On day one, new Secretary for Homeland Security Janet Napolitano
issued a directive requiring her staff to report to her by the end
of the month on five top issues. The directive covered:
- State and local intelligence sharing (law enforcement's
ability to "connect the dots" in looking for terrorist
threats);
- State, local, and tribal integration (ensuring
governance at all levels works together);
- Transportation security (assessing what is being done to
safeguard air, surface, and maritime transportation);
- Risk analysis (determining the most efficacious means to
reduce threats and vulnerabilities); and
- Critical infrastructure protection (reducing the danger
terrorists might destroy or degrade important assets from bridges
to computer networks).
The secretary wants answers by January 28.
Napolitano is right to ask tough questions. While the department
has done much to make America safe, more can be done to improve the
efficacy of programs. In many cases, the department has been
saddled with unworkable congressional mandates. In other instances,
Congress failed to give the department the necessary authority or
direction. If the staff does its job correctly, there are issuesin
each area that ought to be highlighted to the secretary, issues
that, consequently, she should work with Congress to resolve.
Solving State and Local Intelligence
Sharing Snafus
Congress required establishing the Information Sharing
Environment (ISE) in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism
Prevention Act of 2004, but subsequent efforts to increase
governmental information sharing have been inadequate. The ISE
program manager has detailed the many shortcomings: overlapping
roles and responsibilities; cultural, policy, and technological
differences among organizations; policy, process, and procedural
differences; and the absence of universal standards. The result of
these shortcomings is the stubborn persistence of multiple
uncoordinated information products across the federal government,
impeding a concerted and effective information sharing effort.
Meanwhile, the lack of a rapid, uniform government process to
obtain clearances for non-federal partners is undermining all
efforts to improve sharing. Working with the Director of National
Intelligence and the Congress to make ISE a success should be a
priority.
Encouraging State, Local, and Tribal
Cooperation
The Homeland Security Act of 2002 required the department to set
a regional homeland security framework. It never did. And Congress
never followed up--that is a problem.
A regional network is an essential next step in building the
kind of homeland security enterprise that the nation needs. This
network will require state-based regional programs that focus on
ensuring that states are prepared to sustain themselves and that
facilitate cooperation among federal, state, and local efforts.
Regional offices should be required to strengthen state and local
capabilities; facilitate regional cooperation among governments,
the private sector, and nongovernmental organizations; and prepare
and exercise with federal entities that support regional plans.
Such offices would enable regions to access and integrate their
capabilities quickly and to improve integration.
Resolving a Real Transportation
Nightmare
In the area of transportation security, Congress's greatest
blunder was establishing a mandate for 100 percent scanning of all
cargo containers inbound to the United States. Certainly, no
semi-intelligent terrorist would put a bomb in a shipping
container. Containers are routinely lost, pilfered, crushed or
waylaid. What's more, 100 percent scanning is wholly impractical.
Before Congress mandated scanning, it mandated a test called the
"Secure Freight Initiative." This mandate demonstrated that 100
percent scanning of containers bound for the United States from
low-volume, "high risk" ports such as Qasim in Pakistan was
feasible, but it also raised serious questions about the costs and
delays that would be caused by implementing the measure at larger
ports. The Government Accountability Office concluded the much the
same, raising nine major problems. Obtaining a repeal of this
unworkable mandate should be a priority.
Reducing Risks to Risk Analysis
Risk "analysis" has become a congressional codeword to throw
money at pet projects or force new regulatory requirements on the
private sector. If the secretary wants to start looking at the
problem of "risk reduction gone wild," her staff should start with
the 2007 provision requiring federal authorities to reroute rail
cars carrying hazardous material. Federally mandated rerouting will
be extremely costly and cause significant delivery delays.
Furthermore, the security benefits to be gained are vague, since
rerouting simply transfers risk elsewhere. There are far less
burdensome alternatives, including enhancing private sector, law
enforcement, and emergency responder coordination and training. The
secretary must convince Congress that rerouting by Washington is
not the answer.
Thinking Critically About a Critical
Threat
One area of critical infrastructure protection has received
scant attention--the threat of Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP) from a
ballistic missile detonated high above an American city. An EMP is
a high-intensity burst of electromagnetic energy from a nuclear
explosion that could wreak havoc on the nation's electronic
systems--shutting down power grids, snapping supply chains, and
silencing phone networks. Congress chartered the Commission to
Assess the Threat of EMP Attack to the United States but ignored
its recommendations. This failure is tragic.
Developing an EMP response would also make national systems more
robust and resilient against other natural and manmade disasters.
For starters, Napolitano's staff should propose incorporating EMP
attacks into National Planning Scenarios. These are 15 all-hazards
planning scenarios used by federal, state, and local officials in
disaster response exercises. The exercises determine capabilities
and needs while addressing problems before a disaster strikes.
Report and Act
While the secretary needs to get these answers from her staff,
she will have to work with Congress to make substantive changes a
reality. Focusing the department on the "achievable" and
"necessary," as opposed to congressional whims, should be job
one.
James Jay Carafano,
Ph.D., is Assistant Director of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom
Davis Institute for International Studies and Senior Research
Fellow for National Security and Homeland Security in the Douglas
and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage
Foundation.