This testimony was
delivered on October 10, 2007, before the Armed Services Committee,
U.S. House of Representatives.
Pursuing a strong and stable relationship with Pakistan will
continue to be one of America's most important foreign policy
objectives for several years to come. The range and
complexity of issues involved in our relations - eliminating global
terrorist networks, countering the rising tide of Islamic
radicalism in Pakistan, securing and safeguarding Pakistan's
nuclear assets, and facilitating the transition to civilian-led
democracy - require focused and sustained U.S. attention and deft
diplomacy.[1]
Recent developments in Pakistan and the U.S., however, are
threatening to create misunderstandings between our two countries
and to derail this critical partnership. Pakistan's inability
to control a burgeoning terrorist safe haven in its tribal areas
bordering Afghanistan is causing frustration in Washington, while
recently-passed U.S. legislation that conditions military
assistance to Pakistan is causing doubts about the U.S. as a
reliable long-term partner. Washington and Islamabad each
have high expectations of the relationship. In order to
sustain the U.S.-Pakistan partnership over the long-term, we need
to manage these expectations and seek to align our strategic
perspectives of the region more closely. We should not repeat
the mistakes of the past by allowing our ties to Islamabad to
founder. A second breach in the relationship, like that
caused by the Pressler Amendment that cut off U.S. aid to Pakistan
in 1990, would seriously jeopardize U.S. interests in South Asia
and have severe implications for the global fight against
terrorism.
Political Transition
Pakistan is in the midst of an historical political transition
that will determine the core direction of the country at a time
when extremists are seeking to provoke an Islamic revolution.
We have seen dramatic developments in recent weeks and the final
outcome of the political changes is still uncertain.
Washington should welcome the transition to civilian democratic
rule without backing any particular individuals or political
parties. Given the perception that the U.S. has favored
military over civilian rule in Pakistan in order to pursue its own
counterterrorism objectives over the last six years, Washington
will have difficulty convincing Pakistanis that it supports genuine
democracy in Pakistan now. Unequivocal U.S. support for the
democratic transition, such as recent U.S. statements criticizing
the arrest of opposition politicians as well as U.S. discouragement
of declaration of emergency rule in Pakistan, is necessary to try
to defuse the increasingly shrill anti-Americanism that is gripping
Pakistani civil society.
If the Supreme Court this week rules in Musharraf's favor on the
cases before it challenging his eligibility for re-lection to
another five-year term, he will officially become president and all
eyes will begin to shift to the 2008 general election. To lay
a foundation for a credible election process, Musharraf will need
to resign from the Chief of Army position. His lawyer has
already announced to the Supreme Court that he will shed the
military uniform before taking a new oath of office, and he has
little choice but to follow through on the commitment. A
second attempt to renege on his pledge, like he did in 2004, would
meet with a domestic backlash and strong international
condemnation. His recent announcement of a successor Chief of
the Army signals that he is serious about resigning his military
post.
Other preparations for a free and fair election are also
necessary. The Election Commission must work with the
political opposition and international observers to correct voter
rolls, which apparently fail to list millions of voters.
Additionally, the government must give all political parties a
chance to participate fully in the process. Any attempt to
manipulate the elections in favor of a particular political party
would backfire and undermine the credibility of the entire process,
fueling further political unrest.
Rising Extremist Violence
The increase in attacks in Pakistan over the last three months
that have killed over 300 civilians and security personnel appear
to be retaliation for the July 10th military operation at the Red
Mosque but also seem aimed at taking advantage of the political
unrest. Pakistan is now second only to Iraq with regard to
the number of suicide attacks in the country during the last few
months.
The attacks on government forces have mainly taken place in the
Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP) and Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA), where the Pakistan military has resumed
operations against militants. Last week a suicide bomber
killed 15 when he blew himself up near a police checkpoint in the
town of Bannu in the NWFP. Pakistan has reported killing 150
militants in clashes over the weekend in North Waziristan.
Support within the Pakistan Army itself to continue fighting in the
tribal areas may be eroding, though. Circumstances
surrounding the capture of over 240 Pakistani soldiers by Taliban
fighters on August 30 are mysterious and some observers speculate
the soldiers may have surrendered.
