[{"command":"add_css","data":[{"rel":"stylesheet","media":"all","href":"\/sites\/default\/files\/css\/css_rZjCmUBEHftE91DeNru5KqLSSaOmvYzpnCjBdzKdLqM.css?delta=0\u0026language=en\u0026theme=heritage_theme\u0026include=eJwrTi1LzdNPzkksLq7Uy8tPSQUAPMsGtA"}]},{"command":"invoke","selector":null,"method":"openEssay","args":["10000161","\n\n\u003Carticle about=\u0022\/constitution\/amendments\/9\/essays\/162\/rights-retained-by-the-people\u0022 class=\u0022node node--type-constitution-essay node--promoted node--view-mode-embedded clearfix\u0022\u003E\n \u003Ch1 class=\u0022title\u0022\u003E\u003Cspan\u003ERights Retained by the People\u003C\/span\u003E\n\u003C\/h1\u003E\n\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-location\u0022\u003E\n Amendment IX\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-context\u0022\u003E\n \n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-body\u0022\u003E\n \n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EDuring the much-publicized Senate hearings on his nomination to the U.S. Supreme Court in 1987, Judge Robert Bork famously analogized the Ninth Amendment to a constitutional \u201cinkblot,\u201d arguing that judges could not use the amendment to decide cases \u201cwithout knowing something of what it means.\u201d Judge Bork\u2019s inkblot analogy provoked a wave of criticism from self-described \u201cnoninterpretivists,\u201d who argued that the Ninth Amendment\u2019s recognition of unenumerated \u201crights retained by the people\u201d demonstrated the Founders\u2019 rejection of Bork\u2019s jurisprudential approach.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThis controversy also inspired a number of originalist scholars to undertake their own historical investigations to provide a more satisfactory answer to the question of how originalist judges should go about interpreting and applying the Ninth Amendment. These investigations have uncovered a wealth of information regarding the circumstances that led to the amendment\u2019s inclusion in the Bill of Rights and the specific concerns it was designed to address. But these impressive historical excavations have not led to a consensus view among originalists regarding the amendment\u2019s proper interpretation. Instead, there are presently three very different originalist theories of the Ninth Amendment\u2019s original meaning and modern significance.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EBefore discussing the leading originalist theories of the Ninth Amendment, it will be useful to briefly summarize the circumstances that led to its inclusion in the Bill of Rights. The story of the Ninth Amendment\u2019s adoption begins with the decision by the Philadelphia convention to omit a bill of rights from the original Constitution of 1787. The absence of a bill of rights was among the most controversial features of the original constitutional design and provided a rallying point for Anti-Federalist opposition during the state ratification debates. Supporters of ratification quickly converged on a defense of the decision to omit a bill of rights that was first articulated by Philadelphia Framer James Wilson. Wilson defended the Framers\u2019 decision to leave even very popular rights, such as freedom of the press, unprotected because the \u201cvery declaration\u201d of such a right in the Constitution \u201cmight have been construed to imply that some degree of power was given\u201d to the federal government with respect to the press \u201csince we undertook to define its extent.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EWilson\u2019s argument drew upon the interpretive canon\u003Cem\u003E inclusio unius est exclusio alterius\u003C\/em\u003E (the inclusion of one thing necessarily excludes all others), which was widely accepted by courts at the time. Federalists in other states quickly rallied to Wilson\u2019s argument, contending that if a bill of rights had been included in the Constitution, courts might construe the limited enumeration of rights to deny the existence of other rights and to constructively enlarge the scope of federal powers. As Alexander Hamilton warned in \u003Cem\u003EThe Federalist\u003C\/em\u003E No. 84, a bill of rights that \u201ccontain[ed] various exceptions to powers which are not granted\u201d would \u201cafford a colorable pretext to claim more than were granted.\u201d Instead of relying on a limited and almost certainly incomplete enumeration of particular rights that the people would retain after the Constitution\u2019s adoption, Federalists argued that such rights would be better protected by the limited enumeration of federal powers.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EBut this defense of the Philadelphia convention\u2019s decision to omit a bill of rights left Federalists open to a devastating rejoinder. Because the Constitution that emerged from Philadelphia already protected a very limited set of rights, including the right of habeas corpus and the right to trial by jury in criminal cases, Anti-Federalists argued that the Constitution \u003Cem\u003Ealready\u003C\/em\u003E posed the threat of expansive interpretation that Federalists claimed would result from enumerating rights. Federalists never settled on a satisfactory response to this objection. Nonetheless, ratification in the states proceeded apace, though increasingly supported by a tacit understanding that additional rights would be constitutionally protected through the Article V amendment process following ratification.