STATEMENT OF EDWIN
MEESE III
Ronald Reagan Distinguished Fellow in Public Policy and
Chairman, Center for Legal and Judicial Studies
The Heritage Foundation
Before the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
11 August 2004
Mr. Chairman and
Distinguished Members of the Committee:
I am honored to
testify before the Committee today and commend you for your
diligence in analyzing and implementing the report of the National
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (the "9/11
Commission").
As requested by
the Committee, I will present my views on the 9/11 Commission
Findings concerning "Sufficiency of Time, Attention, and Legal
Authority."
By way of
background, I served in the Administration of President Ronald
Reagan, during the first term as Counsellor to the President, the
senior position on the White House Staff, and during the second
term as Attorney General of the United States.
During both terms
I served as a member of the National Security Council and the
President's Cabinet. I also served as chairman of several major
inter-agency groups, including the National Drug Policy Board, the
Domestic Policy Council, and the Cabinet Council on Management and
Administration. I also served in the United States Army Reserve,
retiring as a Colonel, with most of my duty involved in the
Military Intelligence and Civil Affairs branches. During my career
I have served in several capacities in the law enforcement
community.
During the eight
years of the Reagan Presidency counterterrorism became a major
priority throughout the national security and law enforcement
element of the Administration, particularly the Department of
Justice. Incidents such as the hostage-taking aboard the ship
Achille Lara and the bombing of the Belle Disco café
in Germany are examples of the terrorist activities that posed
major challenges for the United States. As a result the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Hostage Rescue Team was specially
trained for counterterrorist operation. Also, we developed
specialized inter-agency counterterrorism teams that were deployed
overseas to instantly respond to terrorist incidents.
As Attorney
General, I spent a considerable portion of my time dealing with
counterterrorism matters. I regularly attended meetings of the
"Trevi Group," an organization of the ministers having law
enforcement authority within the nations that now make up the
European Union. Similar meetings were held regularly of the
Italian-American Working Group on Organized Crime, Drugs, and
Terrorism. I also held numerous bilateral meetings with my
counterparts in other nations around the world and engaged in
several official visits and briefings on the counterterrorism
resources of other countries, including the United Kingdom, Israel,
and Germany.
I provide this
information to indicate that even before 11 September 2001, there
was considerable national security and law enforcement attention
being given to counterterrorism in the United States. Obviously,
the threat has become much greater in subsequent years and the
tragedy of 11 September 2001 is unprecedented in our nation's
history. It is appropriate, therefore, to carefully consider the
recommendations of the 9/11 Commission and to determine how we can
improve our nation's capabilities of dealing with this menace. I
will confine my suggestions to three areas:
(1) The Management of the
Intelligence Community
(2) The Establishment of a
National Counterterrorism Center
(3) The Oversight Function
of Congress Concerning the Intelligence Community
At the outset, let
me suggest that the work upon which this Committee has embarked -
establishing the modern blueprint for national intelligence
activities, should be undertaken carefully and deliberately without
undue haste that might minimize the complexity and difficulty of
this task. As has been seen in the establishment of the Department
of Homeland Security, both the legislative efforts and the
subsequent organizational assimilation involved in major changes to
governmental structures indicates why great care must be taken in
such an endeavor. At the same time, the imminence of the threat is
great and this effort should proceed "with all deliberate speed,"
but with equally careful analysis and proscription.
The 9/11
Commission has recommended major changes in the management of the
Intelligence Community, specifically the establishment of a
National Intelligence Director (NID) who would be separate from the
head of the Central Intelligence Agency. I concur with this
recommendation and believe that the NID should have Cabinet-rank,
but not actually be a participating member of the Cabinet. The NID
should also report directly to the President but should not be a
member of the Executive Office of the President. The reason for
both of these recommendations is that the NID should be
high-ranking but independent of the immediate staff of the
President (or of any other agency in the Executive Branch) so that
the intelligence product will not suffer the possibility of
confusion with political objectives or be subject to attacks that
it is being manipulated to fit policy goals.
The NID should be
the principle intelligence advisor to the President and should also
have responsibility for the strategic and policy management of the
Intelligence Community. As advisor to the President the NID should
have regular access to the President and should occupy the position
as permanent advisor on the National Security Council currently
held by the "Director of Central Intelligence."
The NID should
have adequate staff to perform the management function of
developing intelligence policy, planning for intelligence
activities (including the allocation of roles and mission among the
various intelligence agencies), resources management (including
personnel and financial resources), and evaluation. The latter
function - systematically examining the capabilities,
effectiveness, and results of intelligence activities is an
important innovation, which has been lacking prior to the events of
11 September 2001.
The NID should
also be chairman of the National Intelligence Council, which is
composed of the heads of the 15 major intelligence agencies within
the federal government. This Council should be the primary entity
responsible for the coordination of intelligence activities, the
allocation of responsibilities, and the regular oversight of
intelligence operations. When issues cannot be resolved within the
Council, the NID should have the authority to make final decisions,
subject only to ultimate decision by the President should such a
decision be appealed by one of the agencies.
Questions have
arisen concerning the physical location of the NID. During prior
administrations, space has been provided within the Eisenhower
Executive Office Building for the Director of Central Intelligence
and additional space for the Intelligence Community is located not
far from the White House. These facilities should be made available
to the new NID, since the Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency (now a separate position) would be located at CIA
headquarters at Langley.
The 9/11
Commission has recommended the creation of a National
Counterterrorism Center (NCC), which would be responsible for
intelligence analysis and operational planning for all
counterterrorism activities. The Commission suggests that this new
Center report directly to the NID. However, the NID has
responsibility for all intelligence activities, many of which go
beyond counterterrorism, and to place upon him the burden of
day-to-day operations of the NCC would unduly interfere with his
overall management of the Intelligence Community. Accordingly, it
is recommended that the NCC be organizationally located within the
Department of Homeland Security, since its functions are directly
related to the responsibilities of that Department.
Finally, the
responsibility and structure of Congressional activity for
counterterrorism should be addressed by this Committee. As has been
pointed out by numerous authorities, including the 9/11 Commission,
there are presently several committees in each house of Congress,
which have some responsibility for legislative activity relating to
intelligence. In the interest of both efficiency and effectiveness,
and to focus authority and responsibility, there should be a single
committee in each house in which all legislative activity relating
to intelligence should be concentrated.
I hope that these
initial suggestions will be helpful to the Committee as it goes
about its important work. I would be happy to provide additional
information in response to any questions the Committee might have
about the 9/11 Commission Report, its recommendations, and these
suggestions.
Thank you
for the opportunity to make this presentation before your
Committee.