The U.S. security alliances with Japan and South Korea are
critical to maintaining peace, stability, and prosperity in Asia,
as well as to promoting liberty, democracy, and free-market
principles. These relationships are growing in importance in
light of China's increasing military capabilities, economic weight,
and political influence.
The bilateral U.S.-Japan security ties have expanded
significantly during the past 10 years, resulting in more closely
integrated military[1] operations and a broader
international role for the Japan Self-Defense Forces (SDF). To
accomplish this, Tokyo removed or adapted several of its
self-imposed post-World War II restrictions.[2]
Japan hosts the largest contingent of U.S. military forces in
Asia, including the only forward-deployed aircraft carrier and
Marine Expeditionary Force. Ballistic missile defense
integration is a bright spot in the relationship and joint
operations are becoming more coordinated. Tokyo has been moving
inexorably toward military reform during the past decade, albeit at
a glacial pace and only in response to repeated prodding by
the United States.
Adjusting to a more durable alliance structure, the U.S. and
Japan have already established a blueprint for transforming their
alliance. Successful implementation will require sustained and
energetic involvement by the senior leadership of both countries.
Leadership is not always in evidence, particularly on the Japanese
side, but if this is accomplished, it could provide the basis for
defining a new strategic vision for the alliance in 2010 and
beyond.
Yet, despite the solid bedrock of a strengthened U.S.-Japanese
security relationship, uncertainties remain over the future
parameters of the bilateral alliance. The degree to which Japan is
willing to alter the comfortable alliance status quo is unclear.
There are serious consequences to Japanese inaction. Long-term
Japanese policy stagnation is not in the United States strategic
interest and risks increasing U.S. frustration with its ally.
Tokyo's unwillingness or inability to make tough decisions can
lead to Japan's losing influence and even relevance in a region
increasingly dominated by an ascendant China. As a Chinese proverb
cautions, "Two tigers cannot share the same mountain."
The U.S. should urge Japan to take greater responsibility for
its own defense as well as an expanded regional and global security
role. Much can be accomplished within existing parameters by fully
implementing previous bilateral agreements. Washington should call
on Tokyo to remain engaged in coalition operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq while replacing ad hoc deployment approvals with
permanent enabling legislation. The U.S. should also advocate an
expansion of the alliance and request that Japan increase its
defense spending to fulfill its obligations and achieve
broader security objectives. Although newly electedPrime Minister
Taro Aso will be more amenable to U.S. requests, political and
societal constraints will hinder rapid progress in transforming the
bilateral security relationship.
The Ever-Evolving Alliance
The bilateral U.S.-Japanese military alliance is not stagnant
and has already undergone considerable evolution. The concept
of transforming the alliance from its initial mission of
defending Japan to a broader regional and global focus also has a
long history. In 1992, President George H. W. Bush and Prime
Minister Kiichi Miyazawa affirmed the alliance as a "global
partnership." In 1996, President Bill Clinton and Prime Minister
Ryutaro Hashimoto emphasized that the mutual defense agreement
constituted the foundation for bilateral cooperation on global
issues.[3]
In 2002, the Security Consultative Committee (SCC), composed of
the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense and the Japanese
Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense, initiated a Defense
Policy Review Initiative (DPRI) to analyze the global security
environment; define both nations' roles, missions,
capabilities, forces, and force structure; and cooperate in missile
defense and global security challenges.[4] The 2004 Japanese
Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) called on Japan to become more
engaged militarily in the Indian Ocean region from the Middle East
to Southeast Asia, permit military exports to the U.S. to
facilitate development of joint missile defense, and increase the
size of rapid-reaction forces.[5]
In 2005, the SCC agreed to bold revisions to expand the
parameters of the defense alliance. In February, the two
countries produced the Common Strategic Objectives which
provided a common assessment of strategy and threats. In October,
the SCC completed the U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and
Realignment for the Future(ATARA) which delineated bilateral roles,
missions, and capabilities and defined 15 areas for defense
cooperation and seven measures to improve policy and operational
coordination. As a result of these decisions, bilateral military
and intelligence operations have improved, becoming more
coordinated and integrated.
