State officials committed to reforming health care must make a
threshold decision: whether to use existing government health
care funding to help individuals and families purchase their
own health insurance or to continue funneling taxpayer dollars into
existing health care institutions to defray the costs of caring for
the uninsured in emergency rooms.
American public hospitals have long served a critical
community role by providing a health care safety net for low-income
and uninsured individuals. In addition, they provide specialty and
trauma services and stand as symbols of civic pride and
accomplishment in their local communities. However, over the
years, their financing has become increasingly dependent on
discrete sources of federal funding, particularly from
Medicaid, the huge federal and state program designed to provide
health care for the poor and the indigent.
Indeed, these hospitals' very survival often depends on federal
and state policies that give them preferential treatment. Without
these policies, some of these institutions could not survive,
much less compete in delivering high-quality care and
first-rate service to low-income patients, especially if these
patients could choose from a broad range of health care options. A
sound health policy reform would prioritize the interests of
patients over the interests of institutions.
The long-term financing for these public institutions is in
flux. Currently, 42 states are moving forward with plans to
expand health insurance coverage to low-income and uninsured
populations while simultaneously trying to control costs.[1]
These state efforts, combined with the increasing government
subsidies required to support community "safety-net" facilities,
will jeopardize these hospitals' traditional sources of
revenue. In pursuing state health care reform, state legislators
should seriously consider a new approach to financing that
would transform these institutions from regular beneficiaries
of taxpayer funding to active competitors for taxpayer dollars in a
new and improved state-based health insurance market.
By design or default, policymakers in the United States have
gradually shifted their focus from delivering health care to
providing health insurance. During the 1940s and 1950s, this trend
was strongly encouraged by major changes in the federal tax
treatment of health insurance. Persons who receive private health
coverage through their places of employment can take advantage of
an unlimited tax break-essentially a subsidy-to purchase health
insurance. They can use this group insurance to finance their
care at hospitals and doctors' offices with limited restrictions.
Not surprisingly, the existing third-party payment arrangement has
helped to fuel rising health care costs around the country.
More recently, this trend has been driven by the government's
growing and now-dominant role in health care spending. Seniors
receive their health coverage through Medicare, the huge
entitlement program serving senior and disabled citizens.
Medicare provides not only hospitalization benefits, but also
fee-for-service supplemental coverage for patients to secure
medical services from physicians under a set of specified federal
rules and guidelines. Low-income citizens without insurance through
their employers or the much smaller non-group market must rely on
Medicaid, assuming that they are eligible under state and federal
law. In Medicaid, government acts as the financier, purchaser, and
regulator in the health care sector and even competes with
private-sector institutions.
Finally, the federal and state governments reimburse
hospitals and other health facilities, primarily through federal
and state supplemental payments, for most of the uncompensated care
provided to patients who cannot or choose not to purchase
private health insurance. These two groups of citizens are the
primary customers of public and safety-net hospitals.
Government's role in health care is rapidly expanding and not
likely to end in the foreseeable future. Because government will
likely continue to subsidize the purchase and provision of health
care for a large number of citizens, its focus should shift from
subsidizing health care institutions to subsidizing people.
Policymakers could accomplish this in a variety of ways: by taking
advantage of federal waivers and demonstration projects, converting
Medicaid dollars into funding pools for premium support to enable
beneficiaries to purchase private health insurance, and
redirecting federal and state supplemental payments to
safety-net hospitals into a funding pool to expand private
insurance coverage for the poor and the uninsured, thereby easing
the burden on already overcrowded emergency rooms.
The current policy of propping up public hospitals with
supplemental payments creates a two-tiered health care system that
diminishes individuals' freedom to choose the best health care
at an affordable price. Further, subsidizing public health
insurance programs-whether through direct provision of
services, provider subsidies, or direct health insurance-increases
the likelihood that individuals, especially low-income citizens,
will substitute public coverage for private health insurance.
State officials should consider alternative financial and
structural options for patients who depend on these
institutions.
The High Price of the Status Quo
Current hospital payment arrangements desperately need to
be reformed, but any attempt to reform hospital payments,
especially payments to public hospitals, generally meets with
strong opposition. Indeed, the opposition often insists that
the status quo is perfectly acceptable-or should be to public
officials and taxpayers alike-and that any deficiencies could
easily be rectified with even larger infusions of taxpayers'
money.
Defenders of the current public health care safety net point to
the declining number of public hospitals, their growing
unprofitability because of costlier patient populations, and the
increasing instability that would result if communities lost their
hospitals. These concerns are valid, but they ignore the most
important priority: improving the quality of patient care and
enhancing the ability of individuals to take direct, personal
responsibility for their own health care.
