The United States-South Korean defence relationship took a major
step into the 21st century last week with the announcement that
Washington would withdraw one-third of its 37,000 troops from Korea
by the end of 2005. The news, not completely unexpected in the
light of the U.S.'s decision in May to send 3,600 combat troops
from South Korea to Iraq, still has observers on both sides of the
Pacific nervous. They need not be. Even though this is the largest
drawdown of American forces from Korea since the end of the Korean
War -- and the most significant since 1992, when 7,000 troops left
-- the reduction in 12,500 soldiers from the peninsula, viewed
optimistically, is a win-win situation for America and South
Korea.
First, the number of troops does not completely determine military
capability. In fact, despite the decrease in American soldiers in
Korea, U.S. firepower will actually increase due to expected
changes in force structure over the next several years. Although
technology cannot replace soldiers in some missions, today's
hi-tech equipment can provide significant firepower advantages over
the common foot soldier. Therefore, the U.S. can withdraw some of
its Korean-based troops for other soldier-intensive missions, such
as Iraq, Afghanistan and the war on terrorism, while actually
improving the lethality and deterrence of its forces in
Korea.
Improving the defence capability of U.S. Forces Korea (USFK) can
be accomplished by bringing to bear such systems as Patriot PAC-3
surface-to-air missiles for air defence, the army's new Stryker
brigade, the navy's High-Speed Vessel, and the forward-deployment
of additional air and naval assets to Hawaii and Guam. Washington
is also planning an $11 billion investment in some additional 150
military capabilities over the next four years that will enhance
defence against any North Korean attack.
Secondly, it is useful for Seoul and Washington to reduce the
visibility and "footprint" (that is, the size and number of bases)
of U.S. forces because of trends in Korean public opinion, which
has been mixed about USFK's presence. Moving the U.S. Army out of
Seoul, drawing down troop levels and consolidating bases will
reduce pressures from some sectors of Korean society for all U.S.
troops to leave.
Of note, one should not conclude that the reductions in Korea will
be matched in Japan. Some American troops may be shifted from
Okinawa in the south to Hokkaido in the north to reduce local
political tensions arising from Okinawa hosting the bulk of
American forces. But bases in Japan remain critical for the defence
of Japan and are more important now for other possible Northeast
Asian contingencies -- including Korea.
Next, President Roh Moo Hyun early on stated his belief that South
Korea should do more for its own defence. As the world's 11th
largest economy, South Korea can spend more on its own defence --
and should. The reduction in U.S. forces will provide the Roh
government an opportunity to do more for South Korea's national
security. This supports both Washington's need for more flexibility
in deploying its forces to global hot spots and Seoul's desire for
a bigger role in its national defence.
Lastly, though unlikely, there's a sliver of a chance that the
reduction of U.S. forces could help reduce North-South tensions.
The North long has demanded that U.S. troops leave the peninsula.
This reduction could be seen as a gesture of goodwill to the North
that might lead to some political openings between Seoul and
Pyongyang in addressing issues of national reconciliation or even
the North's nuclear programme. But because no one is naive
regarding North Korean intentions, the force reduction is matched
by an increase in force capabilities.
The bottom line is that despite these changes, America's
commitment to South Korea's defence is as strong as ever. The
U.S.'s obligation to the security of the South against the North is
a moral one in the defence of a fellow democracy, not to mention
codified in the 1953 U.S.-South Korea Mutual Defence Treaty. The
real "tripwire" is the treaty, not the number of U.S. troops in
South Korea.
The alliance has successfully deterred North Korean aggression for
over 50 years. It will do so for as long as needed. A military
confrontation between the North and the South would invariably
result in the demise of the regime in Pyongyang. Fortunately, Kim
Jong Il understands this. Adjusting the U.S.-South Korea
partnership for the 21st century makes ultimate sense. The future
of the alliance will be better for this, making the relationship
ready for challenges on the Korean peninsula and beyond.
Peter Brookes, a veteran of the CIA and naval intelligence, is
a senior fellow at The Heritage Foundation.
First appeared in the Far Eastern Economic Review