Achievements in U.S.-Japan Alliance
Transformation
Greater interoperability:
Forward deploy I Corps headquarters from Ft. Lewis to collocate
with the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Central Readiness Force
headquarters at Camp Zama in 2012.
Establish a Bilateral Air Operations Coordination Center
established at Yokota Air Force Base with integrated air and
missile defense.
Realignment and consolidation of U.S.
forces
Relocate Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma to a new
facility at Camp Schwab.
Redeploy 8,000 U.S. Marines of the 3rd Marine Expeditionary
Force from Okinawa to Guam. Japan to pay $6.1 billion or 75 percent
of the cost.
Relocate elements of Carrier Air Wing 5 from Naval Air Station
Atsugi to MCAS Iwakuni.
Expanded role for Japan Self-Defense
Force
Elevate the Japan Defense Agency to cabinet-level Ministry of
Defense.
Participate in international
peacekeeping operations and disaster relief operations.
Enhanced cooperation
on ballistic missile defense
U.S.-built X-band radar system at
Japanese Air Self-Defense Force's (JASDF) Shariki air base, which
shares data with the Japanese.
Expedite deployment of U.S. Patriot
PAC-3 units at Kadena, Okinawa.
Provide Standard Missile (SM-3)
capabilities to U.S. forward-deployed naval forces.
Accelerate modification of Japanese
Aegis ships with SM-3 capabilities.
Japanese Aegis-equipped destroyer
intercepted a medium-range target missile near Hawaii.[6]
Japan has also been more willing during the past decade to
deploy its defense forces overseas. The SDF deployed disaster
relief teams to Burma and China and participated in U.N.
peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan, Cambodia, East Timor,
the Golan Heights, Honduras, Indonesia, Iraq, Mozambique,
Pakistan, and Rwanda. General Bruce Wright, former commander of
U.S. Forces Japan, commented that Japan routinely agrees that U.S.
forces in Japan should deploy elsewhere (in contrast with U.S.
units in Korea which do not deploy off the peninsula).[7]
Tokyo pays $4.4 billion annually to support the presence of U.S.
troops, equivalent to half of the total cost-sharing assistance
that the U.S. receives from all NATO nations. Every year, Japan
buys $1 billion worth of U.S. military equipment, with $8 billion
of military sales cases currently open.[8]
Japanhas expanded its role, pushing the
envelope of acceptable practices, albeit gradually,
minimally, and with token forces. Much more needs to be done.
Foreign Minister Masahiko Koumura commented that "compared to
Japan's capabilities and strengths as a country, there is more room
to make an effort in peacekeeping operations."[9] When Japan
does send troops overseas, it does so with such restrictive rules
of engagement that it undermines their effectiveness. The 600
Japanese troops in southern Iraq in 2005 were in an enclave that
had to be protected by Dutch, and later British, troops.
Military-to-military coordination is good, though difficult due
to senior political inattention. As one two-star general of the
U.S. Forces Japan remarked, "Every inch of progress is an uphill
battle." There are no Ministry of Defense champions within
Japan's Diet, nor Japanese champions within the U.S. Congress.
Riding the Waves: Japanese Leaders' Conflicting Views on
the Alliance. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (2001-2006)
responded to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the U.S.
by passing the Anti-Terror Special Measures Law. The legislation
permitted Japan to deploy ground troops to Iraq, transport aircraft
to Kuwait, and refuel supply ships heading to the Indian Ocean in
support of coalition operations. Koizumi's motivation for
expanding Japan's global role was primarily grounded in
strengthening the U.S. alliance, though couched in terms of common
global strategic objectives.
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (2006-2007) advocated a more
assertive Japanese foreign policy that involved further
strengthening of the "Japan-U.S. alliance while steadily upgrading
our country's national security platform."[10] In order to
allow Tokyo to assume an expanded security role, Abe pressed for a
revision to Japan's constitution and an expanded role for the
SDF.
