907 July 20,1992 US. AND BOSNIAt TOO LATE, WRONG WAR INTRODUCTION The tragedy of Bosnia continues. The United Nations effort to relieve the besieg ed Bosnian capital of Sarajevo is expanding into a larger military effort to protect the sup dy convoys and secm overland routes. After months of inckcision, and a year of con Kct in Yugoslavia, the Bush Administration is preparing to intervene militarily t6 pro vide air cover and logistical support for the U.N. farces. Americas West European al lies are contemplating their own action ing outrage around the world, fed by nightly television reports. The international force now assembling was prompted in lar g e part by exasperation over the failure of past iiplomatic efforts to stop the bloodletting. But the understandable desk to do some thing and end the perception of Western impotence may have the effect of pmmpting the wrong action. Before the U.S. assumes the obligations entailed in a commitment of American forces to this area, even in a supparting capacity, the potential consequences Df this course of action need to be fully understood.
Short-sighted, Ineffective. There may be a role for U.S. forces in Bo snia, but the White House has yet to make a compelling case for American intervention at any level. In fact, the Administrations handling of the series of crises stemming from the disintegration of Yugoslavia over the past year has demonstrated that its p olicy toward Yugoslavia has been poorly informed, short-sighted, and ineffective. The risk is that this latest move toward deeper engagement is yet another step in that series, but one with far greater potential consequences.
If the Bush Administration is intent on American involvement, its policy toward Bosnia should flow from a general reexamination of American interests and commit ments in the post-Cold War era.
With the collapse of the Soviet empire, the familiar structures of the Cold War rap idly are becoming outdated. In this new era, U.S. interests will be more difficult to de fine and American power less clearly useable to good effect. Laying the foundation for The carnage in Bosnia and the local combatants ruthlessness have produced inmasadvancin g American interests in this new era should be a priority, Despite much talk of a New World order by the Administration, however, few guidelines have emerged.
The destruction of the Soviet Union has ended the last major threat to Europe and thus the need f ar America to continue to bear the principal responsibility for the continents defense. One certain objective of U.S. policy toward Europe should be to reduce the need for U.S. involvement to maintain order in Europe and to transfer that responsibility to the European powers. Bosnia and the larger crisis in Yugoslavia offer an opportunity to begin that process THE CALCULUS OF INTERVENTION Instead of rushing into action in Bosnia, the U.S. should formulate a clear policy to achieve specific objectives. To g u ide this process, it is necessary to answer three ques tions Question #1: What are U.S. interests In Bosnia and throughout the former Yugoslavia There m no vital U.S. interests at stake in the Bosnian struggle. However great the suffering and however viol e nt the conflict in that region may be, there is no likely out come that would seriously threaten any significant American interests. Nor is there sub stantial risk that any major U.S. interests will be threatened by turmoil in any other area of the former Yugoslavia, from Croatia to Macedonia.
This near-irrelevance of Yugoslavia to U.S. interests is a marked changed from the recent past. During the Cold War, the integrity and stability of Yugoslavia was of great importance to the U.S. and the West. Fanner dictator Josip BrozTito received consider able support from the U.S. and the West, which were eager to bolster his defiance of Moscow and keep Yugoslavia out of Soviet control. Yugoslavias strategic importance to the West, however, largely has disappeared with the demise of the Soviet threat to Western Europe. The impact of upheaval in that country today need not extend any fur ther than its own borders.
Those U.S. interests in Yugoslavia which remain in the ailexmath of the Cold War are much less important than before and are more Micult to defme. Beyond an unde niable humanitarian interest in alleviating the wide-spread suffering produced by the regions many conflicts, specific US. interests are difficult to identify. Many observers point to a poorly defined goal of preserving stability in Europe, a stability now presum ably threatened by the events in Yugoslavia. However, it is far from certain that the .I conflict and chaos in Yugoslavia will have a serious destabilizing impact in its own re gion, much less throughout Europe. And in the unlikely event that it did spread to its neighbors, there is virtually no prospect that the conflict wqdd lead to war among the larger European powers, now that the Soviet Union is no more. In the absence of an ag gressive power willing and able to exploit conflict, Europe today can tolerate consider ably more disorder Without serious threat to its own security.
