October 10, 2005---CIA Director Porter Goss
decided last week to not release the CIA Inspector General's report
on 9/11 intelligence failures - and also to not convene
accountability review boards.
Wrong move.
I've been a staunch Goss supporter since he took over the troubled
agency - but not on this one.
The director likely wants to put the 9/11 nightmare behind the CIA
to improve morale internally. But the signal - externally, and
maybe internally, too - is that a climate of impunity
prevails.
To the best of my knowledge, not one single CIA official was fired
over the 9/11 failure - or over pre-war Iraqi WMD intelligence, for
that matter. Such a lack of accountability - and, even,
transparency - for one of America's greatest intelligence failures
serves Goss, the CIA and this country badly.
The Inspector General's report fingers former Director George Tenet
and 20 other current and former CIA officials for sub-par pre-9/11
performance.
Specifically, the report nailed Tenet for focusing too much on
Osama bin Laden - rather than on combating al Qaeda as a whole - in
the years before 9/11. (Tenet and others who contest the findings
prepared rejoinders for the CIA and Congress' intel
committees.)
The Inspector General (IG) report also recommended setting up
agency-wide accountability-review boards; last Wednesday, Goss
nixed the idea.
Strange. Back in his days in Congress, Goss chaired an intelligence
committee that instructed the CIA to look at 9/11 and "determine
whether and to what extent personnel at all levels should be held
accountable for any omission, commission or failure to meet
professional standards."
Goss's decision also befuddled congressional leaders: Pat Roberts
(R-Kan.), Senate intelligence committee chairman, and Rep. Jane
Harman (D-Calif.), the top Democrat on the House intel committee,
both expressed concern. Hill leaders from both parties asked that
the report be made public; Goss declined, citing sensitive
intelligence sources and methods.
To be fair, it's not hard to see reasons for Goss' position.
Indeed, Rep. Peter Hoekstra (R-Mich.), the House Intel Committee
chair, countered that 9/11 investigations have found no "smoking
gun" or anything that could have stopped it. He insisted Goss,
Congress - and everyone else - look forward, concentrating on
intelligence reforms, instead.
Goss is in the midst of rebuilding the scandal-scarred CIA.
Punitive review boards - four years after 9/11 - are likely to
prove highly divisive internally. And to what good effect? Goss
believes that "In no way does [the IG's] report suggest that any
one person or group of people could have prevented 9/11."
The director may believe that the real problem was the draconian
budget and personnel cuts (especially in human, as opposed to
technical, spying) that CIA suffered in the Clinton years.
Cynics suggest that Goss is worried about a possible Tenet book
contract (with a reported $4 million advance). A scorched-earth,
tell-all tome could prove politically embarrassing to Congress
(including former intel Chairman Goss) and both the Clinton and
Bush administrations over 9/11 and Iraq, too.
Finally, Goss has surely noticed that there has been no public
disciplining over 9/11 at the Pentagon, Foggy Bottom or FBI,
either. This would certainly make the CIA feel like it was being
singled out for 9/11 blame, especially given the huge Justice
Department failures here at home.
But nobody is calling for a blood bath - and half the CIA officials
implicated in the IG report have already retired, some apparently
because they oppose the necessary reforms Goss is making at
CIA.
Goss' desire to rebuild the CIA's swashbuckling spirit and
élan is on target, especially during wartime, but it mustn't
create the perception that poor judgment is acceptable. Genuine
accountability for 9/11 mistakes will get everyone's attention on
the need for high-quality intel.
At a minimum, the CIA should release some public form of the IG
report, declassified/redacted as appropriate. This would eliminate
the perception of a CIA coverup - and take a small, but positive,
step toward addressing the anger of 9/11 families, who have
protested the lack of firm accountability over the attack.
Goss is making progress in reforming Langley, including addressing
as many as 20 systemic failures identified in the various post-9/11
investigations. But that doesn't obviate the need for meeting the
democratic gold standards of transparency and accountability to the
American people.
Peter
Brookes is a Heritage Foundation senior fellow. His
book, "A Devil's Triangle: Terrorism, WMD and Rogue States," is
just out
First appeared in the New York Post