Abe perceived the inherent long-term strategic benefit for
Japan, but his prioritization of security policy over domestic
economic issues was rejected by the electorate during the upper
house election. U.S. expectations for what could be accomplished in
alliance transformation under Abe were raised unrealistically.
There are also questions referring to the level to which Abe could
have delivered had he remained in office.
Prime Minister Yasuo Fukuda (2007-2008) had a different foreign
policy perspective from his predecessors. Although he wanted
to maintain the alliance with Washington as the bedrock of
Japanese security, he placed less priority on security issues.
Fukuda placed greater emphasis on maintaining regional harmony by
improving relations with Japan's neighbors and balancing its
relationships with the U.S. and China more evenly. He
commented privately to a Japanese journalist that he did not
think Japan should always say "yes" to the United States. Fukuda
had less interest than his predecessors in pursuing
constitutional revision to attain "normal nation" status and a
stronger regional security role for Japan.
The most tangible manifestation of Fukuda's softer security
policy was his view on reinterpreting Japan's self-imposed
restrictions on the role of its defense forces. Prime Minister Abe
had established an advisory panel to review the restrictive
interpretation of Japan's right to exercise collective
self-defense. The group was to make recommendations on four
scenarios:
- Protecting U.S. naval vessels under attack in international
waters;
- Intercepting ballistic missiles that may be targeted at
the U.S.;
- Defending foreign troops that come under attack during a U.N.
peacekeeping operation; and
- Providing logistical support in overseas countries.
Chairman Shunji Yanai, former Japanese ambassador to the
U.S., commented in July 2007 that "we should bring an end to the
interpretation of the [Japanese] Constitution that does not
match reality." In light of the increasing North Korean and Chinese
military threats, Yanai remarked that the panel believed in an
expanded role for the SDF.[11] However, Fukuda did not accept the
panel's recommendations, indicating that he had no intention
of altering the current interpretation, which prohibits Japan from
defending an ally under attack, even though it is entitled to do so
under international law.[12]
Fukuda's policy strategy reflected both personal
convictions as well as an assessment of the domestic political
landscape. Yasuo Fukuda believed in the "Fukuda Doctrine" of his
father, Takeo Fukuda, who was prime minister of Japan from 1976 to
1978. Takeo pledged in 1977 that Japan would never become a
military power again and was committed to improving relations with
all Southeast Asian nations. Yasuo sought to apply this pledge to
Japanese foreign policy in Northeast Asia as well.
The political lesson of the Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP)
loss of the upper house in the 2007 election, as well as Abe's
subsequent abrupt departure from office, was that the
electorate was more focused on domestic economic issues than on
security reorientation. There was thus no advantage for Fukuda
to spend his and the LDP's limited political capital on an issue
that did not resonate strongly with the populace. This is
particularly true as the LDP tries to recapture public support in
the run-up to a lower-house election which must take place by
September 2009.
Fukuda issued no grand strategy nor undertook any bold steps in
security policy. Instead, he stalled on reinterpreting collective
self-defense, creating a national security council, and revising
Article 9 of the constitution. Even Fukuda's decision to use the
LDP's two-thirds majority in the lower house to override the
upper-house veto in order to renew refueling operations was
interpreted differently in Japan and the U.S. Officials and
analysts in Japan raved about the speed with which Fukuda was able
to restart operations; most had expected a delay until mid-2008.
Washington, however, saw Tokyo's inability to make important
decisions expeditiously as reflective of a third-rate country.
Prime Minister Taro Aso's conservative foreign and security
policies will be a return to those espoused by Koizumi and Abe. He
will be more receptive to expanding Tokyo's role in the bilateral
alliance with the U.S. and loosening restrictions on the SDF. Aso
will push for a reinterpretation of the concept of collective
self-defense. His policies will be more similar to Washington's
than those of Fukuda. As a result, Aso's election offers the hope
of closer coordination on U.S.-Japanese strategic interests. But
Aso's policy focus will be primarily domestic, due to the need to
recapture strong public support.
