Testimony before the
Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific / House International
Relations Committee -
United
States House of
Representatives
Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen:
Thank you for providing me with the opportunity to address the
Subcommittee. Central Asia has re-emerged as a focus of American
foreign policy since the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, and new,
fascinating countries have emerged from under the rubble of the
empire.
Five Countries in Search of a Definition. American
policymakers have at times failed to appreciate the complexity of
Central Asia, with its multi-layer mosaic of history, culture, and
religion. Four of the region's countries are Turkic speaking, while
the Tajiks speak a language closer to Farsi. The populations vary
in their degree of piety, as well as in their attitude toward
Russia and Turkey. The concept of statehood is weak throughout
Central Asia, and appears to be strongest in Uzbekistan. The first
challenge to U.S. policymakers is to understand each country and
its interrelations with its neighbors and the regional powers. It
is necessary to grasp the individual nature of these countries and
even sub-regions, rather than viewing Central Asia as "part of the
former Soviet Union," the "near abroad" of Russia, or "part of the
Moslem world."
When one measures the distances from Tashkent or Bishkek, the
capital of Kyrgystan, to nearby cities, or when one compares flight
times to regional capitals, it becomes clear that the "near abroad"
of Uzbekistan is Afghanistan, Iran, China, and Pakistan, or perhaps
Turkey¾ not only Russia. Since time immemorial, Central Asia
has attracted conquerors¾ from Alexander the Great to
Genghis Khan to Timur the Great, to the Russian czars and
comissars. Today, the U.S. is striving to promote peace, stability,
sovereignty, and the security of the five Central Asian states.
The Engine for Prosperity? Oil could be an engine of
economic development for the Central Asian states. Revenues from
oil transit and downstream industries, such as petrochemicals, are
desperately needed by the governments of Central Asia to help
propel their impoverished societies toward prosperity in the 21st
century. However, the economic viability of the Central Asia
ventures depend upon oil and natural gas prices. What made economic
sense when oil was $20/barrel became infeasible if the current
price range for oil persists. If the Gulf States maintain prices
below $15- $18/barrel, the question of whether significant progress
can be achieved would perhaps best be answered by an oil economist.
One thing is clear¾ the development of Central Asia could
provide lucrative business opportunities to American companies.
Table One below indicates the distribution of oil reserves in
the Caspian region.
Table One: Estimates of Recoverable
Oil and Gas Resources in the Caspian Region
| |
Proven
oil
Billion bbl
|
Possible
oil |
Total |
Proven
gas
Trillion cubic
m
|
Possible
gas |
Total |
|
Azerbaijan |
3.6 |
27.0 |
31 |
0.3 |
1.0 |
1.3 |
|
Kazakstan |
10.0 |
85.0 |
95.0 |
1.5 |
2.5 |
4.0 |
|
Turkmenis |
1.5 |
32.0 |
33.5 |
4.4 |
4.5 |
8.9 |
|
Uzbekistan |
0.2 |
1.0 |
1.2 |
2.1 |
1.0 |
3.1 |
|
Russia |
0.2 |
5.0 |
5.0 |
NA |
NA |
NA |
|
Iran |
NA |
12.0 |
12.0 |
0 |
0.3 |
0.3 |
|
Total |
15.6 |
163 |
178 |
8.3 |
9.3 |
17.6 |
Table Two: Current and Future
Pipelines in the Greater Caspian Region
|
Name |
Route
|
Capacity,
barrel/day |
Length/Status |
| AIOC Early oil
(South- North)
|
Baku- Novorossiysk via Grozny |
120,000+ |
1000 mi / Russian side
functional |
| AIOC Early oil
(East- West)
|
Baku- Supsa via
Tbilisi
|
120,000+ expandable to 500,000 |
550 mi / under
construction |
| AIOC Main Export Pipeline
(MEP)
|
Undecided; preferable via Turkey |
1,000,000 |
over 2,000 mi / decision
pending |
| Caspian Pipeline Consortium
(CPC) |
Kazkstan/Tengiz-
Novorossiysk
|
1,340,000 |
1,500 mi /under construction |
| Turkmenistan-
Afghanistan-
Pakistan oil and gas pipelines
|
Gas: Dauletabad gas field to Central
Pakistan; oil: from Chardzhou, Turkmenistan to Gwadar,
Pakistan |
1,000,000 and
2 billion cubic feet/day
|
gas pipeline: 872 mi;
oil pipeline - over 800 mi /
The war in Afghanistan stalled
construction and the consortium dissolved
|
| Kazakstan- China (oil);
Turkmenistan-
China (oil)
|
Western Kazakstan;
Eastern Turkmenistan
|
TBA |
3,700 mi /
feasibility study pending
|
| Central Asia- Turkey (gas) |
Kazakstan, Turkmenistan,
Azerbaijan |
TBA |
Approx. 1,300 mi. / pending
decision on the status of the Caspian Sea |
| Iran- Turkey |
Northern Iran to Eastern Turkey |
10 bcm/yr over 23 years |
Contract signed; financing
unclear |
| Cross-Caspian (oil and
gas) |
Turkmenbashi (East
Turkmenistan)¾
Baku- Supsa; Tengiz- Baku
|
TBA |
1,000 mi / pending decision on the
status of the Caspian Sea |
Source for both tables: U.S. Department of State.
