Statement of Dr. James Jay
Carafano
Senior Research Fellow
The Heritage Foundation
Before the House
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on
Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
Mr. Chairman and other distinguished Members,
I am honored to testify before you today. In my testimony,
I would like to (1) emphasize why secure ports are essential to the
nation; (2) describe the significant security threats the U.S.
faces today and in the future; and (3) propose steps that Congress
take to improve the security of foreign-owned maritime
infrastructure including revisions to the Maritime and Trade
Security Act.
Maritime Security Matters
Maritime trade is vital to the U.S. economy.
Almost one-third of the U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) is
derived from trade. As you know, 95 percent of American overseas
trade traffics the maritime domain. According to the American
Association of Port Authorities, $1.3 billion worth of U.S. goods
move in and out of U.S. ports every day. In addition, many major
urban centers (more than half of the U.S. population) and
significant critical infrastructure are in proximity to U.S. ports
or are accessible by waterways.
Ports can also be tempting
for terrorists. As points of entry and exit, they are critical
nodes that affect terrorist travel and transiting of material
support or weapons. They might also be prime targets for terrorist
strikes. The economic, physical, and psychological damage that
would result from a significant terrorist attack targeting maritime
commerce or exploiting America's vulnerability to sea strikes is
difficult to estimate, but the stakes are high. A significant
breakdown in the maritime transport system would send shockwaves
throughout the world economy. In fact, in a worst-case scenario, a
large attack could cause the entire global trading system to halt
as governments scramble to recover. Drastic and inefficient
solutions could also be put in place, such as the complete closure
of some ports and duplicative and lengthy cargo checks in both
originating and receiving ports.
During the next decades,
maritime commerce likely will become an even larger and more
important component of the global economy. The future maritime
system will be robust, yet fragile. Maritime shippers increasingly
concentrate their traffic through major cargo hubs ("mega-ports")
because of their superior infrastructure. In the United States, 50
ports account for approximately 90 percent of all cargo tonnage.
Their specialized equipment is essential for the loading and
off-loading of container ships, which constitute a growing segment
of maritime commerce. Today, U.S. seaports unload approximately 8
million loaded containers annually.
Analysts forecast the volume of global container traffic will
double over the next 20 years.
The rising use of container shipping and mega-ports has lowered the
costs and improved the reliability of maritime commerce, leading
firms to rely increasingly on rolling inventories and just-in-time
deliveries. These trends have produced significant economic
benefits for many industries engaged in international commerce, but
have also made individual companies in the supply chain more
vulnerable to interruptions.
Qualifying Maritime Threats
A special report prepared by the Maritime
Security Working Group (chaired by The Heritage Foundation) was
asked to address the long-term security threats to the United
States in the maritime domain. The
group-consisting of experts from academia, research centers, the
private sector, and government-concluded the major trends that will
affect U.S. maritime security are:
-
Internal
Threats from Rogue Actors. The greatest vulnerability to maritime
infrastructure may be internal threats, i.e., employees who have an
intimate knowledge of operations and facilities and access to
transportation and port assets.
- The Growth of Maritime
Criminal Activity. Piracy, human trafficking, and drug
smuggling will continue. Terrorists could mimic or partner with
criminal enterprises.
- The Lack of Visibility
in Non-Commercial Maritime Activity. Currently the United
States lacks sufficient means to monitor maritime activity.
Terrorists could capitalize on this failing in many ways, including
mines and other underwater attacks, smuggling by private craft with
small payloads delivered outside ports, or attacks by small
craft.
- The Maritime Domain as
a Target and Facilitator of Threats against the Environment.
Opportunities for infectious diseases and other environmental
threats carried by seaborne traffic will increase with greater
maritime commerce.
- Anti-Access Strategies
a Real Possibility. An enemy might attack vulnerable targets on
U.S. territory as a means to coerce, deter, or defeat the United
States.
- Stand-Off Attacks from
the Sea. State and non-state groups will be capable of mounting
short-range ballistic missiles and cruise missile attacks-possibly
employing weapons of mass destruction-from U.S. waters.
The group found the challenges identified
above as enduring, disturbing, and inadequately
addressed.
Misplaced Maritime Priorities
On the other hand, the group found that there
were other threat scenarios that are often discussed as less
plausible or that post-September 11 security regimes have made less
likely. In particular, since 9/11, some security analysts argue
that every container bound for the United States should be
inspected because one could possibly be used to smuggle a nuclear
weapon or a "dirty" bomb (radiological dispersion device) into the
country. To counter this threat, they propose spending billions of
dollars on container and port security.
This argument fails on four counts. (1) The
nuke-in-box is an unlikely terrorist tactic. If an enemy wanted to
smuggle a bomb into the United States, a private watercraft would
be a safer and more secure way to transport the weapon, either
directly to the target (e.g., a port) or indirectly by landing it
in Mexico and then driving it across the border. (2) While nuclear
smuggling is possible, so are dozens of other attack
scenarios. It is dangerously myopic to over-invest in countering
one tactic when terrorists could easily employ another tactic. (3)
Searching every container and hardening every port is an extremely
inefficient and expensive way to stop terrorists from using cargo
containers. (4) There is no apparent viable business case for
many of the proposed solutions for "hardening" shipping containers
or conducting 100 percent physical container inspections. These
measures would provide only minimal utility at the cost of billions
of dollars in new duties, taxes, and operating costs.
As a matter of common sense, the United States
should not attempt to make every cargo container and port into a
miniature Fort Knox. Securing trade requires a more
comprehensive and effective approach than just putting up
fences and gates, posting guards at ports, and inspecting all cargo
containers as they enter the country. This approach fails on two
counts: (1) It wastes security resources by inspecting things that
are not a security risk. (2) It creates isolated, easily bypassed
chokepoints to address specific (and unlikely) threats.
