On July 5, Manuel Zelaya, president of Honduras until he was
deposed by his Supreme Court and expelled from the country, tried
to return home. He traveled on a Venezuelan aircraft, chartered by
Venezuela's Hugo Chávez, while the Venezuelan-owned media
group Telesur covered his every utterance. Pro-Chávez United
Nations General Assembly President Miguel D'Escoto, a Nicaraguan
and vocal advocate of anti-American causes worldwide, went along
for the ride. Denied permission to land, Zelaya's aircraft turned
away, leaving violence and bloodshed in its wake.
The presidential aircraft of Argentinean President Cristina
Fernandez de Kirchner--carrying a posse of South American
presidents including Rafael Correa of Ecuador, Fernando Lugo of
Paraguay, and Fernandez de Kirchner herself, along with
Organization of American States (OAS) Secretary General Miguel
Insulza--also planned to land in Honduras to support Zelaya. All
passengers aboard the plane (known as Tango-1) are staunch
supporters/clients of Chávez and grateful beneficiaries of
Venezuela's recent economic largesse. However, like Zelaya's
aircraft, Tango-1 was denied clearance and diverted to El
Salvador.
The events of July 5 reflect careful coordination and planning
on the part of a vocal and increasingly visible body of
anti-American, pro-Chávez executives who are expending time
and political capital in order to advance their brand of popular,
executive-dominated democracy at the expense other more traditional
models.
ALBA's Agent in Honduras
From the moment Zelaya began his campaign for a popular
referendum to alter the Honduran constitution on March 28, he has
charted a collision course with his nation's constitutional
institutions, the legal safeguards established in 1982 after
decades of military rule. As the likelihood of a constitutional
confrontation grew increasingly likely, Zelaya received the
unstinted backing from Hugo Chávez and the Bolivarian
Alternative for the Americas (ALBA), an economic and political
association aimed at fostering and protecting radical populism and
anti-Americanism throughout the Americas.
Following Zelaya's June 28 expulsion, ALBA has worked overtime
to make Zelaya the poster child for the "new democracy" in Latin
America, portraying him as a humble reformer standing up against
corrupt elites, outdated institutions, and the evil military of
Honduras. The truth, however, is that Zelaya has become a stalking
horse for those advocating populist, polarizing agendas aimed at
splitting Honduras politically and promoting a violent
confrontation between the haves and the have-nots, between pro- and
anti-Chávez forces.
At the same time, in an effort to bring Zelaya back,
Chávez is moving to shut off vital oil sales to Honduras,
while internally pro-Zelaya followers are threatening roadblocks
and other actions to cripple Honduras economically.
Combined, these circumstances have provided the first, but
certainly not the last, diplomatic crisis in the Western Hemisphere
for the Obama Administration. In addressing this crisis, the
Administration needs to chart an accurate and realistic course. It
needs to find compass points to guide its policy through a
political and diplomatic storm that threatens democratic order in
Honduras.
Will the U.S. Defend the American
Brand of Democracy?
Fundamental differences exist between ALBA and the U.S.
regarding the concept of democracy. When addressing the current
crisis, U.S. failure to take into account the democratic principles
advocated in a bipartisan manner across Latin America--such as rule
of law, limits on executive power, protections of individual rights
and liberties, and strong democratic institutions--will allow
democracy in Latin America to be defined by the ALBA alliance.
Inflexible attempts to observe certain articles of the
Inter-American Democratic Charter regarding "an unconstitutional
alteration of the constitutional regime" while ignoring the prior
violations of other articles of the charter committed by Zelaya
demonstrate a position likely to kill the charter's spirit.[1]
Does the OAS Speak for U.S.
Interests?
The increased leverage and influence of the ALBA alliance within
the OAS has created a powerful group of actors anxious to dominate
the regional body and use it to achieve their ends. The OAS has
increasingly shifted from an organization where U.S. ideas and
ideals had significant influence to one catering to an increasingly
assertive, often anti-U.S. membership that sees little distinction
between Fidel Castro's communism, Chávez' authoritarianism,
and Daniel Ortega's electoral chicanery. Given the Latin American
traditions of solidarity and non-intervention, the loudest and most
aggressive members in the OAS increasingly carry the day.