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003ESeveral state ratifying conventions proposed lists of amendments that they wished to see adopted following ratification. Although none of these proposals perfectly mirrored the language that was ultimately included in the Ninth Amendment, two sets of such proposed amendments have been identified by modern originalists as potentially relevant to the amendment\u2019s original meaning. The first set of proposals called for an amendment that would expressly recognize the existence of \u201cretained\u201d individual natural rights. A characteristic example of such a proposal, suggested by Virginia\u2019s ratifying convention, acknowledged the existence of \u201ccertain natural rights, of which men, when they form a social compact, cannot deprive or divest their posterity,\u201d including \u201cthe enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.\u201d The second set of amendment proposals, which were targeted more directly at the Federalists\u2019 concerns regarding the \u003Cem\u003Einclusio unius\u003C\/em\u003E canon, called for a rule of construction providing that provisions expressly withholding particular powers from Congress should not be read to imply the existence of unenumerated federal powers.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EFollowing ratification, James Madison became the leading champion of a federal bill of rights as a representative from Virginia in the First Congress. Madison synthesized several of the state ratifying conventions\u2019 proposals into a list of proposed amendments that provided an important template for the first ten amendments to the Constitution. One of Madison\u2019s proposed amendments, which eventually evolved into the current Ninth Amendment, combined aspects of both the \u201cretained\u201d natural rights provisions proposed by various state conventions and the separate set of proposals calling for an interpretive rule prohibiting the constructive enlargement of federal powers. Madison\u2019s proposal declared that \u201cexceptions\u201d of constitutional powers \u201cmade in favor of particular rights\u201d should \u201cnot be so construed as to diminish the just importance of other rights retained by the people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the Constitution.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn a speech introducing the proposed amendments in the House, Madison explained the significance of this provision in the following terms:\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cblockquote\u003EIt has been objected\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009against a bill of rights, that, by enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage those rights which were not placed in that enumeration, and it might follow by implication, that those rights which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the general government, and were consequently insecure. This is one of the most plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against the admission of a bill of rights into this system; but, I conceive, that it may be guarded against.\u003C\/blockquote\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EMadison specifically identified his proto\u2013 Ninth Amendment as reflecting his effort to guard against such arguments.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EFollowing this speech, Madison\u2019s proposals were referred to a Select Committee of the House on which he served. Unfortunately, this Select Committee kept no formal record of its proceedings, leaving modern interpreters with limited information regarding the considerations that influenced the amendment\u2019s final wording. A possible clue to the Select Committee\u2019s internal deliberations is provided by a handwritten list of proposed amendments penned by one of its members, Roger Sherman of Connecticut. The second amendment listed on the Sherman draft declared that \u201c[t]he people have certain natural rights which are retained by them when they enter into Society,\u201d including \u201crights of Conscience in matters of religion,\u201d \u201cof acquiring property and of pursuing happiness \u0026amp; Safety\u201d and \u201cof Speaking, writing and publishing their Sentiments,\u201d and barring the federal government from \u201cdepriv[ing]\u201d them of such rights. A separate amendment in the Sherman draft contains a somewhat garbled provision that bears some resemblance to the rule-of-construction proposals urged by several of the state ratifying conventions: \u201cnor shall\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009the exercise of power by the Government of the united States particular instances here in enumerated by way of caution be construed to imply the contrary.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn the end, the Select Committee settled on new language that departed from both Madison\u2019s initial proposal and the language reflected in the Sherman draft. This new language closely tracked the language that ultimately was included in the Ninth Amendment. For reasons that are not known, the reference to constructive enlargement of federal powers, which had appeared in both Madison\u2019s initial proposal and in proposals submitted by the state ratifying conventions, was dropped from the final version, limiting the Ninth Amendment\u2019s rule of construction to a prohibition on \u201cconstru[ing]\u201d the \u201cenumeration in the Constitution of certain rights to deny or disparage others retained by the people.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn considering the disagreement among modern originalists regarding the Ninth Amendment\u2019s original meaning, it is useful to note a distinction between what the amendment says explicitly and what might be implied by or inferred from its reference to other rights \u201cretained by the people.