[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_rZjCmUBEHftE91DeNru5KqLSSaOmvYzpnCjBdzKdLqM.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000065","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/articles\/1\/essays\/66\/port-preference-clause\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003EPort Preference Clause\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n Article I, Section 9, Clause 6\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n \n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ENo Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another; nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n \n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ELike the Uniformity Clause, with which it was\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Einitially joined at the Constitutional Convention, and the Export Taxation Clause, the Port Preference Clause was meant to interfere with the natural tendency of legislatures to become instruments through which powerful commercial interests injure their politically weaker rivals.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe impetus for the Port Preference Clause came from the Maryland delegation, whose members were especially worried that vessels bound to or from the port of Baltimore might be required to stop in Virginia. Some other delegates objected that Congress should not have its hands tied, lest it be unable to deal adequately with problems such as smuggling on long rivers like the Delaware. The issue was referred to a committee, which included a delegate from each state, and which recommended language nearly identical to the final version now in the Constitution.This was not sufficient for Maryland\u2019s Luther Martin, who became a leading Anti-Federalist. He objected that Congress might easily violate the spirit of the provision, perhaps by limiting Maryland to one inappropriate port of entry on the Potomac: this would effectively require Baltimore shipping to stop in Virginia.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe language of the Port Preference Clause sweeps beyond the specific concerns that motivated its proponents at the Convention. The Supreme Court, however, has construed the Port Preference Clause very narrowly, holding that Congress may grant enormous \u201cincidental\u201d preferences to the ports of certain states through devices such as making improvements (like dredging) or creating obstructions (like bridges) in one place rather than another. \u003Ci\u003EPennsylvania v. Wheeling \u0026amp; Belmont Bridge Co. \u003C\/i\u003E(1856) (\u003Ci\u003E\u201cWheeling Bridge II\u201d\u003C\/i\u003E); \u003Ci\u003ESouth Carolina\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003Ev. Georgia \u003C\/i\u003E(1876). The Court has indicated that\u003Ci\u003E \u003C\/i\u003Ethe clause would be violated by naked discrimination between all the ports of one state and those of another. \u003Ci\u003EWheeling Bridge II\u003C\/i\u003E. But even this prohibition is essentially toothless: it has been read to allow Congress to impose a tax that affected all the ports of some states and no ports in some others. \u003Ci\u003EAugusta Towing Co., Inc.\u003C\/i\u003E \u003Ci\u003Ev. United States \u003C\/i\u003E(1984).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EA dissent in the seminal Supreme Court case complained that the majority\u2019s interpretation rendered the clause a dead letter. \u003Ci\u003EWheeling Bridge II\u003C\/i\u003E(McLean, J., dissenting). More recently, Justice Clarence Thomas suggested in a concurrence that a natural reading of the constitutional language \u201cprohibits Congress from using its commerce power to channel commerce through certain favored ports.\u201d \u003Ci\u003EUnited States v. Lopez\u003C\/i\u003E (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring). As the case law stands, however, Congress is only on its honor to comply with the spirit of the clause by refraining from politically motivated favoritism that distorts the natural economic competition among American ports.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \n \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--photo\u0022 style=\u0022background-image: url(\/sites\/default\/files\/Nelson_Lund.jpg)\u0022\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/www.law.gmu.edu\/faculty\/directory\/fulltime\/lund_nelson\u0022\u003ENelson Lund\u003C\/a\u003E\n \u003C\/h4\u003E\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n University Professor, George Mason University School of Law\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000065-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000065-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000065-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000065-taba\u0022\u003E\n \n \u003Cdiv\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003E3 The Founders\u0027 Constitution 370\u2013373 (Philip B. Kurland \u0026amp; Ralph Lerner eds., 1987)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000065-tabb\u0022\u003E\n \n \u003Cdiv\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EPennsylvania v. Wheeling \u0026amp; Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1856)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ESouth Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4 (1876)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAugusta Towing Co., Inc. v. United States, 5 Cl. Ct. 160 (1984)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000065-tabc\u0022\u003E\n \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000034\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EUniformity Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000037\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ECommerce Among the States\u003C\/a\u003E\n \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000064\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EExport Taxation Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]