While all American health care professionals may strive to
improve patient outcomes, not all face the same set of economic
incentives. In a normally functioning market, if individuals are
unsatisfied or not receiving quality care, the hospital will become
uncompetitive, lose their business, and be forced to restructure or
close. Public hospitals generally do not face competition on cost
and quality and are therefore more susceptible to mismanagement and
negligence. In some cases, the federal and state public
financing arrangements become little more than shameless exercises
in rent-seeking or bold demonstrations of lucrative financial
"gaming" by state and local officials.
Los Angeles. The Martin Luther King Jr./Drew
Medical Center[2] in Los Angeles is a notorious
example of a failed public hospital. Standing as a symbol of
political power and justice for African-Americans, the
hospital operated for over 30 years as a safety-net provider in
south Los Angeles.
The hospital quickly earned the moniker "Killer King" for gross
lapses in patient care. King/ Drew spent more on malpractice claims
than any of California's other 17 public hospitals and was cited
for violating the state's health regulations more often than 97
percent of other hospitals statewide.[3] National outrage and
media attention focused on King/Drew after reports that patients
admitted for routine procedures had received improper dosages of
medicines and had been permanently disabled or killed due to
preventable surgical and treatment errors.
The hospital's defenders claimed that the facility was
ill-equipped and lacked sufficient financial means. Yet the
hospital spent more per patient than 75 percent of the other public
and teaching hospitals in California and far more than the
three other general hospitals operated by the county.[4]
Other defenders claimed that it treated sicker patients who were
more expensive to treat. However, neighboring Harbor-UCLA
Medical Center, which had operating revenues comparable to
King/Drew's, treated more patients in its emergency department,
admitted nearly twice as many patients per year, and
performed more complex procedures (e.g., open heart surgery
and kidney transplants), thus drawing on patients who were sicker
and required more expensive care.[5]
Ultimately, King/Drew suffered from a lack of competitive
accountability, poor management, and improper financial dealings-a
common trend among failing public hospitals.[6]
New Orleans. While King/Drew teaches lessons about
the danger of poor-quality health care when competitive pressures
are absent, Charity Hospital in New Orleans illustrates the danger
of tying a health care safety net to buildings instead of
people.
Founded in 1736, Charity was the oldest continually
operating hospital in the U.S. and remained a crucial source of
care for the city's low-income and uninsured patients. While
Charity served as the critical safety net for these citizens, it
created a two-tiered system of second-class care. Charity was
almost the only option for patients on Medicaid or without
insurance. Private hospitals often neglected the role of providing
care to low-income and uninsured patients because they knew
that Charity would serve this role. This arrangement
institutionalized a two-tiered system in which privately
insured patients could access facilities across New Orleans, while
publicly insured and uninsured residents had few options but
Charity.
Charity Hospital is representative of the one-size-fits-all
health care arrangements for the disadvantaged in urban areas
across the United States. Hurricane Katrina forced the closure of
Charity, eliminating the source of care for more than one in five
city residents.[7] Their health care suffered because
they lacked personal, portable health insurance. By tying the
financing of health care to a building, the government's safety net
and plan to provide access failed.
Reliance on public dollars to operate Charity also drained
resources that otherwise could have sponsored the purchase of
private insurance for low-income and Medicaid residents. As they
reconsider health care reform, Louisiana officials have an
opportunity to rethink the financing mechanisms of health care for
these residents.
One Size "Fits" All. King/Drew and Charity Hospital are
quintessential examples of failed public policy. The lessons of
this failure have a broader application for state officials who are
embarking on serious health system reform.
Public hospitals have played a crucial historical role, but the
nature of that role has changed over time. Created as safety-net
providers for those with little means, these hospitals had missions
of teaching and providing specialty care. This arrangement
existed since the early days of the republic, with the federal
government playing a role in providing health care via the Public
Health Service (PHS). Most notably, the government took on the role
as provider of health care during and after times of war, with the
PHS caring for wounded veterans. State and local governments
followed this model by founding large-scale charity hospitals to
provide access for the poor.
With the creation of Medicaid and Medicare in 1965, public
hospitals began to provide care to these newly "insured" patients.
Encouraged by the injection of new funds, these hospitals expanded
their building programs, creating large public hospital
complexes and extending access to rural areas. Private hospitals,
realizing the steady stream of patients and reimbursements from the
public insurance programs, soon began to compete for these
patients, particularly Medicare patients, leaving many public
hospitals to care for Medicaid and uninsured citizens.[8]
Because Medicaid is a defined-benefit program, benefits would
diminish during economic downturns. When state and public
hospital budgets became strained, officials would limit access
and care opportunities for low-income patients or, in extreme
cases, close safety-net facilities altogether.
