[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_rZjCmUBEHftE91DeNru5KqLSSaOmvYzpnCjBdzKdLqM.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000101","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/articles\/3\/essays\/102\/judicial-vesting-clause\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003EJudicial Vesting Clause\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n Article III, Section 1\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n \n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n \n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe Constitution\u2019s first three articles contain symmetrical introductory language. Each provides that a basic type of governmental \u201cpower\u201d\u2014\u201clegislative\u201d (making laws), \u201cexecutive\u201d (administering the laws), and \u201cjudicial\u201d (expounding laws to decide particular cases)\u2014 \u201cshall be vested\u201d in a corresponding institution: \u201cCongress,\u201d the \u201cPresident,\u201d and \u201cCourts,\u201d respectively. As originally conceived, the Constitution embodied the sovereign will of \u201cWe the People,\u201d who delegated power to three independent yet coordinate branches of government.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThis separation-of-powers structure incorporated two novel Federalist ideas. First, \u201cjudicial power\u201d became a distinct part of government, whereas in England it had been treated as an aspect of executive authority (although the English recognized adjudication as a discrete function). Second, like Congress and the president, federal judges ultimately derived their power from \u201cthe People,\u201d even though they were unelected and given tenure and salary guarantees to ensure their impartiality and prestige. This separate and independent judiciary consisted of a Supreme Court and any lower federal tribunals Congress chose to create. The powers of federal courts can most usefully be divided into three components: judicial review, justiciability, and equitable authority.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ESince 1787, the central meaning of \u201cjudicial power\u201d has remained remarkably consistent: neutrally deciding a case by interpreting the law and applying it to the facts, then rendering a final and binding judgment. The most important cases in Article III are those \u201carising under th[e] Constitution [and] Laws of the United States.\u201d This clause complements Article VI, which provides that \u201c[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009shall be the supreme Law of the Land.\u201d There was a general understanding that this language, and the very nature of a written Constitution ordained by \u201cthe People,\u201d authorized judicial review of the constitutional validity of government actions. For example, in \u003Cem\u003EThe Federalist\u003C\/em\u003E No. 78, Alexander Hamilton reasoned as follows: (1) courts have a duty to resolve cases impartially according to the law, (2) the Constitution is the fundamental and supreme law in which \u201cthe People\u201d explicitly limited the political branches, and (3) therefore, judges must follow the Constitution instead of a clearly contrary ordinary law. Hamilton\u2019s Anti-Federalist rival \u201cBrutus,\u201d how-ever, expressed the fear that federal judges would naturally aggrandize their power and that of the central government. \u201cIn their decisions,\u201d he said, \u201cthey will not confine themselves to any fixed or established rules.\u201d \u201cThis power,\u201d he concluded, \u201cwill enable them to mold the government into almost any shape they please.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe early Supreme Court operated on a restricted notion of judicial review, although it did not strike down any statute until \u003Cem\u003EMarbury v. Madison\u003C\/em\u003E (1803). In that case, Chief Justice John Marshall repeated Hamilton\u2019s analysis and then held that Congress, by forcing the Court to assume original jurisdiction over an action involving a writ of mandamus (an order compelling action by an executive official), had plainly violated limitations on such jurisdiction prescribed in Article III. The Court expressly cabined its power to examining \u201cjudicial\u201d issues of law rather than \u201cpolitical\u201d questions committed by the Constitution to the executive branch\u2019s discretion.\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThis relatively constrained view of the judicial function continued until 1857, when the Court next invalidated a federal law\u2014the critical and politically delicate Missouri Comprmise\u2014in \u003Cem\u003EDred Scott v. Sandford\u003C\/em\u003E. This disastrous attempt to transform judicial review into a man-date to substitute the justices\u2019 policy preferences on slavery for those of political officials crippled the Court\u2019s prestige for a generation.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EBy the late nineteenth century, however, the Court began to interpret the judicial power as allowing it to overturn legislation that did not transgress any explicit constitutional command. Most famously, in \u003Cem\u003ELochner v. New York\u003C\/em\u003E (1905), it held that a state law restricting workers\u2019 hours violated the Fourteenth Amendment by depriving employers and employees of \u201cliberty\u201d and \u201cproperty\u201d without \u201cdue process of law.\u201d The Court construed this language, which originally had been intended to guarantee procedural protections, as creating a substantive right to con-tract freely. In 1937, the Court abandoned this approach and announced that economic legislation would be upheld if it had any rational basis. Subsequently, however, the Court has not shown similar deference to social legislation. Instead, it has struck down laws dealing with issues like education, crime, voting, and abortion\u2014areas previously thought to have been left by the Constitution to the political process.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EJudicial review can be exercised only over cases that are \u201cjusticiable\u201d (i.e., presented in a form suitable for judicial resolution). The Supreme Court has developed many justiciability doctrines, which reflect both Article III require-ments and self-imposed prudential limitations.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Federalist justices swiftly established three bedrock justiciability rules. First, federal court judgments expounding the law are final and cannot be reexamined or revised by Congress or the president. Second, judges will not render legal advice to political officials outside the con-text of a contested case. Third, even if a federal court possesses Article III jurisdiction over a case, it will decline to issue a decision if the underlying question presented is \u201cpolitical\u201d in the sense of being entrusted by the Constitution exclusively to the president or Congress. Long-recognized examples of such political questions include the conduct of war and foreign affairs and the appointment of executive and judicial officials.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EGradually, several other justiciability doctrines evolved. Most importantly, a plaintiff must establish \u201cstanding\u201d to sue by demonstrating the existence of an individualized injury caused by an adverse defendant. Furthermore, courts avoid premature adjudication, especially challenges to administrative agency proceedings, by insisting that claims be \u201cripe\u201d for review (i.e., sufficiently developed both factually and legally). Finally, cases are usually dismissed as \u201cmoot\u201d if the par-ties\u2019 dispute has ended.