[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_rZjCmUBEHftE91DeNru5KqLSSaOmvYzpnCjBdzKdLqM.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000032","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/articles\/1\/essays\/33\/presentment-of-resolutions\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n  \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003EPresentment of Resolutions\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n      Article I, Section 7, Clause 3\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n      \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EEvery Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n    \n            \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EIn August 1787 following the submission of the\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Edraft by the Committee of Detail, James Madison noted that Congress could evade the possibility of a presidential veto by simply denominating a \u201cbill\u201d as a \u201cresolution.\u201d Although his motion to insert the words \u201cor resolve\u201d after the word \u201cbill\u201d in the Presentment Clause (Article I, Section 7, Clause 2) was defeated, the following day Edmund Randolph proposed a freestanding clause with more exacting language, and the Convention approved it. Even before the posthumous publication of Madison\u2019s Convention record, Justice Joseph Story took a view similar to Madison\u2019s: \u201c[C]ongress, by adopting the form of an order or resolution, instead of a bill, might have effectually defeated the president\u2019s qualified negative in all the most important portions of legislation.\u201d \u003Ci\u003ECommentaries on the Constitution of\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003Ethe United States \u003C\/i\u003E(1833). Nearly all commentators\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Ehave agreed with that interpretation.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ENonetheless, not all resolutions of Congress require presidential approval because not all are intended to be law. Generally, joint resolutions do require presentment to the President as they are designed to have the force of law. They differ from bills only in that they usually deal with a single subject, such as a declaration of war. Congressionally proposed amendments to the Constitution are also styled as joint resolutions, but they are not presented to the President. Under the form of the amending process in Article V that has been followed in all cases except the Twenty-first Amendment, Congress proposes and three-quarters of the legislatures of the several states approve. Thus, no presidential involvement is necessary for a joint resolution proposing an amendment to the Constitution. \u003Ci\u003EHollingsworth v. Virginia \u003C\/i\u003E(1798).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EConcurrent resolutions, passed by both houses, apply only to subjects affecting the procedures of both houses, such as fixing the time for adjournment, or to express \u201cthe sense of the Congress\u201d on an issue of public policy, or to set revenue and spending goals. Concurrent resolutions are not \u201claw\u201d and are not presented to the President. Similarly, simple resolutions (sometimes just known as resolutions) do not have the force of law and apply only to the operations of a particular branch of Congress dealing with its internal procedures, imposing censure on a Member, setting spending limits for particular committees, or expressing the viewpoint of one house on a public issue. A bill of impeachment passed by the House of Representatives could technically be seen as in the form of a simple resolution (as might also be Senate approval of treaties and presidential appointments), although it may not officially be designated as such. The Senate\u2019s resolution to convict is similar.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EFor many decades, Congress attempted to use a simple or concurrent resolution (or, at times, so has even a committee within one house) to \u201cveto\u201d executive actions. Congressional expression of disapproval would not go to the President for his signature or veto. In \u003Ci\u003EINS v.\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003EChadha \u003C\/i\u003E(1983), the Supreme Court invalidated\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Ethe use of a resolution by one house (or by extension, a concurrent resolution by both houses) to \u201cveto\u201d an executive action as violative of the Presentment of Resolutions Clause.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EBy the time of \u003Ci\u003EINS v. Chadha,\u003C\/i\u003E there were 295 various types of legislative vetoes in 195 different statutes. Congress initiated the device in 1932, giving President Herbert Hoover the authority to reorganize the executive branch, subject to the approval of Congress. Other versions of the legislative veto became more numerous as the administrative state grew, particularly in the 1940s.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EDespite the \u003Ci\u003EChadha\u003C\/i\u003E decision ruling legislative vetoes unconstitutional, legislative vetoes still occur in pieces of legislation. By one scholar\u2019s count, between the date of the Court\u2019s decision in \u003Ci\u003EChadha\u003C\/i\u003E and 2005, 400 legislative veto-type provisions had been enacted or instituted. Most of these provisions are informal and concern a power of a committee or subcommittee to require its approval before an executive action may go forward. These kinds of arrangements were not directly addressed by the \u003Ci\u003EChadha\u003C\/i\u003E case and have continued ever since.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EOften, a President will object to a formal legislative veto in a congressional enactment in his signing statement, citing \u003Ci\u003EChadha\u003C\/i\u003E. Signing statements, however, do not reach \u201cvetoes\u201d that are the result of amicable relationships between members of executive agencies and Members of Congress at the legislative committee and subcommittee levels. An executive agency will agree, for example, not to exceed a budgetary limit except by permission of a particular Congressional committee. As a result, through informal agreements, committees maintain an even stronger veto-type power over executive action. An example of an early informal agreement to allow committee-level vetoes occurred with the \u201cBaker Accord\u201d of 1989, when Secretary of State James Baker allowed certain committees and party leaders the ability to block aid sent to the Nicaraguan Contras.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ESome legislation that \u003Ci\u003EChadha\u003C\/i\u003E purportedly struck down is still seen by some as being legitimate. In particular, many in Congress argue that the War Powers Act of 1973 is still in force, though the central component of the legislation is a legislative veto. After \u003Ci\u003EChadha\u003C\/i\u003E, there were proposals to change the War Powers Act from a concurrent resolution from both houses that does not require presentment to a joint resolution of disapproval. Those proposals failed.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n      \n  \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--photo\u0022 style=\u0022background-image: url(\/sites\/default\/files\/David_Forte.jpg)\u0022\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n              \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/facultyprofile.csuohio.edu\/csufacultyprofile\/detail.cfm?FacultyID=D_FORTE\u0022\u003EDavid F. Forte\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/h4\u003E\n                  \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n         Professor, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n            \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n    \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n      \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000032-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000032-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n        \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000032-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n      \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n      \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000032-taba\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY\u2019S GUIDE TO CONGRESS (MARY COHN ED., 4TH ED. 1991)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ELOUIS FISHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22132, LEGISLATIVE VETOES AFTER CHADHA (2005), at http:\/\/ www.loufisher.org\/docs\/lv\/4116.pdf\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EGary Lawson, Comment, \u003Ci\u003EBurning Down the House\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003E(and Senate): A Presentment Requirement for Legislative Subpoenas Under the Orders, Resolutions, and Votes Clause\u003C\/i\u003E, 83\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003ETEX. L. REV. 1373 (2005)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EDavid A. Martin, \u003Ci\u003EThe Legislative Veto and the Responsible Exercise of Congressional Power\u003C\/i\u003E, 68\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003EVA. L. REV.\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E253 (1982)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ESeth Barrett Tillman, \u003Ci\u003EA Textualist Defense of Article I,\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003ESection 7, Clause 3: Why \u003C\/i\u003EHollingsworth v. Virginia\u003Ci\u003E Was Rightly Decided, and Why \u003C\/i\u003EINS v. Chadha\u003Ci\u003E Was Wrongly Reasoned\u003C\/i\u003E,\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E83 TEX. L. REV. 1265\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003E(2005)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EDarren A. Wheeler, \u003Ci\u003EActor Preference and the Implementation of \u003C\/i\u003EINS v. Chadha, 23 BYU J. Pub. L. 83 (2008)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000032-tabb\u0022\u003E\n          \n      \u003Cdiv\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHollingsworth v. Virginia, 3. U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n              \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EI.N.S. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n          \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n        \u003C\/div\u003E\n        \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000032-tabc\u0022\u003E\n                      \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000030\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EPresentment Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n                  \u003C\/div\u003E\n      \u003C\/div\u003E\n    \u003C\/div\u003E\n  \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]