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I 685 January 12,1989 I A1MEJRIcAS HOlVIFUSS VICIIMS OF RENT CONTROL INTRODUCTION Americas housing situa tion poses a strange paradox. Overall, Americans have never been better housed. The rental vacancy rates for 1987 stood at 8.5 percent, the highest in two decades. More than 60 percent of Americans live in their own homes. And as Rutgers University schola rs George Sterdieb and James W. Hughes of the Center of Urban Policy Research point out there is now one bedroom for every American.
Yet in the midst of this plenty, city after city appears to suffer from a hous ing shortage. Worse still, homelessness has emerged as a national issue. In Los Angeles, vagrants sleep under bridges, on park benches, in vacant lots. In New York City, homeless beggars and panhandlers have swelled to such num bers that Mayor Edward Koch officially advises residents and visitors n o t to give them money Explanations Fall Short. How did America arrive at such pockets of pover ty in the midst of plenty? There are many contributing factors. The release of several hundred thousand mental patients over the past two decades obvious ly has c reated a hard core of street people literally incapable of caring for themselves. Illegal immigration in Florida and the Southwest probably has fed homelessness in those areas. High unemployment may have caused some problems in hard-hit cities like Detroi t and Houston. And there is no ques tion that cutting back Social Security benefits for the disabled left a small but identifiable group of Americans with little or no personal resources.
Nevertheless, all these explanations fall short of a complete or satiswng ex planation of the problem in the cities. The best estimates are that former mental patients constitute no more than one-third of the homeless in most 1 George Sternlieb and James W . Hughes,The Dynumics ofhericus Housing (New Brunswick Center for Urban Policy ResearchButgers University, 1987).cities. High unemployment seemedlike a plausible explanation in the early 198Os, but jobless rates are now at a fifteen-year low and still hom e lessness persists. Poverty rates also have fallen, yet the homeless remain Another widely touted explanation the Reagan Administration's cut back in construction of public housing can be dismissed out of hand Proponents of this theory cite the sharp reduc tions in the authorization of new units after 19
81. On the face, these figures seem compelling.
But the argument overlooks the fact that public housing units can take five to ten years to complete after they have been authorized by Con gress Some units i n the pipeline, in fact date from the Ford Administration The number of federa public housing units actually completed over the last decade gives a very different picture Federal Public Housing Units Authorized (in Thousands 0 d 1877 1878 1878 1880 1881 1 882 1883 1884 1886 1888 bar Harllmge Inlochart In fact, the 1980s have been boom years for public housing. Yet this up swing coincides with the emergence of large homeless populations..
Thus, analysts who hunt for failures of government largesse as the cause of home lessness are looking in the wrong direction.
What they fail to see is that housing is actually one of the most highly regulated industries in the country. These regulations are not im posed at the federal or state level, but at the local level, where the Federal Public Housing Units Completed (in Thousands ion ia~a inn iaao ioai ma2 mas ma4 mas iwa Year Hmrltmw InWhulm narrow interests of local residents often block the market's ability to provide housing. These impediments to housing usually t ake two forms rent con trol and exclusionary zoning regulations 2 200 Rent-Controlled Cities. Since the 1970s, commentators have been ar guing that exclusionary zoning was limiting the housing options for the poor.
Most of these negative incentives remain in place today. But by far the big gest impediment to low-income housing has been rent control. Over 200 com munities, including nearly all the major cities on the East and West Coasts block rent increases. These cities now all suffer serious homeless pro blems.
An analysis of the rates of homelessness in 50 major cities across the country shows that rent control is the only factor that is associated with high rates of homelessness. The commonly suggested explanations high unemploy ment, high poverty rates, lack of public housing show no correlation.
Rent control blocks the workings of the housing market and discourages developers from responding to increases in demand for low-income housing.
Moreover, rent control often goes hand-in-hand with other anti-g rowth restrictions, such as zoning and building moratoria. All these market interven tions tend to benefit existing homeowners and current residents, but create significant disadvantages for newcomers and the poor Scarce and Expensive Housing. A permanent solution to the homeless problem will require the federal government to encourage cities to clear a path through the tangle of local regulations that restrict the supply of low in come housing. It will mean finding ways to discourage local municipalities f rom using zoning and growth controls as a cost-free way of improving local property values at the expense of outsiders seeking housing Most of all, it will mean overturning municipal rent control. Although generally tolerated as a legitimate police power, rent control is in truth nothing but an attempt by sitting tenants to shift their housing costs to out siders and future tenants. Although it produces some short-term benefits for some individuals, the long-term effect is to make housing more scarce and e x pensive for everybody. If homelessness is going to go, rent control is going to have to go first MYTHS ABOUT THE CAUSES OF HOMELESSNESS None of the conventional housing explanations offer much help in explain ing why homelessness has become such a proble m . True, most American cities have long had their Skid Rows, generally populated by single, white over-30 males often addicted to alcohol. These vagrants slept in doorways and at missions, or were serviced by the local flophouse converted hotels offering p artitioned-off cubicles for a few dollars a night.