Despite the rising violence, Pakistanis are generally ambivalent
about taking on the extremist threat directly. A recent poll
taken by the U.S. nongovernmental organization Terror Free Tomorrow
shows that an overwhelming majority of Pakistanis do not view the
fight against terrorism as benefiting Pakistan nor do they see
defeating al Qaeda as a priority for their leaders. Instead
they appear to blame the recent violence on Pakistani
counterterrorism cooperation with the U.S. and increasingly
question the benefits of continuing to support U.S.-led
anti-terrorism efforts in the region that, in their opinion, rely
too heavily on military force.
Harmonizing U.S.-Pakistan Counterterrorism
Efforts
The U.S. and Pakistan differ on how to achieve counterterrorism
objectives. Our two countries share the overall goals of
bringing stability to Afghanistan and preventing the rise of
extremism in Pakistan. Moreover, we are in agreement that the
Taliban's resurgence in Afghanistan would have a blowback effect in
Pakistan. However, for a variety of reasons, including fears
of creating greater instability in the country, Pakistani doubts
about the U.S. long-term commitment to the region, and Islamabad's
distrust of the Karzai government, Islamabad is reluctant to crack
down fully on the Taliban and other extremists operating from its
territory.
Also contributing to broader U.S.-Pakistan misunderstanding on
counterterrorism issues is the complex political and societal
dynamics in Pakistan that prevent Islamabad from taking credit for
some of its counterterrorism successes. Given the Pakistani
public's opposition to the war in Afghanistan and pockets of
sympathy for the Taliban, Islamabad has refrained from highlighting
its recent contributions in targeting senior Taliban
leaders. With the assistance of
Pakistan,senior Taliban military commanderMullah Akhtar Osmani was
killed last December in an air strike in Afghanistan and Mullah
Dadullah was killed in May in Helmand province, Afghanistan.
The Pakistanis also arrested Taliban Defense Minister Mullah
Obaidullah earlier in the year and eliminated key Pakistani Taliban
leader Abdullah Masood in Baluchistan province in July. [2]
To garner the full counterterrorism cooperation the U.S.
requires from Islamabad, Washington must develop a realistic and
hard-nosed policy that takes on Pakistan's ambivalence toward going
head-to-head with the extremists. Despite Pakistan having
been one of the largest recipients of U.S. aid over the last six
years - receiving well over $10 billion - the terrorist threat
emanating from Pakistan is as dangerous as ever: many of
those involved in recently foiled terrorist plots across the globe
received training and inspiration at terrorist training camps in
Pakistan and a recent United Nations report says that 80 percent of
suicide bombers that have conducted attacks in Afghanistan from
2001 - 2007 were recruited, received training, or stayed in safe
houses located in the North and South Waziristan agencies of
Pakistan's tribal areas.[3]
Pakistan believes the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan relies too
heavily on military operations that result in collateral damage
that further alienates the local population. Furthermore,
Islamabad believes it is possible to negotiate with the Taliban in
order to bring them into the political process. In his
remarks at the closing ceremony of the August Peace Jirga in Kabul,
Musharraf said the Taliban are part of Afghan society and can be
brought into the political mainstream. While promoting an
inclusive political system that provides adequate representation of
Pashtuns is important to stabilizing the country, there should be
no doubt about the international commitment to preventing the
Taliban from again gaining influence in the country.
Advocating a Taliban role affirms extremism as an acceptable
ideology and undermines the establishment of pluralistic democracy
in Afghanistan. Furthermore, a recent UN reports asserts that
overall support for the Taliban in Afghanistan remains
"astonishingly low."[4]
Some observers believe Pakistan prefers to allow the Taliban to
undermine the current dispensation in Afghanistan since the success
of Karzai - perceived as a close ally of India - would be
detrimental to Pakistani security interests.[5] At the same
time, however, the recent wave of terrorist attacks in retaliation
for the Pakistan military's action against extremists at the Red
Mosque in Islamabad on July 10th have led to the death of over 300
Pakistani civilians and security officials, demonstrating that the
Taliban can be as threatening to the Pakistani state as it is to
the Karzai government.