\u201d When read literally, the only thing the Ninth Amendment does is state a rule about how other provisions in the Constitution should be read. The Ninth Amendment thus stands as one of only a handful of provisions, along with the Eleventh Amendment and Article IV, Section 3, Clause 2, that speak to how the Constitution itself should be interpreted. The Ninth Amendment\u2019s explicit command does not directly confer rights or limit the scope of federal powers. Rather, the Amendment simply instructs interpreters to reject arguments that seek to use the existence of particular enumerated rights in the Constitution to \u201cdeny or disparage\u201d other \u201cretained\u201d rights.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThis rule of construction function is at the center of the traditional originalist view of the Ninth Amendment; it views the amendment as a direct response to the \u003Cem\u003Einclusio unius\u003C\/em\u003E concerns expressed during the ratification debates of 1787 and 1788. This traditional view was defended by Justice Hugo Black in his dissenting opinion in \u003Cem\u003EGriswold v. Connecticut \u003C\/em\u003E(1965): quoting Madison\u2019s Bill of Rights speech, Black described the Ninth Amendment as having been \u201cintended to protect against the idea that \u2018by enumerating particular exceptions to the grant of power\u2019 to the Federal Government \u2018those rights which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the General Government.\u2009.\u2009.\u2009.\u2004\u2019\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EProponents of this traditional view have expressed subtly different understandings of what the Ninth Amendment\u2019s \u201cretained rights\u201d language was originally understood to encompass. But they agree that its prohibition on \u201cdenying or disparaging\u201d such retained rights only comes into play when the basis for denial or disparagement is premised on the fact that the Constitution contains an enumeration of rights. Proponents of this view further agree that the amendment\u2019s interpretive command does not raise the \u201cretained\u201d rights referred to in the amendment to the status of constitutional rights and does not directly authorize courts to invalidate laws that infringe upon such rights. Instead, such \u201cretained\u201d rights are simply left with whatever legal status they would have possessed if an enumeration of rights had not been included in the Constitution. The traditional view thus interprets the Ninth Amendment as a \u201chold harmless\u201d provision that functions much like the similarly phrased provision in Article IV instructing that the Constitution should not be \u201cso construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.\u201d\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EWhile the traditional view is supported by a number of originalist scholars, this understanding of the provision has been called into question by two broader originalist theories. Though each of these competing theories recognizes the amendment\u2019s function as a rule of construction, both argue that a normal speaker of English at the time of enactment would have understood the amendment\u2019s text as implying both that the \u201cretained\u201d rights it refers to actually exist and that the federal government is prohibited from \u201cdenying or disparaging\u201d those rights. Thus, according to these theories, the Ninth Amendment\u2019s original meaning (including both its explicit meaning and the implications that would have been understood by an ordinary reader) prohibits all denial or disparagement of \u201cretained rights,\u201d even if such denial or disparagement is not premised on the misconstruction of some enumerated right.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe first of these competing theories is closely associated with the work of Randy Barnett. Much like the \u201cnoninterpretivists\u201d of earlier decades, Barnett argues that the Ninth Amendment\u2019s reference to \u201cretained\u201d rights refers to unenumerated individual rights and that the amendment should be construed to empower courts to enforce such rights directly in the same manner as enumerated rights. But unlike those nonoriginalists who view the Amendment as an open-ended invitation for judges to protect only those unenumerated rights they find appealing, Barnett argues that the amendment\u2019s retained rights language points to a historically defined standard. According to Barnett, the \u201cretained\u201d rights to which the Ninth Amendment refers are individual natural rights that individuals possessed before the Constitution\u2019s adoption and that they \u201cretained\u201d to themselves upon forming their government. Barnett draws support for this interpretation from a variety of sources, including the natural rights language contained in Roger Sherman\u2019s draft bill of rights, early American legal treatises, and Madison\u2019s public statements regarding the amendment, as well as Madison\u2019s private, handwritten notes for his bill of rights speech. Barnett contends that the \u201cretained\u201d natural rights to which the amendment refers may be protected by adopting a judicially enforced \u201cpresumption of liberty\u201d that would require the federal government to demonstrate that its regulations are truly necessary to protect the liberties of others and not merely a pretense to impose undue burdens on the rightful exercise of natural rights by individuals.