Today, there are more than 1,100 public hospitals, most of
which are owned by county governments. Nearly three in four
are in rural areas.[9] Their largest source of revenue is
Medicaid, which accounts for 35 percent of their income.[10]
The central question for taxpayers is whether or not
they and the growing number of low-income patients are receiving
the highest value for the dollars that their legislators are
spending. The answer is clearly "No."
The Vicious Cycle of Public Health
Care Financing
The current public financing of care through safety-net
hospitals creates a vicious cycle. Public safety-net institutions
treat a disproportionately high number of Medicaid and uninsured
patients because these patients generally lack other points of
access to doctors and other medical professionals. Lower Medicaid
and supplemental reimbursements, combined with the relatively
higher proportion of Medicaid and uninsured patients versus
privately insured patients, increase the costs borne by the
hospital.
At least, this is the primary reason that champions of the
status quo give when insisting on increased taxpayer financing of
safety-net care facilities. State officials who are serious
about health system change should examine this claim more
closely.
The truth is that existing public health care reimbursement
arrangements encourage the delivery of services in costlier,
hospital-based settings. Over the past decade, the volume of
inpatients, who typically receive higher reimbursement rates from
Medicaid, has declined, while outpatient volume has increased.[11]
Even with this shift in patient contact, Table 1 shows
that 33 percent of visits by Medicaid patients to an
outpatient health care setting in 2006 were to a hospital facility,
compared to just 14 percent of visits by privately insured
patients.[12] Further, economic barriers to
health care access (i.e., lack of private health coverage)
disproportionately affect minority patients and increase their
reliance on emergency departments for care.[13]

Similarly, Table 2 shows that Medicaid patients use hospital
outpatient facilities nearly four times as often as privately
insured patients and more than twiceas often as uninsured
individuals. Medicaid patients' utilization of hospital emergency
departments is even more troubling, even though their
primary-care utilization rate is 60 percent higher than that of
privately insured patients. If taxpayers' dollars were moved away
from hospital settings and toward outpatient facilities located in
communities, policymakers might witness a patient shift similar to
declining inpatient care.

Effects of Public Hospital
Privatization and Closure
Many state and local governments are abandoning their roles
in the hospital business, selling the facilities to private
operators or closing them. While many champions of the current
financing system claim that care for the disadvantaged and
uninsured would suffer following the closure or privatization of a
public hospital, the empirical evidence does not support this
claim.
According to an Urban Institute study of five localities across
the U.S., the absence of public facilities due to
privatization, closure, or reduction in bed and facility capacity
did not lead to a loss of safety-net care.[14] Three of
the localities closing public hospitals in the 1990s shifted
patients from former public hospitals to community clinics. This
improved the efficiency of services and gave patients better access
to needed care and referral services.
Most important, private institutions accepted the mission of
providing care. Under the previous arrangement, private operators
did not need to provide these services because the public
safety-net facility guaranteed access and received
reimbursement for providing care. While these locations did
not address the ability of individuals to use insurance and
choose their health care providers, the study does show that
eliminating monolithic public hospitals does not necessarily lead
to the loss of safety-net care.
Further, evidence suggests that safety-net hospitals are
beginning to compete and adopt private-sector strategies to attract
privately insured, higher-paying patients. One recent study noted
that safety-net facilities in Boston, Miami, and California's
Orange County are changing their public image to appeal to a
broader group of patients. The study concluded that expanding
privateinsurance coverage is the most direct way to ensure
that safety-net providers remain viable.[15]
How Medicaid Financing Creates
Segregated Health Care
Medicaid provides health coverage for over 60 million low-income
and disabled Americans at a cost of approximately $350 billion per
year. States pay qualified health care providers for a range of
covered services and then seek reimbursement from the federal
government for the federal share of those payments. Medicaid is the
largest source of revenue for public hospitals, providing
approximately 35 percent of their bottom lines.[16]
Safety-net hospitals provide the majority of care to Medicaid
and uninsured patients. To compensate hospitals for uncompensated
and higher costs of caring for these patients, Medicaid provides
two broad forms of supplemental payments in addition to the
traditional service reimbursement rates for beneficiaries' health
care.
Disproportionate Share Payments. The largest source of
support is the Disproportionate Share Hospital (DSH) payment, which
is in addition to the regular payments that public hospitals
receive for providing inpatient care to Medicaid
beneficiaries. Federal law requires states to make these
payments to hospitals that serve a disproportionate number of
low-income patients. Payments are limited to the annual costs
incurred to provide services to Medicaid and uninsured patients
less payments received for those patients.
