[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_rZjCmUBEHftE91DeNru5KqLSSaOmvYzpnCjBdzKdLqM.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000074","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/articles\/1\/essays\/75\/compact-clause\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003ECompact Clause\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n Article I, Section 10, Clause 3\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n \n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ENo State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n \n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe Framers of the Constitution had little difficulty seeing that combinations among the states, or any foreign-affairs activities undertaken by the states, were so fraught with danger to the union that none should be allowed unless Congress consented. Comparable prohibitions had already been contained in the Articles of Confederation, but the Framers chose somewhat stronger language in the Constitution to assure national supremacy in foreign affairs and in relations among the states. The provisions caused no significant debate at the Constitutional Convention, and James Madison described them in \u003Cem\u003EThe Federalist\u003C\/em\u003E No. 44 as \u201cfall[ing] within reasonings which are either so obvious, or have been so fully developed, that they may be passed over without remark.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe constitutional logic of the provisions reflects a profound insight. Fearing that \u201cfactions,\u201d or interest groups, operating at the state level would endanger the Union and the legitimate interests of sister-states, Madison urged the Convention to include a congressional \u201cnegative\u201d of \u201cstate laws in all cases what-soever.\u201d Under his plan, no state law could go into effect without prior congressional approval. The Convention rejected Madison\u2019s proposal as unduly nationalistic and, moreover, unnecessarily broad, on the theory that most state laws would have little if any effect on the union or sister-states. The Convention instead subjected state laws to the operation of the Supremacy Clause: state laws become and remain in effect unless they are inconsistent with federal law or the Constitution.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ECourts, however, cannot always be relied upon, and constitutional obstacles\u2014in particular, the difficulty of mobilizing concurrent majorities in both houses of Congress and the executive\u2019s assent\u2014may prevent Congress from counteracting dangerous state enactments. Thus, for classes of state activities that could be presumed to threaten the union or sister-states, the Convention supplemented federal supremacy with either an absolute prohibition on state action (\u003Cem\u003Esee\u003C\/em\u003E Article I, Section 10, Clause 1) or the Madisonian \u201cnegative\u201d (see Article I, Section 10, Clauses 2 and 3). The congressional approval requirement ensures that each state will be informed of, and heard on, potentially threatening sister-state activities, thus reducing the states\u2019 costs in monitoring and countermanding such activities. Moreover, the requirement compels the proponents of presumptively problematic state activities to mobilize the requisite majorities at the federal level, thus affording an added measure of security.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThroughout the nineteenth century, the Compact Clause generated no more than a handful of cases, usually involving state border disputes. In the twentieth century, the Founders\u2019 fear of state compacts gave away to a more benign view of compacts as a useful instrument of state cooperation. Accordingly, the Supreme Court interpreted the clause in an explicitly nontextual fashion. While the foreign Compact Clause still applies (as a constitutional matter, if not always in practice) to a broad range of formal and informal agreements between a state and foreign countries, the Supreme Court has held that the domestic Compact Clause applies only to a narrow class of state agreements (those\u0026nbsp;that establish binding obligations and, typically, multistate administrative agencies). Moreover, in \u003Cem\u003EU.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission\u003C\/em\u003E (1978), the Supreme Court declared that state compacts require congressional approval only if they \u201cencroach upon the supremacy of the United States.\u201d Because states may not encroach upon federal supremacy in any event, a broad reading of the Court\u2019s decision effectively deprives the Compact Clause of any independent constitutional force.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Supreme Court has never found a state compact void for want of congressional approval. Partly due to that permissiveness, states have seized on compacts to establish national tax and regulatory regimes of unprecedented complexity and consequence. Prominently, a 1998 agreement among states and tobacco producers created a permanent, nationwide regime for the taxation and regulation of tobacco sales. So far, however, this trend has failed to prompt a judicial reexamination and rediscovery of the nearly-forgotten Compact Clause.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \n \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/www.aei.org\/scholar\/michael-s-greve\/\u0022\u003EMichael S. Greve\u003C\/a\u003E\n \u003C\/h4\u003E\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n Professor of Law, George Mason University School of Law\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000074-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000074-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000074-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000074-taba\u0022\u003E\n \n \u003Cdiv\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDavid Engdahl, \u003Ci\u003ECharacterization of Interstate Arrangements: When Is a Compact Not a Compact?\u003C\/i\u003E 64 Mich. L. Rev. 63 (1965)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EFelix Frankfurter \u0026amp; James Landis, \u003Ci\u003EThe Compact Clause of the Constitution: A Study in Interstate Adjustments\u003C\/i\u003E, 34 Yale L.J. 685 (1925)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMichael S. Greve, \u003Ci\u003ECompacts, Cartels, and Congressional Consent\u003C\/i\u003E, 68 M. L. Rev. 285 (2003)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ELarry D. Kramer, \u003Ci\u003EMadison\u0027s Audience\u003C\/i\u003E, 112 Harv. L. Rev. 611 (1999)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000074-tabb\u0022\u003E\n \n \u003Cdiv\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EVirginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EU.S. Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Commission, 434 U.S. 452 (1978)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000074-tabc\u0022\u003E\n \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000068\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EState Treaties\u003C\/a\u003E\n \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000073\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EImport-Export Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000074\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ECompact Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]