On January 14, Álvaro Colom, leader of the center-left
National Unity for Hope Party (UNE), will become president of
Guatemala. The inauguration will draw several Latin American
leaders to Guatemala, including Presidents Felipe Calderón
of Mexico, Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, and Álvaro Uribe
of Colombia. Behind the pomp and protocol, there will unfold a
battle for Colom's political soul. Will the new president take a
populist, anti-American track as Chávez will likely urge, or
will he follow a more pragmatic, free-market course similar to
Presidents Calderón or Uribe? The answer--of great
importance given Guatemala's strategic significance--may depend on
U.S. engagement in the weeks and months ahead.
A New President
With a population of 12.7 million, Guatemala is the most
populous state between Mexico and mainland South America. Its long,
largely unprotected border with Mexico is porous and has become a
convenient route from the coca fields and cocaine labs of Colombia
to Mexico's drug cartels and U.S. streets. That border is also well
known to the illegal migrants escaping Central America's poverty.
How Colom governs is of great importance to U.S. interests and
security.
It has been 23 years since Guatemala's ruling generals turned
the presidency over to a civilian. The horrific, 36-year guerrilla
war that claimed more than 100,000 lives and produced over 1
million refugees ended in 1996. The political foundations of peace
and electoral democracy in Guatemala, as in the rest of Central
America, are increasingly solid. Although marred by some violence,
the September general elections drew14 candidates from a variety of
political backgrounds, from the right to the leftist indigenous
movement of Nobel Prize winner Rigoberta Menchú. The strong
competition forced a second round of voting.
Colom, an industrial engineer, one-time vice minister of the
economy, and three-time presidential candidate defeated Otto
Pérez Molina, a retired general. The extent of Colon's
mandate will be in dispute. He garnered just 52.23 percent of the
vote in the November 4 run-off. Further, only 2.9 million of
Guatemala's 5.9 million registered voters turned out for the
run-off, and Colom's UNE party commands only 48 of the 158 seats in
the legislature, has a mainly rural constituency, and failed to
carry Guatemala City. Colom must demonstrate adeptness at
consensus-building across the political spectrum, negotiation, and
public relations to avoid political gridlock.
The presidency of Óscar Berger, who will step down from
office on the 14th, marked an improvement over his corrupt
predecessor, Alfonso Portillo, although lacking a transforming
dynamic. Berger accomplished modest reforms, raised tax revenue in
a country with a sub-par collections rate, and guarded
macroeconomic stability. Economic growth hit 5.6 percent in 2007,
and new investments flowed into call centers, light manufacturing,
agro-industry, and tourism. With Guatemala's financial house in
comparatively good order, President Colom can ill afford to
overburden the nation's productive machinery with new taxes or to
scare off foreign investment.
A public opinion poll taken on the eve of Colom's inauguration
revealed that Guatemalans are unusually optimistic. They feel their
new president has a chance to begin to overhaul the political
system and lead the country in a better direction.
Many Challenges
The new President, nonetheless, inherits a nation troubled by
massive poverty, extremes of inequality, and enormous developmental
challenges. Seventy-five percent of the population lives below the
poverty line, only one-third of children ever attend secondary
school, and 50 percent of the labor force works in agriculture.
Poverty remains disproportionately concentrated in the indigenous,
Mayan communities. President Colom promises to reach out to the
marginalized with a largely progressive program of social democracy
that displays a "Mayan face," hoping to speed up rural development,
improve education, and improve access to health care.
Drug trafficking, violent crime, and gangs (maras) are
primary concerns for Guatemalans of all classes. Many, such as
outgoing Vice President Stein, warn that Guatemala is on the brink
of becoming a "narco-state." The murders of three Salvadoran
members of the Central American Parliament and their driver,
including the son of the founder of El Salvador's governing party,
in February 2007 focused international attention on the country's
lawlessness and narcotics problem. Guatemala's murder rates are
among the highest in the world; officially, 6,033 were slain in
2006. The police and judiciary appear ineffective against the tide
of crime. In 2005, for example, the Office of the Public Prosecutor
reported that only 46 murder cases out of 4,352 went to trial. It
is incumbent upon Colom to shake up the police and judiciary to
make headway in the battle against crime.
Affordable and secure energy is a major concern for Guatemala
and all of Central America as the cost of petroleum surpasses $100
per barrel. In the run-up to inauguration, President-designate
Colom signaled to Caracas an interest in participating in
Petrocaribe, Venezuela's long-term oil loans and subsidies program.
A positive response by Chávez may be too hard to resist.
If Guatemala is admitted to Venezuela's oil subsidies program,
Hugo Chávezwill likely look for concessions, but proud,
independent-minded, Guatemalans may be reluctant to hop on his
Bolivarian bandwagon. Cutting against Chávez, Mexico,
through its Plan Puebla-Panama, has demonstrated a desire for
stronger energy and trade ties with Guatemala and Central America.
Tighter regional integration and cooperation on economic,
commercial, and security ties would be mutually beneficial.
The U.S. Role
The U.S. has worked to foster an outward, growth-oriented
direction for Guatemala. The U.S-Central American Free Trade
Agreement (CAFTA) entered into force with Guatemala in July 2006.
CAFTA has already helped unlock the potential of non-traditional
exports, attracted new foreign investment, and increased Guatemalan
imports from the U.S. President Bush's visit to Guatemala in March
2007 highlighted strong U.S.-Guatemala ties.
Direct foreign assistance from the U.S. stands at about $50
million. The U.S. currently provides approximately $18 million
annually in assistance for counter-narcotics and the judiciary. The
Merida Initiative--a three-year program primarily designed to
support the battle against drug traffickers in Mexico--calls for an
additional $50 million for regional projects in Central America,
including Guatemala.
The U.S. is also connected to Guatemala by a strong human
bridge. An estimated 1.2 million Guatemalans are believed to be in
the U.S., as many as 60 percent of them illegally. Remittances from
the U.S. to Guatemala totaled $3.61 billion in 2006, representing
roughly 10 percent of the country's GDP. Deportations to Guatemala
for crimes and immigration violations approached 21,000 in 2007.
Close to 5,000 Guatemalan children were adopted last year, mainly
by U.S. parents, but stricter scrutiny to avoid abuse of the
adoption process may reduce adoptions in 2008.
Recommendations and Conclusion
Washington should take four concrete steps to pull Guatemala's
new president into the free-market, democratic fold:
- The White House and State Department should move to engage
President Colom constructively, including an early invitation to
Washington for a White House visit;
- The Department of State, the Department of Justice, and the
Pentagon should continue to strengthen judicial, police, and
counter-narcotics assistance for Guatemala's courts and police as
part of a more proactive strategy for Central America;
- Congress should fund the Merida Initiative with its modest but
important funding for Central American counter-narcotics and
anti-gang actions as well as increase International Military
Education and Training funding and consider reinstating Foreign
Military Financing; and
- The U.S. should encourage Guatemala to introduce reforms that
will make it eligible for a Millennium Challenge grant.
As Central America's largest nation and economy, Guatemala
remains a strategic country, a potential anchor for longer-term
stability in Central America. It is not in the U.S. interest,
despite the misgivings of some, to watch Guatemala become a
narco-state or a failed state. Many in Washington believe the U.S.
can work with a pragmatic Colom and his new government team. The
success of his presidency would have important repercussions for
the people of Guatemala and for U.S. policy in the region.
Ray Walser, Ph.D.,
is Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America in the Douglas and Sarah
Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the
Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International
Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.