Homelessness thus is nothing new. Many New Yorkers know from the media that 3,000 homeless families are now living in the citys welfare hotels but how many remember that 1,000 families were in the same hot els during the administration of John Lindsay in the 1960s? The lawsuit by Robert 3 Hayes, counsel to the Coalition for the Homeless, which established a legal right to housing for New Yorks Bowery bums was filed in 1979 before the Reagan Administration t o ok office Beach People. Still, the homelessness of the 1980s seems both qualitatively and quantitatively different from that of earlier times. The number of beggars sleeping on subway grates and in bus terminals of New York City has in creased dramaticall y . The beach people who inhabit the waterfront at Santa Monica (known today as the homeless capital of the West Coast were not there ten years ago The nature of homeless populations also is changing. Middle-aged al coholics are now a distinct minority, out numbered by younger men, women with children, working adults, the elderly, and the disabled. Much of this new population, of course, represents the atomized elements of shattered families jobless young men addicted to drugs and unmarried women on welfare.
Yet by their sheer variety and numbers, todays homeless seem to indicate that something else has been happening Disputed Numbers. In 1986, with the help of New Yorks Manhattan In stitute for Public Policy, and the Cat0 Institute in Washington D.C the auth o r undertook a lengthy statistical analysis to try to determine what is caus ing homelessness. The data base was the statistics compiled from 40 major cities in the 1984 Report to the Secretaiy of Housing and Urban Development on the Homeless and Emergency Shelters. The HUD numbers have been dis puted. Homeless advocates dismiss them because HUD estimated the nation al homeless population at 350,000 for 1983-1984, whereas activists insist that the number is 2 million to 3 million. On the other hand, subsequ e nt studies involving actual head counts of the homeless have provided strong evidence that the HUD numbers were approximately correct or even overestimated the problem? In fact, HUDs figures for the homeless population in several cities exceeded the estim a tes made by the homeless advocates who so bitterly attacked the federal study? Yet as a means of comparing homeless popula tions between cities, the HUD report is a legitimate starting point. Since 2 See Peter Rossi, J.D. Wright, G. Fisher, and B. Willis, The Urban Homeless: Estimating Composition and Size, Science, March 13,1987; Kenneth Beirne, Americas Homeless: A Manageable Problem and Solution Heritage Foundation Backgrounder Upakte No. 44, May 4,1987; Martha Burt, Feeding the Homeless Washington, D.C The Urban Institute, 1988 3 Anna Kondratas, A Strategy for Helping Americas Homeless, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 431 May 6,1985 4 HUD used the same counting methods from city to city, it can be assumed that the estimates at least maintain some p r oportional accuracy Nine Variables. Regression analysis5 was used to measure the correlation between per capita homelessness in each city and such independent variables as: 1) the size of the city, 2) local unemployment rates, 3) local poverty rates 4) th e availability of public housing, 5) the percentage of population growth or loss over the past fifteen years, 6) the average annual temperature, 7 average annual rainfall, 8) rental vacancy rates, and 9) the presence or ab sence of rent control.
Population figures were from 1984 census figures; unemployment from an average of 1985 and 1986 figures from the U.S. Department of Labor; pover ty rates from the 1980 census; public housing from "D'figures of February 28,1987; population growth from 1970 and 1984 c ensus; temperature and rainfall from National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA data, 1951-1980 inclusive; and vacancy rates from Bureau of Census figures for 22 major cities (1981-1989, plus a wide variety of estimates for current 1986) vacanc y rates from local sources Apparent Anomalies. The actual regressions were performed by Jeffery Simonoff, professor of statistics at New York University [see Appendix].
There is a fairly even distribution, with most cities clustered around the median of 3. 1 homeless per 1,000 population! To derive the rate, the city population is used as the denominator. By contrast, HUD used the popula tion of the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA) as the denominator. This includes suburban neighborhoods and th u s is larger that the city population leading to a small rate. HUD's use of the SMSA population base was criticized by homeless advocates. Only sixteen cities in this analysis show homeless populations above 5.0 per thousand. All of these are cities genera lly regarded as having large homeless populations.
