[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_rZjCmUBEHftE91DeNru5KqLSSaOmvYzpnCjBdzKdLqM.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000158","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/amendments\/7\/essays\/159\/right-to-jury-in-civil-cases\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003ERight to Jury in Civil Cases\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n Amendment VII\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n \n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EIn Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved....\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n \n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EToward the end of the Constitutional Convention, Hugh Williamson of North Carolina noted that \u201cno provision was yet made for juries in civil cases and suggested the necessity of it.\u201d Elbridge Gerry agreed, while George Mason further argued that the omission demonstrated that the Constitution needed a Bill of Rights. Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts responded that the question should be left to Congress because of complexities in determining what kind of civil cases should be given to a jury. A few days later, when Gerry and Charles Pinckney moved to insert \u201cAnd a trial by jury shall be preserved as usual in civil cases,\u201d Gorham argued that there was no usual form, because the structure of civil juries varied among the states. Apparently sensing the difficulty in phrasing the guarantee, the convention unanimously defeated the motion.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIt was a costly oversight, for the omission of a guarantee of civil juries occasioned the greatest opposition to the Constitution in the ratifying conventions, as Alexander Hamilton candidly admitted in \u003Cem\u003EThe Federalist\u003C\/em\u003E No. 83. Hamilton tried to minimize the differences by arguing that the only difference between the supporters and detractors of the Constitution on this issue was that \u201cthe former regard it as a valuable safeguard to liberty; the latter represent it as the very palladium of free government.\u201d Mason and Gerry had themselves refused to sign the Constitution, citing the absence of the guarantee among their other concerns. In the ratification debates, the Anti-Federalists argued that the provision in the Constitution for juries in criminal cases necessarily implied their abolition in civil cases. The Anti-Federalists tied this argument to their objections to the power of the Supreme Court in Article III to hear appeals \u201cboth as to law and fact,\u201d suggesting that the Constitution would effectively abolish juries in the states as well.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn response, the Federalists continued to argue that defining in the Constitution the appropriate cases for civil juries was too difficult a task and that the Congress could be trusted to make provision for civil juries. This was a weak argument, as twelve of the states themselves protected civil juries in their constitutions. Of the six ratifying conventions that proposed amendments to the Constitution, five included a right to a jury in civil cases.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe history of the revolutionary struggle also counted against the Federalists. The colonists had had no objection to trials without juries in traditional admiralty and maritime cases. But when Parliament extended the jurisdiction of the admiralty courts to other cases, the colonists\u2019 opposition to England crystallized around the deprivation of their right to trial by jury. In the \u003Cem\u003EDeclaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking up Arms\u003C\/em\u003E (1775), the Second Continental Congress declared: \u201c[S]tatutes have been passed for extending the jurisdiction of courts of Admiralty and Vice-Admiralty beyond their ancient limits; for depriving us of the accustomed and inestimable privilege of trial by jury, in cases affecting both life and property.\u201d The complaint was also among the bill of particulars in the Declaration of Independence.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Seventh Amendment, passed by the First Congress without debate, cured the omission by declaring that the right to a jury trial shall be preserved in common law cases, thus leaving the traditional distinction between cases at law and those in equity or admiralty, where there normally was no jury. The implied distinction parallels the explicit division of federal judicial authority in Article III to cases (1) in law, (2) in equity, and (3) in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction. The contemporaneously passed Judiciary Act of 1789 similarly provided that \u201cthe trial of issues in fact, in the district courts, in all causes except civil causes of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, shall be by jury.\u201d As Justice Joseph Story later explained in \u003Cem\u003EParsons v. Bedford\u003C\/em\u003E (1830) \u201cIn a just sense, the amendment then may well be construed to embrace all suits which are not of equity and admiralty jurisdiction, whatever may be the peculiar form which they may assume to settle legal rights.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe Supreme Court has, however, arrived at a more limited interpretation. It applies the amendment\u2019s guarantee to the kinds of cases that \u201cexisted under the English common law when the amendment was adopted,\u201d \u003Cem\u003EBaltimore \u0026amp; Carolina Line v. Redman\u003C\/em\u003E (1935), or to newly developed rights that can be analogized to what existed at that time, \u003Cem\u003ELuria v. United States\u003C\/em\u003E (1913), \u003Cem\u003ECurtis v. Loether\u003C\/em\u003E (1974). Accordingly, in a series of decisions in the second half of the twentieth century, the Supreme Court ruled that the Seventh Amendment guarantees the right to trial by jury in procedurally novel settings, like declaratory judgment actions, \u003Cem\u003EBeacon Theatres v. Westover \u003C\/em\u003E(1959), and shareholder derivative suits, \u003Cem\u003ERoss v. Bernhard\u003C\/em\u003E (1970). The Court also applied the amendment to cases adjudicating newly created statutory rights, \u003Cem\u003ECurtis v. Loether\u003C\/em\u003E, \u003Cem\u003EPernell v. Southall Realty\u003C\/em\u003E (1974). In addition, the Supreme Court has ruled unanimously that when factually overlapping \u201clegal\u201d and \u201cequitable\u201d claims are joined together in the same action, the Seventh Amendment requires that the former be adjudicated first (by a jury), and that when legal claims triable to a jury are erroneously dismissed, relitigation of the entire action is \u201cessential to vindicating [the plaintiff\u2019s] Seventh Amendment rights.