Deciding how we should wage a successful war on terrorist groups
such as al-Qaeda is a matter of strategy. And in strategy, thought
always should precede action. Extravagant calls for more airline
security - now, everywhere - miss the point.
A balanced strategy would promote safety, of course, but it also
would encourage continued economic growth and safeguard civil
liberties. It wouldn't trade off one priority for another. The call
for more air marshals and added security at foreign airports is a
case in point. There's nothing wrong with more security, but we
need to weigh carefully the demands we place on other nations,
particularly developing ones.
U.S. policy encourages these economies to deregulate their markets
and embrace free trade. At the same time, we're imposing new
security mandates that make it harder for them to compete in the
global economy. Poorer countries, though, lack the expertise,
technologies and infrastructure to add expensive security measures.
Rather than just heap on more demands, we should give them
technical assistance and reasonable options (lending them air
marshals, for example) to help them provide more sophisticated
levels of air safety.
Overall, adding additional layers of security makes sense. No one
measure will be adequate to defeat every terrorist threat, and we
need more tools that provide options, something other than either
canceling flights or doing nothing. More important, though, than
insisting that every program is airtight and unbeatable - or
demanding that, say, Jackson Hole, Wyo., have the same security as
New York's giant Kennedy airport - is ensuring that we have
complimentary layers of security implemented by people who
cooperate and share information with one another.
We can ensure better security by looking into measures that can be
added along the whole security chain, rather than rushing to
inspect every piece of air cargo (a policy that would all but
ground our $27 billion air freight and express industry).
Initiatives such as the Department of Homeland Security's "known
shipper" program, which bars unidentified persons from putting
cargo on passenger airlines, make more sense.
The Bush administration also is developing initiatives to keep
dangerous people out. For example, today the Transportation
Security Administration has a Computer Assisted Passenger
Prescreening System (CAPPS) that uses such general criteria it
wouldn't keep certain terrorists off an airplane. So now it's
readying a follow-on system, CAPPS II, which will use government
intelligence and law enforcement information to pick out passengers
who might have malicious intent. The skies are steadily becoming
less friendly for terrorists.
Sound strategy, not profligate spending and poorly thought-out
programs, is the right answer.
James
Jay Carafano is the Senior Fellow for Defense and
Homeland Security at the Heritage Foundation and the author of
Waltzing into The Cold War: The Struggle for Occupied
Austria.
First appeared in USA Today