Driving the debate over reauthorization of the Consumer Product
Safety Commission (CPSC) is public concern about the importation of
unsafe products from China. In response to this concern, the Senate
Commerce Committee has drafted legislation (the forthcoming
substitute for the CPSC Reform Act, S. 2045) that is larded with
massive gifts to the plaintiffs' trial bar and would undermine the
CPSC's efforts to improve product safety. It would boost criminal
penalties for distributing products in violation of
consumer-products laws and regulations, dramatically raise fines
for such violations, and give state attorneys general the power to
sue firms on behalf of their citizens--a great boon for trial
lawyers. These three provisions are likely to have serious
unintended consequences, especially for small businesses,
independent retailers, and American products manufacturers and
distributors. The House versions of these provisions (in H.R.
4040), though not perfect, present a more balanced approach. At a
time when economic growth is slowing, Congress should take care to
avoid policies such as these that raise the cost of doing business,
increase legal uncertainty and risk, and threaten jobs.
Fifty Sets of Standards
One virtue of the Consumer Product Safety Commission is that it
creates a single set of product safety regulations for
manufacturers and distributors to follow no matter where in the
U.S. they sell their goods.[1] Many of these regulatory standards are
hyper-technical, specifying such things as the mineral content of
paint on screws used in the internal mechanics of a children's
toy.[2]
With a single set of standards, complicated as they may be,
diligent manufacturers and distributors are able to produce and
sell products that they are confident are in compliance with all
aspects of the law.
Indeed, uniformity of standards was one of the reasons that
Congress created the CPSC in 1972.[3] Congress recognized that the
burden of complying with myriad conflicting state standards for
consumer product safety would actually undermine efforts to improve
safety while imposing unacceptable costs on manufacturers and
distributors.
Further, Congress charged the CPSC to balance the cost of
proposed products standards with the predicted gains in safety, a
practice often lacking at the state level, to ensure that new
standards would, taken as a whole, promote the public good rather
than imposing unreasonable costs on the economy.[4] It was particularly
concerned that CPSC standards improve safety "while minimizing
adverse effects on competition or disruption or dislocation of
manufacturing and other commercial practices."[5] This is an inquiry
to which courts and juries, lacking the expertise of a regulatory
agency, are especially ill-suited.
To give effect to these aims, the 1972 act specifically
preempted all state regulation of consumer products covered by CPSC
action.[6] This clear standard served to prevent
states from undermining the purposes of federal product safety
regulation by any means. The act directed the CPSC to accept
recommendations from state entities for safety standards and to
deputize state officials as enforcement agents, but it also made
clear that the CPSC would make all final decisions and supervise
any enforcement actions.[7] In short, the act was carefully drafted to
carry out Congress's intent to improve product safety as
efficiently as possible, which precluded continued state action in
the area.
The CPSC Reform Act, however, sacrifices uniformity and the
deliberative value of the CPSC process for promise of political and
monetary gain at the state level. Section 20 of the legislation
would reverse 35 years of successful policy experience by allowing
state attorneys general to bring lawsuits on behalf of its
residents for violations of consumer safety rules. The effect of
such lawsuits would be to create de facto state product
safety standards and to preempt, in practice, uniform CPSC
standards. Though the bill limits such suits to seeking injunctive
relief (such as ceasing sale of certain products)[8], companies are
likely to seek settlements with state attorneys general, including
payments to the state and other concessions, in order to avoid the
risk and uncertainty of litigation.
In recent years, many state attorney general offices have become
increasingly politicized, viewed by many as a steppingstone to
higher office. State attorneys general have been bringing more
suits concerning political questions--suits that stir up widespread
publicity and great opportunity for political posturing to offices
that, until recently, were merely concerned with the comparatively
mundane enforcement of the laws. This trend has been particularly
evident in state-directed litigation over global warming and carbon
emissions, activities in financial and securities markets, the
marketing and sale of tobacco, and competition in high-technology
markets. In all of these cases, the states effectively made policy
that, for a variety of policy reasons, is better considered at the
federal level by regulatory agencies or, in some cases, at the
state level by legislatures, but not by prosecutors.
It is especially important to understand that the existing law
gives the CPSC great discretion over when to bring lawsuits or
other enforcement actions and, alternatively, when to work with
manufacturers and distributors to reduce product-related risks.[9]
Indeed, lawsuits and enforcement actions are not the CPSC's primary
tools in its efforts to improve consumer safety.[10] More frequently,
it issues warning letters and works with companies to organize
recalls or other actions. Lawsuits, which are expensive,
adversarial, and often drawn out, can be an impediment to a
successful long-term relationship that maximizes compliance and
safety.[11] State attorneys general should not have
the power to reduce the effectiveness of the CPSC's efforts by
undermining its balanced approach to enforcement.