However, the distribution of DSH dollars is not equal either
within or across states. For example, in 2005, DSH spending ranged
by state from less than 1 percent in Delaware, New Mexico, and
North Dakota to more than 18 percent in Louisiana. In
Wisconsin, Milwaukee has about 17 percent of the state
population but receives more than 85 percent of the state's DSH
dollars. On the opposite end, San Diego has 9 percent of
California's population but receives only 4 percent of the state's
DSH allocation.[17]
DSH payments were also a major cause of the rapid growth in
Medicaid spending in the early 1990s.[18] The DSH program,
while providing critical resources for safety-net facilities,
is the subject of some controversy because some states have
employed financial gimmicks. For example, many states were not
using actual state appropriations for their share of DSH payments,
and providers were not keeping all of their DSH dollars.
Thus, the bulk of DSH spending was not being used to cover
safety-net hospitals' uncompensated care costs as Congress had
intended. Instead, these schemes increased the funds available to
such hospitals, leading to expansions in their programs, which
resulted in more patients using their facilities. Expanding
health care access is usually preferable, just notthrough the
emergency department. These additional funds could have been used
to subsidize private coverage or more choice-based models of
Medicaid managed care.
Upper Payment Limits. The other major source of
supplemental funding is the Upper Payment Limit (UPL), which allows
states to pay categories of providers as a group up to the "upper
limit" of what Medicare would pay for those services. Hospitals
"pool" their UPLs, allowing a state to apply those dollars toward
additional federal reimbursement, which the state government then
redistributes to a few safety-net hospitals.
By paying a lower reimbursement rate to the hospitals, a
state can avoid using general fund dollars for the program. This
arrangement also ensures that other hospitals will not see Medicaid
or uninsured patients because the state concentrates
reimbursements on a few hospitals. Both the Bush
Administration and Congress have sought to restrain UPL
supplemental funding.
The Cost. According to the Government Accountability
Office, federal and state governments spent at least $23.48 billion
on Medicaid supplemental payments in 2006.[19] The
federal government picked up more than half of the tab, with
Medicaid sending an additional $13.38 billion to the states to
cover public and safety-net hospitals' added costs. DSH payments
accounted for nearly 75 percent of Medicaid supplemental
payments in 2006.
Under the current financing system, supplemental Medicaid
payments are critical to the survival of many public hospitals. One
study found that nearly $0.75 of every dollar of Medicaid DSH
spending went to hospitals that had negative total margins before
receiving the payments.[20]

A New Patient Focus. Defenders of the status quo argue
that anycuts in Medicaid spending would stress these hospitals, but
this argument misses a much larger point. The primary concern
should be the patients and their continued suffering under the
existing arrangements, not the hospital's bottom line.
If policymakers' primary concern is patients, then they should
carefully redirect the distribution of supplemental funds to ensure
that individuals have adequate health coverage. Then, if a state
experiences a downturn and a hospital is forced to close, the
individuals and families relying on that particular hospital will
not be trapped without portable, sufficient health insurance
to use at other medical facilities.
The Use and Abuse of Medicaid
Supplemental Payments
Medicaid supplemental payments are made in addition to the
nearly $30 billion spent annually to support the nation's 1,100
public and safety-net hospitals.[21] The state and
federal governments share this cost, with the federal government
paying about 56 percent. While this seems fair, the distribution
creates serious inequities among and within the states. Even more
seriously, it often masks a classic shell game between state and
federal officials in which the taxpayer is always the loser. The
actual burden on federal taxpayers is much higher than 56
percent.
States can decrease their burden of financing public hospitals
by using federal supplemental Medicaid payments. However, an
accurate assessment of the real federal share or effective
matching rate must account for imaginative "recycling" gimmicks
that states use to avoid spending their general fund dollars.
For example, a state will overpay a county-run health care
provider for Medicaid benefits that are far in excess of typical
rates. The federal government then reimburses the state for
half or more of this inflated cost. (The exact percentage varies by
state.) After the state receives the federal matching funds, it
then requires the hospital to rebate the excess payment, leaving
the state with a windfall of federal funds.
In 2005, the federal share of supplemental funds was officially
56.8 percent. In reality, however- after accounting for
"recycling," intergovernmental transfers (IGTs), provider taxes,
and other state transfers-it was actually 86 percent.[22]
A number of states have engaged in this egregious practice.