Experienced Latin American hands feel a sense of growing
dissatisfaction with of the manner in which Insulza has handled the
Honduran crisis. Where was the OAS in the months and weeks leading
up to the current confrontations? The credibility of the OAS,
moreover, has been compromised by the organization's continued
silence on a wide range of anti-democratic moves executed by ALBA
members, including electoral fraud in Nicaragua, curtailment of
freedoms and a concerted campaign against elected municipal
officials in Venezuela, and Insulza's impassioned efforts to bring
communist Cuba back into the OAS fold.
Can the U.S. Play a Constructive Role
in Honduras?
With U.S. economic and diplomatic pressures, combined with the
eager application of sanctions by ALBA allies, the government of
Robert Micheletti will likely be brought to its knees--Honduras is
no Iran or North Korea. Yet the parties that removed Zelaya feel
they were fully justified in their actions by the laws and
constitution of their nation. Critical articles of the Honduran
constitution--notably articles 3, 42, 239, and 374, aimed at
strictly prohibiting any effort at presidential re-election--were
clearly violated by Zelaya.[2]
Honduras in 2009 is not a repeat of the coup that nearly toppled
President Hugo Chávez in April 2002. At this moment, despite
the vocal crowds demonstrating on behalf of Zelaya, most Hondurans
would probably like to see him remain outside of the country:
Hondurans still have faith in their institutions, not in mob
rule.
In the days ahead, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton needs
to demonstrate diplomatic finesse and the capacity to handle a
situation adroitly if the U.S. actually wishes to protect democracy
not only in Honduras but the entire hemisphere. The U.S. must
carefully weigh what benefits are to be gained by returning a
runaway and allegedly corrupt executive to a polarized nation,
particularly one left without the protections of its constitutional
foundations.
Recommendations
When addressing the challenges posed by the current crisis in
Honduras, the U.S. should:
- Clarify U.S. interests in Honduras. At stake in Honduras
are the nation's constitutional institutions, the rule of law, and
the preservation of a political succession process that is already
underway. The health of democracy in Honduras is not a personal or
partisan issue and needs to be the focal point for all further
discussions about this troubled nation. Zelaya's wanton violation
of the constitutional order in Honduras must be taken into
account.
- Advance national reconciliation. The key to Honduras's
future lies in adhering to the framework of the nation's
constitution, protecting the rule of law, minimizing economic
damage, and proceeding with the scheduled November elections.
- Support mediation efforts of Costa Rican President Oscar
Arias. This mediation effort, announced on July 6, and accepted
by the Micheletti government, offers the best prospects for a
solution to the Honduran crisis. Resistance from Hugo Chávez
and the ALBA alliance can be expected.
Another Scalp for Chávez?
In the July 5 flight over Honduras, Zelaya announced that
failure to force his return would constitute "the death of
democracy in Latin America." There is an ironic truth in his
statement: An internationally coerced and unconditional return of
Zelaya to the Honduran presidency will weaken the fundamentals of
liberal democracy (limited government, checks and balances, and
executive accountability) in the Western Hemisphere and hand Hugo
Chávez and his ALBA alliance another propaganda scalp.
Ray Walser, Ph.D., is Senior Policy Analyst for
Latin America in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign
Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis
Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage
Foundation.
[1]Article 3 of the Inter-American Democratic
Charter defines the essential elements of representative democracy,
including, inter alia, respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms; access to and the exercise of power in
accordance with the rule of law; the holding of periodic, free, and
fair elections based on secret balloting and universal suffrage as
an expression of the sovereignty of the people; the pluralistic
system of political parties and organizations; and the
separation of powers and independence of the branches of
government. Article 4 states, "The constitutional subordination
of all state institutions to the legally constituted civilian
authority and respect for the rule of law on the part of all
institutions and sectors of society are equally essential to
democracy." In the present crisis, the OAS is operating in
accordance with Articles 20 and 21, designed to deal with "an
unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime
that seriously impairs the democratic order in a member state"
(emphasis added). "Inter-American Democratic Charter," Organization
of American States, Lima, September 11, 2001, at http://www.oas.org/charter/docs/resolution1_en_p4.htm
(July 7, 2009).