While hard core Taliban elements with links to al-Qaeda will
have to be defeated militarily in both Afghanistan and Pakistan,
Washington, Kabul, and Islamabad should devise together a strategy
to siphon off "guns-for-hire" that would be willing to become part
of civilian society. According to the British House of
Commons Defense Committee Report on "United Kingdom Operations in
Afghanistan," released in July, British commanders in Helmand
province reported that there were two levels of Taliban
fighters: "tier one" fighters who are religious
fundamentalists who would never accept a compromise with government
and "tier two" fighters whose allegiance was not based on ideology
but who were in effect hired guns and more amenable to
reconciliation.[6]
Pakistani Tribal
Areas. Perhaps the greatest challenge in the
U.S.-Pakistan relationship is to develop an effective strategy to
root out the terrorists from the Tribal Areas. Senior U.S.
intelligence officials revealed over the summer that the Pakistani
peace deals in the FATA have not achieved the desired objectives
and, in fact, have allowed the region to develop into an al-Qaeda
stronghold. Pakistani extremists also took advantage of the
decreased military pressure by attempting to institute strict
Islamic edicts in the region--the same tactics employed by the
Taliban in Afghanistan in the mid-1990s. The extremists have
sought to close down girls' schools, barbershops, and video stores,
and are increasingly challenging the writ of the government, even
in some of the settled areas of the Northwest Frontier
Province.
While focusing greater attention to combating this problem, it
is important to acknowledge the tremendous losses the Pakistan Army
has suffered in these areas over the last five years. The
peace deals were implemented because of these losses as well as the
growing disillusionment among military cadre over fighting their
own citizens. Part of the government's plan in initiating the
peace deals was to restore the traditional form of governance
in the region and to co-opt the tribal elders and political
representatives through an infusion of economic assistance for new
roads, hospitals, and schools.
The U.S. revelations about al-Qaeda's safe haven in the border
areas coincided with the Pakistan military's July 10th storming of
the Red Mosque in Islamabad, which left at least 100 dead.
Reports indicate that there were links between the leadership of
the Red Mosque and al-Qaeda elements in the Tribal Areas. The
combination of events led Pakistan to send fresh military
reinforcements to the region, reactivate military checkpoints, and
resume limited military operations.
While Pakistan's willingness to go back on the military
offensive in the tribal areas is welcome, Islamabad's efforts alone
are unlikely to address the serious threat from the region.
U.S. and Afghan forces repeatedly have pursued insurgents to the
border, but are banned from crossing into Pakistan in hot
pursuit. Senior Pakistani military officials do not support
the extremists in the tribal areas, yet they do not view the
situation with the same urgency as the U.S. They also are
reluctant to engage in a full-out confrontation with the extremists
in these areas because of the risk that it would destabilize
Pakistan.[7]
Washington must convince Islamabad to work more closely in joint
operations that bring U.S. resources and military strength to bear
on the situation and employ a combination of targeted military
operations and economic assistance that drives a wedge between the
Pashtun tribal communities and the international terrorists.
A large-scale U.S. troop invasion of Pakistan's Tribal Areas would
have disastrous consequences for the Pakistani state and would not
provide a lasting solution to the problem. A more effective
strategy involves working cooperatively with Pakistan's military to
assert state authority over the areas and once they are secure,
provide substantial assistance to build up the economy and social
infrastructure. The Administration already is moving in this
direction with a pledge of $750 million over five years to develop
the tribal areas.
Over the longer term, U.S. assistance should encourage political
reform that incorporates the institutions of the tribal lands fully
into the Pakistani system. Some have argued that the Pakistan
military is loath to implement political reform in these areas and
that only the democratic parties would move in this
direction. In late July Pakistan People's Party (PPP) leader
Benazir Bhutto filed a petition with the Supreme Court, seeking
enforcement of the Political Parties Act in the FATA that would
extend Pakistan election laws to the region and encourage political
activity. Political parties currently are prohibited from
functioning in the FATA, although there are 12 seats reserved for
FATA members in the National Assembly (lower house of parliament)
and eight in the Senate. The petition claims that since the
political parties are not allowed to field candidates for
elections, the mosques and madrassahs (religious schools) have been
able to assert undue political influence in the region.[8]
Washington should also prioritize development of Reconstruction
Opportunity Zones (ROZs) that would build up industrial zones in
the Northwest Frontier Province and other areas that would produce
textile goods receiving preferential access in the U.S. The
ROZ initiative is an integral component to our overall strategy to
develop the FATA and uproot terrorism from the border areas.