Without a major threat to American interests, therefore, it is difficult to see a compel ling reason for U.S. military involvement in the conflict. There may be other purposes for the use of force, but Washington has not made them clear 2 Question #2: What are the dynamics of the conflict in Bosnia and how Is U.S intervention likely to affect them The Bush Administrations policy toward the disiitegration of Ydgoslavia has dem onstrated scant understanding of the complexities of the crisis. The result has been not o n ly an ineffective policy but actions that have worsened the conflict. Now that U.S and Western military intervention is underway, there is a need for a better grasp of the underlying dynamics of the criskand the effect that Western military intervention i s likely to have on them.
One reason for the Administrations failure is that its policies toward Yugoslavia have been formulated less for their intended impact on Yugoslavia ipelf than or their anticipated effects in other places, most important in the for mer Soviet Union. The Bush Administrations stubborn insistence last year that Yugoslaviq be kept intact I stemmed directly from its number one priority of preventing the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Independence for the Yugoslav republics of Slovenia and Croatia was resisted strongly because of fears that this would encourage hidependence for Ukraine, Georgia, and the other So viet republics, and thereby bring about the breakup of the Soviet Union and the fall of then Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.
T hat the Bush Administrations strategy toward Soviet Union was pro foundly misconceived-and ulti mately unsuccessful-only under scores the error of having used it to determine U.S. policy toward Yugo slavia. Unfortunately this pattern con tinues. Yugoslavi a still is Seen as a mi crocosm of the former Soviet Union and U.S. and Western actions regard ing Bosnia and Yugoslavia continue to be formdated in a context of their The New Borders of Former Yugoslavia international Boundaries I Autonomous Regions 300 m i les Note: Serbia and Montenegro have formed a new federation and continue to use the name Yugoslavia anticipated impact further east. Thus, in the minds of many, Serbias attacks on Croatia or Bosnia m dubiously interpreted as being but a precursor of Russ i as invasion of Ukraine or Estonia, and US. and Western actions must be devised to send the appro priate signals to Moscow and Kiev ing to would-be aggressors. Unfvately, the message alr%ady sent-and nxeivd by the Wests actions toward Yugoslavia over the p a st year is that Western kats and Western actions are separated by a wide gulf and that a determined and skillful aggres sor tan accomplish his goals if the planned offense is not too provoqative To some extent, Western policy makers may be mbtivated by a d esire to send a warn 3 Powerful Nationalism In addition to this inattentiveness to Yugoslavia in its own right, it is evident that the Bush Administration has an insufficient grasp of many of the dynamics underlying the succession of crises in that countr y. First among these is the powerful role played by resurgent nationalism. Bush Administration officials re peatedly have demonstrated their distaste for nationalism in Yugoslavia and elsewhere.
Just prior to the failed coup in the Soviet Union in Septembe r 1991, President Bush traveled to the Ukrainian capital of Kiev to condemn what he termed suicidal national ism and to advise those Soviet republics seeking independence to abandon their quest and instead support Gorbachevs government. Similarly, when an n ouncing economic sanctions on November 9,1991, in an attempt to halt the fighting inYugoslavia, Bush added a blanket condemnation of nationalism. But rdgardless of whether nationalism is seen as good or bad, it remains a very powerful force in the shaping of events in Yugo slavia and elsewhere and cannot be wished away by Western displeasure. Only those policies which understand and take into account the role it plays have any chance of success.
Beyond nationalism, them is little apparent understanding of the existing political dy namics throughout Yugoslavia and the effectiveness of Western action. The belief that Slovenias and Croatias bids far independence last year could be thwarted by the with holding of Western recognition was never realistic. Far fr o m preventing conflict, this approach was an important ingredient in prompting it. Given the Serbian governments public statements and demonstrated willingness to use force in pursuit of political ob jectives, the Wests calculated distancing from Slovenia hd Croatia was an open invi tation to military action by Serbian forces and was seen as such at the time by many Western observers as well as the Serbian government.
In place of its doomed effort to keep Yugoslavia together against the wishes of its own pe ople, the U.S. and the West would have had a better chance of preventing con flict by delivering a sharp, credible warning to the Serbian government not to resort to force-perhaps by threatening some of the very intervention they are now brandishing a yea r later. Instead, following their initial invitation to war, the Western response to the Serbian invasion of Croatia was a year of declarations and condemnations which the Serbian government correctly interpreted as empty rhetoric, and which it ignmd.