There are only a few apparent anomalies. The narrow municipal boun daries of cities like Richmond and St. Louis probably exaggerate their home less rates. On the other hand, New York City's homeless problem may be un derstated. Although the calculation sh o ws a smaller homeless problem than in Chicago or Detroit, there is broad agreement that New York has a much more serious problem than these two cities 4 Using similar methods, the author added to the statistical base another 13 major cities that HUD had n o t sampled (including Atlanta, Dallas, and Denver Five smaller cities with no special characteristics, and where homeless populations were near the median (Grand Rapids, Dayton, Davenport, Colorado Springs, and Scranton) were eliminated. The reason for eli m inating these cities was the great difficulty in determining local vacancy rates. Finally, two smaller cities, Yonkers and Santa Monica, were added in order to increase the statistical sampling of cities that practice rent control. 5 Regression analysis i s a statistical tool for sorting out how each of a number of separate independent variables affect one central dependent variable. It traces the incidence of phenomena and indicates the degree to which, if at all, one appears to influence the other 6 The m e dian means there are as many cities with homelessness rates above that number as there are below it 5 Greater and Lesser Correlations. Surprisingly, the regression:of ,homeless figures against factors commonly assumed to influence homelessness un employme n t, poverty, availability of public housing uncovered no sig nificant correlations. Rainfall had no effect, but average annual temperature showed a small correlation. Warmer cities have slightly more homelessness about 3 percent for every one degree increa se in temperature. This might suggest that people find it easier to be homeless in warmer climates, or it could imply as Sunbelt politicians have often charged that there has been some migration of the homeless to warmer climates.
City size was examined to test the hypothesis that bigger cities attract the homeless. There is no correlation. Population growth also was examined, on the theory that homelessness develops because the housing industry is unable to keep pace with a rapid in-migration. In fact, th e growth factor produces a slightly negative correlation older, shrinking cities tend to have slightly higher rates of homelessness, suggesting perhaps that the problem has to do more with the decay of cities than with their expansion The housing vacancy r a te correlates fairly strongly with the rate of home lessness. The coefficient is .387; meaning that vacancy rates account for about 15 percent of the variations in homeless rate between cities. As would be ex pected, those cities with lower vacancy rates h ave more homelessness. This clearly suggests that at least some of the problem is related to housing availability, as well as individual pathology THE LINK BETWEEN RENT CONTROL AND HOMELESSNESS The most remarkable correlation is with rent control. By itse l f, rent control accounts for 27 percent of the variation between cities (with a coefficient of 521 The certainty of such correlations is measured by what statisticians call the P-factor. In the case of rent control this was below .01 about as cer tain as a social correlation ever gets In the social sciences, a P-factor below l usually indicates statistical significance.) When combined with the tempera ture factor, rent control explains about 31 percent of the variation between cities.
Running the various f actors simultaneously produces one more surprising revelation. When rent control and vacancy rates are combined, the vacancy rate disappears altogether as significant factor in homelessness. This meaq that the only significant factor relating to vacancy r ates is the difference be tween cities with and without rent control. When vacancy figures are con sidered separately, the reason becomes clear. The nine rent-controlled cities studied had the nine lowest vacancy rates in the country.
Among the 41 cities w ithout rent control, only Worcester had a vacancy rate under 4 percent, while all nine rent-controlled cities had vacancy rates below 3 percent. The wide variation in vacancy rates among other non-rent 6 Vacancy Rates in Cities with' and Without Rent Cont r ol BM Fmnolaoo Wmhlngton 8Mh YOnlM ma- l LO. Angel NOW lbrk Nmrk Boaton E Hmrllsrd I rent control no mnt control r~~~l Hmrlllgm InkChrI I ontrolled cities from 4 percent in Philadelphia to 18 percent in New Or eans has no impact on homelessness and seems to reflect only normal aarket fluctuations. Only in cities with rent control are vacancy rates consis ently low.