The Bush Administration first announced this initiative over 18
months ago. The U.S. Administration and Congress should work
together expeditiously to get this critical project off the
ground.
Pakistani Regional Relationships
Pakistan-Afghanistan Relations. Our
ability to defeat al-Qaeda's capabilities and ideology rests on a
strategy that integrates our diplomatic and security efforts toward
Afghanistan and Pakistan and that focuses more intently on
improving these two key countries' relations with each other.
The Afghanistan Freedom and Security Support Act of 2007 that is
now before the U.S. Senate acknowledges this linkage and authorizes
the President to appoint a special envoy to promote closer
Afghanistan-Pakistan cooperation. This is an important
initiative and should be taken up as quickly as possible.
This senior envoy would need to take a pro-active role in
mediating disputes between Afghanistan and Pakistan, prodding both
countries to develop a fresh strategic perception of the region
based on economic integration, political reconciliation, and
respect for territorial boundaries. To achieve stability in
the region, Pakistan will have to root out Taliban ideology from
its own society and close down madrassahs and training camps that
perpetuate the Taliban insurgency. For its part, Afghanistan
will have to acknowledge the sanctity of the border dividing
Pashtun populations between the two countries and ensure adequate
representation of Pashtuns in the Afghan government.
Pashtuns in Afghanistan number about 12 million, making up 42
percent of the Afghanistan population, while the Pashtun population
in Pakistan stands at about 25 million, constituting around 15
percent of the total Pakistani population. British
colonialists had purposely divided the ethnic Pashtun tribes in
1893 with the Durand Line, which now constitutes the 1,600-mile
porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan.[9] Afghanistan at
one time claimed Pashtun tribal areas in Pakistan and has never
officially recognized the Durand Line. Pakistan in the past
has countered Pashtun nationalism within its own orders by
promoting pan-Islamic extremism in Afghanistan.
The Afghanistan-Pakistan peace jirga that was held in early
August in Kabul was a first step in bringing local leaders together
from both sides of the border in face-to-face talks. While no
one expected immediate breakthroughs, the gathering represented an
important step in beginning to build confidence between the hostile
neighbors. Pakistani and Afghan delegates, numbering around
700, focused on terrorism as a joint threat to the two nations and
urged their governments to make the war on terror an integral part
of their national policies and security strategies.
One highlight of the jirga was President Musharraf's admission
during the closing ceremonies that Afghan militants received
support from within Pakistan. His statements represented a
welcome departure from past rhetorical barbs blaming Afghanistan's
woes entirely on President Karzai. Musharraf's remarks
demonstrate that the two sides have made some limited progress in
improving relations since the historic tripartite meeting hosted by
President Bush in September 2006.
Pakistan-India Relations. India and
Pakistan have achieved tangible progress in the peace talks that
started in January 2004. They have held dozens of official
meetings, increased people-to-people exchanges, increased annual
bilateral trade to over $1 billion, launched several cross-border
buses and train services, and liberalized visa regimes to
encourage travel between the two countries. During a meeting
in September 2006-just two months after the Mumbai commuter
train blasts that killed nearly 200-Prime Minister Singh and
President Musharraf established a joint terrorism mechanism and
agreed to expedite resolution of disputes over the Siachen Glacier
and Sir Creek, a narrow strip of marshland separating the province
of Sindh in Pakistan and the state of Gujarat in India.
Perhaps the most significant progress has been the narrowing of
differences over how to address the seemingly intractable issue of
Kashmir. President Musharraf and Prime Minister Singh are
beginning to craft their statements on Kashmir in ways that narrow
the gap between their countries' long-held official positions on
the disputed territory. President Musharraf declared last
December in an Indian television interview that Pakistan would give
up its claim to Kashmir if India agreed to a four-part solution
that involves keeping the current boundaries intact and making the
Line of Control (LOC) that divides Kashmir irrelevant,
demilitarizing both sides of the LOC, developing a plan for
self-governance of Kashmir, and instituting a mechanism for India
and Pakistan to jointly supervise the region. In 2003,
Musharraf dropped Islamabad's long-held insistence on a United
Nations plebiscite to determine the status of Kashmir.