Eventually, the U.S. and the West were farced to recognize Slovenias and Croatias in dependence, but only after a preventable war and the occupation of onethird of Croatia by Serbia.
The Bosnian Crisis. Motivated in part by a desire to prevent a repeat of its error re garding Slovenia and Croatia, the West has rushed to recognize the independence of Bosnia and to assume ever-greater responsibilities in defense of that &publics sover eignty. What would have been appropriate in the earlier situation, however, n o w al most certainly is a hurried mistake. The U.S. and the West are supporting an artificial state, one which enjoys allegiance from only a minority of its own population. For un like Croatia, Bosnia is not under direct attack from Serbia but rather from its own pbp ulation.
In contrast with Slovenia and Croatia, which have long-established and clearly de fined ethnic identities and histories, Bosnia was an admhistrative creation of Tito. No one ethnic group constitutes a majority: approximately one-third of the population is Serb, one-fifth Croat, and the rest largely Muslim. Most of Bosnias population does I 4 not, wane to be part of an indepen dent Bospia bur instead would pre fer to join their ethnic brethren in neighboring states the Serbs wish to be p art of Serbia, the Croats part of Croatia. The 44 percent of the population which is Muslim may wish a separate political exis tence, but they do not have the power to maintain Bosnias inde pendence against the wishes of the non-Muslim majority of the pop u lation and their supporters in the smunding states No well-planned compromise or fervent wish by Western states men is likely to prevent repeated efforts by the Serb and Croat pop ulations to rejoin what they see as their national states. Already, the Bos n ian Serb militias are esti mated to control up to two-thirds of Bosnia. Most of the rest is under the control of Bosnias Cro atian population. The area still under the authority of the Bosnian government-Sarajevo and the Bosnias Ethnic Patchwork Fueling t h e Fires of Separatism Predominant Ethnic Group: Muslim Slavs Serbs Croats 100mlles surrounding temtory-shrinks daily. In the contest between the Wests rigid insistence on the permanence of borders and the resolve of these populations to exercise self-de t e rmination, the farmer is likely to lose. Thus any western effort to preserve the inde pendence and temtorial integrity of Bosnia will be both costly and misconceived The Problem of Serbia. At the root of the crisis in Bosnia and the Yugoslav mess in gener a l is the problem of Serbia. While the Serbian regime is widely and cmtly condemned as an aggressor-directly in Croatia and elsewhere, indirectly in Bosnia by backing Serbian insurgents in that country-its actions have obscured the fact that they are based bn deeply felt grievances by the Serbs. NO lasting solution in Yugosla via is possible without resolving them.
Much of the Western confusion about Yugoslavia stems from a simplistic view of the conflicts there as the result of the ethnic feuds and hatreds portrayed in much of the Western media. Although the ethnic dimension is ever-present, fundamentally these are politicJ conflicts that trace their roots to the Tito era. In the border changes made by Titos communist government soon after it came to power in 1945, Serbia, the larg est of the six republics, was greatly reduced in size; large areas with Serb popsllations weretransferred to the jurisdiction of other republics, most notably Croatia and Bosnia.
This was a deliberate effort by Tito to weaken Ser bia and thexeby better ensure his rule over Yugoslavia. To some extent, it also reflected the intermixed nature of many of 5 these populations. In this process, Bosnia wsis created by an administrative act and its population belatedly informed that they n ow were citizens of a new republic.
Much of the Yugoslav crisis t&y is an attempt by the Serbs, Croats, and others to undo their arbitrary division and rejoin what they regard as their national states. This yearning to overturn Titos legacy has been exploi ted by many national leaders in the Yugoslav crisis out question the chief culprit is Serbias president and fmer head of its communist party, Slobodan Milosevic Far fiom being drawn reluctantly into the conflicts in Bosnia, Croatia, and elsewhere, Milosev ic actively has sought to inflame them. With his base of power in Serbia undermined by the demise of communism, and faced with economic collapse, Milosevic has tried to shore up his power by aggressively identify ing himself with Serbian nationalism.
To do so, MiloseviF has remade himself as the defender of Serbia. To produce this image, he has manufactured extkmal enemies and ensured a continuing series of crises in order to silence dbmestic opponents of his re gime.