Reliance on non-general fund appropriations results in a computed
federal share of 100 percent for Missouri, Vermont, and
Wyoming. Additionally, California, Florida, Georgia, and Texas
exceeded a 95 percent federal share. A 2001 survey of 34 states
estimated that gains by states and hospitals from supplemental
federal Medicaid payments exceed $6 billion.[23] A review
of 10 states by the Department of Health and Human Services found
that DSH payments exceeded hospital-specific limits by more
than $1.6 billion.[24]
Of course, not all state officials engage in "fuzzy math" to
extract more federal dollars. Nonetheless, this practice should be
ended because it is an unjust and irresponsible abuse of taxpayers'
money. Many above-board states (and their patients) suffer or are
denied crucial resources because they choose not- or have not
figured out how-to game the Medicaid payment system. More broadly,
increased funding of buildings and institutions through
uncompensated care pools or direct subsidies to hospitals
almost certainly contributes to the crowding out of private health
insurance. Meanwhile, because these public institutions can depend
on federal subsidies, they experience little competitive pressure
either to improve efficiency in delivering quality care or to be
more accountable to patients.
Chicago Gimmicks. From 1991 to 2000, the Illinois
Department of Public Aid made $5.9 billion in supplemental payments
to Cook County to support inpatient, outpatient, and clinical
services at public facilities in the county. The primary recipient
was Cook County Hospital,[25] which is another monolithic
900-bed public safety-net facility, serving about 1 million
people annually.[26]
These supplemental payments exceeded the actual costs incurred
by Cook County for the period by nearly $900 million. Further, Cook
County used the enhanced payments to cover costs that would not
have qualified otherwise for Medicaid reimbursement. Patients who
did qualify for Medicaid accounted for 55 percent of inpatient days
and 87 percent of outpatient visits at Cook County Hospital.[27]
Regulations prohibited transferring funds from state-owned
facilities to the state government to beef up state
"contributions," but they did not prohibit transferring funds
from local government facilities. As a result, Illinois, with
the help of Cook County hospitals, reaped "windfall profits."
Federal officials often cannot keep pace with states' creative
"compliance" with regulatory changes or clever initiatives to
exploit ambiguities in Medicaid rules. Further, these arrangements
illustrate the difficulty of engaging in meaningful state
health insurance reforms when so much federal taxpayer money
is at stake and dedicated to supporting the existing system of
public hospitals.
Even with these funds, Cook County Hospital and its affiliated
facilities experienced quality control problems and cost
overruns. As recently as 2005, inspections revealed medical errors
and health violations, including incorrect prescriptions and
improper use of equipment.[28] Facing a financial crisis and
administrative malfeasance, including allegations of bribery
and political patronage, the hospital chief resigned and support
grew for turning the hospital over to an independent governing
body because federal officials threatened to withhold funds
unless reforms were implemented.[29]
However, there is a much better way to serve low-income
patients, depoliticize the process, and make the entire system far
more patient-friendly. Illinois could shift its Medicaid dollars
away from institutions and toward people. Illinois could begin
by focusing on the healthiest, most populous, and least expensive
group within the Medicaid population- the "moms and kids." Children
and non-elderly adults make up more than 70 percent of the state's
Medicaid population but account for only about 25 percent less than
30 percent of Illinois' total Medicaid spending ($10 billion
in fiscal year 2005).[30]

With these funds, plus a portion of the federal government's
more than $200 million in DSH payments for 2008, the state
could easily move moms and kids into private insurance plans.[31]
Many of these families already access public facilities for
medical care and would likely choose to continue receiving medical
services in the same facilities. This would bring more private
insurance dollars into the safety-net hospitals, improving their
bottom lines. Others could choose to obtain care in other
locations, forcing public facilities to improve quality, choice,
and access across the spectrum to retain their business or to
accept permanently reduced revenues.
Boston Politics. The Illinois case illustrates the
mechanisms that states use to maximize federal Medicaid
supplemental dollars while minimizing their own shares. On the
other hand, in Massachusetts, the distribution of supplemental
dollars seems to be driven more by narrow political considerations
than by any policy commitment to stated health reform goals.
By all accounts, the 2006 health reform in Massachusetts has
largely succeeded in enrolling hundreds of thousands of previously
uninsured residents in some form of private or state-subsidized
insurance. The key catalyst for this reform was the future
disposition of federal Medicaid money. With federal officials
dissatisfied with how the state had been using federal funds,
Massachusetts faced losing hundreds of millions of dollars in
federal Medicaid matching funds that went primarily to two
safety-net hospitals: Cambridge Health Alliance (CHA) and Boston
Medical Center (BMC).[32]
Under the reform proposal and a historic federal-state
agreement, the supplemental funds supporting these
institutions were redirected from the hospitals' coffers to
low-income uninsured residents to help them purchase health
insurance, allowing them to access facilities of their choice
instead of depending on emergency rooms at CHA and BMC. A central
and revolutionary goal of the Massachusetts health reform was
retargeting existing public funds from health care facilities to
individuals so that they could afford health insurance coverage,
thus reducing uncompensated care at hospital emergency rooms.[33]
In 2008, however, the state faced a nearly $150 million deficit
in the program. Yet CHA and BMC continued to receive nearly $200
million per year in subsidies as a result of a political deal that
clearly violated the intent and spirit of the health reform. Worse,
Massachusetts' political leaders have pressured Washington to
help to cover their cost overruns.[34] Clearly, if the
state had chosen to reduce or eliminate these subsidies for CHA and
BMC, it would have enough to cover its costs and insure even more
of the state's low-income residents, further reducing the
burden of uncompensated care on all state hospitals, not just CHA
and BMC.
