[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_rZjCmUBEHftE91DeNru5KqLSSaOmvYzpnCjBdzKdLqM.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000118","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/articles\/3\/essays\/119\/treason\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003ETreason\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n Article III, Section 3, Clause 1\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n \n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ETreason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n \n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe word treason, as transmitted to the English language from the Latin through the French, means \u201cgiving or delivering up.\u201d The common law understood treason as treachery or breach of faith. It was therefore a crime committed between parties who enjoyed an established relationship of mutual benefit and trust. Petit treason referred to a wife\u2019s killing her husband, or a servant\u2019s or ecclesiastic\u2019s killing his lord or master. High treason involved a breach between subject and sovereign, a betrayal of (or neglect of duty or renunciation of allegiance to, in word or deed) a sovereign to whom a subject owed allegiance by birth or residence. Sir Edward Coke, Baron de Montesquieu, Sir Matthew Hale, and Sir William Blackstone considered treason the highest of crimes and declared that it must be precisely defined to prevent its abuse by governmental authorities. In England, commencing during the reign of Edward III, Parliament narrowed the definition of treason but later widened it according to political exigencies.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe laws of the American colonies reflected the broad outlines of the common law of England, both as to breadth of the offense and severity of punishment, though sometimes the definitions of treason in the colonies were broader than the definition in England. By the eighteenth century, laws began more consistently to reflect the English law of treason, and eventually, during the Revolutionary period, came to require more precise definitions, more exacting standards of proof, and more lenient punishments. During the Revolution, many states adopted language recommended by the Continental Congress and its \u201cCommittee on Spies,\u201d defining treason as adherence to the king of Great Britain (including accepting commissions from him) or to other \u201cEnemies,\u201d giving them \u201cAid and Comfort.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EReflecting the American Founders\u2019 concern with protecting individual rights and their fear of arbitrary governmental power, the Framers of the Constitution sought a precise and permanent definition of treason, the permissible means of proving it, and the limitations on the punishment for it. The drafters of the Constitution reached back (as had the Continental Congress) to language in the Statute of Treasons, 25 Edw. 3, 1351, ch. 2, stat. 5, which limited treason, among other things, to compassing or imagining the death of the king, levying war against the king, or adhering to the king\u2019s enemies, giving them aid and comfort. But the Framers\u2019 definition was even narrower. It did not include the language of \u201ccompassing or imagining,\u201d which had been the basis of the English doctrine of \u201cconstructive treason,\u201d an effective and easily abused method for dealing with political opponents. Thus, in the Constitution, treason consists only in levying war against the United States or adhering to its enemies by giving them aid and comfort. It may be proved only by confession in open court or on the testimony of no fewer than two witnesses to the same overt act.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe debates in the Constitutional Convention show an awareness of English common law and legislative history. James Madison suggested that the proposed definition reported by the Committee of Detail\u2014limiting treason to the levying of war and adherence to enemies\u2014was imprudently narrow and would effectively disallow the wisdom of experience. Others, such as John Dickinson, argued in favor of narrow wording. In the end, the phrase \u201cgiving them aid and comfort\u201d was added to restrict even further the definition of the crime, and evidentiary requirements were tightened by the addition of the phrase \u201covert act.\u201d Furthermore, as James Wilson noted in his 1791 \u003Cem\u003ELectures on Law\u003C\/em\u003E, treason requires generalized grievances and aims against the United States or its government as a whole, rather than particularized, essentially private grievances or aims. Respecting the federal nature of the union, the constitutional definition leaves open the possibility of concurrent state laws for treasons against them in their respective sovereign capacities.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EWhen it came time to defend the Constitution, Madison left behind his earlier aversion to a narrow definition of treason and, in \u003Cem\u003EThe Federalist\u003C\/em\u003E No. 43, lauded the Convention\u2019s wisdom as raising a constitutional bar to \u201cnew-fangled and artificial treasons\u201d (understood as the results and instruments of faction), and as limiting the consequences of guilt. In \u003Cem\u003EThe Federalist\u003C\/em\u003E No. 84, Alexander Hamilton mentions the definition of treason as one of the guarantors of rights that make a separate bill of rights unnecessary.