Giving state politicians a backdoor route to making policy in
consumer products safety regulation would directly undermine core
values of the federal regulatory program: uniformity, cost-benefit
balancing, legal certainty, reasonable discretion in enforcement,
and the removal of highly technical product-standards
determinations from the heated political realm. In sum, this
seemingly minor change would dramatically reshape the realm of
consumer product safety regulation, likely to the detriment of
product safety.
A Boon for Trial Lawyers
Among the groups lobbying hard for an increased state role in
enforcement of consumer products safety regulation are trial
lawyers, who stand to benefit handsomely by this change in several
ways.[12]
As has been widely reported in recent years, trial lawyers often
have close relationships with state law-enforcement officials. In
some states, they are able to use these relationships to bring
lawsuits on behalf of the state and can collect large fees for
doing so.[13] In addition to the possibility of
corruption in the awarding of these licenses to sue, this practice
warps the incentives of state officials charged with serving the
public and litigating for the common good.[14] The CPSC Reform
Act would be particularly invidious in this respect because it
would award prevailing state actors bringing lawsuits against
manufacturers and distributors litigation expenses and attorney's
fees.[15] State attorneys general, then, would be
hard-pressed to deny politically-active state trial lawyers the
opportunity to sue out-of-state companies when the litigation is
unlikely to cost the state a dime and could, in many cases, bring
the attorney general positive publicity. In this way, the
legislation would create an inappropriate incentive for states to
bring suits when they are not needed to protect public safety and
would also create, in many cases, openings for trial attorneys that
may result in corruption or at least the strong appearance of
impropriety.
Trial lawyers stand to benefit in other ways. Violations of CPSC
regulations and standards are considered per se violations
of tort law in suits by individuals who have been harmed by faulty
products.[16] State lawsuits that establish a
violation, then, even if it is a very minor one that the CPSC,
acting on its own, would not have addressed, give trial lawyers the
opportunity to bring follow-on tort lawsuits in which they need not
prove the presence of a product defect. Legal uncertainty
concerning the risk of enormous and disproportionate jury awards in
such lawsuits, as well as the possibility of large litigation
expenses, would prompt many companies to settle, at great expense,
or to fight suits. Again, the incentives presented by such
litigation would run precisely counter to the CPSC's mandate to
carefully balance cost and benefit in making safety
regulations.
Even when products are found not to violate CPSC standards in
lawsuits brought by state attorneys general, trial lawyers would
still benefit from them. This is because manufacturers and
distributors may be subject to tort liability for defects in
manufacturing, design, and failure to warn.[17] In many cases,
proving liability and winning huge damages awards (particularly
punitive damages) depends on trial lawyers' ability to access
internal company documents, some of which may be privileged and so
not discoverable in lawsuits. State attorneys general, however, are
often able to coerce companies into waiving such privileges to
avoid potentially damaging litigation. News reports reveal that
trial lawyers often work closely with state authorities in
determining how such waivers are struck and what materials are
disclosed so that the trial lawyers may use these materials in
subsequent private litigation.[18]
Americans recognize that lawsuit abuse is a major problem that
harms the economy and perverts justice. Congress should not give
the trial lawyers behind lawsuit abuse a new avenue to bring
big-money litigation against all those involved in the making and
sale of products.
Criminal Liability
The CPSC Reform Act would boost criminal penalties for violation
of CPSC regulations to levels that are disproportionate, coercive,
and possibly counterproductive. Under current law, individuals who
violate CPSC regulations after having received a notice of
noncompliance from the CPSC, and corporate officers who have
authorized such conduct, may be subject to criminal fines of up to
$50,000 and up to a year's imprisonment.[19] The Senate's legislation
would increase these penalties to up to $250,000 in fines and
imprisonment of up to five years.[20] There is a real risk that
such massive penalties would discourage the reporting of possible
violations and so actually undermine the effect of SPSC safety
regulations.
At the same time, individuals at companies already under
investigation by the CPSC and possibly subject to criminal
penalties will feel greater pressure to waive fundamental legal
privileges that exist to ensure the integrity of the legal system,
such as the attorney-client privilege, the attorney work-product
privilege, and the privilege against self-incrimination.
Further, the prospect of massive fines under the CPSC Reform Act
(discussed in greater detail below) could cause companies to waive
such legal protections to the detriment of their employees in
criminal suits. In recent years, this has become an increasingly
recognized problem in Department of Justice corporate prosecutions,
to the extent that federal courts have ruled some such tactics
simply unconstitutional[21], prominent former U.S. attorneys general
and top government litigators have called them unnecessary and
unethical[22], and Congress is now considering
legislation to address the problem directly.[23] It would be
counterproductive for Congress to act now to worsen this
significant problem. The prospect of litigation by state attorneys
general carries the same risk.