Bosnia is not the first place whe re Milosevic has stirred up trouble. Kosovo, a region of Serbia populated largely by ethnic Albanians, was subjected to repeated and deliber ately provocative attacks by Milosevics government beginning in the mid-l980s, with the govemment-controlled press fabricating reports of anti-Serb atrocities. The result ing public demands for protection of the Serbs led to a brutal crackdown and rule by force in the region. Similarly, the moves toward independence by the republics of Slovenia and Croatia last year p r ompted reports in the Serbia press of attacks on Croatias Serbian minority. The Serbian government responded with several shows of force and finally an invasion of Croatia by Serbian forces, beginning with sporadic at tacks in August and quickly increasin g in intensity. This led to the occupation by Serb ian forces of one-third of Croatia, most of it populated by Serbs. In a change of tactics the war in Bosnia now is waged largely by militias drawn from the indigenous Serbian population of Bosnia but with the direction and support of Milosevics government.
The West has condemned Serbia for its aggression and has imposed a variety of dip lomatic and economic sanctions in an attempt to isolate the regime. But the Wests re fusal to understand the base of Milos evics power-his image as defender of Serbian minorities and interests-has contributed to his retention of power. Western policies that take no account of Serbian national aspirations simply will play to his strength. In stead, the U.S. and the West should make clear to the Serbian population that Western enmity is directed solely at Milosevic and his regime, not at Serbia or the Serbian peo ple, wherever they may live, and that the U.S. and the West will give strong support to a peaceful resolution of thes e national problems Question#3: How and under what circumstances can the U.S. extricate itself from its military Intervention Chief Culprit. Although few involved in this crisis can escape condemnation, with Any proposal for U.S. intervention should have n o t only well-defked aims but should also lay out a realistic strategy of ending that involvement. Without it, the U.S risks becoming increasingly entangled in a difficult conflict with no clear end 6 If the American de is limited to supporting the internat i onal relief effort, it should be understood that there is little prospect that the fighting in Bosnia will stop until one side achieves victory. The most likely outcome will be that the Serbs and Croats parti tion most of Bosnias territory. Under these co n ditions, the U.S. commitment in Bosnia will be an indefinite one, unless it is prepared at some point to walk away from the conflict even though no settlement has been reached. Even a mission restricted to humanitarian aid, the establishment of a land cor ridor to secure the resupply of Sara jevo, will bring with it the very difficult military prqblem of keeping it open.
If the U.S. goal is a more ambitious one of upholding the Bosnian government and restoring its authority, even a massive troop involvement is unlikely to be sufficient.
Unlike Kuwait, Bosnias problems stem not from an external invasion which can be rolled back by Western intervention; instead, they are a product of the determination of a majority of its own population-albeit with significan t outside support and direction to be rid of Bosnia and to merge their territory with neighboring states. Bosnia al ready has been partitioned de facto by heavily armed militias operating with the full support of millions of their ethnic kin less than a m a ssive Western military intervention and permanent occupation can pre vent the separation of the Serbian and Croatian areas. Any attempt by the West to do so, of course, certainly would produce a long guerrilla war. The Bosnian population justifiably would regard the reestablishment of the authority of the Bosnian govern ment as a foreign imposition. And if the West seeks to restore the administrative bor ders of Bosnia, there remains the problem of continued Serbian occupation of Croatian territory. The qu estion thus arises: Is the West to free only Bosnia or should it move on to Croatia?
Finally, there is the problem of the Serbian government. As long as the Milosevic government continues in Serbia, there is little chance for peace in Bosnia. The reason Be lgrades political interests now are served by stirring up conflict. A limited opera tion to remove the Serbian government will not work, but a military drive to Belgrade Yugoslavias capital, is not feasible. Any guerrilla war in Bosnia resulting from West ern intervention would pale in comparison to that which an invasion of Serbia would bring.
There also may be no need to move militarily against Belgrade. There is a good chance that increasing domestic opposition to Milosevics regime will eventually bring down his government. Large-scale anti-Milosevic demonstrations are occurring in Bel grade, as are increasing defections from his regime and open opposition from such in stitutions as the Serbian Orthodox Church. The U.S. can encourage these efforts by ma k ing clear that, while it opposes the Serbian government, it supports a peaceful res lution of the Serbian populations legitimate grievances. Conversely, Western disre gard for these grievances and for the fate of Serbian minorities throughout Yugoslavia w ill only strengthen Milosevic and make more difficult any resolution.