What State Policymakers Should Do
Federal regulatory changes and authorizations have encouraged
several states to enact reforms. To its credit, the Bush
Administration has begun to crack down on how states pool dollars
to apply for federal matches of Medicaid supplemental funds.[35]
Recent audits have led nearly 30 states to dial back
controversial financing practices.[36] The
Congressional Budget Office estimates that instituting more
formal rules prohibiting certain intergovernmental transfers and
payback arrangements would save taxpayers and the Medicaid program
nearly $18 billion over five years and more than $42 billion
over 10 years.[37] However, Congress has twice
blocked implementation of these regulations.
Beyond these proposed rules and state rollbacks, state officials
need to look for alternative ways to ensure that patients receive
personal, portable, and private health insurance coverage. Two
major policy options could refocus reform on patient care instead
of buildings.
OPTION #1: States could transform
Medicaid supplemental funding into a fund for personal health
insurance coverage.
By tying federal and state funding for the health care of
low-income and uninsured Americans to public institutions,
officials drain resources away from real health care protection,
missing the opportunity to expand health insurance coverage. Tying
supplemental dollars to patients instead of places would:
- Increase access to quality care. Medicaid patients not
only visit health care providers more frequently than privately
insured patients, but also access this care in less efficient ways.
A Centers for Disease Control and Prevention study showed that
Medicaid beneficiaries are twice as likely as privately insured
patients to receive care in a hospital setting. Uninsured patients
are three times more likely.[38] Further, Medicaid
and SCHIP patients are more likely than self-paying patients to
visit emergency departments for non-urgent or semi-urgent care.[39]
By extending private insurance to moms and kids on
Medicaid, states would enable them to choose locations of care that
meet their unique needs, eliminating the current one-size-fits-all
model of public hospitals.
- Promote fairness in the allocation of public dollars.
The current financing of Medicaid is unfair. Inequalities exist
within and among states, with many of the country's poorer states
subsidizing more generous benefit plans in wealthier states. As
noted, supplemental funds are concentrated at a few public
hospitals in each state, often for political reasons. Whether or
not states choose to capitalize on current waiver authority to
redirect supplemental Medicaid dollars toward premium support
and private insurance expansion, Congress should put all
states on a level playing field in Medicaid and DSH allocations.
This means eliminating special deals for individual
states-including New York, which collects nearly $3 billion
annually in hospital provider taxes that federal officials
count as the state contribution.[40] These practices
virtually ensure that no state general appropriations are used
toward the increasing subsidies to prop up public hospitals.
Congress could give states a transition period to adjust to a new
financing arrangement that provides more equitable funding to
states, such as through defined contributions on a
per-enrollee basis.
- Improve the patients' quality of health care. The most
important reason to move supplemental Medicaid dollars away
from institutions and toward individuals is to improve health care
in America. Compared to people on public programs, individuals
with private insurance have better access to health care and
receive better quality care.[41] By extending the
advantages of private insurance to moms and kids on Medicaid,
who are relatively healthy and low-cost in the first place,
policymakers could ensure that their health care will not be
disrupted by budget cuts or restricted to a particular building
that may not fit their personal or medical needs. Starting with
moms and kids would also help to create a healthier and more
affordable insurance market for all citizens in the state. Further,
redirecting supplemental subsidies from institutions to
patients and other health consumers would give public hospitals the
opportunity and incentives to reform their processes and
services to compete for privately insured patients who bring along
higher reimbursement rates.
OPTION #2: States could take advantage
of federal waivers to create premium assistance for private
health coverage.
Created in 2001, the Health Insurance Flexibility and
Accountability (HIFA) initiative encourages states to experiment
with health insurance coverage alternatives. This Medicaid
Section 1115 waiver project allows states to demonstrate
coverage alternatives, including limiting enrollment,
modifying benefit structures, and increasing beneficiaries'
cost sharing.
Under HIFA, many states have expanded private insurance coverage
via premium assistance programs. By leveraging public dollars to
give low-income uninsured or Medicaid patients access to private
health coverage, the government creates greater ties between the
public and private sectors and strengthens the risk pool,
especially when adding moms and kids.