Regression analysis, of course, cannot prove cause and effect. It only aeasures correlations. It could be argued, therefore, that low vacancy r ates lave caused cities to adopt rent control, rather than the reverse. But the rent- al history of all nine cities with rent control tells a different story. New York Zity, which has extended the rent controls first enacted in 1943, had a 8 per ent vacan c y rates in 1941: since then, the rate has never risen above 3 per ent to 4 percent Draconian Local Ordinances. The other cities adopted rent control during he 1970s as a response to inflation not housing shortages. Both Newark and Boston adopted rent cont r ol as an extension of Richard Nixon's 1971 wage and price controls. In 1980, vacancies were still a normal 6 percent, but lave since dropped below 3 percent. Most California cities adopted rent con rol after 1977, when anti-tax advocate Howard Jarvis unwi s ely promised enants that the property tax limitations of Proposition 13 would lead to rent reductions. When these reductions failed to materialize, a wave of anti andlord agitation led to a dozen cities adopting rent regulation. Half of all California ten a nts now live under rent control. The results have been the iame whenever controls have been put in place. In 1980, both Santa Monica md Berkeley had normal vacancy rates of about 6 percent. Their draconian rent control ordinances generally considered the strictest in the country have since driven vacancies to below 2 percent.
Thus, rent control appears to explain why certain major cities on the East and West Coasts Boston, New York, Washington, Los Angeles, and San Francisco have experienced inordinately h igh homeless populations in recent years. The pattern emerging from the statistics is clear: the worst homelessness is concentrated in those few cities with rent control 7 HOW RENT CONTROL AND OTHER REGULATIONS LEAD TO HOMELESSNESS A glimpse of how this i s working can bf seen from the fate of th federal housing voucher program in these cities. Experiments during the 1970s in Green Bay, Wisconsin, and South Bend, Indiana, indicated that providing the poor with rent stamps in a normal market led to an upsurg e of availability in low-income housing. Supply responded to demand. But in cities with rent control, price regulations have so disrupted the market that many poor people cannot even spend their vouchers In Boston, one-third of all vouchers are returned un used. In New York City, the program is in such disarray (60 percent returns) that the federal government is threatening to reduce the citys voucher allotment this in a city where there are nowan.estimated 50,000 homeless.
Supply-and-demand factors explain this phenomenon. In a normal market the increased buying power in the hands of the poor pushes up the market price of rental housing and encourages suppliers to bring forth more low-in come housing either through construction or by conversion from other u ses.
Rent control disrupts this price communication. The result: poor con sumers find their increased buying power has no effect on supply In this way, rent control explains why there are such wide variations in homelessness and why the problem is concentr atedin-afew.major cities on the East and West Coasts Closing the Doors to Development. It is not a complete explanation. At best, rent control *accounts for only about 30 percent of the variations in homelessness. It offers no explanation, moreover, for t h e problem in cities without rent control. But the strong correlation between rent control and homelessness does suggest that local market interventions, rather than federal frugality or the failure of private markets, are at the heart of the problem. In p a rticular, the variety of planning and zoning regulations, build ing moratoria, and no-growth ordinances practiced around the country invite examination. Although their effects are much more difficult to quanti they suggest a chain reaction in which rent c ontrol is only one major link.
Rather than welcoming population growth, many suburbs have tried to close up their doors to new development particularly apartment houses serving lower income Americans. In Resolving the Housing Crisis, M. Bruce Johnson of th e Pacific Institute has presented convincing evidence that Californias practice of suburban exclusion has raised the price of a home about 60 percent above the national average typical local rent for an adequate unit and 30 percent of the tenants income. T he tenant can then use the voucher to shop around for a rental unit of their choice 8 M. Bruce Johnson, ed Resolving the Housing Crisis (San Francisco: Pacific Institute for Public Policy Research, 1982 8 Keeping Out Apartments. This makes it much more di f ficult for first-time buyers to enter the homeowner market As a result, young couples who could once purchase a home are now forced to seek rental accommodations in the city. This in turn puts pressure on rents and forces up prices for the poor. The marke t would respond to this by building more apartments, but many cities block growth and instead impose rent control, protecting incumbent tenants but leaving others literally out in the cold.
The truth is that housing is one of the most highly regulated indu stries in America, mainly the local level through the myriad of planning and zoning or dinances that govern new construction. Most important, residents of suburbs and rural areas want to keep out apartments. Generally they ,want only expen sive single-fam i ly .homes. Sometimes they even oppose homeowners who want to rent out extra rooms. Under these conditions, it is not surprising that in many cities there is a housing shortage. If General Motors had to negotiate with every little planning and zoning board before it could sell cars around the country, America undoubtedly would be suffering a car shortage as well WHY CONTROLS ARE DIFFICULT TO REVERSE In normal circumstances, the housing market is very responsive to the needs of the poor. More than any other g oodin theeconomy;i housingeven. I a tually filters down to the poor. The life expectancy of the average housing unit is 75 years and some buildings last centuries. The filtering down process means that most (low-income housing was once middle-income housi ng.