It is critical that the two sides maintain momentum in the
peace process, since the state of Pakistan-India ties will be a
major determinant of overall regional stability. The peace
process has understandably slowed due to the recent political
instability in Pakistan. In a welcome development, Indian and
Pakistani officials have agreed to meet next week in New Delhi to
discuss nuclear confidence building and expand on their
counterterrorism joint mechanism. If, as expected, Pakistan
holds general elections early next year, the peace process could
become vulnerable, if new leaders fail to express commitment to the
peace talks early on in their administration.
One reason for continued Pakistani ambivalence toward the
Taliban stems from the concern that India is trying to encircle it
by gaining influence in Afghanistan. In this context, the
Taliban offers the best chance for countering India's regional
influence. Pakistan believes ethnic Tajiks in the Afghan
government receive support from New Delhi. India, in
cooperation with Russia and Iran, supported the Afghan Northern
Alliance against the Taliban in the late 1990s and almost certainly
retains links to Northern Alliance elements now in the Afghan
government. Pakistan also complains that the Indian
consulates in the border cities of Jalalabad and Kandahar are
involved in fomenting insurgency in its Baluchistan
province.
Because of the regional rivalry between Pakistan and India,
Islamabad has been reluctant to allow Indian trans-shipment of
goods across its territory into Afghanistan. The U.S. should
encourage India and Pakistan to work toward greater economic
cooperation in Afghanistan as a way to defuse their tensions.
Participants in unofficial talks on improving Indo-Pakistani ties
have suggested that the two countries add Afghanistan as an agenda
item in their formal dialogue.[10]
Pakistan-China Relations. Pakistan and
China have had long-standing strategic ties. China is
Pakistan's largest defense supplier and the Chinese view
Pakistan as a useful counterweight to Indian power in the
region. In the run-up to Chinese President Hu Jintao's visit
to Pakistan last November, media reports speculated that Beijing
would sign a major nuclear energy cooperation agreement with
Pakistan.[11] In the end, however, the Chinese
leader provided a general pledge of support to Pakistan's
nuclear energy program but refrained from announcing plans to
supply new nuclear reactors. China has helped Pakistan build
two nuclear reactors at the Chasma site in the Punjab Province
and has provided Pakistan with nuclear technology as far back as
the 1970s. China also is helping Pakistan develop a deep-sea
port at Gwadar in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan, near the
mouth of the Persian Gulf.
One source of tension between Beijing and Islamabad that
has surfaced in the past has been over the issue of rising Islamic
extremism in Pakistan and the ability of Chinese Uighur separatists
to receive sanctuary and training among other radical Islamist
groups on Pakistani territory. To mollify China's
concerns, Pakistan in recent years has begun to clamp down on
Uighur settlements and on religious schools used as training
grounds for militant Islamists.[12] Their tensions over
Islamic extremism flared earlier this year when Islamic vigilantes
from the Red Mosque kidnapped several Chinese citizens they accused
of running a brothel in Islamabad. Many believe Islamabad's
decision to use military force against the extremists at the Red
Mosque stemmed largely from the incident with the Chinese citizens,
which greatly embarrassed the Musharraf regime.
Pakistan-Iran Relations. Pakistan's
relations with Iran have been far from smooth over the last three
decades. Relations soured following the 1979 Iranian
Revolution due to Pakistani President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq's
previous support of the Shah's regime and his encouragement of
Sunni militant organizations that pushed a strict Sunni
interpretation of Islam and targeted the minority Shiia
population in Pakistan. Iran, in turn, began to export to
Pakistan Shiia militants to counter the Sunni extremists.
Sectarian violence has ebbed and flowed over the last fifteen years
in Pakistan and continues to have a chilling impact on
Iranian-Pakistani relations.
Pakistan's support of the Sunni Taliban in the mid-1990s
significantly raised tensions between Tehran and Islamabad.