REGIONAL POWERS IN CENTRAL ASIA
For a time (1992- 1995), Russia was thought to be in the process
of recapturing a dominant position in its Southern tier, the
Caucasus and Central Asia, but the effort foundered. Russia found
itself caught between its inflated ambitions and declining
capabilities. The redistribution and privatization of the Soviet
wealth, plummeting military budgets, internal turmoil, and
competing visions of Russia's future among its political and policy
elites have all contributed to Russia's inability to restore the
empire by force. Many of the tremendous resources once commanded by
the USSR are now in the hands of private citizens and interests
whose agendas do not necessarily include the restoration of old
order in Central Asia.
Russia's expensive and prolonged involvement in Tajikistan
indicates that the lofty rhetoric about Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS) integration remains just that, and that the human and
economic resources and willingness to sacrifice which would be
needed to cobble the empire back together are lacking. Prime
Minister Evgenii Primakov has said much about Russia's
"multi-vectored and multi-faceted policy," made much of Russia as a
great power, and laid claims concerning the "objective processes of
integration" of the areas contained within the former Soviet Union
under Russian leadership. Nevertheless, the southern New
Independent States (the "NIS")¾ including Central
Asia¾ have been looking West (and East, and South) to break
the mold of post-imperial dependency.
Russia would like to prevent the NIS from exporting energy
resources to deny these countries the cash flows needed to build
independence. Failing that, Russian oil interests will seek to
direct the export routes and pipelines through Russian
territory¾ for their own financial benefit as well as
Moscow's strategic advantage. There is certainly room for Russian
oil and gas companies to play a role in the future development of
the hydrocarbon resources and the economies of the Southern NIS.
However, both the West and the governments of the NIS have a common
interest in warding off Russian attempts to impose hegemony by
playing an irresponsible role in promoting ethnic conflicts, or
preventing their speedy and peaceful resolution.
The elites of the region, having tasted independence, and lured
by the prestige of their own flags, UN seats, and ministerial and
ambassadorial titles, have no desire to revert to the status of
provincial overseers for the Kremlin. Now, with expectations of oil
wealth, they may fight tooth and nail to preserve their
independence and access to their lands' natural resources. However,
when states fail or are very weak, as in the case of Tajikistan or
Kyrgystan, elites become more receptive to interference from
outside powers.
Iran's Challenge. There are other powers coveting the
region and its resources. Iran sees the Central Asian states and
Azerbaijan as its potential sphere of influence and its strategic
rear. Central Asia and the Caucasus are perceived in Tehran as a
market for both its goods and its ideology. Moreover, Iran would
like to profit from transit fees from the traffic of energy
resources exported to the Persian Gulf via Iranian territory.
However, the mullahs are treading softly. Thus far, Tehran, with
its militant Islamic Shi'ite ideology, has been contributing money
to rebuild the mosques and religious educational institutions
neglected during the Soviet era. To date, there is little evidence
of Iranian political sedition or terrorism in the region.
Meanwhile, the secular governments of Central Asia, aware of the
explosive potential of religious extremism, are keeping a tight
leash on Iranian activities. The elites of the NIS are aware of the
popular discontent of the Iranian society and do not wish to follow
the example of the corrupt and bureaucratic theocracy next
door.