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Supreme Court has had occasion to pronounce on treason, albeit infrequently. In \u003Cem\u003EEx parte Bollman\u003C\/em\u003E (1807), Chief Justice John Marshall rejected the idea of \u201cconstructive treason\u201d and held that for treason to be established on the ground of levying war against the United States, an accused must be part of an actual assemblage of men for a treasonable purpose. Conspiracy short of the actual levying of war is insufficient. But in the related case of \u003Cem\u003EUnited States v. Burr\u003C\/em\u003E (1807), Marshall tacked slightly. He again rejected constructive treason, but did so by holding that Aaron Burr, if not physically present in an assemblage of men, could still be convicted of treason on the testimony of two witnesses that he actively helped effect or aid such an assemblage\u2014in effect, aided in the levying of war. Together, these cases made a treason conviction exceedingly difficult for anything other than manifest participation in a treasonable act.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EAfter Burr, the leading treason cases grew out of World War II, for adherence to enemies. In \u003Cem\u003ECramer v. United States\u003C\/em\u003E (1945), the Supreme Court held that a specific intent\u2014adherence to the enemy, and therefore to harm the United States\u2014 is necessary, rather than the simple rendition of aid. Further, the majority came close to holding that such adherence requires proof, not just of an act that on its face is \u201ccommonplace\u201d (such as a meeting) but a manifestly treasonable overt act, evidenced by the testimony of at least two witnesses. But in \u003Cem\u003EHaupt v. United States\u003C\/em\u003E (1947)\u2014the Court\u2019s first affirmation of a treason conviction\u2014 the Court effectively relaxed the standard of proof in \u003Cem\u003ECramer\u003C\/em\u003E by holding that the testimony of two witnesses to overt acts might be supported by other evidence as to the accused\u2019s treasonable intent, including out-of-court confessions and admissions. In a concurring opinion, Justice William O. Douglas (who dissented in \u003Cem\u003ECramer\u003C\/em\u003E) affirmed that the separate elements of intent and overt act are amenable to different modes of proof, and only the latter triggers the constitutional requirement of testimony by two witnesses.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn \u003Cem\u003EKawakita v. United States\u003C\/em\u003E (1952), the Supreme Court held that dual citizenship does not diminish a citizen\u2019s allegiance to the United States, and, in a treason prosecution, whether someone intends to renounce American citizenship hinges on particular facts and may be a question for a jury.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ELower courts have had occasion to enter verdicts of treason, commencing with the Whiskey Rebellion, some of them arguably on broader grounds than what the Supreme Court would later countenance. For example, courts held that armed resistance to the collection of taxes constituted constructive treason. A number of cases arising out of the Civil War also suggested, without directly interpreting the Constitution, that Confederate activities amounted to treason (although the general amnesty of December 25, 1868, pardoned all Confederates). Because of the particular and high constitutional standards associated with the definition and proof of treason, hostile or subversive acts falling short of treason but directed toward the whole polity have been prosecuted under various laws of Congress, including those dealing with espionage (for example, the conviction and execution of Ethel and Julius Rosenberg in 1953) and, more recently, terrorism. The exercise of federal prosecutorial discretion has also led to the prosecution on other grounds of individuals for acts that arguably amount to treason (for example, John Walker Lindh captured in Afghanistan in 2001), or to failure to prosecute at all.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn 2006, Adam Yahiye Gadahn\u2014who, like Lindh, was a convert to Islam\u2014became the first American to be charged with treason since Tomoya Kawakita in 1952. He remains at large but is accused of treason by knowingly adhering to and giving aid and comfort to an enemy of the United States by appearing in al Qaeda videos threatening Americans and the United States with violence. He is also accused of aiding and abetting al Qaeda through the provision of material support and resources.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \n \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/www.stvincent.edu\/Majors_and_Programs\/Majors_and_Programs\/Politics\/Bradley_C_S__Watson\/\u0022\u003EBradley C. S. Watson\u003C\/a\u003E\n \u003C\/h4\u003E\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n Chairman, Politics Department, Saint Vincent College\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000118-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000118-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000118-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000118-taba\u0022\u003E\n \n \u003Cdiv\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHenry Mark Holzer, \u003Ci\u003EWhy Not Call It Treason? From Korea to Afghanistan\u003C\/i\u003E, 29 S.U. L. Rev. 181 (2002)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJames Willard Hurst, The Law of Treason in the United States: Collected Essays (1971)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000118-tabb\u0022\u003E\n \n \u003Cdiv\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003E\u003Ci\u003EEx parte\u003C\/i\u003E Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EUnited States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 55 (C.C. Va. 1807) (No. 14,693)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1945)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHaupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631 (1947)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EKawakita v. United States, 343 U.S. 717 (1952)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000118-tabc\u0022\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]