Under these circumstances, and without a clear political goal, the use of force is un wise. America should not get militarily involved in Bosnia unless it knows the circum stances under which it can extricate itself without damage to its owd interests and to those it is trying to help Permanent Occupation? Under these conditions, it is difficult to see how anything 7 THE CASE FOR INTERVENTION Although there are no vital American interest s directly at stake in the conflicts in Bosnia and elsewhere in the former Yugoslavia, the U.S does have other interests which the Bosnian conflict may help to advance. For Bosnia is a case study of the need for a reevaluation of American interests and com mitments in the post-Cold War era.
During the half-century of the Cold War, the U.S. shouldered the major responsibil ity for the defense of the West and the maintenance of order around the world.
Throughout this era, the U.S. provided the leadership, bor e the principal costs, and fought the wars. The collapse of the Soviet empire has changed this world fundamen tally. Nevertheless, the mental habits from this era linger, and American intervention continues to be reflexively called for in conflicts around the world.
Despite repeated references to a New World Wr, the outlines of the post-Cold War world-and American interests and responsibilities in it-remain to be defmed by Washington. Without this context, attempting to determine U.S. interests in Bosnia o r even throughout all of the former Yugoslavia, can only produce the vague and uncer tain conclusions which heretofore have characterized the Administrations policies. In stead, the &liberations regarding possible U.S. intervention in Bosnia should procee d in the context of redefining Americas broader interests and of rethinking the role of American power in securing them. In the case of Bosnia, U.S. policy should be fmu lated as part of a reshaping of Americas larger European policy.
U.S. Interests in Eur ope. The fundamental American interest in Europe is not en suring the stability of the continent but preventing its domination by an anti-Western power. During the Cold War, an extensive American involvement in Europe was nec essary to counter the enormou s military power of the Soviet Union, and instability was feared because of the certainty of its exploitation by Moskow. With the threat of the domination of Europe now ended by the collapse of the Soviet empire, the strategic sit uation has changed dramat ically. War in Yugoslavia and even regional instability throughout the Balkans no longer is a sufficient threat to American fundamental inter ests to mafldate an automatic U.S. involvement.
Nevertheless, stability remains very important to Americas overall European pol icy. It is essential to the peaceful development of Eastern Europe and to solidifying the most important accomplishment of the U.S. during the last half-century: the pacifica tion of Europe. The demise of the Soviet Union, however, means tha t it is no longer necessary for the U.S. to shoulder the principal burden of securing that stability, as it did throughout the Cold War era. In this new era, U.S. interests lie not just in promot ing stability, but in reacquainting the West European countr ies with their responsibility for maintaining order in Europe.
Europeans long dependency on the U.S. for their defense has atrophied their ability and desire to assume the unpleasant and unfamiliar burdens of defending themselves.
Their appetite for maintaining order beyond their own borders is even less. The weak almost comically inept, European response to the Yugoslav situation is a clear demon stration of the debilitating effects of this dependency Accomplishing this objective, however, is easier said than done. The West 8 The Bush Administrations decision last year to dow the Europeans to take the lead on the Yugoslav crisis was a good one, but it did not take into account the enervating effects of their long dependency on the U .S. Seen as an easy test of the West Europeans determination to expand their cooperation on defense, the situation in Yu goslavia instead has exposed deep differences among them and demonstrated the hol lowness of European security cooperation, undermined as it is by political maneuver ing and narrow self-interest. Despite French President Mitthinds June 25 trip to Sarajevo and his insistence on greater Western action, the French government has been much more preoccupied with devising ways of reducing U.S. influence in post-Cold War Europe and on hamstringing any action anywhere by Germany than of facilitating joint European action in Yugoslavia. None of the other governments are eager for inter vention, and all have seized upon the U.N.s involvement as the panacea they have been waiting for The U.S. Role in the Crisis. Despite their many mee9gs, debates, and proclama tions on the Y ugoslav crisis, the Europeans have succeeded in accomplishing little other than demonstrating their disarray. After a year of s uch confusion and indecision reentry by the U.S. into the dispute has become necessary to prompt European action.