Geographically, Iran is very attractive as an outlet for Caspian
(Kazakhstani and Azerbaijani) oil and Turkmenistani gas. Small
amounts of Kazakstani and Azeri oil brought by barge across the
Caspian Sea are already entering the Iranian pipeline system in the
north of the country, while offset sales are being performed from
the Iranian oil terminal at Kharg Island in the Persian Gulf.
Turkmenistan has built a railroad connecting its network to Iran
and is actively exploring gas exporting options via Iranian
territory. Energy-starved Turkey¾ an important U.S.
ally¾ has negotiated a $20 billion gas pipeline project to
bring Iranian and Turkmeni gas to its fast-growing economy, and
further to the world markets in 1996 under former Islamic Prime
Minister Necmettin Erbakan. However, that project may be abandoned
in favor of a trans-Caspian option via Azerbaijan and Georgia. The
shortest (and therefore cheapest) pipelines would go from the
Caspian Sea south to the Gulf. However, this direction is
undesirable from the American point of view given Iran's persistent
support of terrorist organizations in the Middle East, its export
of Islamic revolution to neighboring states, and its active efforts
to become a nuclear power armed with ballistic missiles. It may
also be problematic, as it will choke most of the world's energy
reserve in the politically highly unstable area where the
geopolitical "tectonic plates" of Iran and Iraq, and Shi'a and
Sunni Islam, are colliding. On the other hand, the Gulf does have
advantages of developed oil refining and port infrastructure, and
the oil companies are certainly lured by cheaper exporting
infrastructure.
The sanctions imposed by the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act,
sponsored by Sen. Alfonse D'Amato (R- N.Y.) and Rep. Benjamin
Gilman (R- N.Y.) forbid significant investment in projects which
would either enhance the Iranian oil and gas system or benefit the
current regime. It is in the interest of America and the West to
deny Iran markets, revenues, and freedom of maneuver in Central
Asia until such time as it abandons its anti-American and
anti-Western position.
Geopolitical Pluralism? The challenge for U.S. policy for
the next century is to keep conquerors away from Central
Asia¾ and to foster regional cooperation between the states,
as well as between the regional players: Russia, Iran, Turkey,
China, India, and Pakistan. The multipolar world about which
Russian Prime Minister Primakov likes to pontificate has
surfaced¾ right next to Russia, in Central Asia. Different
players from the region are pursuing their own economic and
geopolitical agendas.
Because of its sheer size and might, China will loom
increasingly large in Central Asia. To date, it has chosen to treat
the region as its strategic rear while it focuses on the Pacific
Ocean, absorbs Hong Kong, and challenges Taiwan. The 1996 Shanghai
agreement with Russia and the Central Asian countries solidified
Beijing's position while keeping the door open for Chinese economic
penetration of the area. Yet Beijing is interested in keeping the
restless Islamic Turkic Uighur minority in Western China under
control, and is pursuing good relations with the Turkic Central
Asian countries accordingly. China recently signed a troop
reduction agreement with its Central Asian neighbors and Russia
that will allow it to concentrate greater military power in the
South.
Until the Asian economic crisis, the Chinese economy was
attractive enough to spur projects to build the longest gas
pipeline in the world, from Western Kazakhstan to the Xinjiang
province in China. The Chinese national gas company has already
acquired several fields in Kazakstan. If it comes to fruition, this
pipeline may be attractive for consumers further East, in South
Korea and Japan. However, questions abound regarding both the
technical feasibility and the financing for such an ambitious
project, especially if the Chinese economy does not resume its
previous growth rates of 7- 8 percent a year.
Another emerging market, Pakistan, is trying to gain access to
Central Asian energy resources. Through its support of the Taliban
radical Islamic movement, Pakistan hoped to gain control of
Afghanistan. Due to close relations between Pakistan and the U.S.,
Central Asians saw Taliban as enjoying American support. This is a
challenge the U.S. policymakers need to address. Politically and
morally, America cannot afford to be associated with a medieval
fundamentalist Islamic movement which commits the worst human
rights abuses and is supporting itself through drug trafficking.
