer News, August 21, 2006, at www.gcn.com/print/25_25/41716-1.html
(April 29, 2007).
[105] Ted
Bridis, "State Dept. Suffers Computer Break-Ins," Associated Press,
July 11, 2006.
[106] Agence
France-Presse, "U.S. pulls Lenovo PCs from State Department,"
The Washington Times, May 19, 2006, at www.washingtontimes.com/world/20060518-
104316-9737r.htm (April 29, 2007), and Associated Press,
"U.S. to Restrict Use of Computers from Lenovo," The New
York Times, May 20, 2006, p. C9, at www.nytimes.com/2006/05/20/business/20computer.html
(April 29, 2007).
[112] Jimmy
Chuang, "Ex-TSMC Employee Suspected of Selling Secrets to
Shanghai," Taipei Times, March 7, 2002, p. 1, at www.taipeitimes.com/news/2002/03/07/story/
0000126662 (April 29, 2007). See also Stephanie Low,
"Government Drafts Law to Fight High-Tech Espionage," Taipei
Times, March 31, 2002, p. 1, at www.taipeitimes.com/news/2002/03/31/story/0000129898
(April 29, 2007), and Dan Nystedt, "Top Secret Report Sets
Off Alarms in the Tech Sector," Taipei Times, July 4, 2001,
p. 17, at www.taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2001/07/04/92739
(April 29, 2007).
[113] Jason
Dean and Don Clark, "China Clears Intel Chip Plant, Marking a
Potential Milestone," The Wall Street Journal, March 14,
2007, p. A4.
[114] Defense
Science Board Task Force, High Performance Microchip Supply,
p. 30 (emphasis added).
[116] Mulvenon,
"Chinese Information Operations Strategies in a Taiwan
Contingency."
[117] Chinese
State Council, China's National Defense in
2006, chap. 2.
[118] For a
colorful discussion of China's impact on the Russian Far East, see
Burt Herman, "Chinese Presence Grows in Russian Far East,"
Associated Press, August 24, 2005. See also "Zhongguo yimin daju
zhuanru, Eguo fangdu; Mosike nian sunshi 71.9 yi meiyuan; jiang
tuichu xilie zhendui cuoshi, shi jushi zhengchanghua" (Russia seeks
to stem flood of Chinese immigrants, Moscow loses US$7.19
billion each year, will take measures to address this problem and
normalize this trend), Shijie Ribao, March 17, 2006, at
www.worldjournal.com/wj-ch-news.php?nt_seq_id=1327123
(April 29, 2007).
[120] For an
expanded look at this issue, see John J. Tkacik, Jr., "How the PLA
Sees North Korea," in Andrew Scobell and Larry M. Wortzel, eds.,
Shaping China's Security Environment: The Role of the People's
Liberation Army (Carlisle, Pa.: U.S. Army War College,
Strategic Studies Institute, October 2006), pp. 139-172, at www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/pub709.pdf
(April 29, 2007).
[121] For an
excellent summary of the problem, see Wendell Minnick, "China
Rising: East Asia Braces as American Influence Fades,"
DefenseNews, March 19, 2007, pp. 11-12, at www.defensenews.com/story.php?F=2623660
(April 29, 2007). Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong
reportedly believes that, "distracted by problems elsewhere, the
U.S. isn't paying enough attention to Southeast Asia, losing its
regional influence to a rising China and potentially weakening
antiterrorism cooperation." Yaroslav Trofimov and Paul
Beckett, "Singapore Prime Minister Urges U.S. to Bolster Its Ties
in Asia," The Wall Street Journal, April 18, 2007, p. A9, at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB117679618020172427.html
(May 7, 2007; subscription required).
[122] Or
"disrupt his alliances" (fa jiao). Sunzi Bingfa III.
5. See Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Samuel B. Griffith
(London: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 78.