\u201d \u003Cem\u003ELytle v. Household Manufacturing, Inc.\u003C\/em\u003E (1990).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe right to trial by jury is not constitutionally guaranteed in certain classes of civil cases that are concededly \u201csuits at common law,\u201d particularly when \u201cpublic\u201d or governmental rights are at issue and if one cannot find eighteenth-century precedent for jury participation in those cases. \u003Cem\u003EAtlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety \u0026amp; Health Review Commission \u003C\/em\u003E(1977). Thus, Congress can direct Article III courts to resolve personal and property claims against the United States without the aid of a jury, or simply divert such claims to non\u2013Article III courts with no jury component. \u003Cem\u003EOsborn v. Haley \u003C\/em\u003E(2007). In addition, where practice as it existed in 1791 \u201cprovides no clear answer,\u201d the rule is that \u201c[o]nly those incidents which are regarded as fundamental, as inherent in and of the essence of the system of trial by jury, are placed beyond the reach of the legislature.\u201d \u003Cem\u003EMarkman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.\u003C\/em\u003E (1996). In those situations, too, the Seventh Amendment does not restrain congressional choice.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn contrast to the near-universal support for the civil jury trial in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, modern jurists consider civil jury trial neither \u201cimplicit in the concept of ordered liberty,\u201d \u003Cem\u003EPalko v. Connecticut \u003C\/em\u003E(1937), nor \u201cfundamental to the American scheme of justice,\u201d \u003Cem\u003EDuncan v. Louisiana\u003C\/em\u003E (1968). Accordingly, in solitary company with the Grand Jury Requirement Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Seventh Amendment is not \u201cincorporated\u201d against the states; it applies only in the federal courts. In the federal courts, the parties can waive the right, but there is no longer a requirement, as there was in 1791, that civil juries be composed of twelve persons and must reach a unanimous verdict. \u003Cem\u003EColgrove v. Battin \u003C\/em\u003E(1973).\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \n \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n \u003Ca href=\u0022http:\/\/www.hicks-thomas.com\/eric-grant.asp\u0022\u003EEric Grant\u003C\/a\u003E\n \u003C\/h4\u003E\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n Senior Counsel, Hicks Thomas LLP\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000158-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000158-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000158-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000158-taba\u0022\u003E\n \n \u003Cdiv\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EGeorge E. Butler II, \u003Ci\u003ECompensable Liberty: A Historical and Political Model of the Seventh Amendment Public Law Jury\u003C\/i\u003E, 1 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics \u0026amp; Pub. Pol\u0027y 595 (1985)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EEric Grant, \u003Ci\u003EA Revolutionary View of the Seventh Amendment and the Just Compensation Clause\u003C\/i\u003E, 91 Nw. U. L. Rev. 144 (1996)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EKenneth S. Klein, Is Ashcroft v. Iqbal the Death (Finally) of the \u201cHistorical Test\u201d for Interpreting the Seventh Amendment?, 88 NEB. L. REV. 467 (2010)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EStanton D. Krauss, \u003Ci\u003EThe Original Understanding of the Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial\u003C\/i\u003E, 33 U. Rich. L. Rev. 407 (1999)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003E1 John Phillip Reid, \u003Ci\u003EConstitutional History of the American Revolution: The Authority of Rights\u003C\/i\u003E (1986)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-align:justify; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003ESymposium, Originalism and the Jury, 71 OHIO ST. L.J. 883 (2010)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECharles W. Wolfram, \u003Ci\u003EThe Constitutional History of the Seventh Amendment\u003C\/i\u003E, 57 Minn. L. Rev. 639 (1973)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000158-tabb\u0022\u003E\n \n \u003Cdiv\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EParsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433 (1830)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EKohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367 (1876)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ELuria v. United States, 231 U.S. 9 (1913)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBaltimore \u0026amp; Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EBeacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDuncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERoss v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EColgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECurtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189 (1974)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EPernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363 (1974)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EAtlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety \u0026amp; Health Review Comm\u2019n, 430 U.S. 442 (1977)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ETull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EGranfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ELytle v. Household Manufacturing, Inc., 494 U.S. 545 (1990)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EMarkman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370 (1996)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp style=\u0022margin-left:16px; text-indent:-11.95pt\u0022\u003EMonterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687 (1999)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EOsborn v. Haley, 549 U.S. 225 (2007)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000158-tabc\u0022\u003E\n \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000110\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EFederal Party\u003C\/a\u003E\n \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000115\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EOriginal Jurisdiction\u003C\/a\u003E\n \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000145\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EGrand Jury Requirement\u003C\/a\u003E\n \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000153\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EJury Trial\u003C\/a\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]