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EMore recently, Kurt Lash has defended a competing originalist interpretation of the Ninth Amendment that is distinct from both the traditional view and Barnett\u2019s individual natural rights interpretation. Lash emphasizes the similarity between the Ninth Amendment and the calls from numerous state ratifying conventions for a rule of construction that would limit the constructive enlargement of federal powers. Lash acknowledges the linguistic distinction between the states\u2019 rule-of-construction proposals and the final text of the Ninth Amendment, but argues that the Ninth Amendment\u2019s focus on preserving retained rights is properly viewed as responding to the state ratifying conventions\u2019 focus on constraining federal power. Lash argues that the amendment\u2019s reference to \u201cretained rights\u201d is best understood as encompassing \u003Cem\u003Eboth\u003C\/em\u003E individual natural rights and the peoples\u2019 collective right to local self government within their respective states. Like Barnett, Lash views the Ninth Amendment\u2019s textual recognition of other retained rights as supporting judicial protection of such rights even in situations where the danger to such rights does not arise from arguments premised on the fact that other rights have been enumerated. But unlike Barnett, Lash sees the primary significance of the Ninth Amendment as a limitation on federal interference with collective self-governance in the states.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EOne point on which proponents of all three of the principal originalist theories regarding the Ninth Amendment tend to agree is that the amendment, like other provisions of the Bill of Rights, was originally designed to limit the power of the federal government alone and not that of the states. Thus, for example, under Barnett\u2019s individual natural rights interpretation, the amendment prohibits the federal government from infringing individual natural rights but does not impose any similar restriction on the states. An important corollary of this limitation is that the Ninth Amendment confers no power on the federal government, including the federal courts, to protect individual natural rights against state infringement. If any such power exists, it must be found in some other source, such as the Fourteenth Amendment\u2019s Privileges or Immunities Clause.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe scholarly attention lavished on the Ninth Amendment in recent decades has not been matched by a similar level of interest in the amendment among the judiciary. When it comes to Supreme Court decisions, it is much easier to identify instances where the potential interpretive significance of the Ninth Amendment was overlooked than it is to find instances where the amendment exerted a clear influence on the Court\u2019s ultimate decision. For example, Justice Samuel Chase\u2019s well-known paean to unwritten constitutionalism in \u003Cem\u003ECalder v. Bull \u003C\/em\u003E(1798) contained no mention of the Ninth Amendment or that amendment\u2019s suggestion that non-enumerated rights had been \u201cretained\u201d by the American people. Likewise, Chief Justice Marshall\u2019s famous opinions in \u003Cem\u003EMcCulloch v. Maryland\u003C\/em\u003E (1819) and \u003Cem\u003EGibbons v. Ogden\u003C\/em\u003E (1824) made no effort to grapple with the possible tension between the expansive interpretations of federal power articulated in those cases and the Ninth Amendment\u2019s possible role as a limit on constructive enlargement of federal powers. And in \u003Cem\u003EThe Legal Tender Cases\u003C\/em\u003E (1871), the Court seemed to validate the worst fears of Wilson and other Federalists regarding the misapplication of the\u003Cem\u003E inclusio unius\u003C\/em\u003E canon by asserting that the inclusion of a Bill of Rights in the Constitution \u201ctend[ed] plainly to show\u201d that the enactors expected the federal government would possess unenumerated powers. The Ninth Amendment, which had been adopted for the specific purpose of guarding against such reasoning, went unmentioned by the Court.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EThe earliest mention of the Ninth Amendment in a Supreme Court opinion came in Justice Joseph Story\u2019s dissent in \u003Cem\u003EHouston v. Moore\u003C\/em\u003E (1820), where Story associated the amendment primarily with limiting the constructive enlargement of federal powers. This was by far the predominant judicial application of the amendment throughout the nineteenth century and the early portion of the twentieth century. Following the New Deal expansion of federal regulatory power, this interpretation faded in significance, and the Ninth Amendment largely fell into judicial disuse.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EJustice Arthur Goldberg\u2019s concurring opinion in \u003Cem\u003EGriswold\u003C\/em\u003E in 1965 signaled a possible revival of judicial interest in the Ninth Amendment. In that opinion, Goldberg pointed to the amendment as \u201creveal[ing] that the Framers of the Constitution believed that there are additional fundamental rights, protected from governmental infringement, which exist alongside those fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the first eight constitutional amendments\u201d and as supporting the Court\u2019s decision to strike down state laws that infringed the unenumerated right to marital privacy. But Goldberg\u2019s suggestion that a jurisprudence of unenumerated rights be grounded in the Ninth Amendment went unheeded. Justice William Douglas\u2019s majority opinion in \u003Cem\u003EGriswold\u003C\/em\u003E briefly mentioned the Ninth Amendment as part of a laundry list of textually specified individual rights, the \u201cemanations\u201d from which formed \u201cpenumbras\u201d that allowed the Court to infer the existence of an unenumerated right to privacy.