The method by which this occurs will do much to determine whether or not anything of lasting value emerges.
To begin with, the U.S. should no t encourage the United Nations involvement in Yugoslavia. In addition to the U.N. being an ineffective and unreliable instrument for the advancement of American interests, the Bush Administrations reflexive turn to the U.N. for legitimation of its policie s is creating dangerous precedents. National Security Advisor Brent Scowmfts July 6 statement that U.S. farces would not be committed to Bosnia without authorization by the Secu rity Council has the effect of conditioning U.S. policy on U.N. approval. Howe ver mis placed this resort to the U.N. may be in regard to Bosnia, it is certainly ill-advised in terms of its implications for U.S. foreign policy in general.
The U.N.s taking responsibility also undercuts what should be a key U.S. goal: get ting the Euro peans to undertake the action themselves. The Europeans will seize upon any method to escape from the Yugoslav problem, but it is in Americas interest that they do not. To do so, the U.S. must encourage, prompt, even demand joint European action.
The U.S however, must not take the lead in any Western effort. The Teason: Doing so will encourage the Europeans to return to their past pattern of relying on the U.S. to handle their security problems. Instead, the U.S. role should be to pressure the Europe ans to take effective action themselves.
Once such a come is set, the U.S. can help with the logistical and other support deemed necessary. While U.S. air and naval assistance could easily be offexed, the West Europeans have sufficient farces for the task and have no real need for U.S. mili tary participation other than for political reasons.
The same approach holds true for dting a political solution to the regions prob lems. The content of that solution-be it a revision of borders, maintenance of the sta tus quo, or some other approach-is of less importance fo the U.S. than that the Euro peans themselves take the lead in fashioning it and that qey are prepared to uphold it 9 Those who would resist such a course out of fear of a loss of U.S. influence in Eu r o pe should understand that this influence already has diminished rapidly and will con tinue td do so, regardless of any policy that Washington might adopt. The collapse of the Soviet empire means that the West Europeans need for the U.S to defend them has l argely disappeared. Far from lamenting this fact, the U.S. should be relieved to be free of this enormous burden. Nevertheless, the U.S. will continue to have many im portant interests in Europe and must seek to establish a new system for securing them to replace the one now fading. That system cannot be based on continued U.S. interven tions, nor need it be. Instead the Europeans should be encouraged to police their own continent. For there are far more serious problems that await them beyond Bosnia. The f ears of chaos in the former Soviet Union are sobering ones, but none of the problems there are beyond the ability of the Europeans to solve for themselves. It is very much in their interest, as well as that of the U.S that they learn this as soon as possi b le CONCLUSION The conflict in Bosnia is a tragedy. It has also exposed the unreadiness of the U.S and the West to respond to the realities of the post-Cold War world. For the U.S the correct response to the carnage in Yugoslavia is not to rush to do somet h ing, heed less of the outcome, and uncertain of the goals. Rather, the U.S. should proceed delib erately, with a clear understanding of its global interests in this new era now taking shape. The situation in Bosnia, as with events elsewhere, should be app roached from the perspective of how best to advance those interests. Hurrying into Bosnia may do lit tle to help the population there, but it runs the risk of involving the U.S. in a conflict for which no solution, and thus no exit, is known.
America need not, and will not long wish to, continue to assume the principal bur den for keeping order around the world. But it does have an interest in the mainte nance of that order. Only by encouraging its allies, past and future, to assume their proper share of t he burden can it safely relinquish the lions share ofthe responsibility.
New Task for America. Three times in this century-in World War I, World War 11, and throughout Cold War-the U.S. was farced to intervene in Europe to pull it back from the brink. Thro ugh its long involvement in Europe, the U.S. has transformed the continent from one of warring dictatorships to one in which permanent peace and prosperity are within reach. Its task now is to see Europe securely settled into a stable equilibrium so that a nother intervention will never be necessary principal goal should be to help the Europeans overcome the effects of their long de pendence on its protection. That can come only from Americas standing back and en couraging the Europeans to see that the resp onsibility for peace on their continent is now their own The U.S. cannot accomplish that objective through a policy of direct intervention. Its Doug Seay Deputy Director Defense and Foreign Policy Studies 10
