Shaven-headed Deputy Secretary of State
Richard Armitage has the imposing physique of a professional
wrestler and is not usually pestered by inquisitive foreign
reporters. But on May 18, two Chinese-language television crews
stood in his way as he emerged from a Senate hearing room after a
grilling on the administration's strategy in Iraq. Rather than
barrel through the wall of microphones, betacams, and floodlamps,
one of the Chinese reporters told me later, the burly deputy
secretary stopped. Not used to such openness from Armitage, the TV
journalists bucked up their courage to ask what his views were on
the potentially controversial inauguration speech that the
re-elected Taiwan president was scheduled to give two days later.
Armitage pondered before replying.
"I believe President Chen Shui-bian will make a very erudite and
high-level speech," came the inimitable Armitage growl. "It will be
very lofty in its goals," he continued, before responding to a
question about Beijing's possible reaction: "I am quite positive he
will do nothing to inflame cross-strait tensions."
During his first term in office, Taiwan's president had been stung
by Washington's complaints that he had repeatedly and needlessly
antagonized China with his "independentist" speeches, and what's
worse, had not adequately communicated with Washington beforehand.
This time, Chen was sharing the draft text of his inauguration
speech with the U.S. government and seeking Washington's
imprimatur. In late April, Chen sent his
chief-of-staff and a team of prestigious Taiwan lawyers on an
unpublicized visit to Washington where they went over the speech
line-by-line with Bush administration officials and briefed them on
Chen's plans to pursue Taiwan's constitutional reforms.
The move paid off. With full knowledge of the text, Armitage was
unabashed in his willingness to comment on the substance and
erudition of the Taiwan president's speech two days before it
was to be given. Indeed, State Department China-Taiwan policy
officials were a tad surprised that the deputy secretary would
comment on a speech that a foreign head of state had not yet
delivered.
But they pointed out privately that China's rhetoric had ratcheted
up in the day before and it was important not to leave Beijing with
the impression that Washington viewed China's fulminations with
equanimity. The Chinese government issued a statement on May 17
denouncing the Taiwanese president as a man of "bad faith" and
threatening to "firmly and thoroughly crush any moves toward
independence." It warned the Taiwanese to "rein in the horse on the
brink of the precipice" or face "their own destruction by playing
with fire." To be fair, the Chinese had briefed the U.S. ambassador
in Beijing on their statement, so the U.S. was well prepared for
the blast.
Hence, Armitage's praise for the Taiwan president was carefully
considered. It was bolstered by a tough statement from White House
spokesman Scott McClellan, who averred that "threats to 'crush'
Taiwan or drown it in a 'sea of fire' have no place in civilized
international discourse."
The next morning, when the Taiwanese
president finally stood before a rain-soaked crowd of several tens
of thousands and delivered his speech, it was indeed "erudite" and
"lofty." He promised to "establish a dynamic 'peace and stability'
framework" with China "to guarantee there will be no unilateral
change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait." To underscore this
pledge, Chen "proposed" that the process of rewriting Taiwan's
constitution - a key plank in his re-election campaign platform -
exclude "issues related to national sovereignty, territory and the
subject of unification or independence." This, of course, was at
the center of the Bush administration's anxieties that the new
constitution would explicitly declare Taiwan independent from
China.
To mollify China, President Chen said Taiwan "would not exclude any
possibility" for a new relationship across the Taiwan Strait - "any
possibility" being a euphemism that includes unification with
China. "In the future," he said, "the Republic of China and the
People's Republic of China - or Taiwan and China - can seek to
establish relations in any form whatsoever." A new relationship
with China, however, could only be established "if both sides are
willing, on the basis of goodwill, to create an environment
engendered upon 'peaceful development and freedom of choice'"
and, of course, it needs "the consent of the 23 million people of
Taiwan."
These words were a relief to the Bush administration, but did not
assuage Beijing. "Chen Shui-bian has shown no sincerity to improve
relations," fumed Chinese government spokesman Zhang Mingqing.