While the war was raging, plans were laid to build an oil and gas
pipeline to Pakistan, and possibly further, to India. In the long
run, gas pipelines may be built from Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan to
Pakistan. One pipeline may run from Dauletabad field in Southern
Turkmenistan to Central Pakistan. If peace in Afghanistan prevails,
this pipeline would also be beneficial to the people of
Afghanistan, bringing jobs and infrastructure development, such as
roads, railroads, airports, and hospitals, to that much-suffering
country. Energy companies have also suggested a concurrent oil
pipeline. Unfortunately, because of the ongoing conflict, the
prospects for such a pipeline remain grim, and the consortium led
by the American UNOCAL and Saudi Arabian Delta folded as the
hostilities dragged on.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The flow of commerce, investment, and communication in Central
Asia is changing. Formerly dominated by Russia, the region is
opening up to the world. Provided commodities prices recover, this
will be a rapid and transforming process which is going to change
the nature and character of the area, making it much more dynamic.
Currently, railroads between Turkmenistan and Iran, Kyrgyzstan,
Uzbekistan, and China, and highways between these countries and
China, Pakistan, and India, are being constructed. The volume of
telephone calls and first-class mail from Central Asia to Russia is
dropping drastically, while contacts with the U.S., the EU states,
Turkey, Iran, China, Japan, and Korea are growing. However, to
efficiently develop the East- West the Silk Road¾ a
transportation corridor from the Chinese border to Western Europe
and the Middle East¾ the cooperation of not only the Central
Asian states, but also the countries of the Caucasus, such as
Azerbaijan and Georgia, will be needed. New railroads connecting to
trans-Caspian and cross-Black Sea ferries, and in the future
pipelines to China, Korea, and Japan, will have to be constructed
at a great cost.
Another ambitious project under consideration is the gas
pipeline from Eastern Turkmenistan to the Pacific Coast of China.
If built, this would be the longest pipeline in the world (3,700
miles). It is being considered by a consortium which includes Esso
China (Exxon), Mitsubishi (Japan), and China National Petroleum Co.
An oil pipeline from Western Kazakstan is also being considered
along the same route.
Turkey is interested in diversifying its sources of natural gas
away from Russia, which currently supplies 85 percent of its
fast-growing needs. Turkey would like to import 10 billion cubic
meters of natural gas over 23 years from Iran. However, the
pipeline for this project has neither been constructed nor
financed. Turkmenistan could have been an alternative for Iranian
gas if a cross-Caspian pipeline, possibly along the Baku- Supsa and
Baku- Ceyhan route, is built.
The Silk Road Blueprint. The countries of the region,
together with the U.S., Western Europe. and regional players, are
interested in cooperating on the development of a transportation
and communications corridor stretching from the Chinese border to
Georgia, and further across the Black Sea into Europe. To ensure
railroad linkages between Europe and the Caucasus and Central Asia,
railway-capable ferries need to be deployed in the ports of Batumi,
Poti, and Novorossiysk on the Eastern shore of the Black Sea, and
in the ports of Odessa (Ukraine), Constanta (Romania), and Burgas
(Bulgaria). Similar ferries may connect the Turkmen port of
Turkmenbashi with the European side of the Caspian to allow railway
cars to travel all the way to Central Asia, and eventually to
China. A network of modern highways with accompanying
infrastructure is still to be built in the region. Airports are
antiquated and require a major capital investment. Fiber optic
cables needs to be deployed to ensure high-quality voice and data
communication for the oil and petrochemical industries and emerging
market economies in the Caucasus and Central Asia. This massive
undertaking cannot occur without a substantial private-sector
investment. The European Union is promoting its TRACECA
(Transportation Central Europe- Central Asia) project, giving an
advantage to European companies. However, these are the areas in
which American companies have a competitive edge and are capable of
greatly contributing to economic growth in the region.
Conditions for Economic Growth. In order to ensure that
the economies of the Southern NIS eventually take off, vast social
reforms and institution building need to be undertaken. It will be
crucial to ensure that the wealth benefits wide strata of the
Central Asian societies and is not siphoned off out of the country
by a narrow and corrupt circle of high-level government officials,
their cronies, and family members. Unfortunately, there signs that
this is exactly what may happen. These societies need to develop
the rule of law in order to provide for transparency, contract
enforcement, and effective dispute resolution. They need to develop
market institutions. Governments must improve wealth distribution
and conditions for investment, foreign and domestic.