Efforts to protect trade should focus on
improving security of the entire supply chain. Strengthening the
U.S. maritime security regime is a good place to start.
Making the Seas Safer
The Heritage Foundation's maritime security
working group has identified several areas that should be the
centerpiece of U.S. effort to help secure the maritime enterprise.
In addition to strengthening current programs, the three most
critical additional enablers to current efforts should
be:
-
Fix the Coast Guard First. U.S. Coast Guard operations are
central to virtually every aspect of maritime security from
enforcing ISPS to interdicting suspect cargo under the
Proliferation Security Initiative. Fully funding the Coast Guard's
modernization program, Deepwater, at $1.5 billion per year is
essential.
-
Enhance Public-Private Information Sharing. In
particular, better commercial data must be submitted to the
Automated Targeting System (ATS) that would facilitate higher
quality risk assessments of cargo in the pre-vessel-loading
security screening process. This data could include: better cargo
descriptions; identification of seller and purchaser; the goods
point of origin; country from which goods are exported; ultimate
consignee; exporter representative and name of broker; and origin
of container shipment.
-
Improve International Cooperation. The U.S. National
Security Strategy rightly calls for encouraging economic
development through free markets and free trade and enhancing the
capacity of developing nations to compete in a global economy.
Concurrently, however, the United States is also rightly promoting
international security regimes designed to prevent terrorists from
attacking or exploiting global trade networks. Meeting these
requirements is difficult not for the Dubai's of the world, but for
developing countries that lack mature infrastructure, robust human
capital programs, and adequate financing. Federal agencies have
disparate programs to assist these countries in enhancing their
maritime security. These programs are not synchronized with each
other or with our allies in Europe or Asia. Congress should begin
to address this issue by require the General Accountability Office
to inventory and assess the effectiveness of the various U.S.
program and their international counterparts.
In addition to these efforts, the Congress
should take appropriate measures to address concerns over
foreign-owned maritime infrastructure in the United
States.
Assuring Surety in Foreign-Owned
Infrastructure
The sale of a British-based company which
controls cargo handling operations at number of U.S.
facilities-including six major U.S. ports-to Dubai Ports
World, a government-owned company in the United Arab Emirates, has
raised many concerns. While a review of the facts suggests no
apparent security issues, these concerns
do reflect the importance of ensuring that the U.S. government has
undertaken all reasonable efforts to make the seas
safer.
The Maritime Transportation and Security of
Act (MTSA) of 2002 did not consider the sale of maritime
infrastructure to or between foreign-owned firms operating at U.S.
ports. Congress might well consider what revisions to this law
might be appropriate. These could include require.
-
The company facility security officers at U.S.
ports to be U.S. citizens, successfully complete a suitable
background investigation, and be qualified to receive a
transportation worker identification credential (TWIC);
-
A mandatory review of the company security
plan by the U.S. Coast Guard prior to the transfer of
ownership;
-
Notice after the transfer of ownership of any
proposed material changes to the security plan, as well as
committing to meet with U.S. officials to review changes prior to
implementation; providing relevant information required to evaluate
the changes; and addressing security concerns before the changes
are implemented;
-
Committing to reasonable steps to assist and
support any federal, state, or local law enforcement agencies in
conducting law enforcement activities related to facilities or
services provided by the company in the United States;
-
Disclosing information on the design,
maintenance, or operation of U.S. facilities or operations as they
relate to a law enforcement investigations;
-
Providing
any relevant records in the United States involving matters
relating to foreign operations of the company that relate to a law
enforcement investigation;
-
Committing to participation in the
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT);
-
Establishing penalties for non-compliance with
the above measures;
-
Applying these requirements to any transfer of
critical maritime infrastructure whether the gaining company is
U.S. or foreign-based; and
-
Requiring that major U.S. seaports establish
intelligence and information-sharing fusion centers (Joint
Operations Center) similar to the pilot-project Seahawk at the port
of Charleston, South Carolina, and requiring that the centers be
funded equitably and jointly by all public and private stakeholders
at the port.
Port facilities are just one of many aspects that should be
considered in developing a comprehensive maritime security
regime. The United States should approach cargo and port security
from the perspective of a complex global system rather than
attempting (and failing) to make ports and containers
impervious to terrorist threats. Ports are just one part of a
system, designed to move people and things quickly in immense
volumes.
The best way to secure a port is to keep bad
things and bad people out of the port to begin with. And that means
securing the system, not the port. Modifications to MTSA, such as
those proposed here, should be designed to make port security an
integral and useful component to securing the maritime domain-and
not a misguided attempt to turn America's ports into mini-Maginot
lines.
Winning the Long War
President George W. Bush was right to suggest
that we are engaged in a long war in his State of the Union
Address. It is an important distinction. Protracted conflicts like
the Cold War or the War on Global Terrorism require different kinds
of strategies-strategies that place as much emphasis on sustaining
the capacity of the state to compete over the long term as they do
on diminishing the enemy.
Good long war strategy requires meets four
equally compelling priorities: (1) providing security; (2)
promoting economic growth; (3) safeguarding liberties; and (4)
winning the war of ideas. Each has relevance to the maritime
domain. This Committee
and Congress need to insist that the Bush Administration implement
measures to meet each of these priorities, not trading one off for
another. This criterion should serve in evaluating any
security issue, including protecting America's maritime
infrastructure in the United States
Thank you again for the opportunity to address
this vital question.