Workplace Enforcement to Combat Illegal
Migration:
Sensible Strategy and Practical Options
By James Jay Carafano, Ph.D.
Testimony to the U.S. House of Representatives
Committee on Government Reform and Subcommittee on
Regulatory Affairs
Mr. Chairman and other
Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to provide
testimony on this important issue. I would like to focus my remarks
on workplace verification in light of the proposed border security
and immigration enforcement laws proposed in the House and the
Senate. As you all know, the U.S. economy includes a significant
number of unlawfully present workers who are undocumented and
unaccounted for. Research by the Government Accountability Office
(GAO) indicates an alarming degree of collaboration on the part of
employers in hiring illegal workers.
This excessive acceptance of a shadow workforce encourages illegal
border crossings, encourages other companies to break the law, and
forces states and local communities to subsidize cheap, illegal
labor by bearing social costs such as uncompensated emergency room
care, education, and social services.
Both the House and the
Senate have proposed legislation for strengthening work place
enforcement. Both envision using the Basic Pilot program, created
in 1996 under the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility, as a principle tool for denying unlawfully present
workers employment.
This approach fails on a three counts:
-
It is unlikely that
Basic Pilot will prove to be an effective tool;
-
The implementation of
the program will place excessive and unnecessary burdens on the
U.S. economy; and
-
There are practical and
more effective means to enhance workplace enforcement.
I propose an enforcement
strategy that could be implemented without creating more government
and a huge and expensive information technology program. This
strategy could be implemented by revising U.S. tax codes to
facilitate cooperation between federal agencies in enforcing the
law. I propose amending the tax code in a way that will protect
privacy rights and still allow the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), with the cooperation of the Social Security Administration
and Internal Revenue Service (IRS), to find those large employers
who intentionally violate the law by hiring illegal workers and
giving the government incorrect information. In this testimony, I
will: (1) review the Basic Pilot program, (2) highlight the federal
government's role in establishing regulations according to U.S.
laws; and (3) suggest policies and changes to existing policies
necessary to implement these regulations.
What's Wrong with the
Basic Pilot Program?
The Basic Pilot program
was created in 1996 as a part of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act-along with the Citizen Attestation
Verification Pilot, and the Machine Readable Document Pilot-with
the purpose of electronically verifying the employment legitimacy
of newly hired employees. One year later it was implemented in the
five states with the largest immigrant populations (California,
Florida, Illinois, New York, and Texas) in order to test its
ability at detecting false claims to U.S. citizenship, fraudulent
documents, and stolen identities.
Basic Pilot requires
employers to send the work information of all newly hired employees
to the Social Security Administration (SSA) and to the former
Immigration and Naturalization Service for work authorization. For
each newly hired worker, the employer must first tap, via computer,
into the SSA database to verity the worker's social security
number. If the number matches the information in the SSA records,
the worker is a U.S. citizen and no further action is required. If
the worker has immigrant status, the employer must use the DHS
database for further information, and if that information matches
the DHS records, the employee may continue to work. In the case
that the employer's information for the new employee does not match
SSA or DHS records, the employer is responsible for giving the
employee written notice of that fact. If the worker does not
contest his non-confirmation status with SSA or DHS, the notice
becomes final and the employer is required to fire the worker.
In June of 2002, at
Congress' request, the Institute for Survey Research at Temple
University and Westat evaluated Basic Pilot's competency from the
three perspectives of employers, employees, and federal agencies.
In evaluating Basic Pilot's ability to reduce fraudulent claims,
the evaluation team concluded that about 10 percent of cases
submitted to Basic Pilot were undocumented workers, not including
those who were deterred from applying to Basic Pilot employers at
the risk of getting caught. They also discovered that most
employers engaged in prohibited practices. For example, 73 percent
of employees who should have been informed of work authorization
problems never received notice of non-confirmation from their
employers.
Essentially, Basic Pilot
could not and cannot identify imposters or stop unauthorized
workers from creating false documentation, nor can it hinder
employers from illegally hiring unauthorized
workers.
The evaluation team also
found that Basic Pilot does not protect against privacy violations.
According to the 2002 report, the current design of the system does
not prevent employers from illegally accessing employee
information. The cost of the program has also become a burden for
many employers, who cannot afford the $500 annual cost for
operating the program. Those expenses do not include the
approximately $10 million the federal government spent to set up
the Basic Pilot program.
Although Basic Pilot is
"potentially a valid concept," it cannot be implemented on a large
scale. As
a volunteer program, Basic Pilot already has some constraints.