Challenges to a Stronger Security
Relationship
Lack of National Consensus.Japan remains conflicted over
its niche in the post-Cold War environment and the proper role
of its military forces. Overcoming the pacifism of the past 50
years is clearly a factor. But beyond this is the complacency
attributed to the Yoshido strategy in which Japan relied on the
U.S. for its security guarantee while it devoted itself to a
singular pursuit to build economic power.[13]
Abe's bold blueprint for Japan to assume a broader security role
did not gain favor with an electorate bore-sighted on
pocketbook issues. Abe's security vision was rejected, and not
replaced by an alternative policy. There has not been substantial
public debate on Japan's security paradigm and its international
role. Concern over the intentions and implications of China's
growing military capabilities has not overcome national complacency
and an inherent preference for the status quo.
Tokyo has been resistant to U.S. requests to assume a larger
security role. Domestic angst arising from perceived inequities in
the military alliance with the U.S. conflict with a reluctance to
undertake budgetary increases. There has been a greater
willingness to deploy troops overseas in recent years but only
on narrowly defined missions with no risk of being involved in
combat. The task is further constrained by the lack of dynamic
leaders who are willing and able to transform and direct public
opinion. In that sense, the charismatic Koizumi was truly an
anomaly.
Overcoming Japanese inertia will be difficult and will require a
sea change in thinking by both politicians and public, neither
of which are particularly attuned to international security
affairs. Though formidable, the task is not impossible. But it
will require sustained U.S. efforts, beginning with a clear
articulation of the future form of the alliance as well as Japan's
roles, missions, and capabilities.
Constitutional Limits.Article 9 of the Japanese
constitution specifies that Japan forever "renounces war as a
sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as
means of settling international disputes. In order to
accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and
air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be
maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be
recognized." There was declining public support during
2006-2007 for the constitutional changes that Abe was
advocating.
Underfunding Defense Requirements.Japanese defense
spending has now declined for five consecutive years. The Ministry
of Defense requested an increase but was rejected by the
Ministry of Finance. Tokyo needs to increase defense spending
not only to assume a greater security role but to simply remain at
the same level. Following a procurement holiday, Japan now needs to
purchase several systems to replace those it acquired in the 1980s,
including F-15 and P-3 aircraft.
If Japan does not increase defense spending over its unofficial
ceiling of 1 percent of GDP, and with missile defense consuming a
larger portion of its defense budget, Japan will be forced to make
additional force cuts. Some cuts to ground forces are
acceptable, but extensive reductions would hinder Japan's ability
to engage in or transport troops for overseas peacekeeping
operations.
Political Constraints.The prime minister is hampered in
implementing any security policy changes due to government gridlock
brought on by a "twisted parliament" in which the two legislative
houses are controlled by opposing parties. The opposition
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), which controls the upper house,
remains committed to obstructionist tactics to force an early
election of the more powerful lower house of the Diet.
The DPJ refused to approve a special-measures agreement renewing
host-nation support for U.S. forces in Japan, marking the first
refusal of an international agreement by the upper house under
the current constitution. The Fukuda administration was forced to
use the constitutional provision which allows a two-thirds majority
of the lower house to overrule the upper house.
Emboldened by Fukuda's low public approval ratings, the DPJ
passed a symbolic "no confidence" censure of the prime minister.
Though non-binding, it reflected the extent to which the
opposition will go to undermine the current government. The DPJ
will continue to obstruct Japan's security missions as a means
to position itself for a legislative victory. Although differences
between the ruling and opposition parties are smaller than often
perceived, the DPJ's tactics are disruptive to common alliance
objectives.
Transforming the Alliance: Key
Concerns
Does the Political Will Exist?The U.S. sees troublesome
delays in the implementation of the SCC decisions, most notably the
relocation of the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. These delays
have a domino effect on other moves, including that of the U.S.