Several states-including Idaho, Kentucky, Maine, and New
Mexico-have secured HIFA waivers that focus on this premium
assistance element. For example, New Mexico enacted a State
Coverage Initiative in which the state works with private health
plans to create commercial insurance products that businesses,
particularly small businesses, can purchase and offer to their
low-income employees or that individuals can buy on their
own.[42] While these states received
waivers to spend their existing Medicaid dollars on the premium
assistance programs, Maine enacted a similar initiative but
financed the programs by redirecting its DSH allocation away
from hospitals and toward individuals.[43]
These HIFA programs have been largely successful. By
December 2005, the 10 state HIFA demonstrations resulted in
more than 300,000 newly privately insured individuals.[44]
In Illinois, Michigan, and Maine, private insurance
coverage expansions have reportedly reduced the burdens on
safety-net providers, allowing these institutions to compete for
all types of patients, including those that formally used the
facilities on a government-reimbursed or uncompensated basis.[45]
Building on the early success of HIFA, a new wave of state
Medicaid demonstration projects offer tiered benefit packages to
enrollees. Florida, Iowa, Massachusetts, and Vermont have opened
the traditional one-size-fits-all Medicaid benefit package to
offer different choices to beneficiaries depending on their unique
needs and backgrounds. For example, Florida has moved from a
defined-benefit program to a defined-contribution program that
allows beneficiaries to choose among different, competing
managed care plans.
Additionally, state officials allow recipients to choose more
generous and unique benefit packages. Cost-sharing is usually
capped at 5 percent of family income. For a family of four at 150
percent of poverty, this amounts to $133 per month out of a monthly
income of $2,650.[46]
Even the traditional Medicaid program has been shifting to a
model of choice. More than 60 percent of the Medicaid population is
enrolled in managed care arrangements that provide beneficiaries
more choice than is available under traditional Medicaid.[47]
The majority of these enrollees are low-income children and
parents or caretaker relatives, who generally rely on Medicaid to
cover their acute care needs-the same type of care that can be
accessed through private insurance.
While the move to managed care and models of choice within the
Medicaid program is a positive development on balance, many of
these plans still lock beneficiaries into the old-fashioned
one-size-fits-all public institutions, and the plans' benefits are
still tightly controlled by bureaucrats. The low-cost moms and kids
could easily be moved to more flexible and appropriate private
insurance plans. Specifically, the funds used to subsidize their
care through public facilities could be redirected to these
individuals via premium assistance programs that allow them to
decide where they receive care. Certainly, public institutions
could compete for these newly privately insured persons, as would
every other health plan, because these relatively low-health-risk
and low-cost patients are ideal for insurers and hospitals.
Recognizing the opportunity to empower patients over
institutions, in 2007, the Bush Administration proposed the
Affordable Choices Initiative, which would allow states to redirect
DSH payments and other Medicaid supplemental dollars away from
hospitals and toward the purchase of private health insurance for
low-income people. Such flexibility would provide healthy options
to states during fiscal crunches, promote efficiency within
public institutions, and protect patients' freedom of choice.
Regrettably, Congress has not enacted such reforms.
Conclusion
Public safety-net hospitals are critical to health care access
in America. Complaining about a lack of funding for these
institutions will not eliminate health disparities or access
issues. Even if additional public dollars could be redirected to
these institutions, this would only further institutionalize a
two-tiered health care system that places America's most vulnerable
populations at a disadvantage.
The claims on public resources for health care, national
defense, entitlement spending, energy, and other purposes greatly
exceed the available funding. Eventually, the money will run out,
and public safety-net hospitals will be forced to close or
drastically cut services with little warning. Worse, the uninsured
patients who rely on these facilities will become sources of
uncompensated care for other facilities.
Just as they adapted in the 1960s, public hospitals can
maintain their missions and learn to operate in the 21st century of
American health care. In fact, by competing for patients, these
hospitals can evaluate services and programs and streamline
those that make the most sense for the population that they
serve.
Most state officials sincerely want to improve health care
access and quality for their residents. The most effective means of
achieving the goal of health care equality is to enable their
residents, including low-income individuals and families, to access
superior private health insurance coverage instead of depending on
substandard public programs or obtaining routine care in
hospital emergency rooms. By transferring Medicaid dollars to
help poorer individuals and families access solid private coverage
and thereby reducing the overcrowding in America's emergency
rooms, innovative state officials can begin to change the broader
health care system in America.
Christopher J. Meyer is a Health
Policy Fellow in the Center for Health Policy Studies at The
Heritage Foundation.
[1] Vernon Smith, Kathleen Gifford, Eileen Ellis, Robin Rudowitz, Molly O'Malley, and Caryn Marks, As Tough Times Wane, States Act to Improve Medicaid Coverage and Quality: Results from a 50-State Medicaid Budget Survey for State Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008, Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, October 2007, p. 9, at /static/reportimages/5E301DAED513883065D0BBDCD1A37499.pdf (July 22, 2008).