Building the infrastructure for a government electronic information
system to handle millions of transactions itself is costly enough.
The necessary training, insurance for loss or leakage of data,
oversight, and redress would cost millions more and take years to
implement.
Additionally, Basic Pilot
does not address the principle means illegal workers use to get
jobs. There are many ways an undocumented worker can get around the
issue of work authorization.
These include:
-
using fraudulent
documents;
-
using information that
belongs to another, thereby committing identity theft; and
-
being hired by an
employer who does not follow the law.
Basic Pilot did not prove
efficient at eliminating any of these. Basic Pilot cannot stop
undocumented workers from falsifying information or using someone
else's information, thereby disallowing those legitimate workers,
whose information was stolen, the authorization to work.
Furthermore, trying to
enforce and make mandatory a worker verification system to ensure
that every unlawfully present individual is denied a job would
unnecessarily hamper American business and the U.S. economy. To
work lawfully in the United States, those who are not U.S. citizens
must receive DHS authorization. A national-level Basic Pilot
program would question the legitimacy of documented workers' right
to work. Even a small percentage of stolen identities would
negatively affect millions of Americans with a legitimate right to
work, which could result in a dramatic loss of billions of dollars
in industrial productivity.
Additionally, building a
government information system to handle transactions could fall
prey to a plethora of problems-technological failures, violation of
privacy rights, and leaked information are just some among the many
costs taxpayers would have to bear.
For all its other
shortfalls, Basic Pilot fails most because it represents a bad
strategy. It is:
-
Unnecessary.
Undocumented workers are not distributed uniformly throughout the
economy. They are concentrated in a few sectors, including
construction, agriculture, and some service industries. Saddling
the entire economy with the costs of electronic verification makes
no sense.
-
Inefficient.
Given the often inaccurate and outdated data in SSA records, as
well as limited technology, chances are that a small percentage of
false records would affect millions of Americans who have a
legitimate right to work. This would also cause an unacceptable
loss of productivity totaling in the billions of dollars.
-
Intrusive. The
program would run afoul of legitimate privacy concerns. Both the
government and employers would have access to massive databases of
information, which would surely induce/incite some to traffic in
identity theft.
-
Costly. An
electronic verification of every single U.S. worker would end up
costing a lot. Not only would the infrastructure of building a
technology system that could handle millions of transactions be
expensive, but providing training, insurance, oversight, and
redress would take years to implement and be incredibly expensive.
If any data was lost, or leaked, more unwanted privacy issues would
occur.
What Is the Right
Strategy?
The right strategy would
give DHS the resources and authority to target large-scale
employers in the sectors of the economy where undocumented workers
are most present (e.g., agriculture, services industries, and
construction). It would provide a complement of incentives and
enforcement measures to wean employers off of the shadow workforce.
And it would be a set of tools that could be implemented quickly,
so that in conjunction with increased border enforcement and legal
alternatives for South-North migration, the government can redress
the balance between the attractiveness of legal and illegal entry
into the United States now-not years from now.
The Department of Homeland
Security has already taken a step in the right direction. In an
effort to strengthen immigration enforcement, DHS recently expanded
its worksite enforcement efforts. In April 2006, DHS announced an
interior enforcement strategy that comprises increased efforts to
target employers who hire unauthorized workers and immigration
violators and who tap into criminal networks of illegal
immigration. DHS has been bringing criminal charges against these
offenders, rather than relying on administrative fines. The GAO
reports that DHS has increased its numbers of worksite enforcement
from 160 in 2004 to 176 in 2005, and its numbers of criminal
convictions from 87 to 160 over the same period. DHS plans on
expanding worksite enforcement manpower by 206 positions in 2007.
In addition to these
recent initiatives, past efforts at targeted workplace enforcement
have proven effective as well. The lesson is clear. Targeted
workplace enforcement works and it does not require millions of
dollars of new technology, more intrusive government, or expensive
new programs to make it happen.
What Has to Change?
Congress can help by
giving DHS the tools it needs gain effective interagency
cooperation with the SSA and the IRS. The top priority here must be
addressing the prohibition against sharing social security mismatch
data. Currently, Section 6103 of the Internal Revenue Code does not
allow the IRS to release any taxpayer information, even to other
government agencies for purposes of workplace verification.
According to the GAO report and the Temple University evaluation,
approximately 10 percent of Social Security numbers submitted by
employers do not match SSA master records.