These tensions climaxed in August 1998 when the Taliban killed
several Iranian diplomats in the northern Afghan city of
Mazar-e-Sharif. Iran responded by amassing its military along
the border with Afghanistan. If fighting had broken out
between Iranian forces and the Taliban, Pakistan would have likely
been drawn into the conflict in support of the Taliban. It is
difficult to imagine Pakistan would have officially sanctioned
nuclear cooperation with such an unsteady neighbor, although
some analysts believe the bulk of the nuclear cooperation occurred
in the early 1990s before the Taliban had emerged and shortly after
the U.S. had cut off assistance to Pakistan.
Pakistan's halt to official support for the Taliban following
9/11 has helped to improve Pakistani- Iranian ties, and both
countries are actively engaged in talks on developing an
Iran-Pakistan-India oil and gas pipeline.
Nuclear Issues
Preventing Pakistan's nuclear weapons and technology from
falling into the hands of terrorists is a top priority for the U.S.
President Musharraf recently made a series of promotions to
key Army posts aimed at ensuring continuity in Army policies during
the political transition. The round of promotions is critical
to maintaining the professionalism and institutional integrity of
the Army and reassuring the international community that the
military remains committed to the fight against terrorism and
protection of the country's nuclear assets.
While there is no immediate threat to the security of Pakistan's
nuclear weapons during the current political transition, Washington
will need to be diligent in pursuing policies that promote the
safety and security of Islamabad's nuclear assets. The
results of investigations into Pakistani nuclear scientist
Abdul Qadeer Khan's nuclear black market and proliferation
network demonstrate the devastating consequences of
nuclear proliferation by individuals with access to
state-controlled nuclear programs.
Although A.Q. Khan avoided engaging al-Qaeda on nuclear issues,
earlier revelations about a group of former Pakistani military
officials and nuclear scientists who met with Osama bin Laden
around the time of 9/11 reminds us of the continuing threat of the
intersection of terrorism and nuclear weapons in Pakistan. On
October 23, 2001, acting on an American request, Pakistani
authorities detained Bashiruddin Mahmood and Abdul Majeed, two
retired Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC) officials.
Since their retirement from the PAEC in 1999 they had been
involved in relief work in Afghanistan through a non-governmental
organization they established called Ummah Tameer-e-Nau (UTN).
In November 2001, the coalition forces found documents in
Afghanistan relating to UTN's interest in biological weapons.
This prompted Pakistani security forces to arrest seven
members of UTN's board, most of whom were retired Pakistani Army
officials and nuclear scientists.[13]
Former Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet speculates
in his memoirs that UTN's contacts with the Taliban and al-Qaeda
may have been supported by some elements within the Pakistani
military and intelligence establishment. Tenet says
Pakistani interrogations of the seven board members were initially
insufficient. He further notes that despite CIA warnings
to Pakistani officials about UTN's activities before 9/11, it was
only when President George W. Bush dispatched him to Pakistan in
November 2001, following revelations of a meeting between bin
Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and UTN leaders, that Musharraf took
serious action.[14]
Conclusions and Policy Recommendations
Washington is unlikely to succeed in stabilizing
Afghanistan and preventing the Taliban from regaining influence in
the country unless it addresses Pakistani stakes in Afghanistan and
integrates U.S. security and diplomatic policies toward these two
key countries. In this regard, the U.S. should
follow through with suggestions to establish a senior envoy to
focus solely on working with both Pakistani and Afghan officials to
address their political and historical tensions and encourage
greater security and economic cooperation. As part of this
effort, the U.S. will need to spur Pakistan to adjust its security
perceptions of the region and demonstrate U.S. sensitivity to
Pakistan's core security interests and willingness to use influence
with both Kabul and New Delhi to address these concerns. Washington
should continue and expand the Pakistan-Afghanistan jirga process
as a way to bring together local leaders from both sides of the
border.
Washington should encourage New Delhi
and Islamabad to engage directly with one another on the issue of
Afghanistan and help identify regional economic or political
initiatives on which the two can cooperate.
Pakistan should not expect the U.S. to discourage India from having
a role in Afghanistan, since Washington views New Delhi's example
as a pluralistic democracy as a positive influence in helping
Afghanistan develop itself into a stable democracy.