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\n\u003Cp\u003EIn subsequent unenumerated rights cases like\u003Cem\u003E Roe v. Wade\u003C\/em\u003E (1973), \u003Cem\u003EPlanned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey\u003C\/em\u003E (1992), and \u003Cem\u003ELawrence v. Texas \u003C\/em\u003E(2003), the Court has moved away from this type of \u201cpenumbral\u201d reasoning, as well as the Ninth Amendment, preferring instead to ground its fundamental rights jurisprudence in the \u201csubstantive\u201d dimensions of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments\u2019 Due Process Clauses. The Supreme Court has never held the Ninth Amendment to be incorporated against the states through the Fourteenth Amendment, making it one of only a handful of Bill of Rights provisions that have not been so incorporated.\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \n \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author\u0022\u003E\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--media\u0022\u003E\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--photo\u0022 style=\u0022background-image: url(\/sites\/default\/files\/Thomas_McAffee.jpg)\u0022\u003E\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--info\u0022\u003E\n \u003Ch4 class=\u0022con-essay-author--name\u0022\u003E\n Ryan Williams\n \u003C\/h4\u003E\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-author--job\u0022\u003E\n Associate in Law, Columbia University School of Law\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n\n \u003Cdiv class=\u0022con-essay-tabs\u0022\u003E\n \u003Cul data-tabs class=\u0022tabs\u0022\u003E\n \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000161-taba\u0022\u003EFurther Reading\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000161-tabb\u0022\u003ECase Law\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n \u003Cli class=\u0022button-more thirds\u0022\u003E\u003Ca data-tab href=\u0022#node-10000161-tabc\u0022\u003ERelated Essays\u003C\/a\u003E\u003C\/li\u003E\n \u003C\/ul\u003E\n\n \u003Cdiv data-tabs-content\u003E\n \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000161-taba\u0022\u003E\n \n \u003Cdiv\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERandy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2006)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERANDY E. BARNETT, THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE: THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT (2004)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERaoul Berger, The Ninth Amendment, 66 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1980)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ELaurence Claus, Protecting Rights from Rights: Enumeration, Disparagement, and the Ninth Amendment, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 585 (2004)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EKURT T. LASH, THE LOST HISTORY OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT (2009)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ECALVIN R. MASSEY, SILENT RIGHTS: THE NINTH AMENDMENT AND THE CONSTITUTION\u2019S UNENUMERATED RIGHTS (1995)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ETHOMAS B. MCAFFEE, INHERENT RIGHTS, THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION, AND POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY: THE FOUNDERS\u2019 UNDERSTANDING (2000)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThomas B. McAffee, \u003Ci\u003EA Critical Guide to the Ninth Amendment\u003C\/i\u003E, 69 Temp. L. Rev. 61 (1996)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThomas B. McAffee, The Original Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1215 (1990)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMichael W. McConnell, Natural Rights and the Ninth Amendment: How Does Lockean Legal Theory Assist in Interpretation?, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. \u0026amp; LIBERTY 1 (2010)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERyan C. Williams, The Ninth Amendment as a Rule of Construction, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 498 (2011)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EJohn C. Yoo, Our Declaratory Ninth Amendment, 42 EMORY L.J. 967 (1993)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000161-tabb\u0022\u003E\n \n \u003Cdiv\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EMcCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EHouston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EThe Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EGriswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ERoe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003EPlanned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv\u003E\u003Cp\u003ELawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003)\u003C\/p\u003E\n\u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003Cdiv data-tabs-pane class=\u0022tabs-pane\u0022 id=\u0022node-10000161-tabc\u0022\u003E\n \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000126\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EClaims\u003C\/a\u003E\n \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000132\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ESupremacy Clause\u003C\/a\u003E\n \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000162\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003EReserved Powers of the States\u003C\/a\u003E\n \u003Ca href=\u0022\/essay_controller\/10000163\u0022 class=\u0022use-ajax\u0022\u003ESuits Against a State\u003C\/a\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \u003C\/div\u003E\n \n\u003C\/article\u003E\n"]}]