Accounting rules rarely garner much public attention, and for
good reason: The business of toting up numbers is both devilishly
complex and profoundly uninteresting to most Americans.
This week, however, accounting was suddenly in the national
spotlight as policymakers grappled with the ongoing financial
crisis. At issue was a concept known as "mark-to-market." On
Tuesday, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), along with
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB)--the private
regulatory body charged by the SEC with determining such arcane
things--issued new guidance on how companies should apply
mark-to-market rules to their balance sheets. It sounds like a
small thing, especially when compared to a $700 billion rescue
plan, but it is a significant step toward addressing the causes of
the credit crisis.
Mark-to-Market v. Historic Cost
In the simplest terms, mark-to-market accounting (also known as
"fair-value accounting") means that firms should value their assets
based on their current market prices rather than at the price the
firm originally paid for them. As a general principle, this is good
policy--if a firm holds stock, for instance, it is natural that it
be valued at the current trading price rather than the price the
firm paid for the stock perhaps years previously. Both investors
and regulators can make better decisions if they know the real
value of a company as opposed to a valuation that hides gains or
losses.
The problem with mark-to-market, however, comes when assets are
not easily measured. Last November, the FASB issued new rules
concerning how firms should value assets for which there is no
actual or even comparable market price. The rule, known as FAS 157, made it harder for
firms to avoid putting market prices on so-called Level 3 assets,
the ones that are hardest to value.
Problems in Today's Marketplace
Unfortunately, FASB's timing could not have been worse. Growing
problems with mortgage-related securities meant there were an
increasing amount of often complex assets for which there simply
was no trading value--especially recently. Further, many
institutions have been forced to dump assets at fire sale prices.
As a result, firms began to reflect the radically reduced value of
these assets on their accounting statements even in cases where the
company had planned from the beginning to hold the assets for some
time. Not only did this misrepresent their real condition, but for
regulated entities it triggered an immediate need to raise more
capital. The effect was substantial: One source at the time
estimated that reported asset values would be reduced by some $100
billion due to the accounting change.[1]
Faced with this situation, many in Congress and elsewhere called
for mark-to-market to be scrapped. The problem, however, was that,
as flawed as the application of the rules has been, going back to
historic cost would be no more accurate. Sure, firms' books would
look better in these unsettled markets, but they would still not
reflect reality. In addition, intervention by Congress, however
well-intended, would inject politics into the accounting rulemaking
process, further undercutting its integrity and reliability.[2]
Faced with this dilemma, the FASB, along with the SEC, found a
solution. Rather than dump mark-to-market, it simply issued revised guidelines for interpreting last year's
FAS 157 on how to apply that rule to troubled assets. Among other
things, the new guidance makes clear that:
- Firms can use their own estimates as to the value of a
security--based on expected cash flows or other factors--when an
active market does not exist;
- Quotes from brokers or pricing services are not necessarily
determinative as to value if an active market does not exist;
and
- Distressed or forced liquidation sales are not necessarily
determinative in measuring value.
The guidance also lays out the factors to be considered by a
firm in determining whether an investment is only "temporarily
impaired" and thus need not be revalued.
Throughout, the SEC and FASB make clear that the proper
application of this rule is a matter of judgment, not just a matter
of applying formulas. Along with clear and transparent disclosures,
the ability to exercise discretion in determining value should help
to ensure that financial reports provide--as they should--useful
and meaningful information about a firm's financial condition.
These clarifications are good ones, and--without fanfare--go far
to address the problems with mark-to-market. By itself, of course,
the notification does not solve the financial markets' problems.
But it is one among many steps that can be taken to address the
current crisis. The SEC and FASB clarifications both address
shortcomings in the application of the existing rule and will help
to ensure that investors, regulators, and the public have a more
accurate picture of a firm's financial position.
David C. John is Senior
Research Fellow in Retirement Security and Financial Institutions
and James L. Gattuso is
Senior Research Fellow in Regulatory Policy in the Thomas A. Roe
Institute for Economic Policy Studies at The Heritage
Foundation.