Without the rule of law, economic growth in the region will be
limited to the foreign-managed energy sector alone. The
trickle-down effect of the energy boom will be minimal, and will be
beneficial only to a narrow elite. Stability and political
development will suffer. To avoid this, the conditions for local
and foreign investment in downstream production and other sectors
of the economy must be created.
The region has a high rate of endemic crime and corruption, with
venal and inefficient law enforcement organizations. To ensure
economic growth, the national governments have to implement
anti-corruption campaigns and upgrade and train law enforcement
units. In addition, economic regulations should be simplified to
deny bureaucrats the opportunity to extract bribes. The U.S. can
help these countries to adjust their system of government to the
demands of the 21st century.
Both the local governments and the West should encourage the
development of free and open media, as well as non-government
organizations (NGOs) which partially supplant the "mommy" state and
promote individual rights. Western investors and local governments
should support education and training of the indigenous workforce
in order to allow it to acquire the new skills necessary for
functioning in the market economy.
North- South or East- West? The Central Asian region is
facing a dilemma: It can choose the economically more promising
trade flows moving in the East- West direction through the Caucasus
to Western Europe and the Mediterranean. Or it can rely on Iran and
Russia, the traditional regional hegemons, thus furthering trade in
the North- South direction.
East- West is the preferable route for the Southern NIS, as
neither the U.S. nor the Western countries will pursue the
heavy-handed tactics that both Moscow and Iran have in the past.
The West is interested in independence and the development of the
Central Asian states as this meshes with its foreign policy and
security interests. Furthermore, East- West trade flows would
ensure access for the Southern NIS to Western capital markets and
technological prowess, as well as allowing Western companies to
develop local markets in goods and services for the benefit of
local consumers. Local elites could be educated based on Western
know-how, thus leapfrogging a generation of government, legal, and
technological skills which were formerly imported from the USSR.
Still, rich histories, cultural achievements, and the Turkic and
Islamic roots of most of the countries in the region must be
cherished and appreciated by Westerners as they engage the Moslem
Eurasians in trade and cooperation.
If the North- South trade prevails, the local elites will be
further split, some preferring the Islamic orientation of Iran
while others look North to Moscow's blend of lawlessness and robber
baron capitalism. The ensuing clash of civilizations may exacerbate
already existing fault lines in these multi-ethnic,
multi-religious, and ethnically diverse countries. For example, the
educated Russian minorities in Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, and
Kyrgyzstan play an important role in the region's economic
development and governance. In short, while East- West trade flows
guarantee a win-win situation for the southern NIS, North- South
trade may turn the region into a Russian- Iranian condominium,
exacerbate religious conflicts, suppress the independence of the
new states, stem the growth of secular civic societies, and hinder
economic development.
LOCAL CONFLICTS¾ ROADBLOCKS ON
PIPELINE ROUTES
There are a number of local regional conflicts that need to be
resolved in order to secure the flow of oil from Central
Asia to the Caspian, to the Black Sea, and further to the
Mediterranean. The most important among them is the Azerbaijani-
Armenian conflict over Karabakh. It is my opinion that the
sanctions against Azerbaijan contained in Section 907 of the 1992
Freedom Support Act must be lifted to provide American neutrality
in the conflict and enhance our position as a mediator. The other
co-chairs of the Minsk Group, Russia and France, do not apply
sanctions to Azerbaijan.
In addition, there is the ongoing dispute about the status of
the Caspian Sea¾ whether it is a lake or a sea, and the
legal status of the territorial waters and economic zones of the
littoral states. This discord greatly affects the security of
investments in the Caspian Sea oil exploration and rights of way
for pipelines that in the future may criss-cross the bottom of the
Caspian.
The civil war in Tajikistan, tragic as it is, affects oil and
gas transportation issues to a lesser degree. However, as long as
it continues, it provides a justification for the 30,000-strong
Russian CIS-sponsored expeditionary force stationed in the area.
This tragic war has demonstrated the civic weakness of Tajikistan
and laid bare its clan and regional rifts. It has also caused over
500,000 refugees to spill over into Central Asia and beyond.