Zhang demanded "if he has sincerity to improve relations, he must
acknowledge that Taiwan and mainland China together both belong to
a single country," and repeated the Communist government's
long-standing threat that China would "pay any price" to force
Taiwan's unification. Disregarding White House opinions about what
constitutes suitable "international discourse," Zhang again
promised to "thoroughly crush schemes for Taiwan
independence."
Most Taiwanese, even those who solidly support Taiwan's
independence, were uplifted by President Chen's speech - probably
for the same reason that the Chinese were livid. They and the
Beijing government agree on one thing: that (in Zhang's words) "the
content of the whole speech was completely about
Taiwan's status as an independent country".
And this was true. President Chen repeatedly equated "Taiwan" with
the "Republic of China" and at one point he even explicated that
"the Republic of China now exists in Taiwan, the Pescadores, Quemoy
and Matsu. This is a fact." He had been "mandated by the people of
Taiwan to defend the sovereignty, security and dignity of this
nation" and he dwelt at length on the need "to forge a strong will
to defend ourselves, proactively strengthening our defense
equipment and upgrading our self-defense capabilities."
Senior State Department officers assure me that these points were
not lost on the Bush administration. With Chen's narrow election
victory, Washington concedes that "Taiwan independence is now in
the mainstream." Supporting the expansion of democracy remains a
"pillar" of the Bush foreign policy, and in the administration no
thought is given to backing away from America's commitment to
Taiwan's democracy. Truth be told, the Bush administration has no
philosophical problem with the concept of an "independent Taiwan"
except that China threatens war - and threatens credibly - should
Taiwan take that
route.
While Washington had signaled Taipei that "there are limitations
with respect to what the United States will support as Taiwan
considers possible changes to its constitution" the Bush
administration is also telling Beijing that there are limits to its
"one China Policy."
In sworn testimony before Congress on April 21, Assistant Secretary
of State James Kelly admitted that "our one China policy" contained
"sometimes contradictory elements." Homing in on the core
contradiction between support for democracy in Taiwan and Communist
China's demand that the U.S. recognize the island as Chinese
territory, Rep. Grace Napolitano (D., Calif.) pressed Kelly for a
definition of "our One China policy."
Kelly was undiplomatically candid in his reply. "I'm not sure I
very easily could define it," he began, but he quickly added, "I
can tell you what it is not." "It is not," he said, "the One-China
principle that Beijing suggests," but he offered that "it does
convey a meaning of solidarity of a kind among the people on both
sides of the straits that has been our policy for a very long
time." Chen's speech echoed Kelly's by noting that "the peoples on
both sides share a common ancestral, cultural and historical
heritage." Chen even conceded that he "can understand why the
government on the other side of the Strait, in light of historical
complexities and ethnic sentiments, cannot relinquish the
insistence on the 'One China Principle.'"
But Chen warned that "if the other side continues to threaten
Taiwan with military force, if it persists in isolating Taiwan
diplomatically, if it keeps up irrational efforts to blockade
Taiwan's rightful participation in the international arena," the
Taiwanese will be further alienated and "the divide in the Strait"
will widen.
Kelly's redefinition of "our One China policy" in congressional
testimony was the first time an American administration has evinced
some appreciation for the profound political changes that have
unfolded on Taiwan since constitutional democratization on the
island began in 1991. And it was the first hint that the U.S. is
willing to speak in terms of "One China" that does not involve
anybody's claims to sovereign territory. McClellan's sharp rebuke
was the first time since the brutal Tiananmen crackdown of 1989
that any administration had suggested the Beijing regime was
"uncivilized." It was sharper, even, than President Bush's
complaints in December about Chen's willingness to "unilaterally"
change the status quo in the Strait.
The administration's new show of support for Taiwan's
democratically elected president as he moves into his second term
is a sign that its China policy is undergoing a reappraisal. In the
end, if Beijing's bellicosity in the Strait is to be moderated,
Washington's policies need consistency and firmness. And in the
end, if Taiwan's president wants to keep the support of his
American counterpart, he should keep sending his chief-of-staff for
regular consultations in Washington. Communications are much better
that way.
- John J. Tkacik Jr. is a research fellow in the Asian Studies Center of the Heritage Foundation.
First appeared on National Review Online