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAlthough the Court has never deviated from its bans on nonfinal judgments and advisory opinions, it has not taken a similarly consistent approach to standing, ripeness, mootness, and the political question doctrine during the mod-ern era. The justices appointed by Franklin D. Roosevelt strengthened all of these doctrines to minimize litigation attacking regulatory and social welfare legislation, which mushroomed during the New Deal. By contrast, the Warren Court relaxed justiciability requirements to broaden access to the federal judiciary, particularly where necessary to vindicate constitutional rights. Perhaps most significantly, the Court interpreted the Constitution as allowing judicial review of several questions formerly viewed as \u201cpolitical,\u201d such as the apportionment of state legislatures, \u003Cem\u003EBaker v. Carr\u003C\/em\u003E (1962), and Congress\u2019s power to judge the qualifications of its Members, \u003Cem\u003EPowell v. McCormack\u003C\/em\u003E (1969).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Burger, Rehnquist, and Roberts Courts likewise have rejected \u201cpolitical question\u201d defenses in controversial cases involving gerrymandering, the apportionment of congressional districts, procedures for enacting statutes, Indian tribal affairs, assertions of executive privilege, the 2000 presidential election deadlock, and executive branch determinations regarding treaty compliance. Indeed, since the Baker decision, only two issues, impeachment and military training, have been deemed beyond the scope of judicial review. Although the Burger and Rehnquist Courts continued the loose approach to the political question doctrine, they generally strengthened rules of standing, ripeness, and mootness.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn short, the justiciability doctrines have changed over the years and have been employed with varying degrees of rigor. Nonetheless, their purpose has remained constant: to assure the appropriate exercise of judicial power, especially the decision of constitutional cases.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EArticle III has long been construed as implicitly conferring all auxiliary \u201cinherent\u201d authority necessary for courts to exercise judicial power competently. For instance, because adjudication depends on finding accurate and relevant facts, federal judges inherently have the ability to man-age pretrial discovery, make evidentiary rulings, compel witnesses to testify, and appoint experts. Similarly, issuing a judgment is a key component of judicial power, and therefore courts can independently enter and correct their judgments. Finally, courts by their very nature must be able to maintain their authority and supervise the judicial process\u2014for example, by sanctioning disobedience of their orders and courtroom misconduct. Over the past century, the scope of inherent judicial powers has grown dramatically to cope with the vast increase in the amount and complexity of litigation.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ELikewise, the judiciary\u2019s equitable discretion has expanded greatly since \u003Cem\u003EBrown v. Board of Education\u003C\/em\u003E (1954), which countenanced broad decrees to remedy unconstitutional discrimination in public schools. \u003Cem\u003EBrown \u003C\/em\u003Eand other desegregation cases encouraged federal courts to fashion complex remedies in other major public policy areas, such as prison reform. Congress, however, can limit the range of the federal judiciary\u2019s injunctive powers.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn sum, Article III\u2019s introductory language has always been read as granting federal courts the \u201cjudicial power\u201d of deciding cases and any inherent and equitable authority needed to do so properly. The Court has continually adapted the contours of judicial power, however, to address broader legal and political changes.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \n \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--photo\u0022 style=\u0022background-image: url(\/sites\/default\/files\/Robert_Pushaw.jpg)\u0022\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/law.pepperdine.edu\/academics\/faculty\/default.php?faculty=robert_pushaw\u0022\u003ERobert J. Pushaw, Jr.\u003C\/a\u003E\n \u003C\/h4\u003E\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n James Wilson Endowed Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000101-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000101-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000101-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000101-taba\u0022\u003E\n \n \u003Cdiv\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EEvan Caminker, \u003Ci\u003EAllocating the Judicial Power in a \u0022Unified Judiciary,\u0022\u003C\/i\u003E 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1513 (2000)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ELetter from the Justices of the Supreme Court to President George Washington (Aug. 8, 1793), \u003Ci\u003Ereprinted in \u003C\/i\u003EStewart Jay, Most Humble Servants: The Advisory Role of Early Judges, at 179\u2013180 (1997)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJames S. Liebman \u0026amp; William F. Ryan, \u003Ci\u003E\u0022Some Effectual Power\u0022: The Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article III Courts\u003C\/i\u003E, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 696 (1998)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERobert J. Pushaw, Jr., \u003Ci\u003EThe Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural Constitution\u003C\/i\u003E, 86 Iowa L. Rev. 735 (2001)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERobert J. Pushaw, Jr., \u003Ci\u003EJusticiability and Separation of Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach\u003C\/i\u003E, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 393 (1996)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000101-tabb\u0022\u003E\n \n \u003Cdiv\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHayburn\u2019s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMarbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Hudson \u0026amp; Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EMartin v. Hunter\u2019s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EOsborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1871)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMurdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ELochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EWest Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EColeman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBrown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBaker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EAbbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EPowell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cdiv class=\u0022WordSection1\u0022\u003E\n\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan style=\u0022page:WordSection1\u0022\u003EUnited States Parole Commission v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980)\u003C\/span\u003E\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003E\u0026nbsp;\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ELujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S.Ct. 2652 (2013)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000101-tabc\u0022\u003E\n \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000001\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ELegislative Vesting Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000046\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EInferior Courts\u003C\/a\u003E\n \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000075\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EExecutive Vesting Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000090\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EAppointments Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000132\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ESupremacy Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]