[2] The hospital was renamed Martin Luther King Jr.-Harbor Hospital.
[3] Tracy Weber and Charles Ornstein, "Killer King: County-Run Hospital Mired in Poor Care, Financial Misdeeds and Empty Promises," IRE Journal, Vol. 28, No. 3 (May/June 2005), pp. 32-33.
[5] Charles Ornstein, Tracy Webber, and Steve Hymon, "Underfunding Is a Myth, but the Squandering Is Real," The Los Angeles Times, December 6, 2004, at http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-kdday2dec06,0,121956,full.story (July 24, 2008).
[6] Tracy Weber, Charles Ornstein, and Steve Hymon, "Massive Overhaul of Ailing Hospital Urged," The Los Angeles Times, December 23, 2004, at http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-solutions23dec23,0,7059764,full.story (July 25, 2008).
[10] Calculation by Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, based on Obaid Zaman, Ellen Lukens, and Linda Cummings, America's Public Hospitals and Health Systems, 2004, National Association of Public Hospitals and Health Systems, October 2006, at /static/reportimages/EC5465186068A9DF5C0C928366B5419D.pdf (August 20, 2008).
[11] Regenstein and Huang, "Stresses to the Safety Net."
[15] Peter J. Cunningham, Gloria J. Bazzoli, and Aaron Katz, "Caught in the Competitive Crossfire: Safety-Net Providers Balance Margin and Mission in a Profit-Driven Health Care Market," Health Affairs, Vol. 27, No. 5 (2008).
[16] Calculation by Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured, based on Zaman et al., America's Public Hospitals and Health Systems.
[17] Bovbjerg et al., "Health Care for the Poor and Uninsured After a Public Hospitals' Closure or Conversion."
[18] Teresa A. Coughlin, Brian K. Bruen, and Jennifer King, "States' Use of Medicaid UPL and DSH Financing Mechanisms," Health Affairs, Vol. 23, No. 2 (2004).
[20] Regenstein and Huang, "Stresses to the Safety Net."
[22] Teresa A. Coughlin, Stephen Zuckerman, and Joshua McFeeters, "Restoring Fiscal Integrity to Medicaid Financing?" Health Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 5 (2007).
[23] Coughlin et al., "States' Use of Medicaid UPL and DSH Financing Mechanisms."
[24] Daniel R. Levinson, Inspector General, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "Audit of Selected States' Medicaid Disproportionate Share Hospital Programs," memorandum to Mark B. McClellan, Administrator, Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, March 16, 2006, at /static/reportimages/8FEF6B2BC72730B9A6FA967A08A2158A.pdf (July 26, 2008).
[25] Michael F. Mangano, Acting Inspector General, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, "Review of Illinois' Use of Intergovernmental Transfers to Finance Enhanced Medicaid Payments to Cook County for Hospital Services," memorandum to Michael McMullan, Acting Principal Deputy Administrator, Health Care Financing Administration, March 22, 2001, at /static/reportimages/9AE639CC5739A7192E313E68DF542B04.pdf (August 3, 2008).
[33] For a description of this crucial component of the Massachusetts health reform, see Edmund F. Haislmaier and Nina Owcharenko, "The Massachusetts Approach: A New Way to Restructure State Health Insurance Markets and Public Programs," Health Affairs, Vol. 25, No. 6 (2006). See also Nina Owcharenko and Robert E. Moffit, "The Massachusetts Health Reform: Lessons for Other States," Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 1953, July 18, 2006, at http://www.heritage.org/Research/HealthCare/bg1953.cfm.
[34] D'Angelo and Haislmaier, "Health Care Reform in Massachusetts."
[36] Coughlin et al., "Restoring Fiscal Integrity to Medicaid Financing."
[38] Schappert and Rechsteiner, "Ambulatory Medical Care Utilization Estimates for 2006," p. 11.
[39] O'Shea, "The Crisis in Hospital Emergency Departments," p. 10.
[42] Teresa A. Coughlin, Sharon K. Long, John A. Graves, and Alshadye Yemane, "An Early Look at Ten State HIFA Medicaid Waivers," Health Affairs Web Exclusive, Vol. 25, No. 3 (April 25, 2006).
[46] Data based on personal interview with Dennis Smith, former Director, Medicaid and State Operations, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, July 22, 2008.
[47] Marion E. Lewin and Raymond J. Baxter, "America's Health Care Safety Net: Revisiting the 2000 IOM Report," Health Affairs, Vol. 26, No. 5 (September/October 2007).