The British armed forces are too weak and are becoming weaker.
Since 1999, British forces have been continually in action around
the world, but Britain is spending a lower share of its national
income on defense than at any point since 1933. Britain has adopted
defense doctrines that emphasize low-intensity war as a way to
justify spending less on its forces, and it is being pulled into a
toothless European defense plan. All of its services are
shrinking, and they are poorly served by a procurement system
that is a disguise for a system of social and corporate welfare.
The Ministry of Defence is no longer a leading office of state, and
it lacks the political strength and institutional culture to
do its job. In short, Britain is in danger of becoming just another
European state that fails to take defense seriously.
The Special Relationship. This matters profoundly to
the United States. Military and intelligence cooperation has
been at the heart of the special relationship between the U.S. and
Britain since World War II. The U.S. and Britain played the crucial
roles in founding NATO in 1949 and in sustaining that alliance
over the past 50 years. NATO, and the U.S. commitment to the
defense of the Western democracies that it represents, continues to
be central to U.S. policy. Yet without a strong Britain, NATO
will have no European state committed to spending a significant
amount of money on its own defense. Nor will the British armed
forces be able to play their traditional role of deterring
adversaries. This will further weaken NATO and continue the
gradual retreat of the state that since 1939 has been the essential
friend of the United States and of the values of democracy and free
enterprise.
Both Britain and the U.S. must act to renew the transatlantic
bargain on defense that was made in 1949. That bargain has been
based on a U.S. willingness to help the Europeans defend
themselves, as long as the Europeans were strongly committed to
their own defense. That bargain is now in jeopardy.
For Britain, change must begin at the top. Without change
in the Ministry of Defence and above all a powerful Secretary of
State for Defence dedicated to fixing its culture, restoring
funding to the services, amending its doctrine, and reforming its
procurement system, none of the problems confronting the
British armed forces can be addressed. If the British political
system cannot summon the necessary will to restore its military,
Britain will join the ranks of the European states that cannot be
bothered to defend themselves and that treat security-the first
duty of the state-as a negligible responsibility.
What the United States Should Do. The U.S. should help
any British administration that is serious about restoring its
armed forces. It can do this in several ways. In public diplomacy,
it should continue to emphasize that the U.S. has a vital
interest in ensuring that all European members of NATO contribute
meaningfully to their own defense. Institutionally, it should
reinforce the links between the U.S. and British armed forces and
emphasize the importance of interoperability within NATO. Most
importantly, it should reform its own procurement and export
control systems to give greater emphasis to joint development,
manufacturing, and purchasing agreements with Britain and to
improve the ability of U.S. firms to sell to trusted
allies.
If the U.S. continues to treat defense trade cooperation
with Britain as a matter of secondary importance, other
countries will take the U.S.'s place as Britain's defense
industrial partner. If this happens, U.S. industry will lose
orders, U.S. workers will lose jobs, and the U.S. will lose
military interoperability with and a vital connection to its
closest ally in its most important alliance.
Conclusion. Both the U.S. and Britain need to return to
responsibility. The U.S. needs to be a responsible partner in trade
and procurement. The U.K. needs to recognize that it is in grave
danger of being unable to fulfill its responsibilities to its
citizens, forces, and friends and allies around the world.
Acting together, as they have in the past, the U.S. and Britain can
meet these challenges.
Ted R.
Bromund, Ph.D., is Senior Research Fellow in the Margaret
Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby
Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The
Heritage Foundation. Kevin Newak and Alexandra Smith, Heritage
Foundation interns, contributed to the research for this
Backgrounder.