Marines from Okinawa to Guam. Former Deputy Undersecretary of
Defense Richard Lawless, a key figure in transforming the bilateral
relationship, expressed concern over a "state of drift" in the
alliance ever since Fukuda took office. He warned that if the U.S.
perceives Japan as not taking the agreements seriously, the
alliance will lose momentum and relevance, causing a
degradation in military capability in the region.[14]
Is Japan Putting Strategic Objectives First?Japan has
allowed strategic national objectives to take a back seat to
arbitrary budget limits and industrial policy. Japan's
security objectives are inconsistent with current government
funding decisions. Tokyo has undertaken new missions-including
missile defense, expanded overseas operations, and paying a
significant portion of the cost of the realignment of U.S.
forces without a commensurate increase in defense expenditures.
Yet, the government continues to maintain a historical cap on
defense spending of 1 percent of GDP, in essence allowing the
finance ministry to determine Japan's national security strategy
and objectives.
Beyond Alliance Housekeeping? Troop relocation, base
transformation, and burden-sharing issues are contentious,
time-consuming, and, if handled poorly, potentially disastrous to
the well-being of the alliance. Even when handled adeptly, they run
the risk of sucking all the air out of the room by becoming an end
in themselves rather than a means to achieving an objective. Yet,
as important as these issues are, they are merely alliance
management issues, a national-level equivalent to rearranging the
furniture.
Redeploying U.S. military forces to lessen their exposure to the
Japanese populace serves the commendable goal of maintaining
public support by reducing potential flashpoints. But, all of this
does not provide clarity on the current and future roles, missions,
and necessary capabilities of the U.S. and Japanese defense forces.
It is critical to redefine the alliance beyond the North Korean
threat, emphasizing either the need for Japanese involvement
in redressing global security issues or the potential threat that a
rising China represents-the "dragon behind the North Korean tree,"
as a Japanese defense expert characterized it.
Pursuing Incremental Transformation.
Washington will need to manage its own expectations; in this
Japanese political environment a new Japanese national consensus on
alliance transformation will come slowly. The goal of
transformation will be ill served by a pace that reminds the
Japanese public of its inability to make the choice on its own.
Japan's citizens need the pressure, [15] but they also need
to buy into the idea fully.
In 2005 and 2006, large advances were made on the political
level in broadening the parameters of the alliance. With no similar
advances expected for 2008 and 2009, the focus should be on
military-level implementation of the earlier SCC decisions.
Consolidating progress can lay the groundwork in anticipation of
future breakthroughs under a more conducive political
environment.
In the near term, the U.S. should strive to expand Japan's
security role within existing parameters even as it advocates
longer-term expansion of the alliance. To the degree possible,
changes to the alliance should be made out of view of the public
eye to avoid controversy or creating anti-American sentiment.
Much can be done within the existing constitutional and
legal framework to accomplish goals such as expanding the SDF rules
of engagement for overseas operations. Tokyo should replace ad
hoc overseas deployment approvals with permanent legislation to
eliminate the need for recurrent Diet involvement.
While Japan Sleeps
Japan is at a strategic crossroads. It can continue its status
quo thinking by citing "fiscal difficulties" to continue to fend
off calls for it to fully fund its defense requirements. Though it
is the more comfortable choice in the short term, it has the
effect of ceding Asia's leadership role to China. Though
militarily strong in absolute terms, Japan is in decline
relative to Beijing.
A debate has already begun as to whether Japan has become
complacent about devolving to a middle-status power. Such a
development would be welcomed by China which is vying with Japan
for preeminence in Asia and even by South Korea, which remains
conspiratorially worried about a resurgent militaristic Japan.
Chinese preeminence would be a disaster, however, for U.S. national
interests in Asia.
Bold leadership is needed but unlikely in Japan's
consensus-driven political system. In this sense, Koizumi was an
aberration the likes of which is unlikely to appear in the
foreseeable future. Indeed, Fukuda shied away from expanding
Japan's role through security and diplomatic initiatives, such as
reinterpreting the collective self-defense theory or values-based
alliance with democratic neighbors. Polls that show Japanese
frustration with perceived inequities in the military relationship
and the irritants of U.S. troop presence do not stimulate a
strong national consensus to raise Japan's security role.
