On October 31, 2008, the U.N. General Assembly voted 145 to 2
with 18 abstentions for a resolution entitled "Towards an arms
trade treaty: establishing common international standards for the
import, export and transfer of conventional arms." The two nations
voting against the resolution were the United States and Zimbabwe.
The October resolution envisions a "legally binding treaty" that
creates "common international standards" for "the import, export
and transfer of conventional arms," including small arms and light
weapons.
The U.S. should continue to oppose any treaty based on the
October resolution. Although putatively intended as an arms control
measure that would reduce conflicts and limit the ability of
terrorists and organized crime to obtain weapons, the treaty
contemplated by the resolution would in reality be a license to
almost all states, no matter how irresponsible, to buy and sell
arms. The projected treaty would endanger U.S. arms export control
policy, clash with the Constitution, offer a dangerous
justification for dictatorial rule, and make it illegal under
international law for the U.S. to support freedom fighters
abroad.
The "growing global consensus" rhetoric that the treaty's
backers use to characterize its goals makes it unwise for the U.S.
to ignore the campaign for the treaty. If the U.S. ignores it, the
treaty will be drafted and adopted based on the October resolution.
The treaty will then be established as another destructive
precedent in multilateral arms control and a "norm" for sympathetic
lawyers and judges in the U.S. to draw upon and thereby subvert
U.S. sovereignty.
The U.S. should act now to clearly establish its opposition to
the projected treaty and should work to bring other, more
creditable states to its side.
What the U.S. Should Do. The United States needs to take
a measured approach to the upcoming negotiations of the proposed
arms trade treaty. While the U.S. should continue to participate in
the New York-based working group, it should not allow this
participation to be mistaken for acquiescence in or agreement with
the discussions or any resulting treaty.
The U.S. should judge the acceptability of any treaty that
emerges by the following tests and should refuse to sign any treaty
that does not meet all of them:
- Does the treaty recognize the legitimacy of nationally declared
arms embargoes and, more broadly, avoid enshrining
lowest-common-denominator standards?
- Does the treaty contain an agreed definition of terrorism that
differentiates between terrorism and armed rebellion against
tyrannical and oppressive regimes that do not respect the inherent
right of self-government?
- Does the treaty clearly and unconditionally respect the rights
of the private citizens of member states to keep and bear
arms?
- Does the treaty avoid establishing a right to buy and instead
leave this question as a matter for customary international
law?
- Is membership in any monitoring body established by the treaty
restricted to law-abiding states that have a strong and consistent
record of controlling the transfer and sale of arms to terrorists
and repressive regimes?
- Do the terms of the treaty expressly state that it is not
self-executing?
- Do the terms of the treaty expressly exclude rights of
individuals and private entities to sue to enforce the treaty, to
assert rights under the treaty, or to use its provisions as a
defense against prosecution?
The U.S. can and should seek to advance the control of the
international import, export, and transfer of conventional weapons
through means that are less dramatic but more effective than the
projected U.N. treaty. To this end, the U.S. should:
- Seek to use the largely inactive framework of the U.N.
disarmament organization in Geneva as a good-offices organization
in times of regional crisis to bring regional states together and
to negotiate small, geographically limited treaties to address
particular issues.
- Seek to secure adoption of a U.N. Security Council resolution
requiring all U.N. member states to have strong laws against
internal diversions from government stockpiles to terrorists. The
U.S. already has such laws and could work with other responsible
states to supply technical and expert assistance to states that are
genuinely interested in reducing potential terrorists' access to
arms.
- Work through suppliers groups--such as the member states of the
Wassenaar Arrangement, the existing multilateral forum for export
controls on conventional weapons and dual-use goods and
technologies--to build up a body of knowledge and practice for use
by all states that desire to improve their export and transit
controls.
- Draw on the Proliferation Security Initiative model to promote
expanded international monitoring of the sale, purchase, and
transfer of conventional arms.
Conclusion. The purported goal of the U.N. arms trade
treaty is to keep guns out of the hands of terrorists and organized
criminals and to reduce conflict. These are worthy endeavors and
should have the support of the United States and its democratic
allies around the world.
However, a treaty based on the October 2008 arms trade
resolution will not achieve these ends. Instead, it will further
enable dictators and unscrupulous suppliers--including some
European suppliers--to buy and sell arms. It will also provide a
justification under international law for dictatorships to oppress
their people.
Any U.N. treaty based on the October resolution that seeks to
control the import, export, and transfer of conventional weapons
will fail and, in failing, exacerbate the existing evils. If all
U.N. member states were serious about its aims, no new treaty would
be necessary. The unwillingness of the treaty's supporters to face
this reality is the best evidence that the treaty is based on
destructive illusions and will be a dangerous failure in
practice.
Ted R. Bromund, Ph.D., is Senior Research
Fellow and Steven Groves is Bernard and Barbara Lomas
Fellow in the Margaret Thatcher Center for Freedom, a division of
the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International
Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.