While the world's attention is focused on the
departure of elected despot President Jean-Bertrand Aristide from
Haiti, worse problems are brewing to the south. Venezuela's
controversial president, Hugo Chavez, is provoking citizen anger by
blocking a petition drive for a referendum on his dictatorial
rule.
Having rejiggered electoral regulations in his favor, Chavez risks
plunging Venezuela into a civil war. During the last week, his
troops have shot seven unarmed demonstrators to death, and Milos
Alcalay, his ambassador to the U.N., resigned in protest. Chavez is
betting that the Bush administration will not react, fearful that
he will cutoff petroleum exports to America and its allies.
But U.S. officials should not shrink from challenging this
bully.
They should bring his undemocratic actions before the Organization
of American States for debate, freeze accounts of law-breaking
Venezuelan officials, and negotiate alternate petroleum supply
arrangements with other countries. If they don't, Chavez will have
carte blanche to consolidate his authoritarian rule and destabilize
other governments and markets in the neighborhood.
Venezuela once prospered from its state oil industry. But over the
past 25 years, it has evaded market reforms and suffered steady
economic decline. In 1998, voters elected Chavez, a former
coup-plotter and cashiered Lieutenant Colonel, because he promised
- like Aristide in Haiti - to end corruption and lift up the
poor.
Instead, Chavez had the constitution rewritten to insure his stay
in power and bribed corrupt military officers to insure loyalty.
Venezuela now rivals Haiti in poverty and underemployment. While
the country's former middle class does not want to revisit past
failures, few want to see Venezuela turned into a Haitian slum or a
Cuban-style workers' paradise. But that seems to be the president's
intent.
Like Fidel Castro, Chavez has made the armed forces the lead
agency in Venezuela's government, isolating civilians as well as
municipal and departmental (state) officials. While local police
live in barrios and may be unwilling to harm their neighbors, the
army and national guard are protected by barracks and isolation
from civilian contact.
Cuban intelligence and security specialists now reportedly march
alongside soldiers, wearing Venezuelan uniforms and tattling on
dissenters. They have also helped train so-called "Bolivarian
Circles" partisan gangs that spy in neighborhoods, intimidate
opponents and enforce political loyalty.
Outside Caracas, his military units allow Colombian FARC
guerrillas to camp out and resupply in Venezuelan territory. And he
reportedly provides Bolivia's leftist coca union leader Evo Morales
with money and advice. Morales was partly responsible for the
ouster of President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in October
2003.
Ever since an uprising took Chavez temporarily out of power in
April 2002, he has been tightening the noose on his political
opponents. A year ago, citizens collected more than two million
signatures to petition a referendum on his rule. But Chavez halted
that effort, claiming that the existing National Electoral Council
(CNE) lacked authority to make a decision.
In late December, after a new, more partisan council drew up fresh
guidelines, opponents peacefully collected 3.4 million signatures,
more than the 2.4 million required for a referendum. Although
Chavez dismissed it as a "mega-fraud," he said he would accept the
council's evaluation.
Behind schedule in approving the petition, the CNE invented new
rules. On Feb. 24, it said that personal details, such as an
address written in by anyone other than the signer, would
invalidate signatures. Organization of American States (OAS) and
Carter Center observer teams both criticized "excessive
technicalities" challenging the will of the electorate. In fact,
most Latin American countries do not require anything more than a
signature to make a document legally binding.
On Feb. 27, the Chavez-dominated Electoral Council said that
petition organizers would have to ask some 800,000 signers to
reaffirm their signatures and provide fingerprints. Signers might
risk harassment from Chavez's Bolivarian mobs and loss of
government benefits - a gauntlet that could reduce the signature
count below the required 2.4 million. The council's minority
members walked out.
Now the referendum process is a waiting game to see which side
will kick over the table. Neither the OAS nor the Carter Center
have been willing to condemn the CNE or blame the Chavez regime for
fueling civic unrest. Consumed with Haiti, the Bush administration
has remained mum.
Failing to challenge Chavez could hasten a conflict between troops
and civilians fed up with his tricks and ruses. Or it could
embolden him to cut oil exports to the United States and its
Caribbean allies as well as destabilize other countries in the
region.
Instead of waiting for shoes to drop, those interested in saving
Venezuela's shrinking democratic space should stand on principle.
The OAS and the Carter Center should condemn Venezuela's electoral
council for changing the rules after the signatures were collected.
They should urge the National Assembly to impeach the council if it
will not reconsider its decision.
The Bush administration should build a case for suspending
Venezuela's membership in the OAS based on the regime's violation
of the Democratic Charter. It should also consider revoking visas
and freezing bank accounts of Venezuelan officials involved in
corruption and human-rights abuse.
Finally, Washington should start negotiating access to alternate
sources of petroleum in case Chavez shuts off supplies. If we want
Caribbean and Latin American allies to stand with us in protesting
his actions, we should insure that help is not hostage to
oil.
While none of these efforts will stop Chavez from implementing his
plans, they may keep him constrained, minimize the impact of his
actions, and encourage Venezuelan democrats not to lose hope.
First appeared on the National Review Online