It is unlikely that there will be significant forward
movement on security issues at the political level. The glacial
pace of Japanese decision making has become, if possible, even
slower. There will be little Japanese stimulus for highlighting
security issues due to lack of interest by the electorate, few in
the Diet are military experts, and the Ministry of Defense is a
surprisingly minor bureaucracy- the "MoD doesn't cast a long shadow
in the Diet." Alliance transformation will therefore be a gradual,
incremental process that will be frustrating to U.S. officials.
Tokyo's repeated deflections to appeals for greater security
contributions could lead to "Japan fatigue" in Washington. U.S.
officials have expressed frustration with Japan's citing of the
Ministry of Finance's opposition as justification for its failure
to increase the country's defense spending beyond 1 percent of
GDP.
Richard Lawless, former deputy undersecretary of defense,
commented in a May 2008 Asahi Shimbun interview that
Japan's cumbersome decision-making cycle averages seven to nine
years as compared with other countries in the region which are
able to make and execute three different decisions in the same
time. Military tacticians describe this repetitive decision-making
process as observe-orient-decide-act (OODA) with the goal to
be faster than one's opponent, or "getting inside their OODA loop."
A slow OODA process leads to defeat.
Lawless warned that Japan must find a way to increase the pace
of its tempo of decision making, deployment, integration, and
"operationalizing" the alliance with the U.S.[16] A failure
to do so risks Japan's losing influence and even relevance in a
region increasingly dominated by an ascendant China.
Japanese inertia, coupled with a new conservative South
Korean president determined to improve Seoul's relations with
Washington, could lead South Korea to supplanting Japan as the more
important U.S. ally in Asia. South Korea has chafed at repeated
U.S. policy references to the importance of Washington's
alliance with Tokyo, while neglecting Seoul's significant
contributions to peace and stability, including deploying
300,000 troops to the Vietnamese War. Nor is South Korea
constrained by Japan's historical legacy, constitutional
provisions, or societal apathy toward security objectives.
A fundamental question for Washington, including the next
U.S. President, will be how to respond to Japan's tendency for
slow, incremental changes. The U.S. options will be to accept the
status quo, push harder for quicker alliance transformation, look
to Tokyo for contributions in other "soft security" areas,[17] or look elsewhere for more reliable
allies, such as South Korea.
What the U.S. Should Do
Washington must continually urge Japan to take greater
responsibility for its own defense and regional security to a
degree commensurate with its economic power and global interests.
Constitutional revision and assuming a greater security role
are a means not an ends. They are part of broader strategic
objectives to strengthen alliance with the U.S. while assuming
greater responsibility for security in Asia. To this end,
Washington should:
- Urge Tokyo to increase its spending above the historical
constraint of 1 percent GDP in order to fulfill its obligations and
achieve its broader strategic objectives.
- Continue efforts to broaden the responsibilities of Japanese
forces and integrate the Japanese forces with U.S. military and
intelligence operations more closely.
- Continue joint ballistic missile defense development and
urge Tokyo to modify export controls to allow indigenous component
production.
- Begin laying the groundwork with the Japanese to convince their
public of the need for constitutional revision as well as
engaging in peacekeeping, stability-building, anti-piracy
efforts, and securing lines of sea communication. Encourage Japan
to continue providing support to coalition military operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq.
- Encourage Japan to use its economic resources, including U.S.
government aid, to alleviate societal problems overseas,
including those that can foster seeds of terrorism. Tokyo could
assume responsibility for sectoral infrastructure improvements
in Afghanistan, such as health care or the judiciary.
- Improve congressional outreach to legislative counterparts,
including the opposition DPJ, to facilitate understanding of
alliance strategic objectives and gain support for enhanced
Japanese security responsibilities. The Congressional Study
Group on Japan has been relatively inactive and should be
energized to provide stronger leadership on critical alliance
transformation topics.