Manhattans Harlem, after all, was built not for the poor but for the Victorian gentry. When the filtering down process grinds to a halt, however, the hous ing stock is frozen, the affluent remain in place, and housing does not trickle down to the less affluent end of the market.
Driving Up Prices. Reducing homelessness thus requires freeing housing from much of the extensive local regulations. This will not be easy. In the case of suburban zoning, for instance, the suburban homeowner whotmovesv into a new community has considerable economic incentive to prevent any more housing from being built in that community. By limiting new develop ment, homeowners preserve their solitude and environmental amenities which constitute a large portion of the value of their homes. They also limit the total supply of housing, which drives up the price of existing homes. Thus it is not surprising suburban communities typically oppose further growth.
The same incentives lie behind rent control in the central cities. Ex perience has shown tenants who do best under rent control are longstanding incumbents who can expect to remain in their apartments for many years.
Senior citizens and couples with small families (who tend to be affluent) do well. Those who do poorly are people who must change jobs often, and 9 couples with growing families. Once-established in.their privileged positions rent-controlled tenants can b e come a powerful political force against any new development On Manhattans affluent Upper West Side, home to some of Americas best rent control bargains, politicians and community activists regularly decry the housing shortage while calling for moratoria o n new hous ing construction, all in the same breath.
Many exclusion-minded communities have discovered that zoning and rent control can work hand-in-hand. Berkeley California, began its assault on developers in the 1970s by adopting zoning regulations that virtually ended new construction. Finding this was driving up rents, the city council responded with rent controls. This has given lifetime tenure to tenants who had apartments in 1979, but driven down opportunities for new entrants vir tually to zero CO N CLUSION The political dynamics of housing and homelessness are complex. Given the strong political pressures involved, tackling the homelessness problem will require strong action and pressure from Washington. Among the actions needed 1) Washington must t a ke the lead in abolishing rent control. Federal housing assistance and other community development. funds should beat off for communities with rent control. Rent control, moreover, seems to be an unconstitutional interference with the federal governments housing voucher program aimed at helping the poor and thus should be challenged in the courts. From 30 percent to 60 percent of the vouchers issued in rent-control led Boston and New York are being returned to the local housing authorities.
By contrast, ne wspaper listings for apartments in Chicago, where there is no rent control, read Section 8 vouchers welcome 2) Suburban communities should be made to pay a fair price for using zoning restrictions to improve the value of property when this imposes costs o n other communities. When communities use zoning restrictions to block landowners from constructing housing for low-income families, excluding the poor enhances the property values in the community but shifts the burden for housing these families to other c ommunities. New Jersey has a very sensible plan to deal with this problem. Each community in the state is assigned an al lotment of low-income housing to be constructed. A community can decide to use zoning to prevent the construction of this housing, but it must compen sate those communities that take more than their allotment of low-income housing. The federal government should highlight such constructive ap proaches and encourage other states to take similar measures 10to allow the construction of SRO ( s ingle-room occupancy) hotels and ef'ficiency apartments. San Diego, California, has taken the lead in stimulating the availability of such housing. By loosening its building codes the city recently has encouraged construction of four new SRO hotels and pr o vided decent housing for the poor in the private market. As a result San Diego's per capita homeless population is only one-quarter that of neighboring Los Angeles. The federal government should urge other cities to take similar measures 3) Cities should - be-encouraged to loosen theirzoningand .building codes To solve the housing shortage, America's poor must be given an oppor tunity, as consumers, to take part in the housing market. This means that sub urban homeowners and rent-controlled tenants cannot c o ntinue to maintain the privileges they have conferred upon themselves at the expense of the poor. Suburban homeowners must be pressed to give up some of their ex clusionary zoning,practices, and middle-class rent-controlled tenants will have to give up so me of the benefits they enjoy at the expense of the poor There is no other way in which the crisis of homelessness can be solved.
Pre ared for The Heritage Foundation by Wifiam Tucker, New York Corres ondent for The American J! pectator 11 W APPEND I X Homelessness and Some Factors Commonly Cited as Explanations clly Miami Ra Sr Louis, Ma n Francisco. Calif.
Worcester. Mus La An8cla. Calil Santa Monica Calg Neuark. N.J Hutford, Conn Wuhin8lon. D.C.
Detroit, Mich Yonken. N. Y Chicago, 111.
Suttlz Wub.
Lu V- Ncv 8oatoa. Mru Richmond. Vr New York. N.Y.