Last but not least, the war in Afghanistan, started by the
Soviets in 1979, has left millions killed and wounded. It also has
blocked the possibility of constructing oil and gas pipelines from
Central Asia to Pakistan and India. Recent accords in Ashghabad
(March 1999) fail to provide for a coalition government in Kabul
necessary for the cessation of hostilities.
DEMOCRATIZATION
The U.S. is dealing with a number of conflicting objectives in
the region. On the one hand, America is trying to provide
stability, but on the other, it seeks to promote democracy and
human rights. Authoritarian rulers tend to believe that they
furnish stability, thus answering one of America's primary
objectives. They are often quite surprised when the Department of
State criticizes their human rights records. Unfortunately,
countries in the region have not been paragons of virtue when it
comes to political freedom, free elections, free press, and the
preservation of human rights. The leaders of Turkmenistan,
Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan have not conducted elections
that were recognized as free and fair by international observers.
The leaders of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have disqualified bona
fide presidential challengers and dominated mass media. In 1995,
President Nazarbaev shut down the Parliament of his country and got
a more malleable one elected. Kazakhstani presidential election
deadlines were arbitrarily shifted in 1998. Police in most Central
Asian countries often harass oppositionists and democratic
activists. The free media, where allowed to exist, often work in
very difficult conditions.
The U.S. government must put more pressure on the regimes in the
region and educate the top leaders to the notion that in the long
run, it is the participation of the society, its stake in the
economy, and its free economic and political development which
makes their countries strong. In those cases where flagrant
violations are taking place, the U.S. should strongly condemn the
culprits and clarify that U.S. assistance will be on the line if
the violations do not stop.
CRIME, CORRUPTION, AND DRUGS
Undoubtedly, Central Asia is a tough neighborhood. A flood of
drugs is either flowing in from neighboring Afghanistan or being
grown and processed locally, corrupting law enforcement and
government officials, breeding organized crime, and contaminating
the weak fabric of the local societies. Even without the drug
problem, these societies have suffered from indigenous corruption
for centuries. Corruption undermines the legitimacy of local
governments, weakening their authority and opening the door for
militant and radical Islam. The U.S. government needs to assist
local authorities with the development of realistic and viable
anti-corruption measures, cooperate in anti-drug activities, train
local anti-drug forces, and monitor the most vicious organized
crime syndicates.
ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALISM
Usama Bin Ladin and his terrorists are less than one hour away
from some Central Asian capitals by plane. Yet when Uzbek
government officials brought their concerns about the Bin Ladin
Afghanistan-based operations to U.S. executive branch
decision-makers two years ago, they were not taken seriously,
according to Uzbek diplomatic sources. I do not know whether this
claim is true. However, while militant Islam, including
anti-establishment Wahabbi sects, is a concern, the fight against
it cannot be used by local authorities to justify major violations
of human rights and due process. Mass arrests are not a substitute
for good intelligence and law enforcement work. Excessively
oppressive governments may push young unemployed males into the
waiting hands of the Hezbollah recruiters and other militants.
CONCLUSION
Central Asia is in the midst of a revolutionary
transformation¾ economic, political, and cultural. The
peoples of the region look forward to partaking in the global
economic game and in modernization, the fruits of which were denied
to them by the strict controls of the Soviet regime and by
geographic isolation. Unfortunately, their progress may be blocked
or hindered by collapsed commodity prices. The issue of violent and
militant Islam¾ be it of the Shi'ite Iranian or Sunni
Taliban variety¾ will also need to be addressed. Vestiges of
great power imperialism (of the 19th century vintage or otherwise)
will need to be abandoned. The U.S. should encourage governments in
the region to observe human rights and fulfill their obligations
under Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
documents and norms.
An important challenge for the governments of the region, as
well as for the world powers, is to manage the process of
constructing the Silk Road in a cooperative manner, to prevent
competition which might result in violent conflict, and to ensure
access for all domestic and foreign parties to the riches of the
region. The U.S. should be involved in all stages of building that
road.
Ariel
Cohen, Ph.D. is a Senior Policy Analyst, of The Russian
and Eurasian Studies, Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis International
Studies Center, The Heritage Foundation,