Ten percent amounts to nearly nine million workers. Granted,
some mismatches are innocuous and result from misspelling, but most
have no other explanation than an employer's attempt to avoid the
law and hire undocumented workers.
The SSA and the IRS should
have to share information, such as to social security number
mismatches or identity thefts, with the Department of Homeland
Security. DHS has the authority to not only take action against
employers, but against illegal immigrants. If DHS is given access
to SSA and IRS information on cases of mismatched or stolen social
security numbers, DHS could better fulfill its immigration law
enforcement. Within a few years, DHS could feasibly target
one-third of the illegal workforce-close to five million
unauthorized workers.
In order to make the most
efficient use of Social Security mismatch information, DHS should
focus its enforcement efforts on worst offenders/abusers of that
system. The most practical way of dealing with fraud would be to
identify the employers who abuse the system in order to hire
illegitimate workers. While it may not be possible to track all of
the employers who turn a blind eye to the law, the worst violators
could easily be caught using the information they release to SSA.
Those who, according to GAO, give at least 10 new employees the
same social security number throughout a year obviously are in
collusion with their illegal workers and should be prosecuted for
non-compliance with the law.
Employers must also
respond to the mismatch letters from SSA when their employees'
information does not match master records. Most mismatches are
probably harmless, due to misspellings or name changes, but some
mismatches are intended to hide the employment of undocumented
workers. Employers who do not respond to SSA's non-confirmation
letters could be easily tracked. I believe cracking down on the
worst abusers of the system is the most efficient way of tracking
fraud and punishing it.
As part of the worksite
enforcement effort, Basic Pilot should continue to operate and
should remain a small scale, voluntary program. To render it more
useful for enforcement purposes, DHS should have the authority to
randomly investigate and audit employers who participate in the
program. (DHS does not currently have access to Basic Pilot
participant information.) Additionally, to make the program more
cost efficient and to alleviate the financial burden on employers,
Basic Pilot could utilize a protected Web-based system for
information submission. Basic Pilot offers one more tool for DHS to
employ in its efforts to enforce immigration policies.
One additional enforcement
measure would be to strengthen the tax code to restrict employers
to file the wages of illegal workers as tax-deductible. As part of
targeted enforcement, Congress should amend the tax code to remove
the tax-deductibility of wages paid to unauthorized aliens. This
would further strengthen the hand of DHS in securing the
cooperation of American businesses by creating the right incentives
for employers to hire through the legal channels.
Increasing civil penalties
for intentionally hiring illegal workers should also be
considered.
Additionally, DHS should
be able to establish "safe harbor" information-sharing systems and
other incentives to work with employers who are actively seeking to
reduce their reliance on undocumented workers.
To address privacy
concerns, DHS should assess the extent of information sharing it
needs from the SSA and the IRS, and establish how the information
will be utilized to conduct workplace enforcement. DHS also should
develop safeguards to protect taxpayer information against
misuse.
Immigration Reform Is Also
Required
Strengthening enforcement
of employer hiring practices is only one component of what should
be a comprehensive approach. Better border security is also
necessary. But just as important, legal opportunities for migration
have to be provided to give incentive to individuals not cross the
border illegally and to encourage employers to find legitimate
workers. This could include the creation of a temporary worker
program to meet the economic needs of the American economy. Some
undocumented workers are in America temporarily with the plan of
increasing their monetary assets and then returning home. A
temporary worker program would create the correct incentives for
these immigrants to apply for temporary documentation to work
legally in the U.S.
The job market should
determine the allocation of temporary guest workers, not the
government. However, if employers go to great lengths to hide some
of their illegal employees and give SSA false social security
numbers, odds are their business does depend on these immigrant
workers, and the demand will be relatively high. I believe the law
should also require compliance bonds for employers. Compliance
bonds would mandate that employers arrange for transportation and
the room and board of guest workers, which adds to the employer's
expenses if the guest workers were to overstay their visas. Over
time, this should create incentives for employers to ensure their
guest workers leave the U.S. at the end of their 10-month visa
term.
Any temporary worker
program should serve to strengthen, rather than undermine, the
value of citizenship and the health of civil society. In addition,
it must meet minimum security concerns, including appropriate
security, criminal, and health screening measures before
individuals enter the United States. No temporary worker program
should include amnesty. Individuals should have to return to their
place of origin to apply to legally enter the United States. This
is an essential deterrent to future illegal border crossing and
unlawful presence.
Thank you for the
opportunity to submit this testimony.
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