- Encourage Japan to implement procurement reform to gain greater
fiscal efficiency, eliminate some arms export restrictions on
military-related components to allow greater cooperation between
the U.S. and Japan on missile defense programs, and remove
constraints on Japanese defense capabilities, including
restrictions on overseas deployments.
Conclusion
The U.S. has critical national interests in Asia and must remain
fully and energetically engaged in the region. Washington must
employ all of the instruments of national power-diplomatic,
informational, military, and economic-to attain its strategic
objectives. The U.S. cannot do it alone; it relies on its
indispensable allies Japan and South Korea to achieve mutually
beneficial goals.
The U.S. must convince these two allies that the U.S.-South
Korea and U.S.-Japan alliances are not a zero-sum equation. Both
are critically important to achieving U.S. strategic objectives.
Washington should make clear we stand shoulder to shoulder with
both allies since we share common values.
Strong trilateral cooperation between Washington, Tokyo,
and Seoul is critically important. Periodic political or
societal flare-ups that strain relations between Japan and South
Korea must not be allowed to detract from steady long-term progress
in strengthening the military partnership among the three
countries. While the U.S.-Japanese security alliance is in a far
better position to address the 21st century threat environment than
it was five years ago, much work remains.
Bruce Klingner is Senior
Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center at
The Heritage Foundation.
[1] The Japanese Self-Defense Forces are
technically not military forces since Japan is precluded by
its constitution from having a military. For ease of readership,
however, the terms "security" and "military" will be used
interchangeably.
[2] These restrictions include: no overseas
deployments, no participation in collective self-defense
arrangements, no nuclear weapons, no arms exports, no sharing of
defense technology, no more than 1 percent of GDP devoted to
defense spending, and no military use of space. As defined by
Kenneth Pyle, University of Washington, on May 22, 2007, at the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
[3] Brad Glasserman and Katsu Furukawa, "A
New U.S.-Japan Agenda," Issues and Insights, Volume 8, No. 4
(March 2008), p. 5.
[5] Emma Chanlett-Avery, "Japan-US Relations:
Issues for Congress," Congressional Research Service Report for
Congress, March 28, 2007.
[7] John Tirpak, "Air Force Alliance for the
US and Japan," Air Force Magazine, Vol. 90, No. 6 (June
2007).
[8] Wright and Hague, "Japan-Aiming for
Broader, Deeper Regional Security Cooperation."
[9] David Pilling and Victor Mallet, "Japan
Weighs Bigger Role as Peacekeeper," The Financial Times,
February 25, 2008.
[10] David Pilling, "Japan Prepares for a
More Assertive Foreign Role," The Financial Times, March 29,
2007.
[11] "No surprise: Abe Panel to Urge Right
to Exercise Collective Self-Defense," Asahi Shimbun, July
11, 2007.
[12] "Panel Urges Government to Allow
Collective Self-Defense, Fukuda Unwilling," Kyodo News, June
24, 2008.
[13] The three fundamental tenets of the
Yoshido doctrine: 1) Economic rehabilitation was Japan's prime
national goal. Political-economic cooperation with the U.S. was
necessary for this purpose; 2) Japan should remain lightly armed
and avoid involvement in international political-strategic issues.
A low military posture would facilitate productive industrial
development; and 3) In order to gain a long-term guarantee for its
own security, Japan would provide bases for U.S. military forces.
Kenneth Pyle, Japan Rising (New York: The Century
Foundation, 2007), p. 242.
[14] Yoichi Kato, "Japan-U.S. Alliance Faces
'Priority Gap,'" Asahi Shimbun, May 6, 2008.
[15] Pyle, Japan Rising, p.
353.
[16] Kato, "Japan-U.S. Alliance Faces
'Priority Gap.'"
[17] For example, increasing Overseas
Development Assistance, assuming responsibility for reconstructing
sectors in Afghanistan (e.g. hospitals, judicial system), mine
clearing, sea lift, or air lift are possible "soft security"
areas.