Dallat-Fon Wonk Tu.
Denver, colo.
Charlesm WVa Atlanta, Ga Fort Wayne. Ind.
Portland, Ore.
Holur~a. Tex.
Son Diego, CdG Salt Lk City, Uub Little Rak. Ark.
New Ollcon, La Chulncoa. S.C.
Albuqucquc. N.M.
Tucson, Ark Burlin- Vr Baltimore. Md.
Cincinnati. Ohio Syruu N.Y.
Tampr. Ra.
Pitrtbur8b. Pa.
Philuiclphi Pa.
Birmin8hrm. Ala Louisville, Ky.
Gnd Rapids, Micb.
Minaupdir-St. Paul. Minn.
Hil~krr. WLr widenee, RI.
Clml.nQ Ohio Pboeoix. Ark Kamu City, Ma Ch.rloac. N.C.
Lido. Neb.
Rabater, N.Y 15.9 11.6 11.5 10.6 10.5 10.2 9.5 8.8 7.5 6.8 6.8 6.6 6.5 6.0 5.6 5.3 5.0 5.0 4.9 4.7 4.6 4.3 4.2 3.7 3. I 3.1 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.3 2.2
2. I 2.0 I .9 I .9 I .6 I .6 I .6 I .4 1.2 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 5.950 5.000 8.250 1,700 32.600 900 3.000 1.200 4.700 7.500 1.300 19.800 3,200 1.100 3.200 1,175 36.000 7.000 2.500 300 2.000 725 1.550 q400 3.000 525 500 1.600 200 I ,000 1 .ooo 100 1,900 87s 380 650 900 3.600 584 575 350 I ,000 1 ,000 250 800 1,050 400 275 I35 150 24.5 7.5 21.8 8.4 13.7 6.0 14.4 3.7 16.4 7.9 9.9 7.0 32.8 5.9 25.2 7.1 18.6 8.4 21.9
9. I 9.8 4.9 20.3 8.3 11.2 6.6 10.5 8.9 20.2 4.6 19.3 5.3 20.0 7.4 14.1 4.7 13.7 5.0 12.6 10.7 27.5 5.0 11.0 6.3 13.0 7.4 12.7 8.4 12.4 5.3 14.2 6.3 14.1 5.8 26.4 11.0 14.1 4.4 I24 6.3 14.7 5.3 11.3 3.4 22.9 7.0 19.7 7.2 18.4 6.7 18.7 5.0 16.5 9.4 20.6 7.0 22.0 7.2 19.3 6.7 13.5 8.6 12.4 4.5 13.8 6.4 20.4 4.9 22.1 12.4 11.1
5. I 13.2 4.6 12.4 3.7 8.9 3.6 17.5 7.0 29.8 14.0 10.2 14.1 2.8 0.8 41.7 20.0 19.8 9.7 10.7 13.0 14.6 14.2 25.3 20.5 21.5 5.9 9.0 22.9 35.5 5.0 5.0 I .9 1.1 6.5 16.8 25.2 30.6 3.1 2.4
9. I 23.2 20.1 14.9 17.1 24.5 14.3 24.3 21.3 5. I 17.9 73 15.5 22.5 2.4 6.0 12.7 I .4 10.4 372 429 712 I60 3.097 88 314 I36 623 1,088 191 2992 488 183 57 I 219 7.165 1.388 504 63 426 I65 366 1.706 960 165 170 559 69 35 I 365 37 763 370 164 275 403 1.646 280 290 183 624 62 I I56 547 853 443 33 I 180 243 74 55 57 52 66 66 54 49 58 50 54 49 55 59 52 61 5 5 67 52 56 61 52 57 67 68 57 62 67 63 63 73 45 55 53 47 67 54 55 66 S5 47 42 45 51 50 72 55 59 50 48 7.0 8.5 I .6 3.0 2.2 I .8 2.3 2.6 2.0 5.4 2. I 6.0 S.5 9.0 2.6 5.5 2.2 16.0 14.0 5.9 9.0 9.2 5.5 17.0 5.3 14.5 6.5 18.0 9.0 9.7 12.0 6.0 5.4 8.6 9.5 14.7 5 .8 4.0 7.
I 7.3 7.5 6.1 6.0 5.0 6.5 12.2 7.2 6.S 9.0 8.8 risk indiata alia wirb rea coolrol.
Iulicizcd atia were MI ineludcd io 0riliO.l HUD study Source: William Tucker, Where Do The Homeless Come From?
National Review, September 25, 1987, p. 35.