Most troubling in the criminal domain, the CPSC Reform Act would
remove a major requirement in criminal prosecution of individuals
for CPSC regulatory violations. Current law limits prosecution to a
corporate officer or agent who "who knowingly and willfully
authorizes, orders, or performs any of the acts or practices
constituting in whole or in part a violation of [CPSC regulations],
and who has knowledge of notice of noncompliance received by the
corporation from the Commission."[24] Because CPSC regulations
are, in many cases, complicated and hyper-technical, it is
important that the heavy hand of the criminal law is limited to
violations identified by the CPSC and communicated to the
individual so that criminal liability does not reach possible
violations, mistakes of law, or minor violations that even the CPSC
does not consider to be significant. The CPSC Reform Act, however,
would remove this requirement, making the most extreme penalty for
CPSC violations available even in cases where the violations were
minor or not unquestionably intentional.[25] This change is part of a
troubling long-term trend of watering down traditional criminal
intent requirements and increasing criminal penalties for
regulatory violations. Such changes further divorce the criminal
law from traditional notions of right and wrong.
Disproportionate Fines
Finally, the CPSC would dramatically increase civil penalties
for violations of CPSC regulations, which risks several serious
unintended consequences. The legislation would boost penalties for
a single offense (e.g., the sale of a single item that violates
CPSC standards) to up to $250,000 and raise the maximum fine for
related violations (e.g., selling more than one of an item that
violates CPSC standards) to $20 million.[26]
First, as described above, above, the prospect of massive
penalties may coerce companies into cooperating with the government
in ways that sacrifice the rights of their employees. When firms
are threatened with penalties that could put them out of business,
they may make such choices that are not in the best interest of
their employees and other stakeholders.[27] A small, independent
retailer, for example, could face enormous fines for selling an
item that is in violation of CPSC standards. Facing ruin of his
business, and possibly personal financial ruin, a small business
owner would face enormous pressure to cooperate with the government
in any way that it proposes, no matter the consequences to
others.
The prospect of massive fines may actually reduce compliance by
leading some companies and individuals to fear that close
cooperation with the CPSC could put them at financial risk. Small
businesses, especially, may not have the resources to ensure
perfect compliance and so may be unwilling to work with the CPSC to
identify possible violations.
Conclusion
Massive penalties and new options for litigation may help
Congress convince the public that it is getting tough on
manufacturers and distributors of products that fall short of
safety standards, but these actions are unlikely to stem the flow
of unsafe products and may actually be counterproductive in that
respect. The last thing that the nation's economy needs is a new
legal mechanism that would dramatically increase the cost of doing
business, to the detriment of economic and job growth. This
provision, in particular, is little more than a handout to trial
lawyers, who would stand to reap enormous fees in lawsuits against
businesses large and small, and would do nothing to improve product
safety. Increased civil and criminal penalties threaten to reduce
voluntary compliance and may lead to the loss of fundamental legal
rights. In the current climate, it is understandable that Congress
wishes to score political points on the issue of product safety,
but the major provisions of the Senate Commerce Committee's bill
are a step in the wrong direction.
Andrew M. Grossman is
Senior Legal Policy Analyst in the Center for Legal and Judicial
Studies at The Heritage Foundation.
[1] 15
USC §§ 2054, 2056, 2075.
[2]
See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 170.5(a)(2) (specifying that an
internal knob on a refrigerator door "Shall permit the refrigerator
door to be opened on the application of a force equivalent to one
which, if directed perpendicularly to the plane of the door and
applied anywhere along the latch edge of the inside of the closed
door, shall not exceed 66.7 newtons (15 pounds)").
[3]
"Consumer Product Safety Act," P.L. 92-573 (1972), § 2.
[8]
Commerce Committee Substitute for S. 2045, 110th Cong. (2008).
[12]
See, e.g., Am. Ass'n for Justice, Congress: Adopt Tough
Measures to Stop Corporations From Evading Accountability for
Unsafe Foreign Toys, AAJ Urges,
www.atla.org/pressroom/PressReleases/2007/nov14.aspx (last
visited March 3, 2008).
[13]
See Lawsuit Inc., Wall St. J., Feb. 25, 2008, at
A14.
[15]
Commerce Committee Substitute for S. 2045 § 21(g), 110th Cong.
(2008).
[16]Prosser and Keeton on Torts § 220 (5th
ed.).
[17]Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability § 2.
[18]
See, e.g., Mississippi Hoods, Wall St. J., Nov. 17,
2007.
[20]
Commerce Committee Substitute for S. 2045 § 16(b), 110th Cong.
(2008).
[21]
See, e.g., United States v. Klein, F.Supp. 330, 356-69
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
[22]
See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, Testimony before the Committee
on the Judiciary of the United States Senate concerning The
Thompson Memorandum's Effect On The Right To Counsel In Corporate
Investigations, Sept. 12, 2006.
[23]
Attorney-Client Privilege Protection Act of 2007, § 186, 110th
Cong. (2007).
[25]
Commerce Committee Substitute for S. 2045 § 16(b)(2), 110th
Cong. (2008).
[26]
Commerce Committee Substitute for S. 2045 § 16(a), 110th Cong.
(2008).
[27]
See John Hasnas, Trapped: When Acting Ethically Is Against
the Law (2006).