South Korea’s political turmoil of martial law, impeachments, and vitriolic attacks among its political parties has entered its third month—and it’s likely that several more turbulent months lie ahead before any resolution is reached.

Even after the South Korean courts or populace eventually determine the country’s presidency, the divisive polarization and rampant conspiracy theories unleashed by the events of the last few months will hinder, if not preclude, reconciliation.

South Korea’s political upheaval is particularly ill-timed given the dire Indo-Pacific security environment and the change of leadership in the United States. As the two major South Korean political parties jockey for advantage, both worry about their country being ignored or even targeted by new U.S. tariffs or troop reductions. Seoul is hindered in establishing a relationship with the Trump administration by having an unelected acting president and the potential for a new-term change in South Korean leadership with vastly different policy priorities from its predecessor.

South Korea’s political parties are appealing to Washington for support, but any perception of picking sides or interference in domestic affairs could trigger a resurgence of anti-Americanism which periodically embroils the bilateral relationship. Washington must establish close relations with political parties across the spectrum while concurrently articulating U.S. policy priorities and strategic goals.

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Seoul is trying to ascertain the new Trump administration’s policies, but the lack of details has led it to overinterpret some official statements. President Donald Trump’s and Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth’s comments that North Korea was a “nuclear power” were assessed as reflecting the U.S. abandonment of denuclearization as a North Korean policy goal, which would be a major policy shift.

However, that was almost certainly not the case. One can correctly assess that North Korea has nuclear weapons while still not formally accepting or diplomatically acknowledging North Korea as a nuclear weapons state.

Denuclearizing North Korea is not only long-standing U.S. policy but also the legal requirement of 11 UN Security Council Resolutions and U.S. legislation (e.g. the North Korea Policy Oversight Act of 2022). It is also consistent with the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Subsequent statements by the National Security Council spokesman and an unidentified official prior to Japanese Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s visit to Washington affirmed that U.S. policy remains constant in seeking the eventual denuclearization of North Korea. While foreign observers should exercise caution and patience as they await U.S. policy details, U.S. officials must be careful and cognizant that even perceived shifts in nuances can have significant repercussions.

Secretary Hegseth and Secretary of State Marco Rubio have since emphasized the importance of America’s Indo-Pacific allies, even using the traditional monickers of Japan and South Korea as, respectively, the “cornerstone” and “linchpin” of U.S. security in the Indo-Pacific. In the months ahead, U.S. allies will be hoping for even greater reassurance of America’s commitment to defending its interests in the Indo-Pacific and confronting the Chinese Communist Party.

For example, South Korean officials and legislators have expressed concern about “Korea passing,” referring to past instances when Washington appeared to negotiate issues that impacted Korea’s core interests without being included. A primary goal of the George W. Bush administration’s Six Party Talks was to address previous Korean complaints of the U.S. “negotiating our security over our heads.” The Trump administration should work closely with Seoul and Tokyo as it defines its own new strategic approach to China, North Korea, and other Indo-Pacific challenges.

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During its short tenure, the Trump administration has rapidly moved out on domestic and some foreign policy issues, though not yet on the Indo-Pacific, which it deemed to be its regional priority. While the multi-faceted China threat will garner the greatest attention, northeast Asia cannot be ignored since it harbors both a significant security threat to U.S. strategic interests and the American homeland as well as two critically important allies. South Korea and Japan are not only stalwart security partners against regional threats, but also important collaborators on economic security and supply chain issues.

Sometimes lost in U.S. observations of Korea from afar are two foundational premises. First, that while the current situation in Seoul is tumultuous and uncertain, it reflects that democratization has firmly taken hold in the country. South Korea is still a relatively young democracy with only 40 years of free elections after decades of authoritarian regimes, coups, and violent protests. Koreans are fiercely proud of what they have achieved, and the current crisis shows that the constitutional system has and will prevail against even strong challenges.

Second, the U.S.-South Korean relationship has gone through thick and thin, from an alliance forged in blood during the crucible of war to being regional and global partners in an array of security, economic, and diplomatic realms. Even during times of bilateral tension and policy differences, the two countries remained aligned in their strategic interests. That remains true today. Despite changes in leadership, Washington and Seoul must work closely together and with regional partners to address common threats, challenges, and opportunities.