Washington should consider fostering regional trade cooperation
initiatives among Pakistan-India-Afghanistan that would encourage
Pakistan to allow India to transship goods destined for Afghanistan
reconstruction programs through its territory as stipulated in H.R.
2446. The U.S. could support a high-profile regional trade
initiative with Indian, Pakistani, and Afghan representatives
somewhere in the region that also involves participation by U.S.
companies currently involved in the Afghan reconstruction effort.
The U.S. will need to build up Pakistan's capacity to take
on the Taliban and al-Qaeda in the Tribal Areas and focus
substantial attention on developing these areas
economically. Washington must convince Islamabad to
work more closely in joint efforts that bring U.S. resources and
military strength to bear on the situation in North and South
Waziristan and employ a combination of targeted military operations
and economic assistance programs that drives a wedge between the
Pashtun tribal communities and the international terrorists.
A large-scale U.S. troop invasion of Pakistan's Tribal Areas could
have disastrous consequences for the Pakistani state and would not
provide a lasting solution to the problem. A more effective
strategy involves working cooperatively with Pakistan's military to
assert state authority over the areas and once they are secure,
provide substantial assistance to build up the economy and social
infrastructure. Washington's pledge of $750 million to
develop the tribal areas over the next five years is welcome but
the aid should not be delivered until it is clear the Pakistani
authorities have the upper hand in the region and can ensure the
aid does not fall into the wrong hands. This will require
U.S. access to the region and a clear commitment from the Pakistan
government to counter Taliban ideology.
USAID has implemented assistance programs in the FATA for
several years, including road building and school construction, and
through opium cultivation eradication programs that were successful
in the 1980s. Although the U.S. will have to provide aid
initially through Pakistani government channels, USAID should seek
out potential NGOs that could work in these areas so that
eventually it can work through them rather than relying solely on
the local administration.
The U.S. should conduct counterinsurgency training programs for
the Pakistan military, especially the Frontier Corps, whose troops
know the terrain of the FATA, but have little counterinsurgency
training. This training will both build
trust and stronger ties between the U.S. military and its Pakistani
counterparts as well as better prepare the Pakistan Army to fight
al-Qaeda in the Tribal Areas.
To address rising Islamic extremism, Washington should
encourage the Pakistan government to enforce the rule of law
against militants who use the threat of violence to enforce
Taliban-style edicts and close down madrassahs that are teaching
hatred against the West that leads to terrorism.
Washington, in coordination with the United Kingdom and European
allies, should make clear to Pakistan that the Taliban do not have
a place in any future government in Afghanistan and that only those
who firmly renounce violence and participate in the current
political process will have a say in running the country.
The U.S. should refrain from conditioning assistance to
Pakistan as it sends a wrong signal at a time when we need to
demonstrate that the fight against terrorism is a joint endeavor
that benefits Pakistan as much as it does the U.S. and global
community. Given the abrupt cut-off of U.S. aid to
Pakistan in 1990 because of nuclear concerns, the U.S. lost
valuable leverage with Pakistani leaders and created a feeling of
mistrust between our two countries that still plagues the
relationship. Because of the 1990 aid cut-off, Pakistan views
the U.S. as a fickle partner that could exit the region at any
time. This lack of faith in U.S. commitment to the region
hurts our ability to garner the kind of counterterrorism
cooperation we require from the Pakistani government.
Pakistani soldiers are dying in the battle against terrorism and
average Pakistanis are beginning to question whether these
sacrifices are being made solely at the behest of the U.S. rather
than to protect their own country. Conditioning assistance
only fuels the idea that Pakistan is taking action to fight
terrorism under coercion, rather than to protect its own
citizens.
The U.S. should encourage the current transition to
civilian-led democratic rule, yet not try to micro-manage it from
Washington. The Pakistani people by and large do not
support extremist policies and would likely vote into power one of
the secular democratic parties so long as they have a range of
political choices and perceive the elections as transparent and
free.
Lisa A. Curtis is
Senior Research Fellow for South Asia in the Asian Studies Center
at The Heritage Foundation. These remarks were delivered
October 10, 2007, before the Armed Services Committee, U.S. House
of Representatives.