The Senate should remove from the Secure Borders, Economic
Opportunity and Immigration Reform Act of 2007 (S. 1348) a
provision that would require employers to pay temporary guest
workers the "prevailing competitive wage." The requirement is an
improvement over the wage provision in the 2006 Senate immigration
reform bill (S. 2611), which required employers to pay guest
workers "Davis-Bacon" wages set far above market rates.
Nonetheless, the prevailing wage provision in the current bill is
redundant, would reduce labor market flexibility, and would
open the door to costly litigation.
An Improvement Over Previous Bills
The compromise bill creates a new category of Y visas for
temporary immigrant guest workers. Companies must pay these workers
the higher of two wages--the amount paid to similarly skilled
employees or the prevailing competitive wage. The legislation
defines the prevailing competitive wage as:
- the wage set in a union collective bargaining agreement, if one
exists;
- the Davis-Bacon wage if the project is covered by the
Davis-Bacon Act; or
- the amount that employers typically pay for that work as
determined by various government surveys.
The requirement is a major improvement over the wage provisions
of previous immigration reform proposals. The Davis-Bacon Act
requires employers on federal construction projects to pay union
wage scales, which are typically 15 percent to 40 percent
above market rates. The Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act of
2006 (CIRA) would have required employers to pay temporary
immigrants Davis-Bacon wages for any occupation covered by the act,
not just for jobs on federal construction projects.
The Davis-Bacon provision would have made the temporary guest
worker program pointless. The program's supporters want it to
provide a legal outlet for immigrants to live and work temporarily
in America. However, businesses and contractors would be averse to
paying a 40 percent wage premium to hire legal guest workers.
Many firms would probably continue employing undocumented
immigrants illegally at market wages. Guest workers who could not
find legal work at inflated Davis-Bacon wages would continue
working illegally, meaning that millions of immigrants would remain
hiding in the shadows of the underground economy.
The Senate immigration bill defines the prevailing wage as the
market wage for most jobs, avoiding the problems created by
Davis-Bacon wage rates. Nonetheless, the provision remains
unnecessary and harmful.
A Redundant Requirement
Many Members of Congress support prevailing wage provisions to
prevent businesses from paying guest workers below-market wages,
thereby undercutting their constituents' wages. However, the market
will already compel businesses to pay the market wage because the
legislation allows guest workers to switch employers.
If a company hired an engineer as a temporary worker for $35,000
per year when most engineers in the area earned $70,000, the
temporary worker could simply leave his original employer and work
for one that paid the market rate. Employers cannot pay guest
workers below-market wages without running the risk of them leaving
the company for better paying jobs. The prevailing competitive
wage provision would legally require employers to do what market
forces already compel them to do.
Reduced Labor Market Flexibility
Wages signal where workers are needed in the economy. Jobs
paying high wages indicate that demand for new workers is high,
while low wages discourage new workers from entering the field.
Similarly, high wages for a position tell employers that labor
is scarce and needs to be used sparingly, while low wages encourage
employers to hire more freely. Wage flexibility sends workers to
the jobs that most need filling, keeping the economy efficient and
growing.
Prevailing wage requirements and other government wage
controls distort these signals, creating systematic economic
inefficiencies. The provision would have no effect if it were not
for the government surveys required to determine the market wage.
Although the legislation stipulates that they be "recently
conducted," such surveys still take months to administer, process,
and publish. By the time a survey is issued, it may no longer
reflect economic realities. If the surveys are slow to reflect
a decline in demand for particular jobs, many guest workers would
be likely to take jobs where their skills benefit the economy
less.
Regulatory Uncertainty
The prevailing wage provision would also impose a new layer of
regulatory complexity, creating uncertainty for employers. The
legislation properly calls for paying the prevailing wage, "taking
into account experience and skill levels of employees." But
federal wage surveys do not account for skills and experience; they
only provide the average or median wage for an occupation.
Less skilled or less experienced guest workers naturally earn
less than workers with more experience. A company that hires a
Rwandan engineer with only one year of experience for $25 per hour
when the average wage for all engineers is $30 per hour could not
be certain that it had complied with the law. It paid the
worker according to his skills and experience, but not at a rate
published in a government survey.
Frivolous Charges
Companies could face lawsuits for paying guest workers less
than the "official" wage published by the government.
Companies seeking to undermine their competitors or unions
seeking to pressure companies into concessions could threaten or
encourage such lawsuits.
Conclusion
The immigration reform bill's prevailing wage provision would
require most employers who hire temporary guest workers to pay
market wages. This is an improvement over previous proposals that
required inflated Davis-Bacon wages, which would have made guest
workers legally unemployable and driven them back into the
underground economy.
Yet Congress should still remove the prevailing wage
requirement. The provision duplicates a function already provided
by the free market, reduces labor market flexibility, increases
regulatory burdens, and opens the door to frivolous lawsuits.
Congress should not subject employers to more uncertainty,
complexity, and regulation.
James Sherk is Bradley
Fellow in Labor Policy in the Center for Data Analysis at The
Heritage Foundation.